■Ill 

DD3    7DS 


08- 


LIBRARY 


UNIVERSITY   OF   CALIFORNIA. 

Received. ^^..r^;?^^:^^:^     ,  i8^/ 


Accessions  No. 


J^^^       Shelf  iV< 


<C/8- 


EDUC. 
PSYCH. 


■8*v> 


THE 


SYSTEM 


MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


ASA    MAHAN,   D.D.,   LL.D. 

Atjthoe  of  "  The  Science  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,"     "  The  Science  of 
Logic,"    ''The  Science  of  Natural  Theology,"  etc. 


FIFTH      EDITION. 


CHICAGO; 
J,   V.  BUCKBEE   &   COMPANY,  PUBLISHERS 

122  AND  124  WABASH  AVENUE. 


EDUC. 

PS/CH. 

LIBRARY 


COPYRIGHT,     1882, 
BY     S.     C,     GRIGGS     AND     COMPANY 


J^  3>^<f^ 


R.  R.  Donnelley  &  Sons,  Printers,  Chicago. 


PREFACE 


The  object  of  the  following  treatise  is  to  furnish,  not 
only  for  College  classes,  but  especially  for  our  Academies 
and  High  Schools  a  complete  system  of  Mental  Science. 
Two  facts  render  the  treatises  in  common  use  unadapted, 
particularly  to  the  two  purposes  last  named.  Such  treat- 
ises, in  the  first  place,  are  too  large  for  common  use.  Then, 
with  hardly  any  exceptions,  they  treat  of  but  one  depart- 
ment of  the  mind,  the  Intellect.  The  object  of  the  follow- 
ing treatise  is  to  remedy  both  these  defects — to  furnish  a 
work  sufficiently  ample  for  a  clear  elucidation  of  the  whole 
subject,  and,  at  the  same  time,  so  concise  as  not  to  over- 
burden the  mind  of  the  pupil,  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on 
the  other,  to  furnish  a  full  knowledge  of  the  entire  system 
of  Mental  Science,  the  Philosophy,  not  of  the  Intellect 
merely,  but  also  of  the  Sensibility  and  Will.  It  is  fully 
believed  by  the  Author,  and  he  states  this  as  the  result  of 
some  thirty  years'  experience  in  teaching  the  science,  that 
every  pupil,  not  only  in  our  College  classes,  but  every  ad- 
vanced student  in  our  Academies  and  High  Schools,  is 
capable  of  fully  mastering  this  treatise,  and  that  when  he 
has  done  so,  he  will  have  attained  not  only  to  a  distinct 
understanding  of  the  different  faculties  of  the  mind,  but 
also  of  the  varied  functions  of  each  of  those  faculties. 

An  important  suggestion,  to  teachers  of  this  work,  might 
not  be  out  of  place.     The  success  of  the  pupil  in  mastering 

(III) 


IV  PREFACE. 

the  science,  will  depend  mainly  upon  the  attainment  of  a 
clear  understanding  of  the  preliminary  definitions  and 
elucidations.  Short  lessons,  and  careful  explanations, 
should  be  given  here.  When  the  pupil  has  fully  com- 
prehended the  work,  as  far  as  to  the  close  of  the  discus- 
sions of  the  Primary  Intellectual  faculties,  he  will  pass 
through  the  remaining  portions  with  increasing  interest 
and  delight.  With  these  suggestions,  the  work  is  com- 
mended to  the  candid  judgment  of  all  who  are  qualified 
to  understand  and  appreciate  the  subject. 

The  Authok. 


ANALYSIS 


GENEKAL    INTRODUCTION. 


CHAPTER   I. 

PRINCIPLES    OF    INDUCTION    AND    CLASSIFICATION. 

Page. 

Principles  Stated       -------  1 

No  Facts  Omitted,  and  None  Assumed            •  -     1 

Facts  Unlike  will  be  Separated  in  Classes            -  1 

Principle  of  Classification  of  the  Faculties              -  -     1 

Like  Facts  Referred  to  the  Same  Faculty             -  2 

Unlike  Facts  Referred  to  Separate  Faculties  -     2 

The  Number  of  Faculties  as  the  Classes  of  Facts  2 

Determination  of  the  Laws  of  Mind      -         -         -  -     2 

They  Must  be  Consistent  with  the  Facts     -         -  2 

They  Must  be  Contradicted  by  None      -         -  -     2 

They  Must  Explain  All      -----  2 


CHAPTER  II. 

CLASSIFICATION    OF     MENTAL    PHENOMENA    AND     FACULTIES. 

Phenomena  Classified ^ 

Classification  Verified        ------  4 

By  Comparing  the  Classes      -          -         -         -         -  4 

By  the  Testimony  of  Consciousness             -         -  6 

By  Substantive  Terms 5 

By  Qualifying  Terms          -----  5 

By  Universal  Acceptance      -         -         -         -  ^ 
Cv) 


VI  ANALYSIS. 

Page. 

Faculties  Implied  by  the  Classification       -         -         _         6 

Intellect 6 

Sensibilities  --..-.-6 
Will -     6 

Mental  Faculties  Defined  -         -         .         -         -         6 


PART    I 


THE  INTELLECT. 


CHAPTER  I. 

INTELLECTUAL    PHENOMENA. 

Principle  of  Classification 8 

Contingent  and  Necessary  Ideas  Defined      -         -         -     9 

Idea  of  Body  Contingent 10 

Idea  of  Space  Necessary 10 

Idea  of  Succession  Contingent           -         -         -         -  11 

Idea  of  Time  Necessary          .         _         .         _         _  n 

Ideas  of  the  Finite  and  the  Infinite             -         -         -  12 

Ideas  of  Mental  Phenomena  and  Personal  Identity  1 3 

Idea  of  Mental  Phenomena  Contingent  and  Relative  14 

Idea  of  Personal  Identity  Necessary           -         -         -  15 

Division  of  Necessary  Ideas            .         .         -         -  16 
Conditional        -          -         -         -         -         -         -16 

Unconditional          ------  16 

Idea  of  Substance  Explained     -----  16 

Idea  of  External  Phenomena  Contingent        -         -  17 

Idea  of  Substance  Necessary              -         -         -         -  17 

Idea  of  Substance  Clear  and  Distinct     -         -         -  17 

Ideas  of  Events  and  Cause         -----  18 

Idea  of  Events  Contingent,  of  Cause  Necessary      -  19 

Idea  of  Power  Necessary             -----  20 


ANALYSIS.  Vil 

CHAPTER  II. 

PRIMARY    FACULTIES. 

Page. 

All  Knowledge  From  Two  Sources           -         -         -  22; 

Perceived  or  Contingent  Ideas     -         -         -  -22 

Implied  or  Necessary  Ideas      -         -         -         -  22 

Logical  Order  of  these  Ideas       -         -         -         .  -     22 

Chronological  Order  of  these  Ideas           -         -         -  23 

Primary  Intellectual  Faculties     -          -          -         -  -     24 

Knowledge  by  Perception  Classified        -         -         -  24 

From  Sense  or  External  Perception      -         -  -     24 

From  Consciousness  or  Internal  Perception       -  24 

Primary  Faculties  Classified         -         -         -         -  -     25 

Consciousness  or  Internal  Perception         -         -  25 

Sense  or  External  Perception        -         -         -  -     25 

Reason  or  Sense  of  Implied  Knowledge    -         -  25 

These  Faculties,  Why  Called  Primary         -         -  -     ?j6 

All  Simple  Ideas  are  from  One  of  These            -  2Q 

All  Complex  Ideas  are  Composed  from  These  -     26 

Why  Called  Intuitive? 20 

Fundamental  Error  of  Locke      -         -         -         -  -27 

Error  of  the  German  School    -         -          -         -         -  ,28 

CHAPTER    IH. 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Consciousness  Defined     ------  30 

Immediate  and  Mediate  Knowledge    -         -         -  -     30 

Knowledge  by  Consciousness  Immediate           -         -  31 

Knowledge  by  Consciousness  has  Absolute  Validity  -     31 

Objects  of  Consciousness          -----  32 

I_Myself    --------     32 

Personality  and  Identity            -         -         _         .  33 
Error  of  Stew^art         -------      34 

An  Objection  Answered           -----  34 


Vlll  ANALYSIS. 

Page. 

Natural  and  Philosophical  Consciousness     -         -  -     35 

Consciousness  a  Distinct  Faculty     -         .         -         .  37 

True  Theory  Verified  by 

The  Universal  Conviction  of  Mankind         -  -     38 

All  Nations  Having  a  Specific  Term  for  it         -  38 

Unlikeness  to  all  other  Mental  Phenomena  -     38 

Virtual  Recognition  of  all  Philosophers     -         -  38 

The  Object  of  Consciousness  Prior  to  the  State  -     39 

CHAPTER    IV. 

SENSE. 

Distinguished  from  Sensation            _          _         -         _  40 

Spontaneous  and  Voluntary  Sense       -         -         -  -     40 

Organs  of  Sense  and  their  Office      -         -         -         -  42 

Objects  of  Perception         _-_.__  43 

Province  of  Philosophy, — Facts        -         -          -         -  43 

Validity  of  Sense  and  Consciousness  -         -         -  -     44 

Theory  of  External  Perception         _         -         _         _  45 

Theory  Verified           _______  46 

Qualities  of  Matter           ------  46 

Primary  Qualities        -__-_-  -47 

Secundo-Primary  Qualities       _          _          _          -          _  47 

Secondary  Qualities             ______  48 

Representative  and  Presentative  Knowledge             -  48 

Qualities  of  Matter,  How  Known        -          -         -  -     49 

Error  of  Philosophers      ------  50 

Existence  of  Matter,  Ideal  or  Real  ?            -         -  -     50 

Matter  not  a  Mere  Force           _         _         -         -         -  51 

Is  Color  a  Primary  or  Secondary  Quality  ?            -  _     53 

CHAPTER   V. 

REASON. 

Reason  Defined           -------  55 

Sphere  of  Reason             -         =         -         -         -         -  56 


ANALYSIS. 


IX 


Primary  and  Secondary  Ideas  of  Reason 
Validity  of  Knowledge  by  Reason 
Mistake  Concerning  Knowledge  a  Priori 
Error  of  President  Hickok 


Page. 

57 
57 
59 
61 


CHAPTER   VI. 


SECONDARY    FACULTIES. 


Understanding  Defined 

Source  of  Error  _         _         -         _ 

Notions  and  Conceptions  Classified 
Valid  and  Invalid         -  -         - 

Complete  and  Incomplete 
Spontaneous  and  Reflective 
Individual,  Generic  and  Specific 
Concrete  and  Absolute 
Positive,  Privative  and  Negative 
Concrete  and  Characteristic 
Inferior  and  Superior 

Conceptions,  not  Perceptions  Recalled 

A  Fact  often  Attending  Perception 

Mistake  of  Mr.  Stewart 

Mistake  of  Coleridge       -         -         - 


64 
65 

66 
6(j 
66 
66 
67 
68 
68 
68 
69 
69 
69 
69 
70 


CHAPTER  VII. 


JUDGMENT. 


Faculty  Defined 

Acts  of  Judgment  Classified 

Quantity      .         _         - 

Quality 

Relations     _         .         - 

Modality 

Intuitive  and  Deductive 

Empirical  and  Rational 


71 

72 
72 
72 
73 
73 
74 
74 


X  ANALYSIS. 

Page. 

General  Characteristics       -         -         -         -         -         _  75 

Predicate  Identical  with  the  Subject          _         -  75 

Subject  Implies  the  Predicate      -         -         -         -  76 

Incompatibility  of  Objects        _          _         _         -  76 

Act  of  Judgment  in  Generalization    -         -         -         -  77 

Abstraction              ---_-._  77 
General  Notions          --____         -78 

Abstract  Notions     -----._  79 

Universal  and  Necessary  Ideas            -         -         -         -  79 

Classification            ---____  81 

Terms  of  Classification       -.____  81 

Classification,  in  what  Sense  Arbitrary     _         _         .  81 

Genera  and  Species              ______  82 

Generalization          ---_-_-  84 

Rules  of  Generalization      --__-_  84 

Inferred  Judgments  or  Reasoning            _         _         _  84 

Basis  of  Valid  Deduction         -----  85 

The  Syllogism              -         -         -         -         .         -         -  86 

Figures  of  the  Syllogism 86 

Distribution  of  Terms          ------  87 

Constituent  Elements  of  Propositions       -         -         -  87 

Rules  for  Distribution  of  Terms            -         -         -         -  88 

Conversion  of  Propositions 89 

Rules  for  Conversion            -_-._-  89 

Simple      -.-_-__.  89 

By  Limitation       -------  90 

By  Negation  of  the  Predicate             .         .         -  90 

Facts  and  Principles  of  Science            -         -         -          -  90 

Relation  of  Facts  to  Principles         -         -         -         -  91 

Conditions  of  Deduction  in  Science              -          ■         -  91 

Hypotheses  and  Assumptions  in  Science           -         -  91 

Judgment,  How  Improved            _         -         -         _         -  93 

Error  in  Philosophy          -         -         _         -         -         .  93 


ANALYSIS.  XI 

CHAPTER    VIII. 

ASSOCIATION. 

Page. 

Term  Defined     .----..-  95 

Why  Preferred        ----._.  95 

Not  without  Law         -_----.  96* 

Law  of  Association           ----__  96 

Phenomena  of  Association  Explained           -         -         -  97 

Facts  Otherwise  Inexplicable            -         -         -         -  98 

Facts  of  Analogy          - 99 

Phenomena  of  Dreaming            .         -         _         _  99 

Phenomena  of  Somnambulism              .         .         _  100 

Facts  of  Diseases             -         -         -         -         -  100 

Why  Different  Objects  Excite  Similar  Feelings          -  103 

From  Resemblance  Between  the  Objects          -  103 

From  Similar  Relations  to  our  Nature        -         .  103 

From  Relation  of  Objects        -         .         _         _  104 

From  Accidental  Associations             -         -         -  105 

Mistake  Concerning  Association    -         -         -         -  106 

Association  in  Different  Individuals            _         -         -  108 

Influence  of  Habit          -         -         -         -         -         -  108 

Standards  of  Taste  and  Fashion          _         -         .         -  108 

Changes  in  Such  Standards             .         .         -         -  108 

Genius  Associated  with  Judgment     -         -         -         -  109 

Genius  without  Taste     ---_--  110 

Vicious  Associations          _.__--  Ill 

Unfounded  Prejudices              -         -         -         -         -  111 

Slander  and  Libel      -          -          -         -         -         -         -  112 

Influence  of  Association  on  Mental  Traits      -         -  112 

CHAPTER  IX. 

MEMORY    AND    RECOLLECTION. 

Terms  Defined       -         -                   _         .         -         -  114 

Estates  of  Mind  in  Memory          .         -         -         -         _  114 


Xll  ANALYSIS. 

Page. 

Past  Feeling  Revived      -         -     '    -         -         -  114 

Simple  Apprehension  of  the  Object    -         -         -  114 

Revival  of  Circumstances         -         -         -         -  114 

Above  Verified  -____--  115 

From  Consciousness         -         -  -  -         -  115 

From  Mode  of  Recalling  -         -         -         -  115 

Distinct  and  Easy  Recollection       -         -         -         -  115 

Conditions  of  Distinct  Impressions  -         -         -  116 

Attention        --.___-  116 

Circumstances  _-__..  117 

State  of  the  Mind  -----  117 

Diversities  of  Memory        ______  118 

Philosophic     -------  118 

Local  -.-.-_..  118 

Artificial         -------  119 

Ready  and  Retentive  Memory  -         -         -         -  119 

Powers  of  Memory         ------  120 

Improvement  of  Memory  _         .         .         _         -  120 

Distinctness  of  Impressions     -         -         -         _  121 

Distinct  Conceptions  -         _         -         _         -  121 

Systematize  Knowledge  -         -         -         -  121 

Converse  and  Write  _         _         -         _         _  121 

Exercise  the  Memory      _         -         -         -         _  122 

Memory  of  the  Aged         -_.-_-  122 

Duration  of  Memory      -         -         .         .         ^         -  124 

CHAPTER    X. 

THE    IMAGINATION. 

Imagination  Defined  ------  127 

Illustration  - 128 

Distinguished  from  Fancy  -----  129 

Spontaneous  and  Reflective  Imagination         -  -  130 

View  of  Coleridge  ___---  131 

Its  Creations  not  Always  Fictions  -         -         -  131 


ANALYSIS.  xill 

Page. 

Imagination  not  Confined  to  Poetry            -         _         _  134 

Law  of  Taste  as  to  Imagination      -          -         -         _  134 

Imagination  the  Source  of  Ideals        -         -         -         -  136 

Idea  Defined          .-.-.-.  136 

Ideals  Explained       _-.--__  136 

Particular  and  General             _         _         -         .  137 

Not  Confined  to  Beauty  and  Sublimity        -         -  137 

Not  Changeless       -_-__.  138 

Foundation  of  Mental  Progress            _         >         _  138 

Ideals  Divine  and  Human       -          -         _         _  139 

Taste  Defined            -.-_..-  139 

Imagination  without  Taste     -----  140 

Productions  of  Imagination  and  Fancy      -          -         -  141 

Improvement  of  Imagination         _         _         .         -  141 

CHAPTER   XI. 

REASON   RESUMED. 

Secondary  Ideas  of  Reason             _         -         _         -  142 

Idea  of  Right  and  Wrong           -----  143 

Universal         --_-_._  143 

Necessary           -_.-__-  144 

The  Foundation  of  Obligation          -         -         .  145 

Chronological  Antecedents        -----  145 

Power  to  Know  Self  and  Relations          -         -  146 

Actual  Perception  of  Relations            -         -         -  146 

Power  to  Act  or  Refuse           -         -         -         -  146 

Idea  of  Fitness 147 

Synonymous  with  the  Idea  of  Right  and  Wrong  148 

Idea  of  the  Useful,  or  the  Good     ...         -  148 

The  Summum  Bonum         -         -         -         -         -         -  149 

Ideas  of  Liberty  and  Necessity       .         .         _         -  150 

Liberty  and  Will 150 

Their  Chronological  Antecedents             .         _         -  150 

Idea  of  the  Beautiful  and  the  Sublime       ...  151 


ANALYSIS. 


These  Ideas  in  the  Mind         -         -         -         -         -  152 

Objections  to  their  Universality         -         -         .         -  153 

Idea  of  the  Savage           -         -         -         -         -  154 

Degrees  of  Development              -         -         -         -  154 

Influence  of  Defects        -         _         .         _         _  I54. 

Fundamental  Agreement             .         .         .         .  154 

All  Persons  Agree  as  to  Some  Forms      -         -  154 

Chronological  Antecedents        -         -         -         -         -  155 

Illustration  from  Cousin         -         -         -         -         -  155 

Idea  of  Harmony       --_--._  155 

Poetry  Defined       ..-..-.  157 

Idea  of  Truth              157 

Its  Chronological  Antecedent         -         -         -         .  158 

Idea  of  Law       .------.  158 

Law  Subjective  and  Objective        .         .         -         .  158 

Inference  from  the  Above          -         -         -         _         _  159 

Its  Chronological  Antecedent         -         _         -         .  159 

Nature  of  Proof         -------  160 

Fundamental  and  Superficial  Thinkers            -         -  160 

The  Philosophic  Idea         ------  161 

Idea  of  Science       -         -         -         -         -     .    -  162 

Pure  Sciences  -         -         -         -         -         -162 

Mixed  Sciences      -------  162 

Conscience        --------  162 

Authority  of  Conscience         -         -         -         -         -  163 

Objections         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -  I60 

Conscience  as  Used  in  the  Bible     -         -         -         -  164 

Relation  of  Reason  to  Other  Faculties       .         _         .  164 

Reason  Common  to  all  Men            -         _         .         -  165 

CHAPTER    XII. 

LAVV^S    OF    INVESTIGATION. 

Investigation  and  Reasoning  Distinguished       -         -  166 

Substances,  How  Known        -         -         -         -         -  166 


ANALYSIS.  XV 

Page. 

Purposes  of  Induction        -         -         -         -         .         -167 

To  Discover  Attributes            .         _         _         .  167 

To  Classify  into  Genera  and  Species            -         -  167 

To  Discover  General  Facts     -         _         .         _  167 

To  Discover  Universal  Laws       .         _         ^         .  167 

Principles  of  Induction           .         -         _         _         .  167 

Rules  for  Classification      ---___  168 

Rules  for  the  Discovery  of  General  Facts       -         -  169 

Probable  and  Improbable           .         -         _         _         _  170 

Order  of  Sequence         -          -         _         -         _         _  170 

Rules  for  the  Discovery  of  Laws        -         -         -         -  171 

Testimony     --.--_-.  172 
Its  Characteristics     -         -         -         -         -         -         -172 

Grounds  of  Credibility  of  a  Witness       -         _         .  174 

Veracity              -         - 174 

Capacity -         -  174 

Observation  of  Facts 174 

No  Deception  or  Forgetfulness      -         -         -         -  174 

Agreement  of  Words  and  Conduct             _         .         _  174 

Corroborating  Circumstances          _         _         >         -  175 

Absence  of  Motives  to  Falsify              _         _         -  175 

Presence  of  Motives  to  Deny           _         .         _  175 

If  Facts  Accord  with  Our  Experience         -         -  175 

Facts  Accord  with  Character  of  the  Agent       -  175 

Reveal  Traits  in  the  Agent  before  Unknown       -  175 

Concurrent  Testimony             _         _         _         _         -  176 

Each  Witness  Credible       -----  176 

Concurrence  in  Material  Facts         -         -          -  176 

Characters  of  Witnesses  Different       .         _         -  176 

One  States  what  Another  Omits      -         -         -  176 

Apparent  Contradictions             _         _         _         -  176 

Undesigned  Coincidences         .         _         -         -         -  177 


XVI  ANALYSIS. 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

INTELLIGENCE    IN    BKUTES. 

Page. 

Foundation  of  Argument 178 

Resemblance  between  Men  and  Brutes  -         -         -         179 
Man  Scientific,  Brutes  not 179 

Man  Progressive,  Brutes  not    -         -         -         -        182 

Man  a  Moral  Agent,  Brutes  not    -         -         -         _  183 

Facts  Applied  -         -         -         -        -         -       183 


PART     II 


THE    SENSIBILITIES. 


CHAPTER    I. 

RECAPITULATION. 

The  Diversities  and  Relations  of  the  Sensibilities  -  193 

Characteristics  of  the  Phenomena    -         -         _         -  194 

Necessary    - 194 

Transitory         ---__•-  194 

One  Excludes  or  Modifies  Another        -         -  -  195 

Like  or  Unlike  Impulses           ....  195 

Each  Tends  to  Unlimited  Gratification          -  -  195 

Destitute  of  Moral  Qualities     _         -         -         -  196 

Importance  of  the  Subject  ------  196 

CHAPTER   II. 

SENSIBILITIES    CLASSIFIED. 

Classification 199 


ANALYSIS.  XVII 

Page. 

Terms  Defined    --_---.-  200 

Sensations         .----..  201 

Emotions 201 

Desires    --------  201 

Propensities  ---._-_  201 

Appetites         -         -         -         -         -         -         -  201 

Affections 201 

Principles         -------  201 

Passions       --------  202 

CHAPTER  III. 

ANIMAL     PROPENSITIES. 

Sensations  --------  203 

xlppetites 205 

Arise  from  the  Body    ------  205 

Are  Occasional  -_.--_  205 
Produce  Uneasy  Sensations  -         -         -         -  205 

General  Facts         -------        20G 

Number       --------  20G 

Accompanied  by  Pleasure,  -  -  _  -  206 
Highest  Enjoyment  in  Temperance  -  -  -  206 
When  Un perverted  a  Safe  Guide  -  -  _  206 
Effects  of  Restraint  and  Excess    .         -         -         -  207 

Artificial  Appetites         ------       208 

CHAPTER    IV. 

THE    EMOTIONS. 

The  Emotions  Classified      - 210 

Causes  Classified    -         -         -         -         -         -         -211 

Distinguished  from  Desires         -         -         -         -         -  211 

Emotions  as  Ground  of  Happiness  -         -         -         -        212 

Ideas  of  Happiness  and  Misery  _         -         .         -  212 

Transient  and  Permanent  Emotions         -         -         -        21 3 
Growth  and  Decay  of  Emotions  -----  214 


XVlll  ANALYSIS. 

Page. 

Concordant  and  Discordant  Emotions  -         -         .        214 

Sympathetic  and  Repellant  Emotions  -         .         _  215 

Congruous  and  Incongruous  Emotions  -         .         .        216 

Agreeable  and  Disagreeable  Emotions  -         _         .  217 


CHAPTER  V. 

MENTAL    PROPENSITIES. 

The  Affections  -  -  .  _  «  .  -219 
Love  of  Society    -         -         -         -         -         _         -  219 

Love  of  Kindred 220 

Love  of  Sexes 221 

Love  of  Friends -        222 

Love  of  Home _         _  224 

Love  of  Country _        225 

Love  of  the  Species 225 

Love  of  Benefactors  _         -         -         _         .        226 

Love  of  God         -         -         -         .         -         -         _  227 

Characteristics  of  the  Affections      -         -         -         -       228 

CHAPTER  VI. 

THE    DESIRES. 

Classified         ----_--_        230 

The  Desire  of  Continued  Existence       -         -         -  230 

The  Desire  of  Action 231 

The  Desire  of  Knowledge 231 

The  Desire  of  Esteem 232 

The  Desire  of  Power 232 

The  Desire  of  x\uthority  -----  233 
The  Desire  of  Imitation  -----  234 
The  Desire  of  Superiority  -  -  -  -  234 
The  Desire  of  Hoarding  -  -  -  _  .  235 
The  Desire  of  Order  _  ~  -  .  .  235 
Remarks  upon  the  Desires  -----  236 


ANALYSIS.  xix 

CHAPTER  YII. 

GENERAL    ACTIVE    PRINCIPLES. 

Page. 

Classification --       239 

Self-Defense 239 

Self-Love  ----_--.  240 
Conscience  ---_---_  241 
Love  of  Justice 242 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

COMPLEX     PHENOMENA, 

Characteristics    - 244 

Classes  --_-.-...  245 
Wishing _  245 

Lusting  -         -         - 245 

Covetousness      -._-_-._  245 

Holiness,  Virtue  and  Vice 246 

Selfishness       --------        246 

Hatred,  Wrath,  Malice        -         -         -         -         -         -247 

Gluttony         ------..        247 

Licentiousness    -- _  248 

Avarice  ------_.        248 

Revenge     ----_-___  248 

Pride  .'.---_..-  249 
Emulation  -_--.---  251 

Ambition  ---.___.  251 
Jealousy     -----.-__  251 

CHAPTER   IX. 

RELIGIOUS     PROPENSITIES. 

Repentance    --------        254 

Faith  -         .         .         - 256 

Love  ----...--  258 
Patience 260 


XX  ANALYSIS. 

Page. 

Humility         -         .         -         .         ....  261 

The  Filial  Spirit -  262 

A  Spirit  of  Forgiveness  _        -        .        -         .  264 

Forbearance        -__--_-_  264 

Condescension        _.___--  264 

Meekness   ---------  265 

Just  Hatred  -_--..--  265 


PART   III. 


THE  WILL. 


Point  in  Question  -------        267 

Liberty  and  Necessity  Defined  -----  268 

Free  Agent  Defined        - 269 

How  the  Question  Must  be  Answered  -         -         -  269 

Testimony  of  Consciousness    -----        270 

Evidence  from  Inspiration  -         -         -        ,-         -  272 

Objections      --------        273 

Divine  Foreknowledge        ------  273 

The  Will  as  the  Strongest  Motive  -         .         -         -        274 
Conscious  of  Choosing;  not  of  Liberty         -         -         -  275 
Relations  of  the  Will  to  the  Motives       _         -         -        275 
Universal  Principle  as  to  Will    -----  276 

Intention,  Choice,  Volition,  Preference  -         -         -        276 

Points  of  Agreement -  277 

Idea  of  Liberty 278 

The  Will  Subject  to  Habit 279 


A 

SYSTEM  OF  MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


GENERAL  INTRODUCTION. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PRINCIPLES  OF  INDUCTION    AND    CLASSIFICATION   IN   RESPECT 
TO    FACTS    OF    MIND. 

The  principles  of  induction  and  classification  to  -which 
the  strictest  adherence  will  be  maintained,  in  all  our  in- 
quiries, are  the  following:  1.  No  facts  of  mind,  facts  given 
in  Consciousness,  as  real,  will  be  omitted,  or  disregarded; 
and  none  will  be  supposed,  or  adduced  as  the  basis  of 
deductions,  not  thus  given  as  real.  2.  Phenomena,  or 
facts,  in  their  essential  characteristics  unlike,  will  be  sep- 
arated, or  ranged  together  in  distinct  and  opposite  classes; 
while  all  facts,  in  their  essential  characteristics  alike,  will 
be  ranked  together  in  the  same  class.  These  are  the  prin- 
ciples which  do,  in  fact,  universally  obtain  in  all  other 
sciences,  and  must  obtain  in  developing  the  science  of 
mind,  as  the  immutable  condition  of  reaching  any  valid 
deductions. 

PRINCIPLES  BY  WHICH  THE  NATURE,  CHARACTER  AND 
NUMBER,  OF  THE  FACULTIES  AND  SUSCEPTIBILITIES  OP 
THE    MIND    ARE    TO    BE    OBTAINED. 

The  general  princij^le  by  which  the  nature,  character, 
and  number  of  the   faculties,   and   susceptibilities   of  the 

(1) 


2  MENTAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

mipd  are  to  be  determined,  is  tliis:  as  are  the  diverse  facts 
of  mind,  such  are  its  diverse  Faculties,  and  Susceptibili- 
ties. As  are  the  essential  characteristics  of  any  particular 
class  of  facts,  such  is  the  nature  of  the  particular  faculty 
or  susceptibility  to  which  said  facts  are  referred.  From 
this  general  principle  so  obviously  valid  that  none  will 
question  it,  three  general  principles  arise,  to  wit:  1.  All 
facts  whose  essential  characteristics  are  the  same,  are  to  be 
referred  to  one  and  the  same,  faculty,  or  susceptibility. 
2.  Facts  fundamentally  dissimilar  in  their  nature,  are  to  be 
referred  to  distinct  and  separate  faculties,  or  susceptibil- 
ities. 3.  The  number  of  these  distinct  and  separate  Facul- 
ties and  Susceptibilities  is  as  the  number  of  the  distinct 
and  separate  classes  of  mental  phenomena  given  in  con- 
sciousness. 

PRINCIPLES    BY    WHICH    WE    ARE    TO    DETERMINE    THE    LAWS 
OF    MIND,    THEIR    NUMBER    AND    CHARACTER. 

The  laws  of  mind  are  those  principles  in  conformity  to 
which  its  diverse  faculties  act,  or  are  controlled.  By  these 
laws,  we  explain  the  phenomena  of  mind,  and  the  action  of 
its  diverse  faculties  and  susceptibilities.  Any  hypothesis, 
to  lay  claim  to  the  high  prerogative  of  a  Law  of  Mind, 
must  possess  the  following  characteristics  :  1.  It  must 
consist^  or  be  consistent  with,  all  the  facts  referred  to  it. 
Any  hypothesis,  undeniably  contradicted  by  any  one  fun- 
damental fact  of  consciousness,  can  have  no  claim  to  be 
regarded  as  a  law  of  mind.  2.  Said  hypothesis  must  not 
only  be  consistent  with  all  these  facts,  but  must  fully 
explain  them  all.  A  manifest  failure  to  explain  a  single 
essential  fact,  annihilates  utterly  the  claim  of  any  hypoth- 
esis to  be  regarded  as  a  law  of  mind.     3.  These  facts  must 


GENERAL    INTRODUCTION.  3 

be  explicable  upon  no  other  actual  or  conceivable  hypoth- 
esis. Facts  equally  consistent  with  two  or  more  distinct 
and  opposite  hypotheses,  affirm,  and  can  affirm,  neither, 
in  distinction  from  the  other,  as  a  law  of  mind.  But, 
when  any  hypothesis  undeniably  possesses  the  three  char- 
acteristics above  designated,  it  then  stands  demonstrably 
revealed,  as  such  a  law.  By  an  undeviating  adherence, 
in  our  classifications  and  deductions,  to  all  the  principles 
wliich  we  have  laid  down,  we  shall  find  ourselves,  in  all 
our  inquiries,  on  the  high  road  to  certain  knowledge,  and 
shall  ever  enjoy,  in  all  our  leading  deductions,  the  inward 
satisfaction  and  assurance  that  we  can  not  be  wrong. 


MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY. 


CHAPTER   II. 

CLASSIFICATION  OF  MENTAL  PHENOMENA  AND 
FACULTIES. 

MENTAL    PHENOMENA. 

Universal  Mind  has  distinguished,  and  recognized,  three 
classes  of  mental  phenomena,  each  of  which  is  entirely- 
distinct  from  either  of  the  others.  These  phenomena, 
which  comprehend  all  operations  of  the  mind,  actual  or 
conceivable,  may  be  expressed  and  represented  by  the 
terms;  thinking,  feeling,  and  willing.  If  we  attempt  to 
form  a  conception  of  any  operation  of  the  mind  whatever, 
we  must  conceive  of  it,  as  a  thought,  or  a  feeling,  or  an 
act  of  willing  or  mental  determination.  This,  then,  is  a 
full  and  distinct  classification  of  the  operations  of  the 
mind,  operations  to  be  taken  into  account  in  developing 
the  Science  of  Mental  Philosophy,  a  classification  which 
will  be  fully  verified  by  the  following  considerations  : 

CLASSIFICATION    VERIFIED. 

1.  These  classes  of  phenomena  differ  from  one  another, 
not  in  degree^  but  in  kind.  Thought,  in  all  degrees, 
whether  clear  or  obscure,  remains  totally,  and  equally, 
distinct  from  feeling  in  all  its  forms,  such  as  sensations, 
emotions,  and  desires,  on  the  one  hand,  and  all  acts  of 
willing  of  every  kind  and  degree,  such  as  choice,  purpose, 
volition    or    intention,  on    the    other.      So    of   feeling,   in 


CLASSIFICATION    OF    MENTAL    PHENOMENA.  5 

respect  to  thought,  and  acts  of  willing  of  every  actual  or 
conceivable  kind  and  degree.  Nor  is  willing  in  one 
degree,  a  thought;  in  another,  a  sensation,  emotion,  or 
desire;  and  in  another  still,  a  choice,  purpose,  volition,  or 
intention.  In  all  degrees  and  modifications,  these  three 
classes  of  mental  operations,  or  phenomena,  remain  equally 
distinct,  in  their  natnre  and  fundamental  characteristics. 

2.  This  classification  is,  also,  verified  by  the  testimony 
of  universal  Consciousness.  When,  for  example,  one 
speaks  of  thinking  of  any  particular  object,  then  of  desir- 
ing  it,  and  lastly  of  having  determined  \,o  secure  the  object, 
all  mankind  in  common,  at  once,  apprehend  his  meaning 
in  each  of  these  statements,  and  understand  him  as  refer- 
ring to  three  entirely  distinct  classes  of  mental  operations. 
No  one,  when  spoken  to  of  thought,  feeling,  or  willing,  in 
any  of  their  forms,  ever  confounds  any  one  of  these  states 
with  either  of  the  others. 

3.  In  all  languages,  there  are  distinct  terms  appro- 
priated to  express  and  represent  each  of  these  three  classes 
of  mental  phenomena,  terms,  each  of  which  is  exclusively 
appropriated  to  one  class,  and  never  applied  to  either  of 
the  others.  No  one,  for  example,  ever  employs  the  term 
thought  to  represent  feeling,  that  is  sensation,  emotion,  or 
desire,  or  any  act  of  willing.  The  same  holds  equally  true 
of  the  terms  feeling  and  willing.  Each,  by  universal 
usage,  represents  one  class  of  phenomena,  and  is  never 
employed  to  represent  either  of  the  others. 

4.  Qualifying  terms  are  also  in  common  use,  terms 
which  are  exclusively  applied  to  each  of  these  classes  of 
phenomena,  and  never  to  either  of  the  others.  Thus,  for 
example,  we  are  accustomed  to  speak  of  clear  thoughts^  but 
never  of  clear  feelings,  or  determinations.     We   speak  of 


b  MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

inflexible  purposes^  but  never  of  inflexible  feelings  or 
thoughts.  We  also  speak  of  iiTepressible  emotio?is  and 
desires,  but  never  of  irrepressible  thoughts  or  determina- 
tions. 

5.  The  threefold  distinction  and  classification  of 
mental  phenomena  now  under  consideration,  is  clearly- 
marked  by  universal  mind,  and  is  now  so  generally  recog- 
nized in  treatises  on  mental  science,  that  nothing  further 
upon  the  subject  is  demanded  in  this  connection.  With- 
out the  presentation  of  any  additional  considerations, 
therefore,  we  will  now  proceed  to  an  enumeration  of  the 
mental  faculties  implied  by  this  classification  of  mental 
phenomena. 

MENTAL    FACULTIES     IMPLIED     BY   THIS    CLASSIFICATION. 

The  threefold  division  and  classification  of  mental 
phenomena  above  presented,  most  clearly  and  undeniably 
imply  a  corresponding  division  and  classification  of  the 
Mental  Faculties,  Functions,  or  Powers,  a  division  and 
classification  which,  in  accordance  with  general  usage,  we 
shall  represent  by  the  terms;  Intellect  or  Intelligence, 
Sensibility  or  Sensitivity,  and  Will.  To  the  first  faculty, 
we  refer  all  the  phenomena  of  thought,  in  all  its  forms. 
To  the  second  we  refer  all  feelings,  such  as  sensations, 
emotions,  and  desires;  and  to  the  last,  all  acts  of  willing, 
or  mental  determinations.  The  science  of  mind,  conse- 
quently, divides  itself  into  three  parts,  a  development  of 
the  phenomena  and  laws  of  the  Intellect, — of  the  Sensi- 
bility—and of  Will. 

MEANING    OF    THE    WORDS,  MENTAL    FACULTIES. 

When  we  speak  of  a  diversity  of  mental  faculties,  we 
WOM-Id   by    no    means,  be    understood,    as    holding,   or    as 


CLASSIFICATION    OP    MENTAL    FACULTIES.  7 

teaching,  the  wild  dogma,  that  mind,  like  the  body,  is 
made  up  of  parts  which  may  be  separated  from  one 
another.  Mind  is  not  constituted  of  a  diversity  of  blended 
substances.  It  is  one  substance  not  susceptible  of  division. 
Yet  this  one  substance  is  capable  of  a  diversity  of  func- 
tions, or  operations,  which  are  entirely  distinct  from  one 
another.  This  diversity  of  capabilities,  all  of  which  per- 
tain to  this  one  substance,  we  designate  by  the  words, 
Mental  Faculties,  and  hence,  the  phenomena  being  distinct 
and  separate  from  one  another,  we  speak  of  the  powers 
and  susceptibilities  of  thought,  feeling,  and  willing,  as 
distinct  and  separate  faculties  of  the  mind,  faculties  which 
we  designate,  as  stated,  by  the  terms;  Intellect,  Sensibility, 
and  Will.  The  observations  made  above  in  respect  to  the 
mind  itself,  will,  at  once,  appear  equally  applicable  to  each 
of  the  mental  faculties  above  enumerated.  As  we  speak 
of  the  Intelligence,  for  example,  as  a  faculty  of  the  mind 
entirely  distinct  from  the  Sensibility  and  Will,  without 
implying  that  the  mind  is  not  one  substance,  so  we  may 
speak  of  the  diverse  Faculties  of  the  Intellect  without 
implying  that  that  faculty  is  a  compound  of  a  diversity  of 
parts.  The  term  Faculty,  whether  applied  to  the  whole 
mind,  or  to  any  department  of  the  same,  implies  a  diver- 
sity of  functions  of  this  one  identical  substance,  not  a 
diversity  of  substances,  or  parts. 


PAET  I. 


THE    INTELLECT. 


CHAPTER  I. 

INTELLECTUAL  PHENOMENA. 

The  sphere  of  Mental  Science,  as  indicated  in  the  pre- 
ceding chapter,  includes  in  itself  three  fundamental 
departments  of  inquiry — the  Science  of  the  Intellect — the 
Doctrine  of  the  Will— and  an  analysis  of  the  Sensibilities 
of  the  Mind.  Part  I.  of  the  present  treatise  will  be  occu- 
pied with  the  Science  of  the  Intellect,  or  with  a  develop- 
ment of  the  Phenomena^  Faculties^  and  Laws  of  the 
Human  Intelligence.  The  present  chapter  will  be  occu- 
pied, in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  true  science, 
•with  a  classification  of  The  phenomena  of  the  Intelli- 
gence. As  all  that  we  know,  or  can  know,  of  this,  as  well 
as  of  every  other  department  of  the  mind,  is  revealed  to  us 
through  the  phenomena  which  lie  under  the  eye  of  Con- 
sciousness, the  first  inquiries  which  now  present  themselves 
are  :  What  are  the  phenomena  of  thought  thus  revealed  ? 
What  are  their  fundamental  characteristics  ?  In  conformity 
to  what  principles  shall  they  be  classified  and  arranged  ? 

PRINCIPLE    OF    CLASSIFICATION. 

There  is  one  principle,  in  conformity  to  which  all  intel- 
lectual phenomena  may  be  properly  classified,  and  in  the 

^8) 


INTELLECTUAL    PHENOMENA.  9 

light  of  which,  the  fundamental  characteristics  of  such 
phenomena  may  be  very  distinctly  presented.  We  refer  to 
the  modes  in  which  all  objects  of  thought  are  conceived  of 
by  the  intelligence.  Of  these  modes,  there  are  two  entirely 
distinct  and  separate,  the  one  from  the  other.  Every 
object  of  thought  is  conceived  of  as  existing  either  con- 
tingently or  of  necessity:  that  is,  that  object  is  conceived 
of  as  existing,  with  the  possibility  of  concewhig  of  its  non- 
existence, or  it  is  conceived  of  as  existing  with  the 
impossibility  of  conceiving  of  its  non-existence.  If  we 
have  any  conceptions  of  an  object  at  all  we  must 
conceive  of  it  as  falling  under  one  or  the  other  of 
these  relations.  The  principle  of  classification,  therefore, 
is  fundamental,  and  of  universal  application. 

CONTINGENT     AND     NECESSARY    PHENOMENA    OF    THOUGHT 
DEFINED. 

Every  thought,  conception,  cognition,  or  idea,  then,  by 
whatever  term  we  may  choose  to  designate  it,  all  the 
phenomena  of  the  Intelligence,  may  be  classed  as  contingent 
or  necessary.  A  conception  is  contingent^  when  its  object 
may  be  conceived  of  as  existing  with  the  possibility  of 
conceiving  of  its  non-existence. 

An  idea  is  necessary  when  its  object  is  conceived  of  as 
existing  with  the  impossibility  of  conceiving  of  its  non- 
existence. All  the  phenomena  of  the  intelligence  must,  as 
shown  above,  fall  under  one  or  the  other  of  these  relations. 
It  remains  now,  to  illustrate  the  principle  of  classification 
here  adopted,  by  a  reference  to  an  adequate  number  of 
particular  phenomena,  as  the  basis  of  important  distinctions 
pertaining  to  the  different  functions  or  powers  of  the  in- 
telligence.    In  the  notice  which  we  shall  take  of  particular 


10  THE    INTELLECT. 

phenomena,  other  important  characteristics,  aside  from 
those  under  consideration,  will  be  developed,  while  these 
will  be  kept  prominently  in  mind  as  the  grounds  of  classi- 
fication. 

IDEA    OF    BODY    CONTINGENT. 

We  will  begin  with  the  idea  of  body.  Take  any  one 
body  we  please,  the  book,  for  an  example,  which  lies  before 
us.  While  we  conceive  of  this  body,  as  existing,  we  can 
also,  with  perfect  readiness,  conceive  its  non-existence. 
We  believe  that  the  time  was,  when  it  had  no  existence, 
and  that  the  time  may  come,  when  it  will  cease  to  exist. 
The  power  which  brought  it  into  being,  may  also  annihilate 
it.  The  same  holds  true  of  all  bodies,  of  every  kind.  All 
objects  around  us,  the  world  itself,  and  the  entire  universe, 
we  contemplate  as  existing  with  the  possibility  of,  at  the 
same  time,  conceiving  of  their  non-existence.  They  do 
exist.  They  may  be  conceived  of  as  not  existing.  There 
is  no  difficulty  of  conceiving  of  these  propositions  as  true. 
Nor  is  there  any  perceived  contradiction  between  them. 
The  idea  of  body  then  is  contingent.  We  always  conceive 
of  the  object  of  that  idea  as  existing,  with  the  possibility  of, 
at  the  same  time,  conceiving  ot  its  non-existence. 

IDEA    OF    SPACE    NECESSARY. 

We  now  turn  to  a  consideration  of  the  idea  of  space. 
We  can,  as  shown  above,  readily  conceive  of  the  annihila- 
tion of  all  bodies,  of  the  universe  itself.  But  when  we 
have  conceived  of  this,  can  we  conceive  that  space,  in 
which  the  universe  exists,  may  be  annihilated  ?  We  cannot. 
We  conceive  of  space  as  a  reality,  as  really  existing.  Can 
we  conceive  of  it  as  not  being  ?  We  cannot.  No  intelli- 
gent being  can    form   such  a  conception.      Of  this  every 


INTELLECTUAL  PHENOMENA.  11 

one  is  perfectly  conscious.  When  we  have  conceived  of 
the  non-existence  of  this  world,  and  of  all  other  bodies,  of 
the  entire  universe  itself,  let  any  one  attempt  to  conceive 
of  the  anniliilation  of  space,  in  which  we  necessarily  con- 
ceive of  all  these  objects  as  existing,  and  he  will  find  the 
formation  of  such  a  conception,  an  absolute  impossibility. 
The  idea  of  space  then  is  necessary.  We  conceive  of  the 
object  of  that  idea  as  existing,  with  the  impossibility  of 
conceiving  of  its  non-existence. 

IDEAS    OF    SUCCESSION,    AND    TIME,    OR   DURATION. 

These  ideas  are  in  all  intelligent  minds.  No  individual, 
whose  intelligence  has  been  developed  at  all,  will  fail  to 
understand  you,  when  you  speak  of  one  event,  as  having 
happened;  of  another,  as  having  succeeded  it;  and  of  the 
fact  that  that  succession  took  place  in  some  definite  period 
of  time.  We  will  now  mark  the  characteristic  of  these 
ideas. 

IDEA    OF    SUCCESSION    CONTINGENT. 

You  can  conceive  of  some  one  event  as  having  happen- 
ed, and  of  another  as  having  succeeded  it.  In  other  words, 
you  have  the  idea  of  succession.  Can  you  not  conceive^ 
that  neither  of  these  events  occurred  ?  Every  individual 
can  readily  form  such  a  conception.  The  same  holds  true 
of  all  events,  of  all  succession  of  every  kind,  and  in  all 
time.  The  idea  of  succession,  like  that  of  body,  is  there- 
fore contingent. 

THE    IDEA    OF    TIME    NECESSARY. 

But  when  we  have  conceived  of  the  total  cessation  of 
succession,  we  find  it  absolutely  impossible  to  conceive  that 
there  is  no  time,  or  duration,  in  which  succession  may  take 


12  THE    INTELLECT. 

place.  We  can  no  more  conceive  of  the  annihilation  of 
time,  than  we  can  of  that  of  space.  The  idea  of  time,  then, 
like  that  of  space,  is  necessary. 

IDEAS    OF    THE    FINITE    AND    OP    THE    INFINITE. 

The  ideas  of  Space  and  Duration,  as  they  exist  in  all 
minds,  not  only  bear  the  characteristics  of  necessity,  but 
each,  in  common,  pertains  to  its  object  as  absolutely  infinite. 
This  is  undeniable.  The  ideas  of  body  and  succession, 
each  pertains  to  its  object,  as  limitable  or  finite.  Those  of 
space  and  duration  pertain  to  their  objects,  as  being  with- 
out limits,  or  as  infinite.  Each  of  these  ideas,  that  of  the 
finite  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  the  infinite  on  the  other, 
may  be  detached  from  the  objects  to  which  they  pertain, 
and  be  considered  by  itself.  These  ideas  then  whatever 
philosophers  of  certain  schools,  may  say  to  the  contrary, 
are,  undeniably,  in  the  mind.  They  are  also  distinct,  the 
one  from  the  other.  Consequently  the  one  cannot  be 
derived  from  the  other.  The  multiplication  of  the  finite 
cannot  give  the  infinite.  Nor  by  dividing  the  infinite  do 
we  find  the  finite.  Being  correlative  ideas,  the  one  neces- 
sarily supposes  and  suggests  the  other.  The  one  cannot 
possibly  exist  in  the  mind  without  the  other.  Yet,  as 
above  remarked,  the  one  is  perfectly  distinct  from  the 
other. 

Nor  is  one  of  these  ideas  less  disthict  than  the  other. 
When  I  speak  of  the  infinite,  every  one  as  readily  and  dis- 
tinctly apprehends  my  meaning,  as  when  I  speak  of  the 
finite.  The  following  propositions,  for  example — body  is 
limitable  ;  space  is  illimitable — are  equally  intelligible  to 
all  minds. 

There  are  other  forms  in  which   these   ideas  appear  in 


INTELLECTUAL  PHENOMENA.  13 

the  mind,  in  all  of  which  they  sustain,  to  each  other,  the 
same  relations,  and  possess  the  same  characteristics.  When 
the  mind  conceives  of  power,  wisdom  or  goodness,  as  im- 
perfect or  limited,  or  finite,  it  necessarily  conceives  of 
attributes  of  the  same  class  as  perfect,  unlimited,  or  in- 
finite: just  as  when  it  conceives  of  a  reality  which  is  and 
began  to  be,  it  necessarily  conceives  of  a  reality  which^ 
not  only  is,  but  always  was. 

If  an  individual  still  affirms  that  he  has  no  idea  of  the 
infinite,  we  have  only  to  ask  him  whether  he  understands 
the  import  of  the  words  he  employs,  when  he  makes  such 
an  affirmation  :  whether  he  is  not  conscious  of  speaking  of 
something,  which,  in  thought,  he  himself  clearly  distin- 
guishes from  all  that  is  limitable,  or  limited.  These  ques- 
tions, he  will  readily  answer  in  the  affirmative.  In  this 
answer  he  clearly  contradicts  the  affirmation  under  con- 
sideration. For,  if  he  really,  as  he  affirms,  has  no  idea  of 
the  infinite,  he  would  not  know  the  meaning  of  the  terms 
he  uses,  nor  could  he,  in  thought,  clearly  distinguish  the  in- 
finite, from  all  that  is  limitable,  or  finite. 

If  also  we  have  no  real  or  positive,  idea  of  the  infinite^ 
we  can  have  none  of  time  and  space,  for  they  are  positive 
ideas,  and  their  objects  are  given  in  the  intelligence,  as 
positively,  or  absolutely,  infinite. 

IDEAS     OF     MENTAL    PHENOMENA    AND    PERSONAL    IDENTITY. 

Every  individual  believes,  and  must  believe,  that  he 
is  now  the  same  being  that  he  was  yesterday,  and  will  be 
to-morrow.  Numberless,  and  ever  varying  phenomena  are 
constantly  passing  under  the  eye  of  consciousness.  Many 
are  recalled  of  which  we  were  formerly  conscious.  Yet 
they  are  all  referred  to  the  same   individual   subject.      AH 


14  THE    INTELLECT. 

pnenomena,  of  thought,  feeling,  and  willing,  of  which  we 
are  now  conscious,  which  we  recall,  as  having  in  some 
former  period,  been  conscious  of,  or  which  we  expect  to  put 
forth  in  some  future  time,  are  given  in  the  intelligence  in 
this  exclusive  form — I  think,  I  feel,  I  will  ;  I  did  think,  I 
did  feel,  I  did  will  so  and  so.  The  same  holds  equally  true 
of  all  similar  phenomena  which  we  contemplate,  as  about  to 
occur  in  future  time.  Whatever  the  phenomena  may  be, 
the  same  identical  I  is  given  as  its  subject.  This  is 
what  is  meant  by  personal  identity.  It  is  the  unity  of  our 
being ^  of  the  I  or  self  as  opposed  to  the  plurality  and  ever 
changing  phenomena  of  consciousness.  Having  shown 
that  the  idea  of  mental  phenomena  and  of  personal  identity 
are  in  the  mind,  we  will  consider  their  characteristics. 

IDEA  OF  MENTAL    PHENOMENA    CONTINGENT    AND    RELATIVE. 

An  idea  is  said  to  be  relative,  when  its  object  can  be 
conceived  as  existing,  but  upon  the  condition,  that  some 
other  object  is  conceived  of  as,  also,  existing.  Thus,  for 
example,  we  cannot  conceive  body  to  exist,  without  con- 
ceiving of  space  as  existing.  The  reality  of  succession, 
also,  implies  that  of  time.  The  ideas  of  body  and  succes- 
sion, therefore,  are  not  only  contingent,  but  also  relative 
ideas.  The  same,  as  we  shall  perceive  hereafter,  holds  true 
of  the  ideas  of  phenomena  and  events,  and  we  might  add 
of  all  other  contingent  ideas. 

You  have  a  consciousness  of  some  thought,  feeling,  or 
act  of  will.  You  remember  similar  phenomena  of  which 
you  were  formerly  conscious.  You  conceive  of  them  as 
now  being,  or  as  having  been,  actual  realities.  Can  you 
not  conceive  of  them  as  not  being  or  as  never  having  taken 
place  ?    You  can.     Can  you  conceive  of  such  phenomena 


INTELLECTUAL  PHENOMENA.  15 

as  existing  or  having  existed,  without  referring  them  to 
some  subject  ?  In  other  words,  can  you  conceive  of  some 
thought,  feeling,  or  volition  as  now  existing,  or  as  having 
existed  in  former  times,  without  referring  it  to  some  sub- 
ject, some  being  which  thinks,  feels,  or  wills  ?  You  can- 
not. AH  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  are  contingent 
and  relative. 

IDEA    OF    PERSONAL    IDENTITY    NECESSARY. 

How  is  it  with  the  idea  of  personal  identity?  You  are 
now  conscious  of  some  thought,  or  feeling,  or  act  of  will. 
You  recall  others,  of  a  similar  nature,  of  which  you  have 
been  formerly  conscious.  This  you  refer  to  one  and  the 
same  subject,  the  I  of  consciousness,  as  it  is  sometimes 
called.  This  reference  you  and  all  mankind  alike  must 
make.  This  reference  mankind  universally  make  in  all 
the  transactions  of  life.  Under  its  influence  we  hold  our- 
selves and  others  bound  to  fulfill  contracts  made  years  ago. 
Under  its  influence,  the  virtuous  are  commended  and  re- 
warded, and  the  vicious  are  blamed  and  punished  for  actions 
long  since  performed.  Under  its  influence  we  anticipate 
the  retributions  of  eternal  justice  in  a  future  state  for  the 
deeds  done  in  the  body.  Is  it  possible  to  avoid  making 
this  reference?  It  is  not.  You  cannot  possibly  conceive 
of  a  thought,  for  example,  without  referring  it  to  some 
subject  which  thinks.  You  cannot  be  conscious  of  any 
mental  phenomenon,  or  recall  any  others  of  which  you 
were  formerly  conscious,,  without  referring  them  to  one 
and  the  same  subject,  yourself.  The  idea  of  personal 
identity,  then,  is  necessary. 


16  THE    INTELLECT. 

NECESSARY     IDEAS      DISTINGUISHED      AS     CONDITIONAL     AND 
UNCONDITIONAL. 

Here  an  important  distinction  between  necessary  ideas 
demands  special  attention.  When  we  contemplate  the 
ideas  of  space  and  duration,  for  example,  we  find  that  the 
objects  of  these  ideas  must  exist,  whether  anything  else 
exists  or  not.  Those  ideas,  therefore,  are  not  only  neces- 
sary, but  unconditioned  and  absolute.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  ideas  of  personal  identity,  and  of  substance  and  cause 
which  we  shall  hereafter  consider,  are  not,  in  this  sense, 
necessary.  They  are  only  conditionally  necessary.  Phe- 
nomena being  given,  substance  must  be.  An  event  being 
given,  the  supposition  of  a  cause  is  necessary.  Phenomena 
and  events  not  being  given,  we  do  not  affirm  the  existence 
of  substances  or  causes.  The  phenomena  of  consciousness 
not  being  given,  we  do  not  affirm  the  reality  or  identity  of 
the  self,  the  subject  of  these  phenomena.  Such  ideas  are 
conditionally  necessary,  and  not  like  those  of  space  and 
time,  not  only  necessary,  but  unconditioned  and  absolute. 

IDEAS     OF     PHENOMENA     AND     SUBSTANCE. IDEA    OF     SUB- 
STANCE   EXPLAINED. 

If  the  observations  which  have  been  made  upon  the 
idea  of  personal  identity,  have  been  distinctly  understood, 
the  characteristics  of  the  idea  of  substance  will  be  readily 
apprehended.  All  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  and 
memory  are,  as  we  have  seen,  by  a  necessary  law  of  our 
being,  referred  to  one  and  the  same  subject.  The  phe- 
nomena are  accidents,  perpetually  changing.  The  subject, 
however,  remains  the  same.  Now,  in  the  language  of 
Cousin,   "  Being,  one   and  identical,  opposed    to   variable 


INTELLECTUAL   PHENOMENA.  17 

accidents,  to  transitory  phenomena,  is  substance."  But 
thus  far  we  have  only  personal  substance.  The  same 
principle,  however,  applies  equally  to  all  external  sub- 
stances. Through  the  medium  of  our  senses,  such  objects 
are  given  to  us  as  being  possessed  of  a  great  variety  of 
qualities,  and  as  existing  in  a  great  variety  of  states.  The 
qualities  and  states,  which  are  perpetually  varying,  we 
necessarily  refer  to  one  and  the  same  subject ;  a  subject 
which  remains  one  and  identical,  amid  the  endlessly  diver- 
sified phenomena  which  it  exhibits.     This  is  substance. 

IDEA    OP    PHENOMENA    CONTINGENT    AND    RELATIVE. THAT 

OF    SUBSTANCE    NECESSARY. 

Now  as  it  is  with  our  ideas  of  the  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness and  personal  identity,  so  it  is  with  our  ideas  of 
external  phenomena  and  external  substance.  The  former 
is  contingent  and  relative;  the  latter  is  necessary.  When 
any  phenomenon  appears,  we  can  readily  conceive  that  it 
had  not  appeared.  Its  appearance  also  we  can  admit,  only 
on  the  supposition  of  something  else,  to  wit,  substance,  to 
which  this  appearance  is  necessarily  referred.  Our  ideas 
of  phenomena,  therefore,  are  contingent  and  relative. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  idea  of  substance,  relatively  to 
phenomena,  is  necessary.  Phenomena  being  given,  sub- 
stance micst  be.  It  is  impossible  for  us  to  conceive  of  the 
former  without  the  latter. 

OUR    IDEAS    OF    SUBSTANCE     NOT     OBSCURE,    BUT    CLEAR   AND 
DISTINCT. 

According  to  Locke,  "  We  have   no  clear  idea  of  sub- 
stance in  general."     This  idea,  also,  he  represents,  as  "  of 
little  use  in  philosophy."     In  reply,  it  may  be   said,  that 
2 


18  THE   INTELLECT. 

our  idea  of  substance  is  just  as  clear  and  important,  as 
those  of  time,  space,  and  personal  identity.  Of  this  every 
one  is  conscious.  The  same  function  of  the  intelligence 
which  apprehends  one  of  these  ideas,  apprehends  them  all. 
Take  away  the  power  to  apprehend  one,  and  the  power  to 
apprehend  every  other  of  these  ideas  is  annihilated.  Phi- 
losophy itself  also  becomes  an  impossibility.  How  could 
we  reason  philosophically  about  ourselves,  in  the  absence 
of  the  idea  of  personal  identity?  Equally  impossible  would 
it  be,  to  reason  about  objects  external  to  us,  in  the  absence 
of  the  idea  of  substance.  This  and  kindred  ideas,  instead 
of  being  "  of  little  use  in  philosophy,"  are,  in  reality,  the 
foundation  of  all  our  explanations  of  phenomena,  external 
and  internal. 

We  often  hear  individuals,  in  expatiating  upon  the  great 
ignorance  of  man,  affirming,  that  all  we  "  know  of  realities 
in  and  around  us,  is  their  phenomena.  Of  the  substances 
themselves,  we  know  nothing."  In  reply  to  such  rhap- 
sodies, it  may  be  said,  that  our  knowledge  of  every  sub- 
stance of  every  kind,  is  just  as  clear,  distinct,  and 
extensive,  as  our  knowledge  of  its  phenomena.  In  phe- 
nomena, substances  stand  revealed,  the  substance  being  as 
its  phenomena.  In  the  phenomena  of  thought,  for  example, 
we  know  ourselves,  as  thinking  beings,  or  substances,  our 
powers  being  as  the  thoughts  which  they  generate.  Our 
knowledge  of  the  powers  of  thought,  is  just  as  distinct  as 
that  of  thought  itself.  The  same  holds  true  in  respect  to 
all  substances,  material  and  mental. 

IDEAS    OF    EVENTS    AND    CAUSE. 

The  universe  within  and  around  us,  presents  the  con- 
stant spectacle  of  endlessly  diversified  and  ever  changing 


INTELLECTUAL   PHENOMENA.  19 

phenomena.  Some  of  these  are  constantly  conjoined,  in 
the  relation  of  "  immediate  and  invariable  antecedence  and 
consequence."  The  connection  between  others  is  only 
occasional.  In  reference  to  events  of  the  former  class,  the 
mind  judges,  that  the  relation  between  them  is,  not  only 
that  of  antecedence  and  consequence,  but  of  cause  and 
effect.  In  reference  to  every  event,  however,  whether  its 
antecedent  is  perceived  or  not,  we  judge  that  it  had  a 
cause.  This  judgment  is  universal,  extending  to  all 
events,  actual  and  conceivable.  It  is  absolutely  impossible 
for  us  to  conceive  of  an  event  without  a  cause.  Let  any 
one  make  the  effort  to  form  such  a  conception,  and  he  will 
find  that  he  has  attempted  an  impossibility.  Here  it 
should  be  noticed,  that  we  do  not  affirm  that  every  effect 
has  a  cause.  That  would  be  mere  tautology.  It  would  be 
equivalent  to  the  affirmation,  that  whatever  is  produced  by 
a  cause,  is  produced  by  a  cause.  All  this  might  be  true, 
and  the  proposition,  every  event  has  a  cause,  be  false, 
notwithstanding. 

THE    IDEA    OF    EVENTS    CONTINGENT   AND    RELATIVE. THAT 

OF    CAUSE    NECESSARY. 

The  relation  between  the  idea  of  an  event,  and  that  of 
a  cause,  may  be  readily  pointed  out.  Whenever  the  mind 
witnesses,  or  is  conscious  of,  the  occurrence  of  an  event, 
it  apprehends  that  event  as  contingent  and  relative.  It 
might  or  might  not  have  happened.  There  is  no  impossi- 
bility in  making  these  different  suppositions.  The  occur- 
rence of  an  event  also  necessarily  supposes  something  else, 
to  wit,  a  cause.  On  the  other  hand,  no  event  uncaused 
can  possibly  be  conceived  to  have  taken  place.  The  idea 
of  an  event,  then,  is  contingent  and  relative.  The  idea  of 
cause  is  necessary,  conditional!}''  so,  as  shown  above 


THE   INTELLECT. 


IDEA    OF    POWER. 


The  idea  of  Power,  is  that  of  causation  in  its  quiescent 
state,  or  as  the  permanent  attribute  of  a  subject  irrespec 
tive  of  its  action,  at  any  particular  moment.  When 
particular  effects  are  attributed  to  particular  causes,  while 
the  nature  of  the  substances  containing;  such  causes 
remains  unchanged,  the  mind  considers  the  power  to 
repeat  such  effects  under  the  same  circumstances,  as  the 
permanent  attribute  of  those  substances.  This  is  the  idea 
of  power,  as  it  exists  in  all  minds.  All  substances,  in 
their  active  state,  are  Causes — in  their  quiescent  state,  are 
Powers.  Powers  are  of  two  kinds,  active  and  passive. 
The  latter  are  commonly  called  susceptibilities.  As  the 
existence  of  powers  and  causes  is  indicated  by  their 
respective  phenomena,  so  the  nature  of  such  powers  and 
causes  is  indicated  by  the  characteristics  of  their  respective 
phenomena. 

The  idea  of  power,  sustaining  as  it  does,  the  same 
relation  to  phenomena,  that  that  of  cause  and  substance 
do,  is,  of  course,  like  those  ideas,  universal  and  necessary. 

CONCLUSION    OF    THE    PRESENT    ANALYSIS. 

Here  our  analysis  of  intellectual  phenomena  will  close, 
for  the  present.  It  might  have  been  extended  to  almost 
any  length.  Enough  has  been  said,  however,  to  indicate 
the  principle  of  classification  adopted,  and  to  show  its 
universal  applicability,  as  well  as  to  lay  the  foundation  for 
the  important  distinctions,  etc.,  in  respect  to  the  intel- 
lectual powers,  an  elucidation  of  which  will  be  begun  in 
the  next  chapter. 


APPLICATION    OF   THE    PKECEDING  ANALYSIS.  21 


CHAPTER  II. 

APPLICATION  OF  THE  PRECEDING  ANALYSIS.  —  PRI- 
MARY  INTELLECTUAL  FACULTIES.  —  PERCEIVED 
AND  IMPLIED  ELEMENTS  OF  THOUGHT. 

All  the  elements  of  thought,  all  ideas  and  conceptions, 
existing  in  the  mind,  may,  as  we  have  seen,  be  classed,  as 
contingent,  or  necessary.  In  other  words,  all  objects  of 
thought  are,  or  may  be,  in  fact,  conceived  of  as  existing, 
with  the  possibility  of  conceiving  of  them  as  not  existing, 
or  with  the  impossibility  of  conceiving  of  their  non-exis- 
tence, that  is,  as  being  unconditionally,  or  conditionally 
necessary. 

On  careful  reflection,  it  will  be  perceived,  that  all  con- 
tingent elements  of  thought  are  given  exclusively  by  per- 
ception^  external  or  internal,  their  objects  being  recognized 
by  the  universal  intelligence,  as  objects  of  pecception. 
The  necessary  elements,  on  the  other  hand,  are  not  recog- 
nized by  the  intelligence  as  given  by  perception,  but  as 
distinctly  and  immediately  implied  by  what  we  perceive. 
Thus,  for  example,  body,  succession,  phenomena  external 
and  internal,  and  events,  are  objects  of  perception,  and  are 
so  recognized  by  the  universal  intelligence.  The  ideas  of 
space,  time,  substance,  and  cause,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
not  recognized  by  the  consciousness,  as  given  by  percep- 
tion, but  as  implied  by  the  ideas  of  body,  succession,  phe- 
nomena, and  events,  which  are  given,  as  objects  of  percep- 
tion.    Body,  succession,  phenomena,  and  events,  we  per- 


22  THE    INTELLECT. 

ceive.  Space,  duration,  substance,  and  causes,  we  do  not 
perceive,  but  apprehend  b,s  implied  by  the  realities  which 
we  do  perceive.  No  one  will  question  the  correctness  of 
these  statements. 

THE     ELEMENTS    OF    ALL    FORMS    OF    REAL    KNOWLEDGE     DE- 
RIVED   FROM    THESE    TWO    SOURCES. 

All  forms  of  knowledge,  all  ideas,  and  conceptions, 
existing  in  the  mind,  are  constituted  of  elements  derived 
originally  from  these  two  sources  exclusively,  to  wit,  what 
we  perceive,  and  what  is  necessarily  and  immediately  im- 
plied by  what  we  perceive.  Knowledge,  in  any  other 
form,  or  from  any  other  source,  is  inconceivable,  and  natu- 
rally impossible. 

LOGICAL   AND    CHRONOLOGICAL    ORDER   OF   THESE    FORMS     OF 
KNOWLEDGE. 

There  are  two  fundamental  relations  which  all  forms  of 
perceived  and  implied  knowledge,  that  is,  contingent  and 
necessary  ideas,  sustain  to  each  other,  relations  which  it  is 
very  important,  that  the  learner  should  fully  comprehend. 
We  refer  to  what  is  denominated  the  logical  and  chrono- 
logical order  of  such  ideas. 

THE    LOGICAL    ORDER. 

One  idea  is  the  logical  antecedent  of  another,  when  the 
former  is  implied  by  the  latter,  that  is,  when  the  reality  of 
the  ohject  of  the  latter  can  be  admitted,  but  on  the  suppo- 
sition of  the  reality  of  the  ohject  of  the  former.  Body,  for 
example,  cannot  exist  unless  space  does  exist.  Succession 
is  possible  but  on  the  condition  of  the  reality  of  duration  in 
which   the   former  does   and  must  occur,  if  it  occur  at  all. 


APPLICATION    OF    THE    PRECEDING  ANALYSIS.  23 

Unless  real  substances  and  causes  do  exist,  there  can,  by  no 
possibility,  be  any  such  thing,  as  phenomena,  or  events. 
The  ideas  of  space,  duration,  substance,  and  cause, 
consequently  are  the  logical  antecedents  of  the  ideas  of 
body,  succession,  phenomena,  and  events.  In  other  words, 
implied  forms  of  knowledge,  or  necessary  ideas,  are  the 
logical  antecedents  of  forms  of  perceived  knowledge,  or  of 
contingent  ideas.     This  principle  universally  obtains. 

THE    CHRONOLOGICAL    ORDER. 

One  idea  is  the  chronological  antecedent  of  another, 
when,  in  the  order  of  actual  origination  in  the  mind,  the 
former  precedes  the  latter.  In  this  order,  the  perceived 
universally  precedes  the  implied.  In  other  words,  contin- 
gent ideas,  are  universally,  the  chronological  antecedents 
of  the  necessary.  We  perceive  body,  before  we  apprehend 
space  in  which  the  former  does  and  must  exist.  We  per- 
ceive succession,  before  we  apprehend  duration  in  which 
the  former  occurs.  We  perceive  phenomena  and  events, 
before  we  do,  or  can,  apprehend  substance  and  cause  to 
which  the  former  are  referred.  The  truth  of  these  state- 
ments is  demonstrably  evident.  Space  is  apprehended, 
and  can  be  conceived  of,  or  defined,  but  as  that  in  which 
body,  and  substances,  do  and  must  exist,  and  as  implied  by 
the  same.  Duration,  or  time,  is  apprehended,  and  can  be 
conceived  of,  or  defined,  but  as  the  place  of  succession, 
and  as  implied  by  it.  Substance,  or  cause,  is  apprehended, 
but  as  that  to  which  phenomena,  or  events,  are  referred, 
and  as  implied  by  the  same.  Now  that  which  is,  and  can 
be,  apprehended  but  as  related  to,  and  implied  by,  some 
other  object,  cannot,  by  any  possibility,  be  to  the  mind,  an 
object  of  knowledge,  prior  to  that  by  which  it  is  implied. 


24  THE    INTELLECT. 

and  known  only  as  implied.  Knowledge  by  perception, 
therefore  is,  and  must  be,  in  the  order  of  origination  in  the 
mind,  prior  to  implied  knowledge.  In  other  words,  con- 
tingent ideas  are,  universally,  the  chronological  antecedents 
of  necessary  ideas.  This  principle,  as  we  shall  see,  here- 
after, is  of  fundamental  importance  in  the  science  of 
mind. 

PRIMARY    INTELLECTUAL    FACULTIES. 

All  knowledge  begins,  and  undeniably  so,  with  percep- 
tion, and  is  instantly  followed  by,  and  blended  with,  those 
forms,  and  elements,  of  knowledge  directly  and  immedi- 
ately implied  by  what  is  obtained  by  perception,  and  from 
these  two  sources,  we  repeat,  the  constituent  elements  of 
all  human  knowledge,  of  all  ideas  and  conceptions,  in  the 
mind,  are  originally  derived.  The  organs  of  perceived  and 
implied  knowledge,  therefore,  are  the  Primary  Faculties 
of  the  Intelligence.     This  is  undeniable. 

KNOWLEDGE    BY    PERCEPTION    CLASSIFIED. 

Knowledge  by  perception,  however,  is  of  two  distinct 
and  separate  kinds,  and  is  derived  from  two  distinct  and 
separate  sources,  externul  and  internal^  objective  and 
subjective.  Knowledge  by  perception  pertains,  in  part, 
to  external,  material,  substances,  and,  in  part,  to  internal 
phenomena,  the  operations  of  the  mind  itself.  We  have, 
then,  two  distinct  and  separate  faculties  of  perception,  the 
external  and  the  internal,  that  which  perceives  external, 
material,  substances,  and  that  which  perceives  internal 
phenomena,  or  the  operations  of  the  mind  itself.  The 
former,  we  denominate  Sense,  or  the  Faculty  of  External 
Perception.  The  latter  we  denominate  Consciousness,  or 
the    Faculty  of   Internal    Perception.       That    faculty    by 


PRIMARY    INTELLECTUAL   FACULTIES.  25 

which  we  apprehend  implied  knowledge,  or  the  objects  of 
necessary  ideas,  we  denominate  Reason.  The  following, 
therefore,  are  the  primary  faculties  of  the  intelligence, 
namely; 

PRIMARY    INTELLECTUAL   FACULTIES. 

1.  The  Faculty  of  internal  perception,  the  function  of 
the  intelligence  by  which  we  perceive  and  apprehend  the 
phenomena  of  the  mind  itself.  This  faculty  we  denomi- 
nate Consciousness. 

2.  The  Faculty  of  external  perception,  the  intellectual 
function  by  which  we  perceive  and  apprehend  the  qual- 
ities of  external,  material,  substances.  This  faculty  we 
denominate  Sense. 

3.  The  Faculty  of  implied  knowledge^  the  function  of 
the  intelligence  by  which  we  apprehend  necessary  truths. 
This  faculty  we  denominate  Reason. 

The  terms,  Consciousness,  Sense,  and  Reason,  through- 
out this  treatise,  will  be  employed  in  strict  accordance 
with  the  definitions  of  the  same  above  given.  The  defi- 
nition given  to  the  term  consciousness,  accords  with 
universal  usage.  That  given  to  the  term  sense  is  the 
first  meaning  assigned  to  it  by  Webster,  and  is  the  mean- 
ing generally  attached  to  it  when  employed,  as  it  is  in  this 
treatise,  to  designate  a  special  faculty,  or  function,  of  the 
intelligence.  A  great  diversity  of  meanings  attach  to  it, 
when  employed  for  other  purposes.  Similar  remarks  apply 
to  the  term,  reason.  In  common  language,  various  mean- 
ings are  attached  to  it.  In  scientific  treatises,  it  is  now 
being  generally  employed  in  strict  accordance  with  the 
definition  of  it  above  given. 


26  THE    INTELLECT. 

THESE    FACULTIES — WHY    CALLED    PEIMARY. 

Consciousness,  Sense,  and  Reason,  are  called  the 
primary  faculties  of  the  intelligence,  for  two  considera- 
tions: 

1.  Because,  that  with  them,  all  our  knowledge  com- 
mences. 

2.  All  our  complex  cognitions  are  composed  of 
elements  given  by  these  faculties.  All  the  phenomena  of 
the  intelligence  are  either  simple  or  complex.  All  simple 
ideas  are  found  to  be  direct  intuitions  of  one  or  of  the 
other  of  these  faculties.  All  complex  ideas  are  found,  on 
a  careful  analysis,  to  be  composed  of  elements  previously 
given  by  these  faculties.  The  truth  of  this  last  remark 
will  be  fully  confirmed  in  the  progress  of  our  subsequent 
investigations. 

ALSO    CALLED    INTUITIVE    FACULTIES. 

The  faculties  above  named  are  also  sometimes  denomi- 
nated Intuitive  Faculties.  The  reason  is,  that  each  alike 
pertains  to  its  objects,  by  direct  intuition.  Consciousness, 
for  example,  by  direct  intuition,  and  not  through  any 
medium,  apprehends  the  phenomena  of  the  mind.  The 
same  is  true  of  the  faculty  of  Sense  in  respect  to  the  phe- 
nomena of  external  material  substances.  The  action  of 
Reason  is  conditioned  on  the  prior  action  of  sense  and 
consciousness.  It  is  not  through  any  medium,  but  by 
direct  intuition,  however,  that  reason  affirms  truth  as 
universal,  necessary,  and  absolute.  Like  the  former, 
therefore,  it  may,  with  equal  propriety,  be  denominated  a 
faculty  of  intuition.  These  faculties,  as  we  shall  see  here- 
after, orive  us  the  elements  of  all  our  knowledge. 


PRIMARY    INTELLECTUAL    FACULTIES.  27 

FUNDAMENTAL     ERROR     OF     LOCKE,   AND     OF      THE     SENSUAL 
SCHOOL    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

According  to  Locke,  and  the  Sensual  School  in  phi- 
losophy, of  which  he  was  the  founder,  the  elements  of  all 
our  knowledge  are  derived  exclusively  from  two  sources, 
external,  and  internal,  perception.  "  Our  observation,"  he 
says,  "employed  either  about  external,  sensible  objects,  or 
about  the  internal  operations  of  our  minds,  perceived  and 
reflected  on  by  ourselves,  is  that  which  supplies  our 
understandings  with  all  the  materials  of  thinking.  These 
two  are  the  fountains  of  knowledge  from  whence  all  the 
ideas  we  have,  or  can  naturally  have,  do  spring."  Neither 
this  author,  nor  his  school  in  philosophy,  take  any  account 
of  implied  knowledge,  or  of  necessary  truths,  that  is, 
knowledge  by  reason.  They  even,  as  seen  above,  deny 
the  possibility  of  this  form  of  knowledge,  and  take  no 
account,  whatever,  of  the  faculty  by  which  such  knowl- 
edge is  obtained.  This  is  a  fundamental  error  in  phi- 
losophy, an  error  which  legitimately  led  to  the  Materialism 
and  Atheism  of  the  latter  part  of  the  past,  and  early  part 
of  the  present  century,  and  which  in  fact  lies  at  the 
foundation  of  much  of  the  infidelity  of  the  present  time. 
Implied  knowledge,  or  necessary  ideas,  is  just  as  real,  and 
as  valid,  as  knowledge  by  perception,  or  as  contingent 
ideas.  When  this  fact  is  admitted,  and  when  the  validity 
of  each  of  the  primary  faculties,  as  organs  of  real  knowl- 
edge, is  vindicated,  there  will  be,  in  the  sphere  of  science, 
no  denial  of  the  being  and  perfections,  of  a  personal  God, 
or  of  the  truths  of  religion.  Infidelity,  in  all  its  forms,  and 
in  all  ages,  has,  in  fact,  and  form,  based  its  deductions 
upon   a  denial   of  the  reality,  or  validity,  of  some  one  or 


US  THE    INTELLECT. 

other  of  the  primary  faculties  above  defined.  In  all  ages 
and  nations,  and  in  all  schools  of  philosophy  in  which  the 
validity  of  knowledge  through  each  of  the  primary  facul- 
ties, has  been  admitted, — as  true  science  immutably 
demands  that  it  shall, be, — the  being  and  perfections  of  a 
personal  God,  and  the  essential  truths  of  religion,  have 
been  universally  admitted  and  affirmed. 

FUNDAMENTAL     ERROR    OF     THE     GERMAN,    OR     TRANSCEND- 
ENTAL   SCHOOL    IN    PHILOSOPHY. 

The  German,  or  Transcendental  School  in  Philosophy, 
in  opposition  to  that  of  Locke,  makes  every  thing  of 
implied  knowledge,  or  of  necessary  ideas,  and  takes  little, 
or  no  account  of  knowledge  by  perception,  external  and 
internal,  but  to  deny  its  validity.  According  to  the  funda- 
mental principles  and  teachings  of  this,  the  German 
school,  necessary  ideas  are  originated  in  the  mind  prior  to 
contingent  ones,  the  former  giving  existence  to,  and  deter- 
mining the  essential  characteristics  of  the  latter.  In  other 
words,  implied  knowledge  exists  in  the  mind  prior  to  that 
by  which  the  former  is  implied,  and  without  the  prior 
existence  of  which,  the  implied  can,  by  no  possibility,  as 
we  have  already  seen,  exist  at  all:  one  of  the  greatest,  and 
most  palpable,  errors  that  ever  appeared  in  the  sphere  of 
philosophy.  Knowledge  by  perception,  does  in  fact,  and 
from  the  nature  of  the  case,  must,  in  actual  experience, 
precede,  occasion,  and  determine  the  essential  character- 
istics of,  all  forms  of  implied  knowledge.  In  other 
words,  contingent  elements  of  knowledge,  instead  of  being 
preceded,  occasioned,  and  determined  in  their  nature  and 
form,  by  the  necessary  elements,  do,  in  fact,  precede, 
occasion,   and  determine   the   fundamental  characteristics 


PRIMARY    INTELLECTUAL    FACULTIES.  29 

of  the  elements  of  necessary  ideas.  It  is  this  fundamental 
error  of  this  school,  which  has  given  being  and  form  to  the 
Idealism,  and  Scepticism  of  the  present  century. 

THE    TRUE    PHILOSOPHY. 

The  true  philosophy,  avoiding  the  fundamental  errors 
of  both  schools, — of  the  sensual,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  the 
transcendental,  on  the  other, — and  vindicating  the  validity 
of  both  perceived  and  implied  knowledge  in  all  their  legit- 
imate forms,  and  through  each  primary  faculty  in  common^ 
will  vindicate,  within  the  sphere  of  true  science,  the  doc- 
trine of  the  being  and  perfections  of  a  personal  God,  to- 
gether with  the  essential  truths  and  principles  of  morality 
and  religion,  while  it  will  fully  meet  and  satisfy,  all  the 
real  scientific  demands  of  universal  mind. 


30  THE    INTELLECT. 


CHAPTER  III. 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Consciousness,  or  the  Faculty  of  internal  Perception, 
has  already  been  defined,  as  that  faculty  or  function  of  the 
intelligence  by  which  we  perceive,  and  apprehend,  the 
phenomena,  or  operations  and  states,  of  the  mind  itself. 
By  consciousness  we  have  a  knowledge  of  all  that  occurs 
in  the  interior  of  our  own  minds,  just  as  through  the 
faculty  of  sense,  or  external  perception,  we  know  the 
events  of  the  external  world  around  us.  Consciousness,  as 
above  defined.  Sir  William  Hamilton  denominates  Self- 
Consciousness.  "  Internal  Perception,  or  Self-Conscious- 
ness," he  says,  "is  the  fsLCxihy  2:>^ese?itative  or  intuitive  oHhe 
phenomena  of  the  Ego  or  mind."  It  makes  no  difference 
by  what  name  a  specific  faculty  is  called,  while  there  is  a 
perfect  agreement  in  regard  to  its  actual  existence,  and 
proper  sphere  and  functions. 

IMMEDIATE    AND    MEDIATE    KNOWLEDGE    DEFINED. 

Two  forms  of  knowledge  exist  in  the  mind,  forms  of 
knowledge  which  may  be  denominated  immediate^  and 
mediate.  When  we  have  a  direct,  intuitive,  perception  of 
an  object,  we  say  that  we  have  an  immediate  knowledge 
of  that  object.  When,  on  the  other  hand,  we  know  an 
object,  not  directly  and  immediately,  but  through  some 
other  object,  we  then  attain  to  a  form  of  knowledge  which 
is  denominated  mediate  knowledge.     All  forms  of  immedi- 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  31 

ate  knowledge,  Sir  William  Hamilton  refers  to  one  and 
the  same  general  faculty  which  he  denominates  Conscious- 
ness, assigning  to  it  two  distinct  functions,  those  of  exter- 
nal  and  internal  perception,  or  the  faculties  of  Sense  and 
Self-Consciousness.  Whenever  we  have  a  direct  and  im- 
mediate perception  of  any  object,  we  are  he  affirms,  con- 
scions  of  that  object.  If  such  a  use  of  language  should 
generally  obtain,  the  faculty  of  internal  perception  being 
denominated  Self-Consciousness,  not  a  little  would  be 
gained  in  the  sphere  of  distinct  thought.  The  term  coii- 
scions  we  shall  employ  as  this  author  has  defined  it,  employ- 
ing the  term  Consciousness  according  to  general  usage,  and 
as  above  defined. 

KNOWLEDGE     BY    CONSCIOUSNESS     DIRECT     AND     IMMEDIATE. 

Knowledge  by  Consciousness  is  always  direct  and  im- 
mediate. We  do  not  perceive,  or  know,  our  own  mental 
states  through  any  medium,  but  are  always  directly  and 
immediately  conscious  of  the  same.  This  is  undeniable, 
and  is  universally  admitted. 

KNOWLEDGE    BY    CONSCIOUSNESS     HAS     ABSOLUTE     VALIDITY. 

Knowledge  by  Consciousness,  therefore,  has  the  highest 
possible  validity,  and  within  the  sphere  of  science,  must  be 
held  as  absolutely  valid  for  the  reality  and  character  of  all 
its  respective  objects.  It  is  "  science  falsely  so  called," 
that  would  deny,  ignore,  or  modify,  any  fact,  or  facts,  of 
which  we  are  really  and  truly  conscious.  Facts  of  con- 
sciousness, and  these  exclusively,  as  the  student  of  mental 
science  should  keep  constantly  and  distinctly  in  mind  in 
all  his  mental  investigations,  lie  at  the  basis  of  all  legiti- 
mate   deductions,   throughout   the    entire    sphere    of    this 


32  THE    INTELLECT. 

science.  If  he  would  not  be  fundamentally  misled  in  his 
inquiries,  he  must  immutably  adhere  to  the  principles  laid 
down  in  the  introduction  to  this  treatise,  to  wit,  to  deny, 
ignore,  or  modify,  no  facts  actually  given  in  conscious- 
ness as  real,  to  suppose  or  assume,  as  the  basis  of  deduc- 
tion, no  facts  not  thus  given,  and  finally  to  hold,  as  im- 
mutably valid,  all  deductions  to  which  such  real  facts  do 
legitimately  lead. 

FACTS   OR    OBJECTS   OF    CONSCIOUSNESS. 

In  every  act  of  consciousness,  two  objects  are  directly 
and  immediately  cognized,  or  perceived  and  apprehended, 
to  wit,  some  particular  mental  state  on  the  one  hand,  and 
the  mind  itself,  the  T,  or  self,  as  the  subject  of  that  state,  on 
the  other;  and  we  are  just  as  distinctly,  and  absolutely  con- 
scious of  the  one,  as  we  are  of  the  other.  Every  such  act, 
we  represent  in  such  language  as  the  following  :  I  think,  I 
feel,  I  will.  In  all  such  states,  we  are  as  absolutely  con- 
scious of  the  I  that  thinks,  feels,  and  wills,  as  we  are  of  the 
phenomena  of  thought,  feeling,  and  willing,  which  we  refer 
to  the  self,  or  the  /.  Of  this,  every  one  will  be  fully  con- 
scious, who  will  carefully  reflect  upon  what  he  actually  has 
cognizance  of,  in  all  acts  of  consciousness.  All  my  mental 
states,  I  know  and  recognize  absolutely  as  my  own.  How 
can  I  know  them  as  mine  unless  I  am  conscious,  and  equally 
so,  of  them  as  mental  states,  and  of  the  I,  myself,  as  the 
subject  of  said  states  ?  *'  Is  it  not,"  says  Mr.  Mansel,  "  a 
flat  contradiction  to  maintain  that  I  am  not  immediately 
conscious  of  myself,  but  only  of  my  sensations  or  volitions? 
Who  then  is  this  I  that  is  conscious,  and  how  can  I  be  con- 
scious of  such  states  as  mine  ?  In  this  case  it  would  surely 
be  far  more  accurate  to  say,  not  that  I  am  conscious  of  my 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  33 

sensations,  but  that  the  sensation  is  conscious  of  itself  ;  but 
thus  worded,  the  glaring  absurdity  of  the  theory  would 
carry  with  it  its  own  refutation."  Again  he  says:  "The 
one  presented  substance^  the  source  from  which  our  data  for 
thinking  on  the  subject  are  originally  drawn,  is  myself. 
Whatever  may  be  the  variety  of  the  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness, sensations  by  this  or  that  organ,  volitions, 
thoughts,  imaginations;  of  all  we  are  immediately  conscious 
as  affections  of  one  and  the  same  self.  It  is  not  by  any 
afterthouo-ht  of  reflection  that  I  combine  too-ether  sijrht, 
thought,  and  volition,  into  a  factitious  unity  or  compounded 
whole  ;  in  each  case  I  am  immediately  conscious  of  my 
self  seeing  and  hearing,  willing  and  thinking.  This  self- 
personality,  like  all  other  simple  apprehensions,  is  indefin- 
able; but  it  is  so,  because  it  is  superior  to  definition.  It 
can  be  analyzed  into  no  simple  element,  for  it  is  itself  the 
simplest  of  all ;  it  can  be  made  no  clearer  by  description  or 
comparison,  for  it  is  revealed  to  us  in  all  the  clearness  of 
an  original  intuition,  of  which  description  and  comparison 
can  furnish  only  faint  and  partial  resemblances." 

THE    MIND    SELF-CONSCIOUS    OF    ITS    OWN    PERSONALITY. 

The  truth  above  announced  is  of  fundamental  import- 
ance in  mental  science,  and  is  now  being  distinctly  recog- 
nized as  such,  within  the  sphere  of  that  science.  We  affirm 
ourselves  to  be  persons,  and  not  things,  because  we  have 
a  direct,  immediate,  and  absolute  consciousness  of  our  own 
personality.  We  affirm  ourselves  to  be  persons  endowed 
with  the  powers  of  thought,  feeling,  and  voluntary  deter- 
mination, because  we  are  absolutely  conscious  of  ourselves, 
as  actually  exercising  these  diverse  mental  functions.  We 
affirm  our  personal  identity,  because  we  are  absolutely 
3 


34  THE    INTELLECT. 

conscious  of  ourselves,  as  being  the   same  persons  to-day, 
that  we  were  yesterday. 

IMPORTANT    ERROR    IN    MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

Until  quite  recently,  philosophers  have  been  accustomed 
to  distinguish  between  phenomena  and  substance  in  this 
form.  They  have  affirmed,  that  the  former,  and  not  the 
latter,  is  the  object  of  perception,  external  and  internal. 
"  We  are  not,"  says  Professor  Stewart,  "  immediately  con- 
scious of  its  (the  mind's)  existence;  but  we  are  conscious  of 
sensation,  thought,  and  volition  ;  operations  which  imply  the 
existence  of  something  which  feels,  thinks,  and  wills."  Now 
there  is  no  such  distinction,  as  is  here  made,  between  phe- 
nomena and  substance.  Phenomena  is  substance  itself 
manifested  to  the  mind.  The  idea  of  appearance,  where 
and  when  no  substance  appears,  is  admitted,  even  by  Kant, 
to  be  an  absolute  absurdity.  x\ppearance  is  nothing  but 
substance  appearing,  and  a  sound  philosophy  will  hold  this 
principle,  as  having  universal  and  absolute  validity  through- 
out the  entire  domain  of  science  mental  and  physical,  to 
wit,  that  substances  in  their  nature  are  as  their  real, 
OR  ESSENTIAL  PHENOMENA.  The  oppositc  doctrinc  leads 
to  the  wildest  conceivable  absurdities,  in  mental  science 
especially.  Suppose,  that,  in  accordance  with  the  teachings 
of  Mr.  Stewart  and  others,  thought,  feeling,  and  volition, 
should  appear  in  empty  space,  the  subject  of  these  phenom- 
ena not  appearing  in  them,  and  consequently,  manifested 
nowhere  else,  at  all.  How  could  we  know  who  that  subject 
is,  or  whether  any  such  subject  does,  in  fact,  exist  ? 

OBJECTION    ANSWERED. 

But  how^  it  may  be   asked,  can  there  be,  at  the  same 
time,  a  knowledge  of  both  the  subject^  and  the  object  of 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  35 

knowledge  ?  How  can  the  mind  at  one  and  the  same  mo- 
ment, be  conscious  of  a  given  state  and  of  itself  as  the  sub- 
ject of  that  state  ?  In  reply  we  would  put  to  the  objector 
two  or  three  other  questions,  and  when  he  has  answered 
these,  we  will  fully  explain  to  him  the  quo  modo  of  knowl- 
edge by  Consciousness  in  all  its  forms,  and  through  every 
other  faculty  also.  How^  we  ask,  in  the  first  place,  can  the 
mind  be  conscious  of,  or  know  any  object  whatever?  How 
can  the  mind  be  conscious  of  any  mental  state,  and  not  be 
conscious  of  itself,  as  the  subject  of  that  state  ?  In  other 
words,  how  can  there  be  phenomena,  when  no  substance  is 
manifested  ;  an  appearance,  when  no  substance  appears  ? 
The  question  to  be  solved  by  philosophy  is,  not  hov^  we 
know,  but  lohat  do  we  know  ?  It  is  not,  how  we  do,  or  can 
know,  but  what  we  do  in  fact,  know,  by  consciousness  ? 
The  question,  what  do  we,  in  fact,  know  by  consciousness, 
has  already  been  answered,  to  wit,  our  own  mental  states, 
and  our  own  personal  selves  as  the  subject  of  those  states. 
Sound  philosophy  will  accept  the  answer  as  given,  and  that 
without  any  attempt  to  modify  that  answer,  in  fact  or  in 
form. 

NATURAL,    OR    SPONTANEOUS,  AND    PHILOSOPHICAL,    OR 
REFLECTIVE    CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Consciousness,  in  its  simple  spontaneous  form,  is  com- 
mon to  all  mankind,  in  the  natural  development  of  their 
intelligence.  In  the  language  of  Cousin,  it  is  "in  all  men 
a  natural  process."  Every  individual  is  accustomed  to  use 
the  propositions,  I  think,  I  feel,  I  will,  etc.,  all  persons,  also, 
are  accustomed  to  speak  of  themselves  as  conscious  of  par- 
ticular states  or  exercises  of  mind.  This  evinces  that  they 
not  only  are  conscious  of  their   own    mental    exercises,  but 


36  THE    INTELLECT. 

also  are  aware  of  the  function  of  the  intelligence  exercised 
under  such  circumstances.  All  men,  also,  in  the  spontane- 
ous developments  of  consciousness,  clearly  distinguish 
themselves  as  subjects  of  mental  phenomena,  from  all  ex- 
ternal causes,  or  objects  of  the  same.  They  may  not  be 
able  technically  to  express  this  distinction  with  the  clearness 
and  definiteness  that  a  philosopher  would.  They  may  not 
be  able  to  understand,  at  first,  the  meaning  of  the  terms  he 
would  employ  to  express  that  distinction.  Still  it  is,  to 
them,  a  no  less  palpable  reality,  than  to  him. 

As  to  Consciouness,  which  is  thus  seen  to  be,  "  in  all 
men,  a  natural  process,"  "  some,"  in  the  language  of  the  phi- 
losopher above  named,  "  elevate  this  natural  process  to  the 
degree  of  an  art,  a  method,  by  reflection,  which  is  a  sort  of 
second  consciousness, — a  free  re-production  of  the  first,  and 
as  consciousness  gives  all  men  an  idea  of  what  is  passing  in 
them,  so  reflection  gives  the  philosopher  a  certain  knowledge 
of  everything  which  falls  under  the  eye  of  consciousness." 
Reflection,  or  Philosophic  Consciousness,  is  simple  or  natu- 
ral consciousness  directed  by  the  will,  in  the  act  of  careful 
attention  to  the  phenomena  of  our  minds.  As  natural  con- 
sciousness is  one  of  the  characteristics  which  distinguishes 
man  from  the  brute,  so  philosophic  consciousness  is  the 
characteristic  which  distinguishes  the  mental  philosopher 
from  the  rest  of  mankind.  The  above  remarks  may  be 
illustrated  by  a  reference  to  two  common  forms  of  observa- 
tion in  respect  to  external,  material  substances.  The  phe- 
nomena of  such  substances  all  mankind  alike  notice,  and  to 
some  degree  reason  about.  It  is  the  natural  philosopher, 
however,  who  attentively  observes  these  phenomena,  for  the 
purpose  of  marking  their  fundamental  characteristics,  as  the 
basis  of  philosophic  classification,  generalization,  etc.     The 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  37 

same  holds  true  in  respect  to  the  two  forms  of  conscious- 
ness under  consideration.  Mental  phenomena  all  men  are 
conscious  of,  and  all  men,  to  a  greater  or  less  degree,  are 
accustomed  to  reason  about.  The  philosopher,  however, 
by  laborious  efforts  of  self-reflection,  most  critically  attends 
to  these  phenomena,  for  the  purpose  of  marking  their  char- 
acteristics, classifying  and  arranging  them  according  to 
philosophic  principles,  and  thus  determining  the  powers  and 
laws  of  mental  operations.  In  simple  consciousness,  in 
short,  we  have  a  knowledge  of  whatever  passes  in  our 
minds.  In  reflection  we  have  the  same  phenomena  classi- 
fied and  generalized,  according  to  fundamental  character- 
istics. 

CONSCIOUSNESS    A    DISTINCT    FACULTY    OF    THE    MIND. 

Is  consciousness  a  distinct  and  separate  facultj*  of  the 
mind  ?  On  this  question,  philosophers  are  not  yet  fully 
agreed,  and  high  authority  may  be  cited  in  support  of  each 
side.  Sir  William  Hamilton  is  commonly  reckoned  as 
advocating  the  negative  side  of  this  question.  Conscious- 
ness as  he  has  defined  the  subject,  he  has  fully  proved  not 
to  be  such  a  faculty  ;  and  self-consciousness,  however,  he 
has  defined,  and  treated  as  such  a  faculty  :  and  self-con- 
sciousness as  defined  by  him,  is,  as  we  have  already  shown, 
perfectly  identical  with  consciousness  as  we  have  defined 
the  term,  and  as  it  is  commonly  defined  by  philosophers. 
The  authority  of  this  author  therefore,  is,  in  fact,  wholly  in 
favor  of  the  doctrine  maintained  in  this  treatise,  to  wit, 
that  consciousness,  or  self-consciousness,  as  he  has  defined 
the  term,  is  a  distinct  and  separate  faculty  of  the  mind. 
That  this  is  the  true  theory,  we  argue  from  the  following 
considerations  : 


THE    INTELLECT. 


TRUE    THEORY    VERIFIED. 


1.  The  intuitive  convictions  of  the  race — of  all  mankind  in 
common,  clearly  evince  the  existence  in  the  mind  of 
two  distinct  and  separate  forms  of  knowledge,  to  wit, 
that  which  pertains  to  external,  material  substances  on 
the  one  hand,  and  that  which  pertains  to  the  mind  itself,  on 
the  other.  Equally  familiar  are  all  men  with  the  two  special 
faculties  through  which  these  diverse  forms  of  knowledge 
are  obtained.  Nor  do  they  ever  confound  these  forms  of 
knowledge,  nor  the  faculties  referred  to,  the  one  with  tlie 
other. 

2.  Among  all  civilized  nations,  this  faculty  is  repre- 
sented and  designated  by  an  appropriate  and  specific  term, 
a  term  which  is  never  applied  to  any  other  faculty.  No  term 
in  the  English  language,  for  example,  has  a  more  fixed, 
definite,  and  exclusive,  meaning  and  use  than  the  term 
Consciousness.  No  individual  misapprehends  the  meaning 
of  the  term,  nor  misapplies  it  whenever  it  is  employed  :  a  fact 
which  most  clearly  evinces  how  distinctly  marked  and 
recognized,  this  faculty,  together  with  its  appropriate  ob- 
jects, is  in  universal  thought. 

3.  Knowledge  by  consciousness  does,  in  fact  exist  in  the 
mind — knowledge,  wholly  distinct  and  separate  from  all 
other  kinds  of  mental  phenomena  there  found.  This  is  unde- 
niable and  is,  in  fact,  universally  admitted.  To  deny  to 
consciousness,  therefore,  the  prerogatives  of  a  distinct  and 
separate  faculty  of  the  mind,  is  to  violate  all  valid  and  ad- 
mitted laws  of  mental  classification  and  deduction. 

4.  Even  those  philosopliers  who  deny  to  this  faculty 
such  a  prerogative,  speak  of  it,  and  elucidate  it  as  such  a 
faculty.     To  this  statement  we  know  of  no  exceptions.  The 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  39 

translator  of  Cousin,  for  example,  after  assigning  to  tliis 
faculty  the  same  functions  that  we  have  done;  after  affirm- 
ing that  it  is  not  "  a  distinct  and  special  faculty,"  or  "  a 
principle  of  any  of  the  faculties,"  or  "the  product  of  these," 
thus  defines  this  same  thing  which  he  affirms  to  have  no 
beinor  at  all  :  "  Consciousness  is  a  witness  of  our  thouofhts 
and  volitions." 

Precisely  similar  contradictions  appear  in  the  writings 
and  discourses  of  all  who  deny  the  doctrine  of  this  treatise 
upon  this  subject. 

OBJECTS    OF    CONSCIOUSNESS   CHRONOLOGICALLY  ANTECEDENT 
TO    THE    CONSCIOUSNESS    OP   THE    SAME. 

Perception,  in  all  its  forms  external  and  internal,  im- 
plies, of  course,  the  prior  existence  of  its  object,  whatever 
that  object  may  be.  Pain,  for  example,  as  a  state  of  the 
sensibility  does  not  exist  because  we  are  conscious  of  it, 
but  we  are  conscious  of  it  because  it  does  exist  ;  the  ex- 
istence of  the  object  being  chronologically  antecedent  to 
the  consciousness  of  its  existence.  The  same  does,  and 
must,  hold  true  universally. 


40  IHE    INTELLECT. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

SENSE. 

Sense,  or  the  faculty  of  External  Perception,  has  been 
defined,  as  that  faculty,  or  function,  of  the  intelligence,  by 
which  we  apprehend  the  phenomena,  or  qualities  of  exter- 
nal, material  substances. 

TO    BE    DISTINGUISHED    FROM    SENSATION. 

The  exercise  of  this  faculty  should  be  carefully  distin- 
guished from  those  states  of  the  Sensibility  which  always  ac- 
company it,  but  which  are,  notwithstanding,  none  the  less, 
for  that  reason,  distinct  from  it,  to  wit,  sensations.  Sensa- 
tion is  the  state  of  the  sensibility  which  immediately  suc- 
ceeds any  impression  made  by  any  cause,  upon  our  physi- 
cal organization.  Sensation  is  exclusively  a  state  of  the 
sensibility.  Sense  is  no  less  exclusively  a  function  of  the 
intelligence.  Of  these  distinctions  we  should  never  lose 
sight,  when  reasoning  upon  this  department  of  mental 
science. 

SPONTANEOUS    AND    VOLUNTARY    DETERMINATION    OF    SENSE. 

Sense,  like  consciousness,  is,  in  its  primitive  develop- 
ments, a  simple  spontaneity  of  the  intelligence.  Its  action, 
in  this  state,  is,  in  no  sense,  conditioned  on  the  will.  Per- 
ception, in  its  distinct  forms,  is  conditioned  on  attention, 
which  is  nothing  but  the  perceptive  faculty,  directed  by  the 
will  ;  and  hence,  for  the  want  of  a  better  term  or  phrase, 


SENSE.  41 

called  voluntary  determination  of  the  faculty.  Attention, 
in  the  direction  of  consciousness,— that  is,  when  directed  to 
mental  phenomena, — is  called  reflection.  When  in  the 
direction  of  the  faculty  of  external  perception, — that  is,  to- 
wards the  phenomena  of  material  substances, — it  is  called 
observation. 

The  necessity  of  observation,  that  is,  of  attention, 
in  the  voluntary  direction  of  the  perceptive  faculty  towards 
phenomena  obscurely  given  in  the  spontaneous  develop- 
ments of  that  faculty,  maybe  readil}*  illustrated.  A  portion 
of  a  congregation,  for  example,  who  have  been  listening  to 
a  certain  speaker,  have  fallen  into  a  state  of  slumber.  The 
speaker  suddenly  stops,  and  immediately  all  are  aroused. 
Now,  if  the  audience  had  not,  in  some  form,  heard  the 
voice  which  broke  upon  their  ears,  why  were  they  aroused? 
Yet,  if  inquired  of  in  respect  to  what  had  been  spoken  to 
them,  they  would,  for  the  obvious  and  exclusive  reason 
that  they  had  not  attended  to  it,  be  wholly  unable  to  an- 
swer. How  often  do  we  hear  the  remark,  I  gained  no  dis- 
tinct conception  of  that  part  of  a  discourse.  My  attention 
happened,  at  the  time,  to  be  directed  to  something  else. 

The  attention  may,  in  some  instances,  be  so  fixed  upon 
Lome  object  in  one  direction,  that  the  sensibility  and  intel- 
ligence both  may  be  almost,  if  not  quite,  totally  isolated 
from  what  would  otherwise  deeply  affect  us  in  another  di- 
rection. A  gentleman,  for  example,  who  was  employed 
about  the  machinery  in  a  factory,  had  one  of  his  fingers  en- 
tirely cut  off,  by  the  sudden  and  unexpected  starting  of  a 
portion  of  that  machinery  which  carried,  with  great  veloc- 
ity, a  circular  saw.  So  intensely  did  his  attention  instantly 
become  occupied  with  the  prevention  of  the  destruction  of 
the  whole  machinery,  that  he  was  not  aware   of  the  injury 


42  THE    INTELLECT. 

done  to  his  own  person,  nor  was  he  sensible  of  the  least 
pain  from  it,  till  the  accident  was  pointed  out  to  him  by  an- 
other who  stood  by.  As  soon,  however,  as  the  injury  was 
discovered,  the  pain  from  it  became  intense. 

The  basis  of  attention  is  the  spontaneous  action  of  the 
sensibility  and  intelligence, — action  which  always  occurs, 
when  the  proper  conditions  are  fulfilled,  and  when  the  mind 
is  not  isolated  from  objects  in  other  directions,  by  its  in- 
tense action  upon  some  object  (as  in  the  case  above  cited), 
in  some  specific  direction. 

OKGANS    OF    SENSE,    AND    THE    KNOWLEDGE   CONVEYED    BY 

EACH. 

In  regard  to  the  particular  organs  of  sense,  of  which 
five  are  commonly  reckoned,  to  wit,  sight,  hearing,  taste, 
smell,  and  touch, — organs  through  which  a  knowledge,  of 
the  particular  qualities  of  material  substances  is  conveyed  to 
the  mind,  but  little  need  be  said.  One  remark,  however, 
may  be  deemed  of  some  importance.  It  is  this :  each 
organ  pertains  exclusively  to  the  particular  quality  or 
qualities  which  are  the  objects  of  that  particular  organ. 
The  peculiar  qualities  given  by  sight,  for  example,  are 
given  by  no  other  sense.  The  relation  of  objects,  such  as 
distance,  which  is  a  mere  relation,  and  not  a  quality  at  all, 
we  learn,  by  experience,  to  determine  by  various  senses,  as 
sight,  touch,  hearing,  and  smelling  even  in  some  instances. 
But  the  existence  and  qualities  of  such  objects  are  given,  as 
causes  and  objects  of  particular  sensations  and  perceptions 
in  us,  by  each  of  the  senses  alike;  each  sense,  or  each  organ 
of  the  general  faculty  giving  the  quality,  or  qualities,  which 
are  the  objects  of  that  particular  organ. 


SENSE.  45 

OBJECTS    OF    PEROEPl'ION. 

The  objects  of  perception  (external  perception)  are  the 
qualities  of  material  substances.  The  qualities  perceived 
are  resistance,  extension,  form,  color,  taste,  smell,  sound, 
etc.  Such  qualities  are  to  us  the  index,  and  the  only  index 
we  have,  of  their  respective  subjects.  In  the  consciousness 
of  thought,  feeling,  and  mental  determinations,  we  know 
ourselves  as  thinking,  feeling,  and  acting  beings.  So  in 
the  experience  of  sensations  and  perceptions  produced  in 
us  by  external  material  substances,  we  know  them  as  the 
powers  which  produce  these  perceptions  and  sensations;  in 
other  words,  we  know  them  as  substances  possessed  of  the 
qualities  of  resistance,  extension,  form,  color,  etc. 

THE    PROVINCE    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

Philosophy,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind,  has  to  do  with 
facts  as  they  are,  with  the  nature  of  the  powers  revealed 
in  those  facts,  and  with  the  laws  in  conformity  to  which 
those  powers  act.  With  the  mode  of  their  action  further 
than  this,  it  has  nothing  to  do.  In  the  fall  of  heavy  bodies- 
to  the  earth,  for  example,  we  learn  that  attraction  is  a  prop- 
erty of  all  material  substances.  We  then  set  ourselves  to- 
determine  the  law  which  controls  the  action  of  this  proper- 
ty. Here  we  are  within  the  legitimate  domain  of  philoso- 
phy. But  suppose  we  attempt  to  explain  the  mode  in  which 
the  attractive  power  acts.  "  Such  knowledge  is  too  won- 
derful for  us.  It  is  high,  we  cannot  attain  unto  it."  Phi- 
losophy, well  satisfied  with  her  own  legitimate  and  wide 
domain,  resigns  such  things  to  the  Eternal  One,  who  created 
all  the  powers  of  the  universe,  and  consequently  under- 
stands the  mode  of  their  action.     h\\    that   philosophy  can 


44  THE    INTELLECT. 

say  in  regard  to  the  mode  of  action  of  any  power  is,  that 
such  is  its  nature. 

COMPARATIVE    VALIDITY   OP   THE    AFFIRMATIONS    OF    SENSE 
AND    CONSCIOUSNESS. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  contemplate  the  comparative 
validity  of  the  affirmations  of  these  two  functions  of  the  in- 
telligence, sense  and  consciousness.  I  will  suppose  that 
I  have  a  perception  of  some  external  object,  as  possessed  of 
the  qualities  of  extension,  form,  and  color.  In  conscious- 
ness I  recognize  the  existence  of  this  perception  as  a  phe- 
nomenon of  my  own  mind.  Which  of  these  affirmations 
are,  in  reality,  the  most  valid,  and  which  would  a  wise  and 
sound  philosophy  impel  me  to  esteem  and  treat  as  such  ;  — 
the  affirmation  of  sense,  in  respect  to  the  qualities  of  the 
external  object,  or  of  consciousness,  in  regard  to  the  exist- 
ence and  character  of  the  affirmation  of  the  former  faculty, 
as  a  phenomenon  of  the  mind  itself  ?  Neither,  surely.  Each 
faculty  pertains  alike  to  its  object,  by  direct  and  immediate 
intuition.  The  affirmation  of  each  is  alike  positive  and  abso- 
lute in  respect  to  its  object.  The  action  of  one  is,  in  real- 
ity, no  more  a  mystery  than  that  of  the  other.  The  quo 
modo  of  the  action  of  each  is  alike  inexplicable,  and  no 
more  inexplicable  than  the  mode  of  action  of  every  other 
power  in  existence.  It  is  a  sage  remark  of  Dr.  Brown, 
when  speaking  of  the  mode  in  which  causes  produce  their 
respective  effects,  "  that  everything  is  mysterious,  or  noth- 
ing is."  When  philosophy  leads  us  to  doubt  the  real  affir- 
mations of  any  faculty  of  the  intelligence,  then  philosophy 
itself  becomes  impossible,  and  the  attempt  to  realize  it,  the 
perfection  of  absurdity. 


SENSE.  45. 

THEORY    OF    EXTERNAL    PERCEPTION. 

The  way  is  now  prepared  for  an  enunciation  of  the 
theory  of  external  perception,  taught  in  this  treatise. 
Knowledge  implies  two  things  ;  an  object  to  be  known,  and 
a  subject  capable  of  knowing.  Between  the  nature  of  the 
subject  and  object  there  must  be  such  a  mutual  correla- 
tion, that,  when  certain  conditions  are  fulfilled,  knowledge 
arises,  as  a  necessary  result  of  this  correlation.  Between 
matter  and  mind  this  correlation  exists.  The  latter  knows 
the  former,  because  the  one  is  2i  faculty^  and  the  other  an 
object  of  knowledge.  Mind  perceives  the  qualities  of  mat- 
ter, because  the  former  has  the  ^ot^er  of  perception,  and 
the  latter  is  an  object  of  perception. 

Mind  also  exists  in  a  tri-unity,  consisting,  as  we  have 
seen,  of  the  intelligence,  sensibility,  and  will.  To  each  of 
these  departments  of  our  nature,  the  external  world  is  cor- 
related. Certain  conditions  being  fulfilled,  particular  qual- 
ities of  material  substances  become  to  the  intelligence, 
direct  objects  of  knowledge.  Other  conditions  being  ful- 
filled, they  affect  our  sensibility;  producing  in  us  certain 
sensations  either  pleasurable,  painful,  or  indiflferent.  Our 
will  then  acts  upon  these  substances,  controlling  their  move- 
ments, and  modifying  their  states ;  while  they,  in  turn,  re- 
act upon  the  will,  modifying  and  limiting  its  control.  In 
the  first  instance,  knowledge  is  direct  and  immediate.  In 
the  second,  through  a  consciousness  of  sensation,  we  learn 
the  correlation  between  those  objects  and  our  sensibility.  In 
the  last,  through  a  consciousness  of  the  exercise  of  our  will, 
and  an  experience  of  the  results,  we  learn  the  correlation 
between  these  substances  and  our  voluntary  powers.  In 
all  instances,  however,  whether  our  knowledge  is  direct  or 


46  THE    INTELLECT. 

indirect,  it  is  alike  real  and  absolute.  In  respect  to  the 
Tnanner  in  which,  when  certain  conditions  are  fulfilled,  we 
know  these  objects,  the  only  answer  that  philosophy  gives 
or  demands,  is  this  :  Such  is  the  correlation  between  the 
nature  of  the  knowing  faculty  and  that  of  the  objects  of 
knowledge. 

THEORY  VERIFIED. 

It  is  a  sufficient  verification  of  the  theory  above  an- 
nounced, that  it  is  a  statement  of  the  case,  as  it  presents 
itself  to  the  universal  intelligence, — that  it  is  encumbered 
with  no  difficulties  which  are  not  involved  in  every  theory 
of  a  different  kind  which  has  hitherto  been  presented,  and 
is  entirely  free  from  those  difficulties  which  are  perfectly 
fatal  to  those  theories.  Every  individual  believes,  that  he 
knows  the  external  world  as  correlated  to  the  three  de- 
partments of  our  nature  under  consideration,  and  in  accord- 
ance with  the  principles  above  stated.  Every  theory  also 
must  rest,  in  the  last  analysis,  in  respect  to  the  niocle  of 
knowledge,  upon  this  one  principle;  The  miml  k)ioios,  be- 
cause it  is  a  faculty  of  knowledge.  The  difficulties  which 
all  theories,  contradictory  to  that  above  announced,  involve, 
are  these  :  either  they  do  not  present  the  facts  or  conditions 
of  knowledge,  or  the  manner  of  knowing,  as  they  are  given 
in  and  by  the  universal  intelligence. 

QUALITIES    OF    MATTER. 

We  next  direct  special  attention  to  consideration  of  the 
qualities  of  matter.  According  to  Sir  William  Hamilton, 
and  in  his  classification  we  fulh^  concur,  such  qualities  may, 
and  according  to  a  strictly  scientific  arrangement,  should, 
be  classed  as,  primary  proper,  secundo-primary,  and  sec- 
ondary. 


SENSE.  47 

PRIMARY    QUALITIES. 

The  first,  the  primary  proper,  includes  all  those  proper- 
ties which  belong  to  matter  as  such,  and  which  cannot, 
even  in  thought,  be  separated  from  it,  as  matter.  The 
necessary  constituent  elements  of  our  idea  of  matter,  as 
such,  are  two, — that  it  occupies  space,  and  is  contained  in 
space;  that  is,  has  real  extension,  solidity  and  form.  Hence, 
in  the  language  of  the  author  referred  to,  "  we  have  eight 
proximate  attributes  : 

1st.  Extension, 

2nd.  Divisibility, 

3rd.  Size, 

4th.  Density  or  Rarity, 

5th.  Figure  (or  form), 

6th.  Incompressibilit}^, 

7th.  Mobility, 

8th.  Situation." 

These  qualities  distinguish  no  one  kind  of  material  sub- 
stance from  any  other,  but  matter  itself  from  every  other 
substance;  and  cannot,  even  in  thought,  be  separated  from 
it,  as  matter. 

SECUNDO-PRIMARY    QUALITIES. 

The  secundo-primary  qualities  are  those  which  per- 
tain, not  to  matter,  as  such,  but  which  distinguish  different 
classes  of  material  substances  from  one  anotiier,  and  which 
pertain,  as  essential  qualities,  to  such  classes.  Thus  bodies 
in  the  language  of  the  author  quoted  from  are  classed,  in 
reference  to  their  "  gravity  and  cohesion  ;  also  as  heavy 
ind  light,  as  hard  and  soft,  — solid  and  fluid, — viscid  and 
friable, — tough  and  brittle, — rigid  and  flexible, — fissile  and 
infissile, — ductile  and    inductile, — elastic  and    inelastic, — 


48  THE    INTELLECT. 

rough  and  smooth, — slippery  and  tenacious, — compressible 
and  incompressible, — resilient  and  irresilient, — movable  and 
immovable." 

SECONDARY    QUALITIES. 

The  secondary  qualities  are,  properly  speaking,  subject- 
ive affections  in  ourselves,  and  not  properties  of  matter  at 
all.  They  pertain  to  matter  merely  as  causes,  unperceived 
in  themselves,  of  these  affections  or  sensations.  Such  for 
example,  are  the  qualities  represented  by  the  terms:  sound, 
flavor,  savor,  and  actual  sensation,  heat,  cold,  etc. 

REPRESENTATIVE    AND    PRESENTATIVE    KNOWLEDGE. 

Every  one  is  accustomed  to  distinguish  between  that 
kind  of  knowledge  which  is  direct  and  immediate^  and  tliat 
which  is  obtained  mediately  \  that  is,  through  something  dif- 
fering numerically  from  the  object  of  knowledge.  The  former 
kind.  Sir  William  Hamilton  denominates  presentative^  and 
the  latter,  represe7itative  knowledge.  The  general  faculty 
of  presentative  knowledge,  he  designated  by  the  term  con- 
sciousness. Whenever  we  have  a  direct  and  immediate 
perception  of  an  object,  we  are,  he  affirms,  conscious  oi  thsit 
object.  This  general  faculty  has,  he  further  teaches,  two 
distinct  and  separate  functions, — those  of  external  and  in- 
ternal perception;  that  is,  sense,  and  self-consciousness.  In 
our  judgment,  we  repeat  what  we  have  before  said;  it  would 
be  well  for  science,  that  these  term>,  to  wit,  consciousness, 
sense,  or  "  the  faculty  of  external  perception  or  perception 
simply,"  and  self-consciousness,  were  generally  employed 
in  strict  accordance  with  the  definitions  of  this  author.  The 
term  consciousness  we  shall  employ  as  he  does;  that  is,  when 
we  wish  to  affirm  that  we  have  a  direct  and  immediate 
knowledge,  perception,  of   an    object,  we  shall  affirm,  that 


SENSE.  49 

we  are  conscious,  or  are  directly  ^iwd  immediately  cowsciom^, 

OF    THAT    OBJECT. 

RELATIONS    OF    THE    INTELLIGENCE    TO    THE    QUALITIES    OF 
MATTER. 

We  are  now  prepared  for  a  distinct  statement  of  the 
actual  relations  of  the  universal  intelligence  to  the  qualities 
of  matter.  They  are  these:  Of  the  primary  qualities 
throughout,  and  of  the  secundo-primary  in  part,  to  say 
the  least,  our  knowledge  is  direct  and  immediate,  that  is, 
presentative.  We  are,  for  example,  in  external  percep- 
tion,  just  as  directly,  immediately,  and  absolutely  conscious 
of  matter  as  an  external  object  actually  possessed  of  the 
qualities  of  extension  and /brm,  as  we  are,  in  internal  per- 
ception, of  ourselves,  as  exercising  the  functions  of  thought, 
feeling,  and  willing.  It  would  be  no  more  an  impeach- 
ment of  the  absolute  testimony  of  universal  consciousness 
to  deny  one  of  the  above  propositions,  than  it  would  be  to 
deny  the  other.  Our  knowledge  of  the  secondary  qualities 
of  this  substance,  on  the  other  hand,  is  wholly  representa- 
tive; that  is,  indirect  and  mediate,  being  obtained  wholly 
through  the  consciousness  of  our  varied  sensations.  The 
secondary  qualities  are  given  in  the  universal  consciousness, 
as  the  unknown  causes  of  conscious  states  of  the  sensibility, 
sensations.  The  primary,  and  secundo-primary,  on  the 
other  hand,  are  as  universally  given  in  consciousness,  as 
the  knoic?i  objects  of  conscious  states  of  the  intellige?ice. 
Here  is  found  the  fundamental  distinction  in  the  relations 
of  the  universal  intelligence  to  the  different  qualities  of 
matter. 

FUNDAMENTAL    ERROR    IN    PHILOSOPHY. 

By  many  philosophers,  the   dogma  is  maintained,  that 
4 


50  THE    INTELLECT. 

all  our  knowledge  of  matter  is  exclusively  representative, 
being  indirectly  and  mediately  derived,  through  sensation. 
We  might,  with  the  same  truth  and  propriety,  affirm  that 
we  have  no  knowledge  of  this  substance,  through  this 
medium,  as  to  affirm  that  all  our  knowledge  of  it  is  thus 
derived.  We  should  no  more  deny  conscious  facts,  to 
affirm  that  all  our  knowledge  of  matter  is  presentative, 
than  we  should  to  affirm,  as  the  sensational  theory  does,  that 
all  our  knowledge  of  it  is  representative.  We  are,  as  we 
have  said,  directly  and  immediately  conscious  of  matter,  as 
far  as  its  primary  qualities  are  concerned,  as  th6  known  ob- 
ject of  known  acts  of  the  intelligence,  sense,  perception; 
and  unless  universal  consciousness  is  ''  a  liar  from  the  be- 
ginning," presentative  is  the  only  form  of  knowledge  of 
which  these  qualities  are  the  objects.  We  are  conscious  of 
the  secondary  qualities,  on  the  other  hand,  but  in  this  one 
form  exclusively,  as  the  unknown  causes  of  conscious  states 
of  the  sensibility,  sensations;  and  this  is  the  only  sense  and 
form  in  which  our  knowledge  of  matter  is  received  through 
this  one  medium.  The  sensational  theory  has  no  other 
foundation  than  a  partial  induction  of  the  facts  of  conscious- 
ness, being  compatible  with  one  part,  and  absolutely  in- 
compatible with  the  other. 

HAS    MATTER    A    REAL    OR    ONLY    AN    IDEAL    EXISTENCE  ? 

Till  quite  recently,  a  fundamental  difficulty  has  attended 
the  discussion  of  this  question;  the  almost  universally  ad- 
mitted assumption,  that  all  our  knowledge  of  this  substance 
is  exclusively  representative,  being  derived  wholly  through 
the  medium  of  sensation.  While  that  assumption  remained 
as  an  admitted  principle  in  the  science  of  mind,  it  was  ab- 
solutely impossible  to  vindicate   for  matter  anything  more 


SENSE.  51 

than  an  ideal  existence;  that  of  an  unknown,  and  unknow- 
able cause  of  a  given  mental  state,  sensation.  As  the  ex- 
istence of  this  state  could  be  accounted  for  equally  well,  on 
various  and  opposite  hypotheses,  no  positive  evidence  of 
an  external,  material  cause  could,  by  any  possibility,  be 
adduced.  Now,  however,  the  sensational  theory  has  been 
demonstrably  exploded,  within  the  sphere  of  science.  It 
has  been  demonstrably  established,  that  all  our  knowledge 
of  this  substance  is  not  through  the  medium  of  sensation; 
tliat  all  our  knowledge  of  its  primary  qualities,  to  say  the 
least,  is,  not  mediate  or  representative,  but  direct  and  im- 
mediate, or  presentative.  "In  our  perception  conscious- 
ness "  says  Sir  William  Hamilton,  "  there  is  revealed  as  an 
ultimate  fact,  a  self  and  a  not-self — each  given  as  inde- 
pendent, each  known  only  in  antithesis  to  the  other.  No 
belief  is  more  intuitive^  iiniversdl^  imniediate^  or  irresistible^ 
than  that  this  antithesis  is  real  and  known  to  be  real  ;  no 
belief  is  therefore  more  true.  If  the  antithesis  be  illusive — 
self  and  9iot-self  subject  2Lnd  object,  Zand  Thou,  are  distinc- 
tions without  a  difference  ;  and  consciousness,  so  far  from 
being  "  the  internal  voice  of  our  Creator  "  is  shown  to  be 
like  Satan,  "a  liar  from  the  beginning."  Matter,  then,  as 
a  substance  external  to  the  mind,  and  possessed  of  the 
properties  of  resistance,  extension,  and  form,  has  real 
being. 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  MATTER  AS  A  FORCE  VOTD  OF  THE  PRI- 
MARY QUALITIES,  SUCH  AS  SOLIDITY,  EXTENSION  AND 
FORM. 

The  doctrine  is  now  being  pressed  with  great  zeal  into 
the  sphere  of  science,  that  matter  is,  not  an  extended  sub- 
stance having  resistance  and  form,  but  an  indefinable  and 


52  THE    INTELLECT. 

inconceivable  something,  denominated  a  force.  This  has 
become  the  watchword  of  a  new  school  in  philosophy,  to 
wit  :  Matter  has  real  existence,  not  however,  as  a  material 
substance  having  real  resistance,  extension,  and  form,  but 
as  an  immaterial  something,  acting  in  space  as  a  force.  Let 
us  contemplate  this  new  doctrine  for  a  few  moments. 

Those  who  agree  with  us  have  no  controversy  with  this 
school  in  regard  to  the  question,  whether  matter  is,  in  its 
nature,  a  real  force.  This  is  the  common  doctrine  of  all 
schools  who  believe  in  an  external  world.  What  we  con- 
tend for  is  this  ;  that  the  idea  of  matter  as  a  force,  is  just 
as  compatible  with  the  doctrine,  that  it  has  the  properties 
of  real  resistance,  extension,  and  form,  as  with  the  dogma,, 
that  it  has  no  such  properties.  We  further  contend,  that 
the  advocates  of  the  new  doctrine  have  never  yet  developed 
a  solitary  fact  pertaining  to  the  nature  of  the  forces  operat- 
ing in  the  universe  around  us,  that  proves,  or  renders  it,  in 
the  remotest  degree,  probable  that  matter  does  not,  in  fact,, 
possess  the  qualities  under  consideration,  together  with  all 
primary,  and  secundo-primary  qualities  which  have  beea 
attributed  to  it.  We  contend  still  further,  that  from  an 
appeal  to  the  nature  of  the  case,  it  cannot  be  shown,  that 
the  remotest  antececleyit  probability  exists  in  favor  of  this 
new  doctrine,  and  against  that  which  we  maintain.  In  it- 
self, it  is  just  as  conceivable,  just  as  possible,  and  just  as 
probable,  that  the  forces  existing  and  operating,  in  space, 
and  occupying  space,  have,  for  example  the  qualities  of 
real  resistance,  extension,  and  form,  as  that  they  have  no 
such  qualities.  We  finally  adduce  against  this  new  doc- 
trine, and  in  favor  of  the  one  which  we  maintain,  the  abso- 
lute affirmations  of  the  universal  consciousness.  Either 
that  consciousness  is  a  lie,  or  we  have  absolute  knowledge 


SENSE.  53 

of  the  forms  existing  and  operating  in,  and  occupying 
space,  as  possessed  of  the  qualities  under  consideration. 
The  whole  subject  before  us  stands  thus : 

1.  This  new  doctrine  is  not  self-evidently  true.  This, 
no  one  will  deny. 

2.  It  cannot,  by  any  possibility,  be  proved  to  be  true. 
This  is  equally  undeniable. 

3.  Not  a  solitary  real  fact  can  be  adduced  which  renders 
its  truth,  in  the  remotest  degree,  probable. 

4.  It  has  not  a  single  element  of  antecedent  probability 
in  its  favor. 

5.  This  new  doctrine  is  confronted,  and  the  opposite 
doctrine  affirmed  as  true,  by  the  direct,  immediate,  and  ab- 
solute affirmations  of  the  universal  consciousness.  Either 
knowledge  is  not  knowledge,  that  is,  it  is  not  it,  or  this  new 
doctrine  is  false,  and  the  one  we  maintain  is  true;  the 
former  having  no  other  foundation  than  mere  assumptions 
based  upon  infinite  ignorance,  while  the  latter  is  based  up- 
on the  immovable  rock  of  truth,  absolute  knowledge.  We 
may  safely  challenge  the  advocates  of  the  new  doctrine  to 
present  a  solitary  real  fact,  or  a  valid  argument,  in  any 
form,  that  invalidates  or  weakens  the  force  of  any  of  the 
propositions  above  presented. 

IS    COLOR   A    PRIMARY,    OR    A    SECONDARY   QUALITY    OP 
MATTER   ? 

In  all  schools  of  philosophy,  known  to  us,  color  is  as- 
sumed to  be  merely  a  secondary  quality  of  matter.  Into 
this  error  Sir  William  Hamilton  has  fallen,  although  ho  has 
himbelf  given,  with  perfect  correctness,  the  distinguisliing 
characteristic  which  separates  the  primary  from  the  second, 
ary  quality,  and   in  express  words,  and  with  equal  correct- 


64  THE    INTELLECT. 

ness,  has  given  this  identical  characteristic  to  this  one  qual-  • 
ity,  color.  The  primary  quality,  he  tells  us,  cannot,  even 
in  thought,  be  separated  from  matter,  but  necessarily  per- 
tains to  it  as  such  a  substance.  He  then  gives  forth  the 
following  statement  in  regard  to  the  quality  under  consider- 
ation,— a  statement  the  validity  of  which  will  not  be  ques- 
tioned: "  As  Aristotle  has  observed,  we  cannot  imagine 
body  without  all  color,  though  we  can  imagine  it  without 
any  oneP  Color,  then,  is  a  primary  quality  of  matter,  or 
this  substance  has  no  such  qualities  at  all.  The  particular 
colors  by  which  different  objects  are  distinguished  from 
one  another,  constitute  the  secundo-primary  qualities  of 
matter.  For  a  more  full  and  complete  discussion  of  the 
true  doctrine  of  sense,  or  external  perception,  we  would 
refer  to  the  chapter  on  this  subject  in  the  larger  work,  the 
Intellectual  Philosophy. 


KEASONo  55 


CHAPTER  V. 
REASON. 

REASON    DEFINED, 

Reason  has  already  been  defined,  as  the  faculty  of  im- 
plied  knowledge^  the  faculty  which  gives  us  necessary  ideas, 
— ideas  necessarily  implied  by  the  facts  perceived,  and  ap- 
prehended by  the  faculties  of  external  and  internal  per- 
ception, sense,  and  consciousness.  Through  sense, — per- 
ception, for  example,  we  have  a  direct  and  immediate  con- 
sciousness of  body,  as  possessed  of  the  qualities  of  exten- 
sion and  form.  By  reason,  on  occasion  of  such  perceptions, 
we  apprehend  space,  in  which  body  does  and  must  exist,  the 
former  being  implied  by  the  latter;  that  is,  the  existence  of 
body  being  absolutely  impossible,  but  upon  the  condition 
that  space  in  which  the  former  exists,  and  which  it  occu- 
pies, does  exist.  In  the  consciousness  of  external  and  in- 
ternal  facts,  occurring  as  they  do,  one  after  the  other,  we 
obtain  the  idea  of  succession;  and  by  reason,  on  occasion 
of  such  apprehension,  we  cognize  time,  or  duration,  as 
necessarily  impliedhY  succession.  By  sense  and  conscious- 
ness, also,  we  perceive  phenomena.  On  occasion  of  such 
perceptions  and  as  necessarily  implied  by  the  same,  reason 
cognizes  substance.  By  external  and  internal  perception, 
too,  we  apprehend  events.  By  reason,  on  occasion  of  such 
apprehensions,  we  cognize  cause  as  necessarily  implied  by 
events.      Of   body    and    succession    we    are    conscious    as 


56  THE    INTELLECT. 

limited,  and  of  space  and  duration,  as  unlimited.  On 
occasion  of  the  consciouness  of  such  attributes  in  these 
objects,  reason  apprehends  the  correlative  ideas  of  the  fin- 
ite, on  the  one  hand,  and  of  the  infinite,  on  the  other.  On 
occasion  of  the  consciousness  of  ourselves  as  the  subjects  of 
internal  phenomena,  reason  apprehends  the  idea  of  per- 
sonal identity,  as  necessarily  implied  by  such  conscious 
facts.  On  the  perception  of  any  fact  external  or  internal, 
reason  apprehends  still  another  idea,  that  of  exiatence^  an 
idea  represented  by  the  verb  to  be,  in  its  various  forms. 
So  also  on  the  perception  of  various  objects,  reason  appre- 
hends the  ideas  of  resemblance  and  difference,  likeness  and 
unlikeness,  equality  and  inequality,  unity  and  plurality, 
or  number,  etc. 

SPHERE    OP    REASON. 

Reason  being  exclusively  the  faculty  of  implied  knowl- 
edge, its  sphere  is  thus  fixed,  determined,  and  limited. 
Its  action  is  always  conditioned  on  the  prior  action  of  the 
other  faculties,  and  the  essential  characteristics  of  all  truths 
attained  by  reason,  must  be  as  are  those  of  the  facts  and 
objects  known  as  real,  through  these  faculties.  From  the 
nature  of  the  case,  this  must  be  so.  Implied  knowledge 
must,  in  its  essential  characteristics,  be  determined  by  that 
by  which  the  former  is  implied.  Space  and  time,  for 
example,  are  known,  and  can  be  conceived  of,  but  as  the 
place  of  body  and  succession,  and  all  our  ideas  of  substances 
and  causes  existing  and  operating  in  time  and  space,  must 
be  as  is  our  knowledge  of  the  particular  phenomena  and 
efi'ects  attributed  to  said  substances  and  causes.  The  ex- 
clusive sphere  of  reason,  we  repeat,  is  to  apprehend  the 
realities  directly  and  immediately  implied^  and  necessarily 


REASON.  57 

SO,  hy  the  facts  and  objects  known  and  affirmed  as  real  hy 
and  through  the  other  primary  faculties. 

PRIMARY    AND    SECONDARY    IDEAS    OF    REASON. 

Reason,  as  we  have  shown,  gives  us  apprehensions  of 
realities  implied  as  real  by  facts  and  objects  affirmed  as 
such  by  the  other  intellectual  faculties.  In  connection  with 
the  action  of  the  primary  faculties,  sense  and  consciousness, 
it  apprehends  such  realities  as  space,  time,  the  finite  and 
the  infinite,  substance,  personal  identity,  and  cause.  In 
connection  with  the  action  of  the  secondary  faculties,  to  be 
elucidated  hereafter,  it  apprehends  other  realities  implied 
as  such  by  objects  given  as  real  through  these  faculties. 
Those  ideas  of  reason  attained  through  the  action  of  the  pri- 
mary faculties;  as,  the  ideas  of  space,  time,  the  finite  and  the 
infinite,  substance,  personal  identity,  and  cause,  we  denom- 
inate the  primary  ideas  of  reason.  Those  on  the  other  hand, 
attained  through  the  action  of  the  secondary  faculties;  such 
for  example,  as  the  ideas  of  God,  duty,  the  true,  the  beautiful, 
the  good,  liberty,  necessity,  immortality,  and  retribution,  we 
denominate  the  secondary  ideas  of  reason.  The  former 
class  of  ideas  enter,  as  elements,  into  all  our  conceptions  of 
objects  of  every  kind.  The  latter  constitute  the  laws  of 
thought  and  action  in  all  their  forms.  The  former  have 
been  already  sufficiently  elucidated  in  this  and  the  preced- 
ing chapters;  the  latter  will  be  elucidated  in  a  separate 
chapter,  after  we  shall  have  developed  the  nature  and 
characteristics  of  the  secondary  faculties  referred  to. 

VALIDITY    OF    KNOWLEDGE    BY    REASON. 

Implied  knowledge  has  the  same  validity  and  can   have 
no   more   than   the   knowledge  by  which  the  former  is  im- 


58  THE    INTELLECT. 

plied  has.  Knowledge,  through  sense  and  consciousness, 
has,  as  we  have  seen,  absolute  validity  for  the  reality  and 
character  of  its  objects.  Knowledge  by  reason,  therefore, 
has  the  same  validity.  Body,  succession,  phenomena  ex- 
ternal and  internal,  and  events,  have,  not  an  ideal^  but  a 
real^  and  actually  knoion  existence,  and  are,  in  themselves, 
as  apprehended  by  the  intelligence.  Space,  time,  sub- 
stance, personal  identity,  and  cause,  are  in  themselves,  and 
to  the  mind,  actually  known  realities.  Materialism,  ideal- 
ism, and  scepticism, — all  of  which  rest  wholly  upon  this  one 
assumption  announced  by  Kant,  that  we  do  not,  and  can- 
not know  realities  as  they  are  in  themselves;  that  the  ob- 
jects of  all  our  ideas  and  conceptions  are  "  not  in  themselves 
what  we  take  them  to  be,"  are  systemg  of  "  science  falsely 
so  called."  Materialism  impeaches  the  validity  of  our 
knowledge  of  mind.  Idealism  impeaches  the  validity  of 
that  of  matter,  and  both  systems  that  of  all  implied  knowl- 
edge. Scepticism,  in  the  language  of  the  author  just  named, 
"gives  out  all  things  as  mere  appearance^'*  denying  the 
validity  of  knowledge  in  all  its  forms  alike.  We  have  seen, 
that  our  knowledge  through  all  the  primary  faculties  is 
valid  for  realities,  as  they  are  in  themselves.  In  reasoning 
from  facts  to  principles,  from  the  finite  to  the  infinite,  from 
creation  to  a  personal  God,  for  example,  we  are  not  reason- 
ing from  the  unknown  to  the  still  more  profoundly  unknown, 
but  from  the  absolutely  known  to  the  necessarily  implied. 
The  student  in  mental  science  cannot  be  too  deeply  im-- 
pressed  with  the  fact,  that  right  here  lies  the  only  real  issue 
between  theism  and  anti-theism.  The  latter  affirms  that, 
in  our  reasonings  from  assumed  facts  to  final  causes,  we 
are,  in  truth,  reasoning  from  the  absolutely  unknown  to  the 
still  more  profoundly  unknown.     The  former   affirms  that, 


REASON.  59 

in  thus  reasoning-,  we  are,  in  fact,  advancing  through  tlie 
absolutely  known  to  the  necessarily  implied.  The  deduc- 
tions of  each  system  have  an  immutably  necessary  connec- 
tion with  its  principles,  and  must  stand  or  fall  with  said 
principles.  We  either  do,  or  do  not,  know  the  essential 
facts  of  nature,  and  do,  or  do  not,  know  them  as  they  are  in 
themselves.  If  we  do  thus  know  these  facts,  then  all 
schools  in  science  admit  and  affirm  that  the  doctrine  of  the 
being  and  perfections  of  a  personal  God  is  based  upon  eter- 
nal rock,  the  rock  of  truth.  If  on  the  other  hand,  as  anti- 
theism  affirms,  we  do  not  thus  know  these  facts;  if  nature 
is  to  us  absolutely  unknown  and  unknowable, — then  it  is 
infinite  folly  in  us  to  inquire  at  all  after  ultimate  causes  in 
any  form;  that  is,  to  attempt  to  deduce,  from  infinite  igno- 
rance, absolute  knowledge. 

FUNDAMENTAL    MISTAKE    IN    KEGARD    TO   THE     SPHERE     AND 
FUNCTIONS    OF  KNOWLEDGE  A  PRIORI. 

Knowledge  through  reason,  has  been  denominated  by 
some  philosophers,  knowledge  a  jo?'/on,  and  many  and  very 
wild  speculations  have  been  indulged  in,  respecting  the 
proper  sphere  and  functions  of  such  knowledge.  Among  these 
speculations,  the  two  following  deserve  special  attention. 

ERROR    OF    THE    GERMA.V    PHILOSOPHERS. 

By  direct  insight  of  reason,  or  by  knowledge  a  priori^ 
the  German  philosophers,  since  the  time  of  Kant,  profess- 
edly determine  the  validity  of  knowledge  by  means  of  all 
the  other  intellectual  faculties,  and  even  by  reason  itself. 
On  the  assumed  authority  of  such  insight,  they  have  pro- 
nounced all  knowledge  existing  in  the  mind,  even  ideas  of 
reason,  utterly  invalid. 


60  THE    INTELLECT. 

"  We  have  therefore  intended  to  say,"  says  Kant,  in 
giving  the  results  of  his  philosophy,  "  that  all  our  intuition 
is  nothing  but  the  representation  of  phenomenon — that  the 
things  which  we  invisage  (form  conceptions  and  judg- 
ments of)  are  not  that  in  themselves  for  which  we  take 
them  ;  neither  are  their  relationships  in  themselves  so  con- 
stituted as  they  appear  to  us  ;  and  that  if  we  do  away  with 
our  subject,  or  even  only  the  subjective  quality  of  the 
senses  in  general,  every  quality,  all  relationships  of  objects 
in  space  and  time,  nay,  even  space  and  time  themselves 
would  disappear,  and  cannot  exist  as  phenomena  in  them- 
selves, but  only  in  us.  It  remains  utterly  unknown  to  us 
what  may  be  the  nature  of  the  objects  in  themselves,  sep- 
arate from  all  the  receptivity  of  our  sensibility.  We  know 
nothing  but  our  manner  of  perceiving  them,  which  is  pecu- 
liar to  us,  and  which  need  not  belong  to  every  being,  al- 
though to  every  man. 

"  With  this  only  we  have  to  do."  With  this  assump- 
tion, all  the  German  philosophers  since  the  time  of  Kant 
fully  agree.  Now  it  is  utterly  impossible  to  conceive  of  a 
greater  absurdity,  or  of  forms  of  more  palpable  self-contra- 
diction, in  the  sphere  of  philosophy,  than  is  involved  in 
the  above  doctrine  in  respect  to  the  proper  functions  of 
reason,  or  of  knowledge  a  priori.  What  authority  has  im- 
plied knowledge  to  determine  the  validity  of  that  by  which 
it  is  implied?  In  other  words,  how  can  a  faculty,  whose  ex- 
clusive province  is  to  apprehend  realities  implied,  and  only 
known  as  implied  by  facts  and  objects  affirmed  as  real  by 
other  distinct  and  separate  faculties,  determine  the  validity 
of  the  affirmations  of  said  faculties  ?  How  can  any  faculty 
determine  the  validity  of  its  own  absolute  affirmations  ? 
How,  for  example,  can  intuition  determine  the  validity  of 


REASON.  61 

knowledge  by  intuition,  and  how  can  vision  itself  deter- 
mine the  validity  of  knowledge  by  vision?  Finally,  h.'W 
can  we,  through  faculties  known  to  deceive  us  utterly 
everywhere  else,  obtain  valid  knowledge  of  "  our  manner  of 
perceiving  objects  ?"  The  whole  German  philosophy  has. 
its  exclusive  basis  in  mere  assumptions, —  assumptions  in- 
volving the  most  palpable  absurdities  and  contradictions  of 
which  we  can  possibly  form  a  conception. 

ERROR    OF    PRESIDENT    HICKOK    AND    OTHERS. 

President  Hickok,  together  with  a  school  of  philosophy 
of  which  he  is  the  most  distinguished  representative,  claims 
for  reason,  or  knowledge  a  priori^  a  still  higher  and  more 
far-reaching  insight.  By  such  insight,  first  of  all,  he  pro- 
fessedly determined,  in  harmony  with  the  teachings  of  the 
transcendental  philosophy  of  Germany,  that  our  perceptive 
faculties,  sense  and  consciousness,  do  not  cognize  facts  and 
objects  in  the  world  of  matter  and  spirit,  as  they  are;  that 
no  objects  exist  in  space,  objects  having  real  extension  and 
form,  such  as  are  absolutely  affirmed  to  exist  by  the  univer- 
sal consciousness;  but  that  space,  on  the  other  hand,  is  oc- 
cupied by  mere  forces  utterly  void  of  the  attributes  named 
above.  On  the  authority  of  the  same  insight,  he  affirms- 
that  we  can  obtain,  through  nature,  no  valid  proof  of  the 
being  and  perfections  of  God,  but  that  the  infinite  is  cog- 
nized as  real  by  direct  and  immediate  insight  of  reason.. 
Thus,  on  the  authority  of  knowledge  a  priori^  correcting- 
inspiration  in  the  assertion,  that  "  the  invisible  things  of 
Him  (God)  from  the  creation  of  the  world  are  clearhj  seen^ 
being  understood,"  not  by  direct  insight  or  reason,  but  "  ^// 
the  things  that  are  made^  even  His  eternal  power  and  God- 
bead."     In   his  rational   cosmology,  he   professedly   deter- 


62  THE    INTELLECT. 

mines  purely  and  exclusively  by  knowledge  a  priori^  not 
only  the  nature  of  the  forces  existing  and  acting  in  the 
world  around  us,  but  the  precise  mode  in  which  these  forces 
were  created  and  organized.  In  short,  by  direct  insight  of 
reason,  or  by  knoioledge  a  priori^  he  professedly  gives  not 
only  the  nature  of  space  and  time,  but  of  all  the  sub- 
stances, forces,  and  causes, — finite  and  infinite,  existing  and 
acting  in  time  and  space. 

Now  the  merest  tyro  in  philosophy  ought  to  know,  that 
reason,  or  knowledge  a  ^^Won,  has,  and  can  have,  no  such 
insight,  sphere,  or  authority  as  is  here  assigned  to  it.  In- 
dependent of,  and  prior  to  the  action  of  the  perceptive 
faculties,  it  has,  in  reality,  no  insight  at  all;  and  when  it 
does  act,  it  can  do  no  more  nor  less  than  give  the  realities 
implied  as  such  by  facts  and  objects  affirmed  as  real  by 
these  faculties.  Within  this  sphere,  and  nowhere  else,  has 
it  authority,  and  here  its  authority  is  absolute,  just  as  is 
the  authority  of  each  of  the  perceptive  faculties  within  its 
proper  sphere,  and  in  respect  to  its  appropriate  objects.  In 
respect  to  the  question,  what  substances  or  causes  do  exist, 
reason  has  no  direct  and  immediate  insight  at  all.  Let  us 
contemplate  this  subject  in  still  another  point  of  light.  Of 
two  or  more  distinct  and  opposite  hypotheses  each  of  whii^h 
is,  with  each  and  every  other,  equally  conceivable,  and  as 
a  consequence,  equally  possible,  we  cannot  determine  a 
priori  which  is,  and  which  is  not,  true.  This  is  undeniable. 
Of  two  events,  for  example,  each  of  which  is  in  itself  as 
possible,  and  as  likely  to  happen,  as  the  other,  we  cannot 
determine  a p)i'iori  which,  will  happen.  Now  when  we  con- 
template time  and  space  by  themselves,  three  distinct  and 
separate  hypotheses  present  themselves  in  respect  to  what 


REASON.  63 

events  and  substances  finite  and  infinite,  do  occur  and  exist 
in  time  and  space,  to  wit  : 

1.  No  events  do  occur  in  time,  and  no  substances  do 
exist  in  space. 

2.  Events  do  occur  and  substances  do  exist  in  time  and 
space  ;  but  neither  are  to  us  objects  of  valid  knowledge. 

3.  Events  do  occur  in  time,  and  substances  do  exist  in 
space,  and  both  are  to  the  mind  objects  of  valid  knowledge. 
How  can  we  determine  a  priori  which  of  these  hypotheses 
is,  and  which  is  not,  true  ?  How  can  reason,  the  faculty  of 
implied  knowledge,  and  that  only,  look  into  empty  time 
and  space,  and,  by  direct  and  immediate  and  independent 
insight,  determine  whether  any,  and  if  so,  what  events  do 
occur  in  time,  and  what  substances,  forces,  and  causes 
finite  and  infinite,  do  exist  and  act  in  space.  No  hypotheses 
can  be  more  self-evidently  absurd  and  false,  than  is  the 
idea^  that  reason  has  such  insight,  or  that  knowledge  a 
priori  has  any  such  authority  as  is  ascribed  to  it  by  this 
author  and  his  school  in  philosophy. 


64  THE    INTELLECT. 


CHAPTER  VI. 
SECONDARY  FACULTIES. 

UNDERSTANDING    DEFINED. 

Through  the  faculty  of  sense,  and  a  consciousness  of  sen- 
sations, we  have,  as  we  have  seen,  intuitions  of  the  qual- 
ities of  external  material  substances  ;  phenomena,  such  as 
are  expressed  by  the  terms  extension,  form,  resistance, 
color,  taste,  smell,  and  sound.  By  consciousness,  we  have 
similar  intuitions  of  the  operations  of  our  minds;  such  as 
thinking,  feeling,  and  willing.  Through  reason,  on  condi- 
tion of  the  perceptions  of  sense  and  consciousness,  we  have 
intuitions  such  as  those  of  time,  space,  personal  identity, 
substance,  and  cause.  These  intuitions  being  given,  another 
and  secondary  intellectual  process  occurs,  a  process  in 
which  said  intuitions,  necessary  and  contingent,  are  united 
into  notions^  or  conceptions  of  particular  things.  Thus,  our 
notion  of  body,  for  example,  is  complex,  and  when  analyzed 
into  its  distinct  elements,  is  found  to  be  constituted  exclu- 
sively of  intuitions  given  by  the  faculties  above  referred  to. 
We  conceive  of  it  as  a  substance,  in  which  the  qualities 
named  inhere, — a  substance  existing  in  time  and  space,  and 
sustaining  certain  relations  to  other  substances,  of  which 
we  have  notions  similarly  compounded.  The  same  holds 
true  of  our  notions  of  all  substances  whatever.  They  are 
all  complex,  and  constituted  exclusively  of  intuitions  given 
by  the  primary  faculties.  A  notion,  then,  is  a  complex  in- 
tellectual phenomenon,  composed  of  intuitions. 


SECONDARY   FACULTIES.  65 

The  faculties,  or  functions  of  the  intelligence,  which 
give  us  the  latter,  we  have  already  considered.  What 
shall  we  call  that  which  gives  us  the  former  ?  In  other 
words,  what  shall  we  call  the  notion-forming  power  of  the 
mind  ?  In  conformity  to  a  usage  which  has,  since  the  time 
of  Coleridge,  extensively  obtained,  we  denominate  this 
faculty  of  the  intelligence,  the  understanding.  In  strict 
conformity  to  this  specific  application,  will  the  term  under- 
standing, when  special  notice  to  the  contrary  is  not  given, 
be  employed  throughout  this  treatise.  It  will  be  employed, 
not  as  Locke  uses  it,  as  designating  the  general  intelli 
gence,  but  as  a  function  in  which  intuitions,  contingent  and 
necessary,  given  by  the  primary  faculties,  are  combined, 
into  notions  or  conceptions  of  particular  objects^  or  classes  of 
objects. 

SOURCE    OF    ERROR. 

As  intuition,  in  all  instances,  pertains  directly,  immedi- 
ately and  singly,  to  its  object,  intuitive  perception  must  be 
held  as  always  valid  for  the  reality  and  character  of  its  ob- 
ject. All  forms  of  scientific  procedure  have  their  basis  in 
the  assumed  truth  of  this  one  principle,  the  validity  of  in- 
tuition for  the  reality  and  character  of  its  object.  Error,  on 
the  other  hand,  commences  with  conceptions,  or  notions. 
How  often  do  we  hear  one  individual  say  to  another  :  your 
conception  of  such  and  such  object,  is  right  or  wrong,  true 
or  false.  How  often  are  grave  conclusions,  atid  trains  of 
reasoning,  based  upon  misapprehensions  of  the  subject  to 
which  such  conclusions  and  reasoning  pertain.  The  dis- 
ciple of  truth  will  be  exceeding  careful  in  the  formation 
of  conceptions  in  respect  to  all  important  objects  of 
thought. 

5 


66  THE    INTELLECT. 

NOTION'S,  OR    CONCEPTIONS,  CLASSIFIED. 

We  are  now  prepared  for  a  distinct  classification  of 
these  intellectual  apprehensions,  phenomena  which  take 
rank  under  different,  and  varied  classes,  according  to  the 
point  of  light  in  which  they  are,  from  time  to  time,  con- 
templated. 

VALID    AND    INVALID    CONCEPTIONS. 

One  of  the  most  obvious  divisions  is  that  of  valid  and 
invalid,  or  true  and  false.  A  conception  or  notion  is  valid 
for  the  reality  and  character  of  its  object,  that  is,  is  true, 
when  it  embraces  the  perceived  and  implied  elements  of 
thought  actually  given  by  intuition  in  respect  to  its  object. 
It  js  invalid  or  false,  when  it  excludes  any  elements  thus 
given.,  or  includes  any  not  thus  given.  This  is  the  universal 
criterion  of  valid  and  invalid,  true  and  false,  conceptions. 

COMPLETE    AND    INCOMPLETE    CONCEPTIONS. 

K  conception  or  notion  is  complete  when  it  embraces 
fully  all  the  attributes  of  its  object.  A  conception  is  in- 
complete, when  it  embraces  but  a  part  of  such  attributes. 
A  conception,  though  incomplete,  is  true  or  valid,  when  it 
embraces  none  but  real  attributes.  It  is  false,  though  com- 
plete, when  it  includes  attributes  not  real,  or  excludes 
those  which  are  real. 

SPONTANEOUS    AND    REFLECTIVE    CONCEPTIONS. 

There  are  two  distinct  and  opposite  states  in  which  a 
given  conception  may  be  contemplated,  to  wit,  as  it  first 
appears  in  consciousness  through  the  spontaneous  and 
primitive  action  of  the  understanding  ;  and  as  it  appears 
when  each  element  embraced  in  it  has  been   the   object  of 


SECONDARY    FACULTIES.  67 

distinct  rejection,  and  the  entire  conception,  with  all  its 
constituent  elements,  is  presented  in  consciousness  in  a  dis- 
tinct and  reflective  form.  The  former  may  be  classed  as 
spontaneous,  and  the  latter  as  reflective  conceptions;  the 
former  being  indistinct  and  undefined,  and  the  latter 
always  appearing  in  the  consciousness  in  forms  distinct  and 
well  defined.  The  importance  of  habitually  forming  full, 
and  distinct,  or  reflective,  apprehensions  of  all  important 
objects  of  thought,  cannot  be  overestimated.  It  is  worse 
than  useless,  for  example,  to  read  books,  or  listen  to  dis- 
courses, unless  we  habituate  ourselves  to  the  formation  of 
distinct,  and  reflective,  apprehensions  of  what  we  read  or 
hear. 

INDIVIDUAL,    GENERIC    OR    GENERICAL,    AND    SPECIFIC    OB 
SPECIFICAL    CONCEPTIONS. 

Conceptions  which  pertain  to  single  objects,  or  to  in- 
dividuals, are  denominated  individual  conceptions.  Those 
which  pertain  to  ki?ids,  which  embrace,  not  individuals,  but 
classes  (species)  under  them,  are  denominated  generic  or 
generical  conceptions.  Those,  on  the  other  hand,  which 
pertain  to  the  classes  (species)  referred  to,  are  denominated 
specific,  or  specifical  conceptions.  The  species  ranks 
under  the  genus,  and  the  individual  ranks  under  the 
species.  The  individual  conception  embraces  all  the  ele- 
ments given  by  intuition  in  regard  to  the  ol^ject  of  the  con- 
ception. Specifical  conceptions  embrace  only  those  ele- 
ments common  to  all  individuals  which  rank  under 
them.  The  generical  conception  embraces  only  those 
elements  common  to  all  the  specifical  conceptions 
which  rank  under  it. 


68  THE    INTELLECT. 

CONCRETE   AND    ABSOLUTE    CONCEPTIONS. 

Concrete  conceptions  pertain  to  their  objects  as  they 
actually  exist,  and  embrace  all  the  elements  given  by  in- 
tuition, relatively  to  their  objects — conceptions  represented 
by  such  terms  as  John,  man,  animal,  etc.  Abstract  concep- 
tions, on  the  other  hand  pertain  only  to  some  single  quality 
given  by  intuition  irrespective  of  the  object  to  which  the 
quality  belongs, — conceptions  represented  by  such  terms  as 
goodness,  whiteness,  hardness,  etc. 

POSITIVE,  PRIVATIVE  AND    NEGATIVE    CONCEPTIONS. 

Conceptions  which  embrace  those  elements  only  which 
are  actually  given  by  intuition  in  respect  to  their  objects, 
are  called  positive  conceptions,  such,  for  example,  as  are 
represented  by  such  terms  as  sound,  speech,  knowledge, 
wisdom,  etc.  Conceptions  which  pertain  to  their  objects 
as  void  of  certain  qualities  which  might,  but  do  not,  belong 
to  said  objects,  are  denominated  privative  conceptions, 
such,  for  example,  as  are  represented  by  such  terms  as 
dumbness,  deafness,  ignorance,  etc.  When,  on  the  other 
hand  a  conception  pertains  to  its  object  as  merely,  or 
necessarily,  void  of  certain  qualities,  it  is  called  a  negative 
conception, — conceptions,  forexatnple,  represented  by  such 
terms  as  a  dumb  statue,  a  lifeless  corpse,  etc. 

CONCRETE    AND    CHARACTERISTIC  CONCEPTIONS. 

We  commonly  have  two  classes  of  conceptions  in  re- 
gard to  the  same  class  of  objects,  the  one  embracing  all  the 
elements  given  by  intuition  in  respect  to  said  objects,  and 
the  other  comprehending  those  only  which  peculrarize  and 
distinguish   such   objects  from  all   individuals   resembling 


SECONDARY    FACULTIES.  69 

said  objects,  but  belonging  to  other  classes.  The  former 
class  of  conceptions,  the  concrete,  we  have  already  defined. 
The  latter  may  be  denominated  characteristic  conceptions. 

INFERIOR   AND    SUPERIOR    CONCEPTIONS. 

When  our  conception  takes  rank,  as  an  individual,  under 
another  as  its  specifical,  or  as  a  specifical  under  another  as 
its  generical  conception,  the  former  is  denominated  the  in- 
ferior, and  the  latter  the  superior,  conception. 

MISTAKE    IN    REGARD    TO    NOTIONS    OR    CONCEPTIONS. 

Conceptions  have  been  sometimes  defined  2i^ perceptions 
recalled.  This  is  a  mistake.  Perception  may  be  repro- 
duced, the  object  being  present,  but  cannot  be  recalled,  the 
object  being  absent.  Whenever  we  perceive  an  object,  the 
understanding  forms  a  notion,  or  conception,  of  said  object, 
the  perceptive,  and  notion-forming  power  often  acting  in- 
stantaneously. In  memory,  or  association,  the  conception, 
or  notion,  formed  of  the  object  when  perceived  is  recalled, 
and  not  the  perception  of  it. 

A    FACT    OFTEN    ATTENDING    PERCEPTION. 

It  is  a  fact  with  which  all  are  familiar,  that  when  we  un- 
expectedly meet  an  object  before  uuknown  to  us,  but 
which,  in  certain  particulars,  resembles  one  well  known,  we 
seem  for  a  time  to  see  the  latter  with  perfect  distinctness. 
The  reason  of  this  phenomenon  we  suppose  to  be  this: 
under  such  circumstances,  the  notion  we  have  of  the  known 
object  is  recalled  with  such  vividness,  that  it  almost  exclu- 
sively occupies  the  attention  of  the  mind. 

MISTAKE    OF    MR.    STEWART. 

According    to    this   philosopher,  in  all  conceptions,  the 


70  THE    INTELLECT. 

absent  object  is,  in  the  first  instance,  always  believed  to  be 
present,  as  an  object  of  direct  perception.  Universal  con- 
sciousness affirms  the  error  of  such  a  dogma.  The  mistake 
of  Mr.  S.  arose,  as  we  suppose,  from  his  definition  of  con- 
ception, that  is,  that  it  is  a  past  perception  recalled.  If 
this  were  true,  we  do  not  see  but  that  we  must,  not  only  at 
first,  but  at  all  times,  regard  the  object  of  our  conception, 
as  directly  present. 

MISTAKE    OF    COLERIDGE    IN    RESPECT   TO    THE    UNDER- 
STANDING. 

Coleridge  defines  the  understanding,  as  the"  faculty  of 
judging  according  to  sense,"  a  definition  which  he  copied 
from  Kant  and  other  German  philosophers.  According  to 
such  philosophers,  the  understanding  pertains  only  to  ex- 
ternal material  substances.  It  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
subjective,  with  mind.  Now  this  is  a  great  error  in  phi- 
losophy. As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  form  notions  and  con- 
ceptions of  mind  as  really  as  we  do  of  anything  not  our- 
selves. Notions  subjective  as  really  exist,  in  consciousness, 
as  those  which  are  objective.  Nor  can  any  reasons  be  as- 
signed, why  we  should  attribute  the  formation  of  the  latter 
to  one  faculty  of  the  intelligence,  and  that  of  the  former  to 
another.  The  appropriate  sphere  of  the  vmderstanding  is 
evidently  limited  only  by  the  finite.  Reason  alone  pertains 
to  the  infinite,  the  absolute,  and  the  universal.  All  other 
realities  fall  within  the  range  of  the  understanding. 


JUDGMENT.  71 


CHAPTER    VII. 
JUDGMENT. 

FACULTY    DEFINED. 

Through  the  action  of  the  primary  faculties,  as  we  have 
seen,  we  obtain  the  constituent  elements  of  all  our  knowl- 
edge. Through  the  action  of  the  understanding,  as  we 
have  also  seen,  we  forjii  notions^  or  conceptions  particular 
and  general,  of  varied  objects  of  thought.  When  such  con- 
ceptions have  been  formed,  and  two  or  more  of  them  are 
present  in  the  consciousness,  another  operation  fundamental- 
ly distinct  from  any  which  we  have  yet  contemplated,  occurs; 
an  operation  in  which  a  particular  relation  is  affirmed  to  exist 
between  said  conceptions,  or  the  subjects  of  the  same.  To 
form  a  conception  of  K  and  B  for  example,  and  to  judge 
that  A  and  B  agree  or  disagree  with  each  other,  that  they 
resemble  or  are  unlike,  that  they  are  equ^l,  or  unequal  to, 
each  other,  are  undeniably  mental  operations  entirely  dis- 
tinct and  separate,  the  one  from  the  other.  The  faculty  of 
conceptions,  or  the  notion-forming  power,  we  have  already 
defined  as  the  understanding.  What  shall  we  denominate 
the  faculty  to  which  all  "  relative  suggestions,"  relative 
affirmations,  or  acts  of  judgment,  shall  be  referred  ?  In 
accordance  with  a  usage  which,  to  a  greater  or  less  extent, 
has  obtained,  since  the  time  of  Kant,  we  denominate  this 
new  faculty,  the  judgment.  The  reality,  nature,  and  sphere, 
of  the  faculty  of  judgment  have  now  been  fully  ascertained. 


72  THE    INTELLECT. 

We  will,  accordingly,  proceed  to  an  elucidation  of  the  lead- 
ing characteristics  of  varied  acts  of  this  faculty. 

ACTS    OF    JUDGMENT    CLASSIFIED. 

Acts  of  judgment  take  rank  in  different  classes  accord- 
ing to  the  varied  stand-points  from  whicti  they  are  contem- 
plated.    We  will  consider  the  following  as  examples : 

QUANTITY    OF    JUDGMENTS,  AS   UNIVERSAL,  PARTICULAR,  AND 
INDIVIDUAL    OR    SINGULAR. 

In  respect  to  their  quayitity^  that  is,  to  the  number  of 
individuals  to  which  they  pertain,  they  are  classed,  as 
universal^  particular,  and  individual  or  singular  ;  as  in  the 
case  of  those  represented  by  the  propositions,  all  men  are 
mortal,  some  men  are  mortal,  and  John  is  mortal.  In  the 
first  proposition  mortality  is  affirmed  of  all  individuals  rep- 
resented by  the  term  men.  This  judgment  is,  for  this 
reason,  denominated  universal.  In  the  second  proposition 
mortality  is  affirmed  of  a  part  only  of  the  race  represented 
by  the  term  men.  Such  judgment  consequently,  is  called 
particular.  The  last  judgment  affirms  mortality  of  a  single 
individual,  and  hence  is,  denominated  a  singular  or  an 
mc?^m^waZ  judgment.  All  judgments,  when  contemplated 
in  reference  to  the  idea  of  quantity,  take  rank,  as  universal^ 
particular^  or  individual  or  singular^  judgments. 

QUALITY    OF    JUDGMENTS    AS    AFFIRMATIVE    OR    NEGATIVE. 

As  to  their  quality,  judgments  are  classed  as  affirma- 
tive^ or  negative',  as  in  the  propositions,  all  men  are  mortal, 
and  mind  is  not  matter.  In  the  former  case,  the  predicate 
is  affirmed,  and  in  the  latter,  it  is  denied  of  the  subject. 


JUDGMENT.  73 

RELATIONS    OF   JUDGMENTS,  AS  CATEGORICAL,  HYPOTHETICAL 
AND    DISJUNCTIVE. 

When  our  conception  is  directly  affirmed  or  denied  of 
another;  as  in  the  propositions,  all  men  are  mortal,  and 
mind  is  not  matter,  the  judgment  is  denominated  categori- 
cal. When  conceptions,  in  a  given  judgment,  stand  re- 
dated  as  antecedent  and  consequent;  as  in  the  judgment, 
*'  if  Csesar  was  a  tyrant,  he  deserved  death,"  said  judgment 
is  denominated  hypothetical.  When  one  conception  is 
given  as  included  in  a  single  member  of  a  given  class;  as  in 
the  judgment,  "  Caesar  was  a  hero  or  a  usurper,"  or  it  is 
in  B,  C,  or  D,  the  judgment  is  said  to  be  disjunctive.  From 
the  nature  of  the  relation  between  the  subject  and  predi- 
cate in  judgments,  all  such  affirmations  must  be  either 
categorical,  hypothetical,  or  disjunctive. 

MODALITY    OF   JUDGMENTS  AS  PROBLEMATICAL,  ASSERTATIVE, 
CONTINGENT    AND    NECESSARY. 

When  the  connection  between  the  subject  and  predicate 
of  a  given  proposition  is  conceived  of  as  merely  possible, 
that  is,  with  the  conviction  that  the  relation  designated 
may,  or  may  not,  exist;  as  in  the  judgment,  A  may  be  in  B, 
the  judgment  is  problematical.  When  the  connection  is 
conceived  of,  as  not  only  possible,  but  actual,  the  judgment 
affirming  such  connection  as,  for  example,  A  is  in  B,  is 
called  assertative.  When  this  connection  is  conceived  as 
actual,  with  the  conviction,  that  it  might  possibly  be  other- 
wise, as  in  the  proposition,  B  to-day  does  exist,  as  A  did 
yesterday,  the  judgment  is  denominated  contingent.  When, 
on  the  other  hand,  a  given  relation  between  conceptions  or 
their  objects,  is  considered  not  only  as  actual,  but  attended 


74  THE    INTELLECT. 

with  the  conviction,  that  the  facts  of  the  case,  can,  by  no 
possibility,  be  otherwise  than  they  are,  the  judgment 
affirming  such  connection  is  denominated  necessary  or 
apodeictical;  as  in  the  judgments,  body  implies  space,  suc- 
cession implies  time,  and  events  imply  a  cause. 

Contemplated  in  reference  to  the  idea  of  modality,  all 
judgments  must  be  classed  as  problem' itical^  assertative^ 
contingent  or  necessary.  All  contingent  and  necessary 
judgments  are  also  assertative. 

INTUITIVE    AND    DEDUCTIVE    JUDGMENTS. 

All  valid  judgments  may  be  ranked  under  one  or  the 
other  of  two  classes  denominated  intuitive^  or  deductive* 
When  the  validity  of  a  given  judgment  is  directly  and  im- 
mediately discerned;  as  in  the  judgments,  body  implies  space, 
succession  implies  time,  events  imply  a  cause,  and  things 
equal  to  the  same  thing  are  equal  to  one  another,  the  judg- 
ment is  said  to  be  intuitive.  When  the  validity  of  a  given 
judgment  is  evinced,  as  an  inference  from  other  judgments, 
it  is  denominated  a  deduced  or  deductive  judgment. 

EMPIRICAL     OR    EXPERIENCE    AND     RATIONAL     OR     A     PRIORI 
JUDGMENTS. 

When  the  validity  of  a  given  judgment  is  evinced  by 
direct  and  immediate  perception  external  or  internal,  said 
judgment  is  called  an  empirical  or  experience  judgment. 
Two  objects  in  immediate  contact,  for  example,  are  directly 
perceived  to  be  equal  or  unequal.  The  judgment,  affirming 
their  equality  or  inequality,  is  denominated  an  empirical 
or  experience  judgment.  All  judgments  pertaining  to 
fact^of  internal  and  external  perception  are  of  this  character. 
All    such   judgments,   also,   are  contingent    and    intuitive. 


JUDGMENT.  •  75 

When,  on  the  other  hand,  independent  of  all  experience,  it 
is  immediately  perceived,  that  from  the  nature  of  the  rela- 
tions between  the  subject  and  predicate,  a  given  judgment 
must  be  valid,  it  is  denominated  a  rational,  ov  a  priori^  that 
is,  a  self-evident  judgment.  Of  this  character  are  such 
judgments  as  this,  every  event  has  a  cause.  We  need  no 
facts  of  observation  or  experience,  to  know  that  sucli  a  judg- 
ment cannot  be  invalid.  Such  judgments  have,  not  only 
intuitive,  but  necessary  certainty.  Hence,  in  scientific 
language,  they  are  called  a  priori  judgments. 

FUNDAMENTAL    CHARACTERISTICS    OF    ALL    SUCH    JUDGMENTS. 

Philosophers,  in  all  ages,  have  recognized  the  existence 
of  judgments  a  priori^  that  is,  of  judgments  possessed  of  an 
intuitive  and  necessary  certainty.  Yet  no  philosopher  has 
heretofore  attempted  even,  to  give  the  fundamental  charac- 
teristics, criteria  or  tests  of  such  judgments.  Such  criteria 
we  will  now  attempt  to  give.  On  what  conditions,  then, 
can  any  judgment  have  intuitive  and  necessary  certainty  ? 
We  answer,  on  one  or  the  other  of  the  three  following  con- 
ditions exclusively  : 

1.  The  predicate  must  be  identical  with,  or  an  essential 
part  of,  the  subject.  When  we  say,  for  example,  that  A  is 
A,  we  know  that  the  judgment  cannot  be  false  ;  for  what- 
ever A  may  be,  it  must  be  equal  to,  and  identical  with, 
itself.  Such  judgments  are  called  tautological  judgments 
and  are,  of  course,  though  self-evident,  of  very  little,  if  of 
any,  use  in  science.  When  we  say,  on  the  other  hand,  that 
all  bodies  have  extension,  the  predicate,  in  that  case,  repre- 
sents an  essential  element  of  the  subject,  and  must,  of 
necessity,  pertain  to  the  subject.  All  judgments,  then,  in 
which  the  predicate  represents  a  known  and  necessary  ele- 


76  THE    INTELLECT. 

ment  of  the  subject,  and  is  affirmed  of  it  as  such,  must  have 
intuitive  and  necessary  certainty.  Such  judgments  are 
called  explicative  ;  because  the  predicate  is  explicative  of 
the  subject :  these  are  of  great  use  in  science. 

2.  The  second  class  of  judgments  which  have  intuitive 
and  necessary  certainty,  includes  those  in  which  the  subject 
implies  the  predicate  ;  that  is,  the  reality  of  the  object,  or 
the  occurrence  of  the  fact,  represented  by  the  subject,  is 
necessarily  conceived  of  as  impossible  but  upon  the  con- 
dition of  the  actual  existence  of  the  object  or  cause  repre- 
sented by  the  predicate.  The  judgments  to  which  we  have 
before  referred  are  of  this  character,  to  wit,  body  implies 
space,  succession  implies  time,  phenomena  implies  substance, 
and  events  imply  a  cause. 

On  reflection,  it  will  be  perceived,  at  once,  that  in  each 
of  these  judgments,  the  subject  implies  the  predicate.  If 
body,  for  example,  does  exist,  space  must  exist.  So  of 
succession  and  time.  If  succession  is  real,  time  must  be 
real.  The  same  holds  true  of  the  relations  between  phe- 
nomena and  substance,  and  events  and  cause.  The  former 
cannot  be,  unless  the  latter  is,  real.  Such  judgments  must 
have  necessary  intuitive  certainty,  their  contraries  being 
conceived  as  absolutely  impossible.  The  fundamental 
principles  and  axioms  in  all  the  sciences  are  of  this  char- 
acter. Judgments  of  this  character  are  called  implicative 
judgments. 

3.  Where  the  relation  of  absolute  incompatibility  is 
necessarily  conceived  as  existing  between  two  conceptions, 
or  objects,  and  the  judgment  affirms  this  incompatibility, 
such  judgment  also  has  the  character  of  intuitive  and  neces- 
sary certainty.  Of  this  character  are  such  judgments  as 
these  :    it   is  impossible    for   the    same    thing  at  the  same 


JUDGMENT.  77' 

time  to  exist  and  not  to  exist  ;  and  infinity  and  perfection, 
cannot  err  in  judgment. 

Judgments  of  this  character  are  called  incompatible 
judgments,  and  must  have  intuitive  and  necessary  certainty. 
On  reflection,  it  will  be  readily  apprehended,  that  all  judg- 
ments falling  under  one  or  the  other  of  the  three  relations 
above  specified,  must  have  this  form  of  certainty,  and  that 
none  but  such  can  possess  these  characteristics.  The 
criteria  given  by  other  philosophers,  are  rather  ea;^e?'?ia/ and 
circumstantial^  than  intrinsically  characteristic  as  all  scien- 
tific criteria  should  be.  We  refer  to  such  criteria  as  those 
given  by  Dr.  Ried  and  others  ;  such  for  example,  as  the 
fact,  that  all  men  do  admit  their  validity  in  all  their  reason- 
ing; that  even  those  who  deny  their  validity  act  upon  them; 
and  that  if  they  are  denied,  the  validity  of  all  reasoning 
fails.  No  such  criteria  lead  the  student  to  consider  the 
nature  of  the  relation  between  the  subject  and  predicate  in 
such  judgment,  and  reveal  to  him  the  fact,  that  they  not 
only  are,  but  must  be^  true,  the  very  ends  accomplished  by 
the  tests  which  we  have  given. 

ACTION    OF    THE  JUDGMENT  IN  THE  FORMATION  OF  ABSTRACT 
AND    GENERAL    CONCEPTIONS    AND  PURE  IDEAS  OF  REASON. 

Abstract  and  general  notions  or  conceptions,  and  pure 
ideas  of  reason,  have  already  been  defined.  In  the  prim- 
itive developments  of  the  intelligence,  no  such  conceptions 
or  ideas,  of  course,  exist.  All  then  and  there  is  concrete 
and  particular.  How  are  the  general^  the  abstract,  and 
pure  rational  ideas,  evolved  from  the  concrete  and  particu- 
lar ? 

ABSTRACTION. 

All  our  notions,  or  understanding-conceptions,  are,  as 


78  THE    INTELLECT. 

we  have  seen,  complex,  constituted  of  elements  furnished 
by  the  primary  faculties,  sense,  consciousness,  and  reason. 
To  make  an  abstraction  of  a  notion  is,  in  thought,  on  the 
ground  of  the  ideas  of  resemblance  and  difference,  to  sep- 
arate these  elements  from  one  another,  giving  special  at- 
tention to  some  one,  or  more,  or  each  of  them  in  particular. 
Into  our  conceptions  of  body,  for  example,  the  elements 
of  form,  solidity,  color,  etc.,  enter.  In  the  light  of  the 
ideas  of  resemblance  and  difference,  the  intelligence  per- 
ceives at  once,  that  the  element  of  solidity  differs  from  that 
of  form,  and  that  of  color  from  either  of  the  others.  In 
thought,  therefore,  either  of  these  qualities  may  be  so  sep- 
arated from  all  the  rest  that  it  shall  be  the  object  of  special 
reflection,  or  observation.  Thus  our  conceptions  of  each 
quality  of  the  object,  and  as  a  consequence,  of  the  object 
itself,  may  become  more  or  less  distinct  and  complete. 
The  way  is  now  prepared  to  answer  the  inquiry,  —  how  are 
the  conceptions  and  ideas  above  referred  to  formed  in  the 
mind  ? 

GENERAL    NOTIONS. 

In  answering  this  inquiry,  we  begin  with  general 
notions.  We  will  take  for  example  and  illustration,  the 
notion  designated  by  the  word  mountain.  It  is  admitted, 
that  in  the  first  development  of  the  intelligence,  there  was 
no  such  general  notion  in  the  mind.  The  intelligence  be- 
gan not  with  the  general  notion,  but  with  the  conception  of 
some  particular  mountain  which  had  before  been  an  object 
of  perception.  How  then  is  the  general  eliminated  from 
the  particular  ?  Another  mountain  becomes  an  object  of 
perception.  Under  the  influence  of  the  associating  prin- 
ciple, the  first  notion  is  recalled.  The  judgment,  as  these 
perceptions  are  present  on    the   theatre  of  consciousness, 


JUDGMENT.  79 

separates  the  elements  common  to  the  two.  The  under- 
standing now  combines  these  common  elements  into  a  new 
conception,  under  which  the  judgment  subsumes  the  two 
particulars.  On  the  perception  of  a  third  mountain,  the 
general  notion,  in  a  manner  like  that  just  described,  under- 
goes a  new  modification,  by  which  it  embraces  those  ele- 
ments only,  common  to  the  three  particulars,  while  each 
particular  is  again  classed  under  the  general.  Thus  the 
process  goes  on,  till  the  notion  under  consideration  assumes 
its  most  general  form.  This  is  the  process  by  which  gene- 
ral notions  are,  in  all  instances,  formed,  a  process  so  partic- 
ularly elucidated  in  a  former  chapter,  that  nothing  further 
need  be  said  upon  it  here. 

ABSTRACT    NOTIONS. 

We  will  now  consider  the  origin  and  genesis  of  abstract 
notions  such  as  are  designated  by  such  terms  as  redness, 
sweetness.  These  are  distinguished  from  general  notions, 
and  also  from  necessary  and  universal  ideas,  by  this  char- 
acteristic. They  designate  some  single  quality  of  particular 
substances  without   reference  to  those  substances. 

To  form  general  notions,  more  than  one  object  must  be 
given.  To  form  abstract  notions  but  one  is  required.  Ex- 
ample :  This  apple  is  red.  When  we  have  separated  the 
quality  designated  by  the  term  red,  from  the  subject  to 
which  it  belongs,  we  then  have  the  abstract  notion  desig- 
nated by  the  term  redness.  The  same  holds  in  all  other 
instances. 

UNIVERSAL   AND    NECESSARY    IDEAS. 

In  explaining  the  origin  and  genesis  of  universal  and 
necessary  ideas,  in   their  abstract  and    universal   form,  we 


80  THE    INTELLECT. 

will  take  as  the  basis  of  our  explanation  and  illustration 
the  principle  of  causality :  to  wit,  Every  event  has  a 
cause. 

It  is  admitted,  that  originally,  this  principle  is  not  given 
in  this  form.  What  is  given  ?  Some  particular  event,  and 
the  judgment, — This  particular  event  had  a  cause.  It  is 
also  admitted  and  affirmed,  that  the  universal  principle  is. 
not,  here,  as  is  true  of  contingent  general  principles,  given 
by  the  succession  of  particulars.  For  if  you  suppose  the 
event  repeated  a  thousand  or  a  million  times,  all  that  you 
have  in  each  instance  is  the  particular  event,  and  the  par- 
ticular affirmation, — This  event  had  a  cause.  How  then  shall 
we  account  for  the  formation  of  the  idea  or  principle  under 
consideration?  Let  us  recur  to  the  individual  fact  above 
alluded  to — the  fact  composed  of  two  parts  ;  the  empirical 
and  absolute  parts.  We  will  leave  out  of  view  the  idea  of 
succession,  and  confine  ourselves  to  the  one  fact  before  us. 

By  immediate  abstraction  let  us  suppose  the  separation 
of  the  empirical,  and  the  disengagement  of  the  necessary 
and  absolute.  We  then  have  the  pure  idea  of  the  absolute 
and  necessary.  This  idea,  thus  developed,  we  find  it  impos- 
sible not  to  apply  to  all  cases,  real  or  supposed.  We  have 
then,  and  in  this  manner,  the  universal,  necessary,  and 
absolute  idea  or  principle. 

This  process  might  perhaps  be  more  distinctly  explained 
by  a  reference  to  the  ideas  of  body  and  space.  These  ideas 
are  not  originally  given  in  their  present  simple,  abstract 
form.  They  are  given  in  such  propositions  as  this  :  This 
particular  body  is  somewhere,  or  in  space.  Here  you  have 
the  empirical  part,  body,  and  the  necessary  and  absolute 
part,  space.  Separate  the  two,  and  you  have  the  contin- 
gent idea  of  body,  and  the  necessary  and  absolute  idea  of 


JUDGMENT.  81 

space.      Hence   the    principle,    universal,    necessary,    and 
absolute  :    Body  implies  space. 

CLASSIFICATION. 

The  process  of  classification  can  now  be  readily  ex- 
plained. We  will  refer  back  to  the  case  when  two  partic- 
ular notions  were  in  the  mind,  and  the  general  was  evolved 
from  them.  As  soon  as  the  notion  last  named  appears,  the 
two  particulars  are  subsumed  or  classed  under  it.  In  the 
same  manner  every  particular  previously  perceived  is  ar- 
ranged under  the  general,  and  in  all  the  successive  modifi- 
cations which  it  subsequently  undergoes. 

FORMS    OF    CLASSIFICATION. 

There  are  three  distinct  points  of  view  from  which 
objects  are  classified. 

1.  In  view  of  general  resemblances,  they  are  classed, 
on  the  ground  of  common  qualities,  under  general  notions, 
such  as,  man,  animal,  etc. 

2.  In  view  of  some  one  quality  without  reference  to 
resemblance  in  any  other  particular,  they  are  classed  under 
notions  purely  abstract,  such  as  redness,  whiteness,  etc. 
We  often  class  objects  together,  as  white,  hard,  sweet,  etc., 
without  reference  to  their  relations,  in  any  other  partic- 
ulars. 

3.  Objects  are  classed  together,  in  view  of  their  corre- 
spondence to  pure  rational  conceptions,  such  as,  a  circle, 
square,  right  and  wrong,  etc. 

CLASSIFICATION,    IN    WHAT    SENSE    ARBITRARY. 

It  will  readily  be  seen  that  classification  from  one  point 
of  view,  will  run  directly  across  and  break  up  that  which 
6 


82  THE    INTELLECT. 

is  formed  from  another.  How  distinct  and  opposite,  for 
example,  will  the  classification  be  which  is  founded  upon 
some  one  abstract  quality,  such  as,  redness,  from  that  which 
is  based  upon  general  resemblance,  and  formed  under  a 
general  conception.  Equally  distinct  and  unlike  either  of 
the  others  will  be  the  arrangement  of  objects,  which  are 
classed  together  under  some  pure  rational  conception. 

For  these  reasons  classification  has,  by  many  been  re- 
garded as  perfectly  arbitrary.  It  is  true,  that  we  are  at 
liberty  to  adopt  either  of  the  principles  of  classification 
above  described  we  please.  In  this  respect,  the  process  is 
perfectly  arbitrary.  If  we  classify  at  all,  however,  we  must 
adopt  one  or  the  other  of  the  forms  under  consideration,  no 
other  forms  being  conceivable.  When  we  have  selected 
our  principle,  also,  the  subsequent  arrangement  of  objects 
in  conformity  to  it  is  necessary.  In  very  important  re- 
spects, therefore,  classification  has  its  laws,  which  are  by 
no  means  arbitrary. 

GENERA    AND    SPECIES. 

In  the  process  of  classification,  objects  are  ranged  to- 
gether as  genera  and  species.  Thus  we  have  the  genus 
tree,  and  the  different  classes,  or  species  of  fruit-bearing 
and  forest  trees,  ranged  under  it.  A  species  also  is  often 
itself  a  genus  relatively  to  particular  and  distinct  classes 
belonging  to  that  species.  If  fruit-bearing  be  assumed  as 
the  genus,  then  we  have  the  apple,  plum,  peach,  cherry 
trees,  etc.,  ranged  as  species  under  this  generic  term.  The 
illustration  might  be  extended  indefinitely,  from  the  highest 
to  the  lowest  forms  of  genus  and  species.  Our  present 
concern  is  with  the  principle  on  which  objects  are  thus 
classed.     It  is  that  to  which  we  have  frequently  referred  in 


JUDGMENT.  83 

this  chapter  —  the  idea  of  resemblance  and  difference.  The 
genus  is  formed  on  the  perception  of  remote  resemblances. 
Species  under  the  genus  are  formed  on  the  perception  of 
important  differences;  while  objects  are  classed  under  the 
species,  on  the  perception  of  resemblances  more  near  and 
special.  Thus  the  genus  tree  is  formed  on  the  perception 
of  qualities  common  to  all  trees.  The  species  fruit-bear- 
ing and  forest  trees,  are  separated  from  each  other,  on  the 
perception  of  important  differences,  each  species  being 
formed  on  the  ground  of  resemblances  more  near  and  par- 
ticular than  those  designated  by  the  general  term  tree. 

In  illustration  of  the  process  in  which  classes,  as  genus 
and  species,  are  formed,  we  will  take  the  case  of  the  child. 
A  certain  object  stands  near  the  paternal  mansion,  which  he 
has  learned  to  designate  by  the  term  tree.  By  and  by  he 
sees  another  object  resembling  this  in  all  important  par- 
ticulars. Here,  he  says,  is  another  tree.  In  his  mind  they 
are  distinguished  as  greater  and  less,  and  in  respect  to 
location.  Here  is  the  obscure  development  of  the  ideas  of 
genus  and  species.  At  length,  however,  he  perceives  a 
tree  diflfering  in  very  important  particulars  from  either  of 
the  others.  He  now  asks  the  question,  what  kind  oi  tree  is 
this  ?  The  answer  is,  we  will  suppose,  a  maple  tree.  Then 
the  inquiry  arises,  what  tree  is  that  which  stands  near  the 
house  ?  He  is  told  that  it  is  an  elm  tree.  He  has  now  the 
idea  of  the  genus  tree,  formed  on  the  perception  of  common 
qualities,  and  of  two  species,  separated  from  each  other  on 
the  perception  of  important  differences.  All  trees  subse- 
quently perceived,  presenting  similar  resemblances  and 
differences,  will  be  separated  and  arranged  accordingly.  As 
other  trees,  differing  from  either  of  these,  are  perceived, 
they    will    be    separated    and    classed  in  a  similar  manner. 


84  THE    INTELLECT. 

Throughout  the  whole  process,  one  idea  guides  the  mind, 
that  of  resemblance  and  difference. 

GENERALIZATION. 

But  few  words  are  requisite  in  the  explanation  of  the 
mental  process  called  generalization.  A  general  fact  is  a 
quality  common  to  every  individual  of  a  given  class.  It  may 
be  peculiar  to  that  class  :  or,  while  it  belongs  to  each  in- 
dividual of  the  class,  it  may  appertain  to  individuals  of 
other  classes. 

RULES    IN    RESPECT    TO    GENERALIZATION. 

1.  No  fact  must  be  assumed  in  general,  which  does 
not  belong  to  each  individual  of  the  class  to  which  it  is 
referred. 

2.  No  general  fact  must  be  assumed  2iS peculiar  to  one 
class,  which,  though  strictly  general  in  respect  to  that 
class,  nevertheless  appertains  to  individuals  of  other 
classes. 

3.  No  fact  must  be  assumed  as  general  without  a  suffi- 
cient induction  of  particulars,  to  remove  all  doubt  in  respect 
to  the  question  whether  it  is,  oris  not,  a  general  fact. 

INFERRED   JUDGMENTS    OR    REASONING. 

All  judgments  are  characterized  as  intuitive,  or  inferred 
or  deduced.  The  former  we  have  already  considered.  To 
the  latter  class  special  attention  is  now  invited.  Two 
objects,  we  will  suppose,  are  in  thought  before  the  mind. 
The  relations  between  them  are  not  immediately,  that  is, 
intuitively  discernible.  How  can  these  relations  become 
objects  of  knowledge  ?  On  this  one  condition  exclusively, 
that  they  sustain  known  and  common  relations  of  resem- 


JUDGMENT.  85 

blance  or  difference,  or  unlikeness,  equality  or  inequality,  to 
some  known  object.  So  far  forth  as  they,  in  the  same  par- 
ticulars, agree  with  this  one  object,  they  do,  and  must, 
agree  with  each  other.  So  far  forth,  on  the  other  hand,  as 
in  the  same  particulars,  one  agrees  and  the  other  disagrees 
with  this  object,  they  disagree  with  each  other.  All  valid 
deductions,  all  forms  of  valid  reasoning,  in  all  the  sciences, 
have  their  exclusive  basis  in  these  principles.  All  the 
axioms,  in  all  particular  sciences,  are  nothing  but  these 
principles  stated  in  forms  adapted  to  said  sciences.  All 
reasoning  which  strictly  conforms  to  these  principles  must 
be  valid,  and  all  such  procedures  which  violate  these  prin- 
ciples must  be  invalid. 

FORM    OR    BASIS    OF    ALL    VALID    DEDUCTION,    OR    REASONING. 

From  the  nature  of  the  case,  as  will  be  readily  appre- 
hended, every  deduction,  inference,  or  conclusion,  in 
reasoning,  must  have  its  basis  in  two,  and  only  two,  propo- 
sitions, called  in  science,  premises  :  to  wit,  the  general  prin- 
ciple as  above  stated,  and  the  facts  of  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment in  conformity  to  said  principle: — the  inference  or  con- 
clusion is  thence  deduced.  The  proposition  containing  the 
general  principle,  is  called  the  major  premise,  that  affirming 
the  facts  of  the  case,  is  called  the  minor  premise  ;  and 
that  containing  the  inference,  the  conclusion.  As  in  every 
argument  there  are  two, — only  two  objects  (terms)  compared 
with  a  common  third  object  (term),  every  valid  argument 
must  have  two  premises,  and  three  terms.  That  with  which 
these  objects  (terms)  are  compared  is  called  the  middle 
term,  and  those  compared  with  said  middle  term,  are 
denominated  the  extremes. 


86  THE  INTELLECT. 


THE  SYLLOGISM. 

An  argument  expressed  in  regular  form,  is  called  a  syl- 
logism. If  we  assume  the  letters  Z  and  X,  to  represent 
the  extremes,  and  the  letter  M,  to  represent  the  middle 
term,  an  argument  in  syllogistic  form  would  stand  thus : 

Every  M  is  X. 

Every  Z  is  M. 

Therefore,  every  Z  is  X. 

While  it  is  true,  that  very  few  arguments  assume  the 
form  of  the  syllogism,  it  is  also  true,  and  self-evidently  so, 
that  all  valid  arguments  are  reducible  to  this  form. 

FIGURE    OF    THE    SYLLOGISM. 

The  figure  of  the  syllogism,  as  the  words  are  employed  in 
the  science  of  logic,  refers  to  the  relations  which  the  mid- 
dle term  sustains  to  the  extremes  in  the  premises  of  the 
syllogism.  As  in  one  of  the  premises  one  extreme  is  com- 
pared with  the  middle  term,  and  with  the  other  in  the  other 
premise,  there  are  but  three  possible  relations  of  subject 
and  predicate  which  three  such  terms  can  sustain  to  each 
other.  In  the  two  premises,  that  term  of  which  the  other  is 
affirmed  or  denied  is  called  the  subject,  and  that  which 
is  affirmed  or  denied  of  it  is  called  the  predicate.  The 
relations  referred  to  are  these  ;  to  wit,  that  in  which  the 
middle  term  is  the  subject  of  one  extreme  and  the  predi- 
cate of  the  other, — that  in  which  it  is  the  predicate  of  both, 
and  that  in  which  it  is  the  subject  of  both.  As  a  conse- 
quence, there  can  be  but  three  legitimate  figures  of  the 
syllogism  ;  the  idea  set  forth  in  the  common  treatises  on 
logic,  that  there  is  a  fourth  figure,  being  an  important  error 


JUDGMENT.  87 

in  this  science.     We  will  give  an  example  of  a  syllogism  in 
each  of  the  figures  in  order  : 

First  figure.         Second  Figure.         Third  Figure. 

M=:X.  X=M.  M=X. 

Z  =  M.  Z=M.  M=Z. 

z=x,  z=x.  z=x. 

We  have  given  the  above  syllogisms  in  these  forms  to 
demonstrate  to  the  pupil  a  fundamental  error  in  the  com- 
mon treatises  on  logic;  to  wit,  that  in  the  second  figure, 
we  can  prove  only  negative,  and  in  the  third  only  particu- 
lar, conclusions;  whereas,  in  each  figure  alike,  we  legiti- 
mately obtain  not  only  particular,  but  universal,  affirmative 
conclusions.  In  the  treatise  on  logic,  as  the  reader  will 
clearly  see,  by  carefully  studying  Sir  William  Hamilton's 
scheme  of  notation  given  on  page  162,  we  have  absolutely 
demonstrated  the  fact,  that  in  each  figure  in  common,  we 
obtain,  in  the  most  valid  forms,  twelve  affirmative,  and 
twenty-four  negative,  conclusions;  and  all  in  the  same  forms 
in  each  figure. 

DISTRIBUTION    OF    TERMS. 

A  term  is  said  to  be  distributed,  when  it  represents,  in 
the  proposition  in  which  it  is  employed,  all  its  significates, 
that  is,  all  the  individuals  of  the  class  to  which  said  term 
is  applicable.  In  the  proposition,  all  men  are  mortal,  for 
example,  the  term  men  represents  every  individual  of  the 
race,  and  is,  therefore,  distributed.  A  term  is  undistributed, 
as  is  the  case  with  the  term  men,  in  the  p^-oposition,  some 
men  are  mortal,  when  it  stands  for  but  a  part  of  its  significate. 

CONSTITUENT    ELEMENTS    OP    PROPOSITIONS. 

All  logical  propositions,  being  of  course  affirmative  or 
negative,  universal   or  particular,  are   composed    of  three 


88  THE    INTELLECT. 

parts, — the  subject,  that  of  which  something  is  affirmed  or 
denied, — the  predicate,  that  which  is  affirmed  or  denied  of 
the  subject,  and  the  copula,  that  by  which  the  affirmation 
or  denial  is  made.  In  the  proposition,  for  example,  X  is  M, 
X  is  the  subject,  M  is  the  predicate,  and  ^5  the  copula, — the 
copula  always  being  represented  by  the  verb  to  be,  in  some 
of  its  forms. 

RULES    FOR    THE    DISTRIBUTION    OF    TERMS. 

The  following  rules  universally  obtain  in  respect  to  the 
distribution  of  terms. 

1.  All  universal  and  no  particular  propositions  distribute 
the  subject;  thus  constituting  the  fundamental  distinctions 
between  such  propositions. 

2.  When  the  subject  represents  an  inferior,  and  the 
predicate  a  superior  conception,  then  all  negatwes,  and  no 
affirmatives^  distribute  the  predicate.  The  reason  for  this 
rule  is  obvious.  In  the  proposition,  for  example,  all  men 
are  mortal  beings,  the  term  men  represents  one  species,  of 
which  mortal  beings  are  the  genus,  or  superior  conception. 
As  the  latter  term  has  a  wider  application  than  the  former, 
or  inferior  conception,  the  proposition,  all  men  are  mortal 
beings,  would  imply  no  more  than  that  some  mortal  beings 
are  men.  In  all  such  propositions,  consequently,  the  sub- 
ject is,  and  the  predicate  is  not,  distributed.  In  negative 
propositions,  on  the  other  hand,  all  of  the  subject  is  denied 
of  all  the  predicate,  as  in  the  proposition,  no  men  are 
mortal  beings.  Here,  of  course,  each  term  is  distributed, 
because  each  represents  all  of  its  significates. 

3.  In  all  propositions,  in  which  the  subject  and  predi- 
cate are  not  related  to  each  other  as  inferior  and  superior 
conceptions,  all  universal  propositions  distribute  the  predi- 


JUDGMENT.  89 

cate  as  well  as  the  subject.  In  such  propositions,  for  ex- 
ample, as  these,  X=M,  A  resembles  B,  and  things  equal  to 
the  same  things  are  equal  to  one  another,  the  terms  or  con- 
ceptions are  equal  and  not  inferior,  the  one  to  the  other. 
As  a  necessary  consequence,  the  predicate  as  well  as  the 
subject  is  distributed. 

CONVERSION    OF    PROPOSITIONS. 

A  proposition  is  converted  when  its  terms  are  transposed; 
that  is,  when  the  subject  is  put  for  the  predicate,  and  the 
latter  for  the  former.  The  proposition,  before  conversion, 
is  called  the  exposita^  and  after  conversion  the  converse. 
When  there  is  a  mere  transposition  of  the  terms,  with  no 
change  of  the  quantity  of  the  proposition,  conversion  is 
said  to  be  simple.  When  there  is  a  change  of  quantity^  it 
is  called  conversion  by  Ibnitation.  In  conversion,  this  rule 
holds,  universally  and  for  self-evident  reasons,  that  no  term 
must  be  distributed  in  the  converse  which  was  not  distrib- 
uted in  the  exposita.  All  forms  of  conversion  in  which 
this  rule  is  not  violated,  are  allowable.  Hence  the  follow- 
ing specific  rules  of  conversion  have  universal  validity. 

SPECIFIC    RULES    OF    CONVERSION. 

1.  In  all  propositions  in  which  neither  term  is  distrib- 
uted, as  in  all  particular  affirmatives  ;  or  in  which  both 
terms,  the  subject  and  predicate,  are  distributed,  conver- 
sion may  be  simple.     For  example  : 

PARTICULAR    AFFIRMATIVE. 

Ex. — Some  men  are  liars. 
Con. — Some  liars  are  men. 


90  THE    INTELLECT. 

UNIVERSAL    NEGATIONS. 

Ex. — No  patriot  is  a  traitor. 
Con. — No  traitor  is  a  patriot. 

UNIVERSAL    AFFIRMATIVES. 

Ex. — Things  equal  to  the  same  things  are  equal  to  one 
another. 

Con. — Things  equal  to  one  another  are  equal  to  the 
same  things. 

2.  In  universal  affirmative  propositions  in  which  the 
subject  is  an  inferior,  and  the  predicate  the  superior  con- 
ception, conversion  is  by  limitation  ;  that  is,  the  exposita 
is  a  universal,  and  the  converse  is  a  particular  proposition. 
The  converse  of  the  proposition,  all  men  are  mortal  beings, 
for  example,  is  this  :  some  mortal  beings  are  men.  This, 
from  the  nature  of  the  case,  does,  and  must,  hold  true  in 
respect  to  all  propositions  of  this  character. 

3.  Particular  negative  propositions  are  converted  by 
attaching  the  term  of  negation  to  the  predicate.  The 
converse  of  the  proposition,  some  men  are  not  honest,  is 
this  :  some  beings  who  are  not  honest  are  men.  This  is 
called  conversion  per  accident.  As  in  reasoning,  there  is 
very  frequent  occasion  to  use  the  converse  of  the  propo- 
sition which  has  been  proved,  it  is  of  great  importance  that 
the  scientific  student  should  fully  comprehend  the  princi- 
ples above  elucidated. 

FACTS    AND    PRINCIPLES    IN    SCIENCE. 

The  facts  of  science  are  those  events^  or  objects^  which 
admit  of  scientific  explanation  and  elucidation.  The  prin- 
ciples of  science  are  those  self-evident  truths,  or  ascertai?ied 


JUDGMENT.  91 

laios^  in  the  light   of  which  the   facts   referred  to  are  ex- 
plained and  elucidated. 

RELATION    OF    FACTS    TO    PRINCIPLES    OF    SCIENCE. 

Principles  have  validity  for  the  explanation  and  elucida- 
tion of  any  given  class  of  facts,  when  the  validity  of  the 
former  is  necessarily  implied  by  the  latter  ;  that  is,  when 
said  facts  are  incompatible  with  any  hypothesis  but  this, 
and  all  harmonize  with  it.  The  law  of  attraction,  for  ex- 
ample, as  develo])ed  and  elucidated  by  Newton,  not  only 
is  consistent  with  all  the  facts  of  external  nature,  and  ex- 
plains them  ;  but  it  is  necessarily  implied  by  them  ; 
all  facts  not  only  affirming  its  validity,  but  contradict- 
ing every  other  hypothesis.  That  law  therefore,  becomes 
legitimately  a  ^j>?7'/iC2}:>/e  of  science,  for  the  scientific  ex- 
planation and  elucidation  of  the  facts  of  nature.  The  same 
holds  true  of  all  valid  principles  of  science.  Their  validity 
as  such  principles,  is  necessarily  im^plied  by  the  facts  to 
the  elucidation  of  which  they  are  applied. 

THE      IMMEDIATE      CONDITIONS      OF      VALID      DEDUCTIONS     IN 

SCIENCE. 

All  valid  deductions  in  science  are  the  necessary  conse- 
quents of  valid  principles  and  real  facts,  — facts  and  prin- 
ciples sustaining  to  each  other  the  relations  above  desig- 
nated. Deductions  not  having  their  exclusive  basis  in  such 
principles  and  facts,  have  no  claim  to  validity. 

HYPOTHESES    AND    ASSUMPTIONS    IN    SCIENCE. 

An  hypothesis,  as  distinguished  from  a  principle  in  sci- 
ence, is  a  supposition  or  idea  assumed  to  account  for  known 
facts;  but  not  necessarily  implied  as  true  by  said  facts.  An 


92  THE    INTELLECT. 

hypothesis,  to  be  worthy  of  any  regard  whatever,  must  be 
consistent  with  all  the  facts  to  which  it  is  applied,  and  ra- 
tionally explain  them  all.  An  hypothesis  may  be  properly 
employed  in  the  explanation  of  facts  when  it  is  definitely 
understood  that  it  is  employed  only  as  an  hypothesis,  and 
when  said  facts  do  not  reveal  and  verify  principles  for- 
their  own  consideration.  An  hypothesis,  also,  shown  to  be 
consistent  with  a  given  class  of  facts,  has  absolute  validity 
against  any  deductions  based  upon  an  opposite  hypothesis 
pertaining  to  the  same  facts.  A  class  of  facts  is  adduced, 
for  example,  to  prove  the  crime  of  murder.  The  facts 
adduced  to  prove  the  charge,  and  the  arguments  based 
upon  said  facts,  are  proved  to  be  utterly  void  of  validity, 
when  it  is  shown,  that  these  facts  are  all  consistent  with 
some  opposite  hypothesis, — mere  accidents,  for  example,  or 
the  motive  of  self-defense.  Facts  equally  consistent  with 
various  and  opposite  hypotheses,  prove  neither,  in  distinc- 
tion from  any  of  the  others.  Assumptions  are  mere  liypoth- 
eseSs  employed  as  valid  principles  in  the  explanation  of 
facts,  and  the  construction  of  systems  of  knowledge.  All 
unascertained  facts,  employed  as  real  and  known,  in  the 
construction  of  such  systems  of  knowledge,  having  their 
basis  in  assumptions,  are  mere  logical  fictions.  Such, — as 
we  have  demonstrated  in  the  science  of  Natural  Theology 
especially, — are  the  fundamental  characteristics  of  all  the 
various  systems  of  materialism,  idealism,  skepticism,  natu- 
rali3m,  and  evolution.  When  we  examine  the  basis  princi- 
ples of  every  one  of  these  systems,  we  find  those  principles 
to  be,  without  exception,  mere  assumptions, —  utterly  void 
of  all  claims  to  the  high  rank  oi principles  of  s Hence.  And 
yet  this  is  the  exclusive  form  in  which  they  are  employed 
in  the  construction  of  those  sj^stems. 


JUDGMENT.  93 

THE    JUDGMENT,    HOW    IMPROVED. 

The  judgment  is  developed  and  improved,  by  means  of 
a  habit  of  careful  discrimination  in  respect  to  objects  of 
thought, — noticing  their  points  of  resemblance  and  differ- 
ence: by  the  habit  of  careful  classification  and  generaliza- 
tion, and  of  the  equally  careful  reference  of  facts  to 
principles.  One  of  the  most  eminent  mathematicians  that 
this  country  ever  produced,  laid  the  foundation  of  his  high 
attainments,  by  careful  stud}''  of  a  single  work, — the  com- 
mon arithmetic.  Finding  himself,  on  his  entrance  into 
college,  uniformly  deficient  and  behind  his  class,  especially 
in  the  mathematics,  he  went  back  and  took  up  the  treatise 
referred  to,  and  studied  it  until  he  had  not  only  solved 
every  problem  presented,  but  fully  comprehended  every 
principle  and  rule  in  the  science  as  therein  treated  ;  and 
furthermore,  the  reasons  and  grounds  of  the  validity  of  the 
rules  and  principles.  The  result  was,  that  from  that  time 
onward  no  member  of  his  class,  and  no  student  in  the  in- 
stitution, could  keep  in  sight  of  him  in  any  department  of 
the  mathematics.  Such  are  the  immutable  conditions  of 
attaining  a  strong  and  well  balanced  judgment  ;  and  no 
individual  who  thus  thinks  and  studies  can  fail  to  attaiii 
this  high  power.  Not  a  few  students  become  immutably 
disciplined  in  the  science  of  non-thinking,  by  the  careless- 
and  indiscriminating  and  incomprehensive  study  of  "  many 
books." 

FUNDAMENTAL    ERROR    IN    PHILOSOPHY. 

In  most  treatises  on  Mental  Science,  no  proper  distinc- 
tion is  made  between  these  two  faculties,  the  understand- 
ing and  judgment.  Coleridge,  for  example,  defines  the 
understanding    as   "the    faculty  of   judging  according    to 


94  THE    INTELLECT. 


faculty  of  apprehensions  and  judgment  in  respect  to  neces- 
sary truths.  Hence,  he  affirms  that  "judgments  of  the 
understanding  admit  of  degrees,  while  those  of  reason 
preclude  all  degrees."  Other  philosophers  who  have  treated 
at  all  of  these  faculties,  have  adopted  the  same  conclusion. 
Hence,  they  often  speak  of  "the  logical  understanding''^ \ 
while  reason  is  represented  as  the  proper  scientific  faculty, 
— the  faculty  employed  in  all  the  pure  sciences.  Now 
neither  the  understanding  nor  the  reason  are,  in  any  sense, 
faculties  of  judgment.  By  the  understanding,  we  form 
conceptions^  or  notions  of  the  objects  of  external  and  inter- 
nal perceptions.  By  the  reason,  we  apprehend  the  realities 
necessarily  implied  by  objects  of  perception, — realities, 
such,  for  example,  as  space,  time,  substance,  and  cause. 
By  the  faculty  of  judgment,  we  affirm  the  relations  exist- 
ing between  the  objects  thus  perceived  and  apprehended. 
By  the  understanding,  for  example,  we  form  conceptions 
of  body.  By  reason,  on  occasion  of  forming  such  concep- 
tions, we  apprehend  space.  By  the  judgment  exclusively, 
we  affirm  the  relations  existing  between  these  two  objects, 
body  and  space  ;  a  relation  expressed  in  the  proposition, 
body  implies  space.  The  same  holds  true  in  all  other  in- 
stances. We  have  but  one  scientific  faculty,  — the  judg- 
ment;  and  this  faculty  is  exclusively  employed  in  all 
judgments  and  deductions  ;  in  all  the  sciences  alike,  pure 
and  mixed;  and  in  affirming  relations  between  all  objects 
and  realities,  finite  and  infinite.  "Confusion  worse  con- 
founded "  is  introduced  into  the  spnere  of  science,  when 
these  distinctions  are  overlooked,  or  misapprehended. 


ASSOCIATION.  95 


CHAPTER  VIII. 
ASSOCIATION. 

TERM    DEFINED. 

"  That  one  thought  is  often  suggested  to  the  mind  by 
another,  and  that  the  sight  of  one  external  object  often  re- 
calls former  occurrences,  and  revives  former  feelings,  are 
facts,"  says  Mr.  Dugald  Stewart,  "  which  are  perfectly  fa- 
miliar, even  to  those  who  are  least  disposed  to  speculate 
concerning  the  principles  of  our  nature."  This  is  what  is 
meant  by  the  term  associatio?i.  It  is  that  principle  of  our 
minds  by  which  past  thoughts  and  states  are  recalled,  and 
revived,  through  the  influence  of  present  perceptions, 
thouo;hts,  and  feelings.  This  law  of  the  human  mind  was 
denominated  by  the  old  philosophers,  "  association  of 
ideas."  By  Dr.  Brown  it  was  denominated  "  suggestion." 
By  others,  it  is  designated  by  the  simple  term,  association. 

TERM    ASSOCIATION,    WHY    PREFERRED. 

I  prefer  the  latter  term  to  either  of  the  former,  because 
it  alone  expresses  all  the  phenomena  which  require  consid- 
eration, when  treating  of  the  subject  before  us.  We  find 
by  experience,  that  not  only  thoughts  and  events  are  asso- 
ciated, but  thoughts,  events,  and  feelings  also.  The  term 
association  of  ideas,  can  be  properly  applied  to  ideas  only. 
The  same  is  true  of  suggestion.  An  idea  or  event  cannot 
properly  be  said  to  suggest  feelings.     Thoughts  and  events 


96  THE    INTELLECT. 

may  be  said  to  revive  feelings  ;  and  feelings  may  be  said 
to  suggest  thoughts  and  events.  Association  is  the  term, 
and  the  only  term,  which  can  properly  be  applied  to  all 
these  different  classes  of  phenomena. 

THE    ASSOCIATIXG    PRINCIPLE    NOT    WITHOUT    LAW. 

Although  the  mind  is  so  constituted,  that  certain  states 
follow  certain  other  states,  these  phenomena,  as  philosophers 
have  long  since  observed,  not  only  do  not  follow  each  other 
at  random,  but  are  known  to  follow  some  one  or  more  fixed 
laws.  To  ascertain  and  illustrate  the  operation  of  these 
laws,  has  been  considered  one  of  the  great  problems  in  in- 
tellectual philosophy  ;  and  has,  accordingly,  occupied  a 
conspicuous  place  in  almost  every  treatise  upon  the  science. 
Mr.  Hume,  I  believe,  was  the  first  philosopher  who  attempt- 
ed to  settle  definitely  the  number  of  these  laws.  According 
to  this  philosopher,  they  are  all  reduced  to  three  :  Resem- 
blance, cause  and  effect,  and  contiguity  in  time  and  place^ 
Others  have  since  added  that  of  contrast. 

THE    LAW    OF    ASSOCIATION. 

Years  ago,  Dr.  Brown  presented  the  suggestion, — a 
suggestion  which  he  did  not  attempt  to  verify,  that  "  if 
our  analysis  be  suflficiently  minute  "  all  associations  would 
be  found  to  depend  upon  one  and  the  same  law.  Mr. 
Dugald  Stewart  had  previously  affirmed,  that  there  are 
great  numbers  of  facts  of  association  that  do  not  fall  under 
any  of  the  laws  developed  by  any  of  his  predecessors. 
"  Things,"  he  says,  "  which  have  no  known  relations  to 
each  other,  are  often  associated,  in  consequence  of  their 
producing    similar   effects    upon    the    mind."      Here    Mr, 


ASSOCIATION.  97 

Stewart,  without  being  aware   of  the  fact,  has  stated  the 
only,  the  exclusive,  and  universal,  law  of  association. 

THE    LAW    OF    ASSOCIATION    STATED. 

Whenever  any  one  object  of  present  thought^  or  percep- 
tion^ suggests  somet/iing  else  which  has  been  a  former  object 
of  thought^  or  perception^  the  reason^  and  the  only  reason  is, 
that  the  j^resent  object  produced  upon  the  mind  an  effect 
similar  to  that  which  was  produced  by  the  former  object. 
That  this  is  the  only  and  exclusive  law  I  argue  from  two 
fundamental  considerations. 

PHENOMENA    OP    ASSOCIATION    EXPLAINED. 

1.  All  the  phenomena  referred  to  the  commonly  received 
laws,  can  be  explained  on  this  hypothesis. 

That  many  of  the  phenomena  of  association  can  be  ac- 
counted for  in  consistency  with  the  commonly  admitted 
laws,  will  be  denied  by  no  person  of  reflection.  That 
objects  which  resemble  each  other,  that  those  which  have 
been  perceived  at  the  same  time  or  place,  that  sustain  to 
each  other  the  relation  of  contrast,  or  cause  and  eifect,  do 
mutually  suggest  each  other, — is  undeniable.  But  do  such 
phenomena  necessarily  suppose  the  existence  of  a  plurality 
of  laws  ?  May  they  not  all  be  referred  to  one,  and  that  the 
one  under  consideration  ?  Those  of  resemblance,  obviously 
may.  The  same  is  true  of  those  which  sustain  to  each 
other  the  relations  of  contiguity  of  time  and  place,  and  of 
cause  and  effect.  For  they  undeniably  have  co-existed 
with  the  same  feeling  or  states  of  mind.  Tiie  only  phe- 
nomena which  present  the  appearance  of  difficulty,  are 
those  of  contrast.  That  a  giant  and  a  dwarf  resemble  each 
other  in  but  few  particulars,  and  that  they  stand  in  striking 
7 


98  THE    INTELLECT. 

contrast  to  each  other,  is  readily  admitted  ;  but  that,  as  ob- 
jects of  perception,  or  recollection,  they  may  have  co-ex- 
isted with  the  same  feelings,  or  states  of  mind,  and  as 
causes  also  of  the  same,  I  as  fully  believe,  as  I  do  that  the 
conception  of  a  hero  and  of  a  lion  have  co-existed  in  a 
similar  manner.  A  giant  and  a  dwarf  are  strongly  con- 
trasted; but  each,  as  striking  departures,  though  in  different 
directions,  from  the  common  stature,  may  have  co-existed 
with  similar  feelings  of  wonder  or  sitrprise^  and  as  common 
causes  of  the  same  ;  and  this  may  be  the  only  reason  why 
one  suggests  the  other.  In  conversing  upon  this  subject 
on  a  particular  occasion,  an  individual  present  remarked, 
that  he  recollected  having,  at  a  particular  time,  seen  a 
dwarf.  A  giant,  which  he  had  previously  seen,  was  not 
suggested  at  all,  but  another  dwarf  whom  he  had  before 
met  with.  I  at  once  asked  the  speaker,  if  the  giant  re- 
ferred to  was  not  a  familiar  acquaintance  of  his.  He  replied 
that  he  was.  This  fact  readily  accounted  for  the  phenom- 
ena of  association,  presented  by  him.  Familiarity  had 
destroyed  the  feeling  of  strangeness,  which  had  formerly 
co-existed  with  the  perception  or  recollection  of  the  giant. 
The  same  feeling,  however,  co-existing  with  the  perception 
of  the  two  dwarfs,  the  perception  of  one  would  of  course 
suggest  the  other.  In  the  same  manner,  all  the  phenomena 
of  contrast  may  be  reduced  to  the  hypothesis  before  us. 

FACTS    OTHERWISE    INEXPLICABLE. 

2.  There  are  fundamental  facts  of  association  which  can 
not  be  accounted  for,  except  by  the  law  under  considera- 
tion. 

This  is  admitted  by  Mr.  Stewart  in  the  extract  above 
cited,  and  his  statement  v/iil  be   denied   by   no   one  at  all 


ASSOCIATION.  99 

familiar  with  facts  of  consciousness.     I   will   now   adduce 
some  facts  of  this  kind. 

1.  Facts  of  analogy^ — an  exceedingly  various  class  of 
associations,  which  can  be  accounted  for  best  upon  this  one 
principle.  Why,  for  example,  do  the  conception  of  the 
lion  and  of  the  hero,  mutually  suggest  each  other  ?  Exter- 
nally they  bear  no  relations  of  resemblance,  contiguity  in 
time  or  place,  cause  and  effect,  or  contrast.  The  contem- 
plation of  one,  however,  does  produce  upon  the  mind 
awe-inspiring  effects  similar  to  those  which  are  induced  by 
the  contemplation  of  the  other,  and  this  is  the  only  assign- 
able reason  why  they  mutually  suggest  each  other.  So  of 
all  other  facts  of  association.  An  individual,  for  example, 
relates  to  a  number  of  persons  a  single  incident  of  a  sub- 
lime, beautiful,  heroic,  horrid,  or  ludicrous  character.  How 
happens  it  that  each  hearer  instantly  recollects  almost 
every  incident  of  a  similar  character  which  he  has  ever  met 
with  ?  These  incidents  resemble  each  other  in  one  particu- 
lar only,  and  sustain  no  other  relation  to  each  other  than 
this  :  they  have,  as  objects  of  perception  or  contemplation, 
existed  in  the  mind  as  causes  of  similar  feelings  to  those 
awakened  by  the  incident  under  consideration.  The  hy- 
pothesis before  us  is  the  only  one  conceivable  which  ac- 
counts for  such  phenomena. 

2.  Phenomena  of  Dreaming.  —  The  phenomena  of 
dreaming  can  readily  be  accounted  for  on  this  hypothesis, 
and,  as  I  conceive,  upon  no  other.  In  consequence  of 
peculiar  attitudes  of  the  body,  or  states  of  the  physical  or 
mental  system,  certain  feelings  are  awakened  in  the  mind. 
Those  objects  of  thought  or  perception  which  have  for- 
merly co-existed  with  similar  feelings,  are  consequently 
suggested;  and  these  are  judged  to  be  the  causes  of  exist- 


100  THE    INTELLECT. 

ing"  feelings.  A  sick  man,  for  example,  with  a  bottle  of 
hot  water  at  his  feet,  dreamed  that  he  was  walking  upon 
the  crater  of  -^tna,  and  that  this  was  the  cause  of  the 
burning  sensation  which  he  felt.  He  had  formerly  felt 
similar  sensations  when  walking  upon  the  crater  of  Vesu- 
vius, and  had  just  been  reading  of  a  traveler's  walking 
upon  the  crater  of  JEtna.  These  facts  fully  account  for 
his  dream.  In  a  similar  manner,  all  the  phenomena  of 
dreaming  may  be  accounted  for.  But  can  they  be  ac- 
counted for  by  the  common  laws  of  association?  I  answer, 
no. 

Phenomena  of  Somnamhulis'm. — Some  of  the  phenom- 
ena of  somnambulism  here  deserve  an  attentive  considera 
tion.  It  is  well  known  that  somnambulists  frequently  pass 
from  a  state  of  wakefulness  to  that  of  sleep,  and  vice  versia^ 
very  suddenly;  and  that  in  each  change,  there  is  an  entire 
oblivion  of  what  passed  in  the  preceding  state;  while  the 
train  of  thought,  or  the  employment  left,  when  passing 
from  the  present  state,  is,  on  returning  to  that  state,  in- 
stantly resumed,  at  the  very  point  where  it  was  left.  Sen- 
tences left  half  finished,  when  passing  out  of  one  state,  are 
completed  as  soon  as  the  individual  enters  upon  the  same 
state  again.  How  manifest,  from  such  phenomena,  is  the 
fact,  that  the  universal  law  of  suggestion  is  based  upon 
similarity  of  states  or  feelings. 

FACTS    CONNECTED    WITH     PARTICULAR    DISEASES. 

There  are  many  facts  connected  with  particular  diseases, 
which  more  fully  confirm  and  illustrate  the  principle  which 
I  am  endeavoring  to  establish.  Take,  as  a  specimen,  the 
two   following   cases   stated    by  Dr.  Abercrombie,  in    his 


ASSOCIATION.  101 

Intellectual  Philosophy.  I  give  them  in  the  words  of  the 
author. 

"Another  very  remarkable  modification  of  this  affection 
is  referred  to  by  Mr.  Combe,  as  described  by  Major  Elliott, 
professor  of  mathematics  in  the  United  States  Military 
Academy  at  West  Point.  The  patient  was  a  young  lady 
of  cultivated  mind,  and  the  affection  began  with  an  attack 
of  somnolency,  which  was  protracted  several  hours  beyond 
the  usual  time.  When  she  came  out  of  it,  she  was  found 
to  have  lost  every  kind  of  acquired  knowledge.  She  imme- 
diately began  to  apply  herself  to  the  first  elements  of  edu- 
cation, and  was  making  considerable  progress,  when,  after 
several  months,  she  was  seized  with  a  second  fit  of  somno- 
lency. She  was  now  at  once  restored  to  all  the  knowledge 
which  she  possessed  before  the  first  attack,  but  without  the 
least  recollection  of  anything  that  had  taken  place  during 
the  interval.  After  another  interval  she  had  a  third  attack 
of  somnolency,  which  left  her  in  the  same  state  as  after  the 
first.  In  this  manner  she  suffered  these  alternate  conditions 
for  a  period  of  four  years,  with  the  very  remarkable  circum- 
stance that  during  the  one  state  she  retained  all  her  original 
knowledge;  but  during  the  other,  that  only  which  she  had 
acquired  since  the  first  attack.  During  the  healthy  interval, 
for  example,  she  was  remarkable  for  the  beauty  of  her  pen- 
manship, but  during  the  paroxysm  wrote  a  poor,  awkward 
hand.  Persons  introduced  to  her  during  the  paroxysm,  she 
recognized  only  in  a  subsequent  paroxysm,  but  not  in  the 
interval;  and  persons  whom  she  had  seen  for  the  first  time 
during  the  healthy  interval,  she  did  not  recognize  during 
the  attack." 

"  Dr.  Prichard  mentions  a  lady  who  was  liable  to  sudden 
attacks  of   delirium,  which,  after  continuing    for    various 


102  THE    INTELLECT. 

periods,  went  off  suddenly,  leaving  her  at  once  perfectly 
rational.  The  attack  was  often  so  sudden  that  it  commenced 
while  she  was  engaged  in  interesting  conversation,  and  on 
such  occasions  it  happened,  that  on  her  recovery  from  the 
state  of  delirium  she  instantly  recurred  to  the  conversation 
she  had  been  engaged  in  at  the  time  of  the  attack,  though 
she  had  never  referred  to  it  during  the  continuance  of  the 
affection.  To  such  a  degree  was  this  carried,  that  she 
would  even  complete  an  unfinished  sentence.  During  the 
subsequent  paroxysm,  again,  she  would  pursue  the  train  of 
ideas  which  had  occupied  her  mind  in  the  former.  Mr. 
Combe  also  mentions  a  porter,  who  in  a  state  of  intoxica- 
tion left  a  parcel  at  a  wrong  house,  and  when  sober  could 
not  recollect  what  he  had  done  with  it.  But  the  next  time 
he  got  drunk,  he  recollected  where  he  left  it,  and  went  and 
recovered  it." 

Here  are  manifest  and  striking  facts  of  association.  On 
the  commonly  received  laws  of  the  associating  principle, 
they  cannot  be  explained  at  all.  On  the  hypothesis  under 
consideration,  however,  they  admit  of  a  most  ready  expla- 
nation. How  can  they  be  explained  on  any  other  hypoth- 
esis? 

I  will  adduce  another  fact  taken  from  the  same  author. 

"A  case  has  been  related  to  me  of  a  boy,  who  at  the 
age  of  four  received  a  fracture  of  the  skull,  for  which  he 
underwent  the  operation  of  trepan.  He  was  at  the  time 
in  a  state  of  perfect  stupor,  and  after  his  recovery  retained 
no  recollection  either  of  the  accident  or  of  the  operation. 
At  the  age  of  fifteen,  during  the  delirium  of  a  fever,  he 
gave  his  mother  a  correct  description  of  the  operation,  and 
the  persons  who  were  present  at  it,  with  their  dress,  and 
other  minute  particulars.     He  had  never  been  observed  to 


ASSOCIATION.  103 

allude  to  it  before,  and  no  means  were  known  by  which  he 
could  have  acquired  the  circumstances  which  he  men- 
tioned." 

But  one  explanation  can  be  given  of  such  a  remarkable 
fact.  During  the  interval  between  the  surgical  operation 
and  the  sickness  referred  to,  the  feelinors  existing"  in  con- 
nection  with  the  operation  had  never  been  revived,  and 
from  the  peculiarity  of  the  feelings  could  not  have  been. 
During  this  sickness,  in  consequence  of  the  action  of  the 
fever  upon  the  brain  and  skull,  these  feelings  were  revived. 
The  consequence  was,  that  the  circumstances  attending 
their  existence  were  recalled.  No  other  hypothesis  can 
explain  such  facts. 

WHY  DIFFERENT    OBJECTS  EXCITE    SIMILAR   FEELINGS. 

The  law  of  associations  has  been  stated  and  illustrated. 
We  are  now  prepared  for  another  important  inquiry,  to 
wit.  On  what  principle  is  it  that  different  objects^  or  rather 
thoughts  and  perceptions,  excite  similar  feelings  in  our 
minds,  and  thus  mutually  suggest  each  other?  The  fol- 
lowing may  be  specified  as  the  most  important  reasons  why 
different  objects  excite  such  feelings. 

1.  In  consequence  of  natural  resemblance  between  the 
objects  themselves.  That  objects  naturally  alike  should  ex- 
cite similar  feelings,  is  a  necessary  consequence  of  personal 
identity.  Such  objects  do  not  suggest  one  another,  be- 
cause they  are  alike,  but  simply  because,  being  alike,  they 
excite  similar  feelings.  The  principle  of  association  in 
such  instances  is  the  same  as  in  all  others. 

2.  Objects  excite  similar  feelings,  and  thus  mutually 
suggest  each  other,  in  consequence  of  similarity  of  relations 
to  the  original  principles  of  our  nature.    Sweetness,  beauty, 


104  THE   INTELLECT. 

and  harmony,  as  mere  objects  of  sense,  are  totally  unlike. 
But  they  may  and  do  sustain  such  a  relation  to  the  original 
principles  of  our  nature,  as  to  induce  similar  states  of  mind. 
Consequently,  the  perception  of  one  may  suggest  that  of 
the  other.  Thus  the  origin  of  figurative  language,  such  as 
sweet  or  beautiful  sounds,  admits  of  a  ready  explanation. 
Also  the  sublime  comparisons  of  poetry  and  oratory,  founded 
upon  the  relations  of  analogy.  An  Indian  orator,  speaking 
of  the  American  revolution,  said,  "  That  it  was  like  the 
whirlwind,  which  tears  up  the  trees,  and  tosses  to  and  fro 
the  leaves,  till  we  cannot  tell  whence  they  come,  nor 
whither  they  will  fall.  At  length  the  Great  Spirit  spoke 
to  the  whirlwind,  and  it  was  still."  Says  another,  whose 
age  numbered  more  than  one  hundred  years  :  "  I  am  the 
aged  hemlock.  The  winds  of  an  hundred  winters  have 
whistled  through  my  branches,  and  I  am  dead  at  the  top." 
"  And  I  heard,"  says  the  sacred  writer,  "  as  it  were  the 
voice  of  a  great  multitude  and  as  the  voice  of  many  waters, 
and  as  the  voice  of  mighty  thunderings,  saying,  AUeluiah; 
for  the  Lord  God  omnipotent  reigneth."  Milton,  speaking 
of  the  breaking  up  of  the  council  of  Pandemonium,  says: 

"  Their  rising  all  at  once,  was  as  the  sound 
Of  thunder  heard  remote." 

An  aofed  soldier,  in  one  of  the  tragedies,  says  of  himself: 

"  For  I  have  fought  when  few  alive  remained, 
And  none  unscathed  ;  when  but  few  remained. 
Thus  marred  and  mangled — as  belike  you  've  seen 
C  summer's  night,  around  the  evening  lamp, 
Some  scorched  moths,  wingless,  and  :  alf  consumed 
Just  feebly  crawling  o'er  their  heaps  of  dead." 

How  different,  as  mere  objects  of  sense,  are  all  the  things 
compared  together  in  the  above  quotations  !      But  sustain- 


ASSOCIATION.  105 

ing  a  common  relation  to  the  original  laws  of  the  mind, 
they  induce  similar  feelings  or  states  of  mind.  Conse- 
quently, the  apprehension  of  one,  suggests  that  of  the 
other. 

3.  Objects  co-exist  and  excite  similar  feelings,  in  con- 
sequence of  a  perceived  relation  between  the  objects 
themselves  ;  such,  for  example,  as  the  relations  of  cause 
and  effect,  parent  and  child,  etc.  Why  it  is  that  the  feel- 
ings excited  by  one  of  these  objects  are  transferred  to  the 
other  as  soon  as  the  relation  between  them  is  perceived, 
we  cannot  tell.  All  that  we  can  say  is,  that  such  'is  the 
constituticn  of  our  minds,  that  when  two  objects  are 
known  to  sustain  such  relations  to  each  other,  they  will,  in 
all  ordinary  circumstances,  excite  similar  feelings,  and  the 
idea  of  one  will,  consequently,  suggest  that  of  the  other. 

4.  Objects  co-exist  with  similar  feelings  in  consequence 
of  mere  accidental  association.  Whenever  the  mind  has 
been  brought,  from  any  cause  whatever,  into  any  particu- 
lar state,  the  accidental  perception  of  any  object,  or  sug- 
gestion of  any  thought,  however  foreign  to  the  cause  of  the 
present  state,  will  so  modify  that  state,  that  the  new  object 
will  ever  after  sustain  an  entirely  new  relation  to  the  sensi- 
bility of  our  nature.  To  the  present  state  of  the  mind, 
thus  modified,  it  sustains  the  relation  of  a  cause.  Conse- 
quently, its  subsequent  presence  as  an  object  of  perception, 
or  of  conception,  will  excite,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree, 
that  state,  and  will  of  course  recall  the  objects  which  for- 
merly co-existed  with  the  same  state.  Thus  the  same  ob- 
ject may,  at  different  periods  of  our  lives,  be  associated 
with  entirely  different,  and  even  opposite  states  of  mind, 
states  of  mind,  also,  totally  different  from  what  they  are 
naturally  adapted  to  produce.     Thus  of  course  they  may, 


106  THE    INTELLECT. 

and  will,  recall  entirely  different  objects  to  our  remem- 
brance. In  many  instances,  we  find  it  wholly  impossible 
to  account  for  the  change  which  has  taken  place  in  the 
effect  of  particular  objects  upon  our  sensibility,  and  con- 
sequently upon  our  train  of  associations;  so  gradual  and 
accidental,  has  been  the  transfer  of  the  object  from  one 
state  of  feeling  to  another. 

APPLICATION    OF  THE    PRINCIPLES    ABOVE    ILLUSTRATED. 

The  law  of  association  which  has  been  confirmed  and 
illustrated,  has  many  and  very  important  applications.  To 
a  few  of  these,  special  attention  is  invited,  as  we  conclude 
the  present  chapter. 

GROUND     OF    THE     MISTAKE  IN     RESPECT    TO     THE     LAWS    OP 
ASSOCIATION. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  state  distinctly  the  ground  of 
the  mistake  of  philosophers,  pertaining  to  the  laws  of 
association.  Because  objects  sustaining  certain  relations 
to  each  other  do  mutually  suggest  one  another,  they  have 
fastened  upon  these  relations  as  the  Zatos  of  association.  In 
this  manner,  they  have  overlooked  the  fact,  that  objects 
suggest  each  other,  only  on  the  ground  of  a  common  im- 
pression made  by  each  upon  the  mind,  and  that  the  rela- 
tions existing  between  them  present  the  reason  why  they 
make  a  common  impression,  instead  of  revealing  laws  of 
the  associating  principle.  Philosophers  have  noticed  the 
fact,  that  some  objects  are  associated  on  the  exclusive 
ground  of  a  common  impression.  Yet  they  have  singu- 
larly overlooked  the  universal  law  of  association  revealed 
in  that  fact. 


ASSOCIATION.  107 

ACTION    OF   THE  ASSOCIATING  PRINCIPLE    IN    DIFFERENT 
INDIVIDUALS. 

We  are  all  familiar  with  the  fact,  that  the  action  of  the 
associating  principle  is  very  different  in  different  indi- 
viduals. This  is  evidently  owing  to  two  circumstances, — 
natural  temperament,  andthe  diverse  pursuits  of  individuals; 
one  thereby  being  more  deeply  interested  in,  and  conse- 
quently more  deeply  impressed  with  different  objects,  and 
with  different  elements  of  the  same  object,  than  another. 
Let  any  number  of  individuals  of  diverse  temperaments,  for 
example,  contemplate  the  same  painting,  each  will  be  most 
forcibly  impressed  with  those  features  of  it  particularly  cor- 
related to  his  own  peculiarities  of  natural  temperament. 
Hence  the  corresponding  diversity  of  the  action  of  the  as- 
sociating principle,  in  such  a  case.  So  with  a  gentleman 
on  a  tour  of  observation  ;  a  merchant  engaged  in  the  pur- 
chase and  sale  of  grain  ;  and  a  farmer  seeking  a  location 
for  his  family  ; — in  looking  over  the  same  plantation.  Each 
will  contemplate  it  in  the  light  of  the  leading  idea  in  his 
own  mind.  A  corresponding  diversity  will  of  course  exist 
in  the  impressions  received,  and  in  the  consequent  action 
of  the  associating  principle. 

INFLUENCE    OF    HABIT. 

That  actions  and  trains  of  thought,  to  which  we  have 
been  long  familiar,  are  performed  and  carried  on  by  us 
with  a  degree  of  ease  and  exactness  perfectly  unaccount- 
able to  a  new  beginner,  is  obvious  to  every  one.  In  respect 
to  the  ease  and  exactness  with  which  trains  of  physical 
actions  to  which  we  have  become  habituated  are  repeated, 
two  reasons  may  be  assigned. 

The  first  is,  a  certain  conformation  of  the  physical  or- 


108  THE    INTELLECT. 

ganization,  so  that,  as  soon  as  the  train  is  commenced,  the 
action  of  the  muscles  in  obedience  to  the  will  is  spontaneous 
and  necessary  in  a  given  order  of  action. 

The  second  is,  the  fact  that  all  the  actions  under  con- 
sideration have  become  indissolubly  associated  with  the 
same  state  of  mind.  Of  course,  as  soon  as  that  state  is  re- 
produced, those  actions  are  spontaneously  suggested  in 
their  proper  order. 

The  same  remarks  are  equally  applicable  to  trains  of 
thought  to  which  we  have  become  habituated.  When  the 
mind  has  often  existed  in  a  certain  state,  there  is,  as  shown 
above,  a  strong  tendency,  spontaneously,  or  on  the  slightest 
impression,  to  recur  to  that  state  again.  The  train  of 
thought  having  become  associated  with  this  state  is,  of 
course,  pursued  with  precision  and  facility. 

STANDARDS    OP    TASTE    AND    FASHION. 

"  A  mode  of  dress,"  says  Dugald  Stewart,  "  which  at 
first  appears  awkward,  acquires,  in  a  few  weeks  or  months, 
the  appearance  of  elegance.  By  being  accustomed  to  see 
it  worn  by  others  whom  we  consider  as  models  of  taste,  it 
becomes  associated  with  the  agreeable  impressions  which 
we  receive  from  the  ease  and  grace  and  refinement  of 
their  manners."  Thus  the  pronunciation  common  to  the 
higher  classes  in  Edinburg,  while  it  remained  the  capital 
of  Scotland,  and  which  was  then  regarded  as  the  standard 
of  purity  in  diction,  has  now  become  barbarous,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  removal  of  the  capital  to  London. 

VICISSITUDES    IN    RESPECT    TO    SUCH    STANDARDS. 

Every  one  is  familiar  with  the  perpetual  vicissitudes  in 
dress,  and  everything,  the  chief  recommendation  of  which 


ASSOCIATION.  109 

is  fashion.  The  remarks  of  Mr.  Stewart  on  this  point  also, 
are  so  much  to  the  purpose,  and  so  well  expressed,  that  I 
will  venture  another  citation  from  him.  "It  is  evident 
that,  as  far  as  the  agreeable  effect  of  ornament  arises  from 
association,  the  effect  will  continue  only  while  it  is  confined 
to  the  higher  orders.  When  it  is  adopted  by  the  multitude, 
it  not  only  ceases  to  be  associated  with  ideas  of  taste  and 
refinement,  but  it  is  associated  with  ideas  of  affectation, 
absurd  imitation,  and  vulgarity.  It  is  accordingly  laid 
aside  by  the  higher  orders,  who  studiously  avoid  every  cir- 
cumstance in  external  appearance,  which  is  debased  by  low 
and  common  use  ;  and  they  are  led  to  exercise  their  inven- 
tion in  the  introduction  of  some  new  peculiarities,  which 
first  become  fashionable,  then  common,  and  last  of  all  are 
abandoned  as  vulgar."  There  is  one  circumstance  which 
Mr.  Stewart  has  not  mentioned,  which  has  perhaps  quite  as 
much  influence  in  inducing  these  vicissitudes  as  that  pre- 
sented above.  "The  higher  classes"  are  pleased  with 
revolutions  in  society  which  are  visibly  produced  by  them- 
selves, and  which  do  not  diminish,  but  increase  and  render 
manifest,  to  themselves  and  the  world,  their  own  controll- 
ing influence.  In  the  perpetual  vicissitudes  of  costume, 
proceeding  from  and  controlled  by  themselves,  they  are 
continually  manifested  to  themselves  as  the  "  glass  of 
fashion,  and  the  mould  of  form."  Thus  a  continued  grati- 
fication of  the  love  of  power  is  enjoyed,  a  motive  not  the 
most  commendable  to  be  sure,  but  yet  quite  as  real  as  that 
above  presented. 

PECULIARITIES    OF    GENIUS    ASSOCIATED    WITH  JUDGMENT,  OR 
CORRECT    TASTE. 

We  are  now  able  to  state  distinctly  the  peculiarities  of 


//^^    0?  THK  ""^N^^^ 

f/U  DIVERSITY)) 


110  THE    INTELLECT. 

true  genius,  when  associated  with  good  judgment.  It  con- 
sists in  distinguishing  those  things  which  please, — simply 
in  consequence  ot*  accidental  associations,  like  those  above 
referred  to, — from  those  which  are  correlated  to  the 
original  and  changeless  principles  of  our  nature;  and  in  thus 
shadowing  forth  the  real  and  permanent  forms  of  beauty, 
sublimity,  and  fitness.  Those  forms  of  thought  which  stand 
correlated  to  the  current  opinions  of  the  day,  may  have  a 
wide-spread  ephemeral  popularity,  after  which  they  sink  to 
a  silent  or  dishonored  grave,  and  a  long  oblivion.  The 
productions  of  true  genius,  associated  with  good  taste,  on 
the  other  hand,  will  please  as  long  as  human  nature  re- 
mains what  it  is. 

INFLUENCE    OF    WRITERS    AND    SPEAKERS    OF    SPLENDID 
GENIUS,  BUT    OF    INCORRECT    TASTE. 

It  is  well  known,  that  very  strong  conceptive  and  im- 
aginative faculties  (the  peculiarities  of  true  genius),  some- 
times exist  in  the  absence  of  a  well-balanced  judgment  and 
consequent  good  taste.  The  productions  of  such  individuals 
will  be  characterized  by  surpassing  excellences,  and  glaring 
defects.  Yet  the  mass  of  their  admirers  will,  in  time,  be- 
come as  well  pleased  with  the  latter  as  with  the  former  ; 
and  the  defects  will,  perhaps,  be  more  frequently  copied 
by  imitators  than  the  excellences.  The  reason  is  this. 
The  defects  come  to  be  associated  with  the  feelings  of 
interest  and  delight  which  the  excellences  excite.  The 
former  are  thus  embalmed  and  consecrated  by  the  latter. 
Every  individual  who  would  preserve  his  taste  unvitiated, 
should  be,  in  a  special  sense,  on  his  guard  under  such  cir- 
cumstances. 


ASSOCIATION.  Ill 

DANGER     OF     VICIOUS     ASSOCIATIONS. 

Great  genius  and  great  vices,  polished  manners  and 
corrupt  morals,  and  productions  the  most  finished  in  respect 
to  style  and  imagery,  and  the  most  foul  in  respect  to  senti- 
ment, are  not  unfrequently  associated  among  men.  The 
imminent  peril  of  intercommunion  with  such  minds  and  with 
such  productions,  is  manifest,  in  the  light  of  the  lawof  asso- 
ciation above  illustrated.  The  feelings  of  sublimity,  beauty, 
and  delight,  awakened  by  the  contemplation  of  great  minds, 
polished  manners,  and  the  perfections  of  style  and  imagery, — 
at  first  weaken,  and  finally  entirely  supplant  the  feelings  of 
disgust,  abhorrence,  and  repellency,  which  the  contempla- 
tion of  vice  and  corrupt  principle,  in  their  unassociated 
grossness,  excites.  The  final  result  is,  the  acquirement  of 
polished  manners  and  style,  with  the  loss  of  virtue  and  vir- 
tuous principles.  That  "  which  cannot  be  gotten  for  gold," 
and  for  ''  which  silver  cannot  be  weighed  as  the  price 
thereof,"  in  comparison  with  which  "  no  mention  shall  be 
made  of  coral  or  of  pearls,  and  the  price  of  which  is  above 
rubies,"  has  been  exchanged  for  that  which  might  have 
been  attained  in  much  higher  perfection  without  this  irrep- 
arable loss  ;  but  which  may  exist  in  connection  with  the 
foulest  morals,  and  an  equal  preeminence  in  guilt. 

UNFOUNDED    PREJUDICES,    HOW    JUSTIFIED. 

Every  individual  is  familiar  with  the  fact,  that  persons 
and  classes  of  men,  placed  in  circumstances  degrading  in 
public  estimation,  often  become  the  victims  of  cruel  and 
unrighteous  prejudice.  Some  circumstance,  aside  from 
condition,  is  fastened  upon  as  the  cause  of  this  feeling, 
which  is  thus  justified,  on  the  assumption  that  it  is  natural, 


112  THE    INTELLECT. 

and  therefore  necessary,  designed  and  sanctioned  by  Prov- 
idence. Feelings  connected  with  individuals  by  accidental 
association,  are  assumed  as  resulting  from  the  original  con- 
stitution of  our  nature,  and  are  justified  on  that  assumption* 

SLANDER    AND    LIBEL. 

It  is  very  frequently  asserted  as  a  proverb,  that  the  evils 
resulting  from  giving  persons  a  bad  name,  and  spreading 
false  reports  respecting  them,  will  ere  long  correct,  and 
more  than  correct  themselveSj  in  consequence  of  a  reaction 
of  public  feeling,  as  the  truth  comes  to  be  known.  This 
would  be  true,  were  men  disposed  to  render  impartial  jus- 
tice in  all  instances.  But  this  is  far  from  being  the  case. 
Preeminent  virtues  and  endowments,  together  with  a 
commanding  influence,  may  often,  under  such  circum- 
stances, occasion  a  reaction  of  public  feeling  which  will 
perfectly  overwhelm  the  authors  of  the  mischief.  The 
standing  of  the  mass  of  mankind,  however,  is  not  such  as 
to  occasion  such  reaction,  even  when  the  wrong  done  comes 
to  be  known.  Hence,  it  often  happens  that  the  feelings 
first  awakened  come  to  be  permanently,  to  a  greater  or  less 
degree,  associated  with  them  in  the  public  mind.  If  this 
is  not  so,  no  thanks  are  due  to  those  who  first  set  the  ball 
rolling. 

INFLUENCE     OF     ASSOCIATION     IN     PERPETUATING      EXISTING 
MENTAL     CHARACTERISTICS. 

**  To  the  pure,"  says  the  sacred  writer,  "  all  things  are 
pure;  but  to  the  corrupt  and  unbelieving,  there  is  nothing 
pure."  In  other  words,  a  mind  truly  pure  comes  to  be  so 
correlated  to  objects  in  respect  to  not  only  the  action  of  the 
voluntary  power,  but  also  in  respect  to  the  sensibility  and 


ASSOCIATION.  113 

intelligence,  that  all  things  awaken  thoughts  and  feelings 
tending  to  perpetuate  and  increase  that  purity.  The  same 
is  true  with  the  vicious.  Every  object  of  thought  and 
perception  is  brought  into  such  a  relation  to  their  minds, 
as  to  generate  thoughts  and  feelings  which  tend  only  to 
develop  and  confirm  existing  tendencies  to  corruption. 
This  law  of  self-perpetuation  which  virtue  and  vice  re- 
spectively possess,  is  found  in  the  associating  principle.  In 
a  mind  which  has  long  been  the  cage  of  impure  thoughts 
and  feelings,  those  feelings  at  last  come  to  be  associated 
with  all  objects  of  thought,  and  thus  the  entire  current  of 
thought  and  feeling  is  turned  into  an  impure  channel. 

There  are  no  limits  to  the  application  of  the  associating 
principle,  as  above  illustrated.     Its  importance  in  mental 
science  will  be  appreciated  as  it  is  understood  in  its  end- 
lessly diversified  applications. 
8 


114  THE   INTELLECT. 


CHAPTER  IX. 
MEMORY   AND    RECOLLECTION. 

TERMS     DEFINED. 

Memory  and  Recollection  are  treated  by  philosophers, 
as  important  departments  only  of  the  principle  of  associa- 
tion. This,  as  we  shall  see,  is  demanded  by  sound  philo- 
sophical analysis.  The  two  terms  above  named  are  often 
used  interchangeably,  and  never  distinguished  but  by  the 
following  circumstances.  In  the  process  denominated 
memory^  notions,  or  conceptions  of  facts  and  events,  are 
spontaneously  recalled  to  the  mind.  In  that  called  recol- 
lection^ these  intellectual  states  are  recalled  by  an  effort  of 
will. 

STATES     OF     MIND     IN     MEMORY     AND     RECOLLECTION. 

There  are  three  distinct  mental  operations  connected 
with  each  of  these  processes  of  mind. 

1.  Some  feeling  or  state  of  mind  which  has  formerly 
co-existed  with  the  perception  or  apprehension  of  the 
object  recalled — a  feeling  or  state  spontaneously  recurring, 
or  revived  by  some  object  of  present  thought,  perception, 
or  sensation. 

2.  A  simple  apprehension  of  the  object  or  event  itself, 
— an  apprehension  attended  with  no  belief  or  judgment 
whatever  pertaining  to  the  object. 

3.  A  recurrence,  in  thought,  of  the  circumstances  of 
time  and  place  connected  with  the  perception  or  apprehen- 
sion of  the  object. 


MEMORY    AND    RECOLLECTION.  115 

THE  ABOVE  STATEMENT  VERIFIED. 

That  objects  of  memory  and  recollection  are  not  re- 
called directly  and  immediately,  but  are  suggested,  in  the 
manner  above  described,  is  obvious  from  two  considera- 
tions. 

1.  From  universal  coJisciousness .  Those  who  are  least 
accustomed  to  analyze  the  operations  of  their  own  minds, 
as  well  as  philosophers,  have  noticed  the  fact.  Hence  the 
common  affirmations  :  "  this  reminds  me  of,"  or  "  this  sug-^ 
gests  to  my  mind  such  and  such  occurrences," — clearly 
showing,  not  merely  that  such  events  are  suggested,  but 
that  the  objects  of  them  are  conscious  of  it. 

2.  When  we  wish  to  recollect  any  events,  or  in  the 
common  phrase,  to  recall  them,  we  do  not  attempt  to  do 
this  directly,  but  by  directing  the  attention  to  various  ob- 
jects, at  present  before  the  mind,  that  they  may  suggest 
those  which  we  wish  to  recall.  Memory  and  recollection 
are,  in  this  respect,  subject  to  precisely  the  same  law;  and 
the  law  which  governs  each  is  the  same  which  governs  the 
entire  phenomena  of  association.  The  above  remark  is  so 
obviously  true,  that  philosophers,  as  stated  aoove,  almost 
universally  treat  of  these  subjects  in  the  same  connection, 
memory  being  considered  as  one  department  only  of 
association. 

DISTINCT    AND    EASY    RECOLLECTION. 

Taking  this  position  for  granted,  or  as  having  been  al- 
ready proved,  it  will  follow,  as  a  necess-iry  consequence, 
that  the  ease  and  distinctness  with  which  any  objects  or 
events  will  be  recalled  to  the  mind,  will  always  be  propor- 
tioned, to  the  depth  and  intensity  of  the  impressions 
formerly  received  from  them,  and  to  the  number  of  objects 


116  THE    INTELLECT. 

and  events  with  which  such  impressions  have  heretofore 
co-existed,  or  may  hereafter  coexist.  This  conclusion  we 
also  find  to  be  confirmed  by  universal  experience.  When 
you  hear  the  declaration,  "  such  and  such  events  I  shall 
never  forget,"  suppose  you  ask  the  reason  for  such  an 
affirmation.  The  answer  will  invariably  be,  "  it  made  such 
a  deep  impression  upon  my  mind."  On  the  other  hand,  if 
a  person  is  asked  for  the  reason  why  he  recalls  with  such 
difficulty  any  particular  event,  he  will  uniformly  answer, 
"  it  made  such  a  feeble  impression  upon  my  mind."  As- 
suming that  the  state  of  the  sensibility  is  the  regulating 
principle  of  suggestion,  the  fact  is  self-evident,  that  the 
ease  with  which  any  particular  event  will  be  recalled,  de- 
pends not  only  upon  the  depth  and  intensity  of  the  impres- 
sion which  it  formerly  made,  but  upon  the  number  of  ob- 
jects or  events  with  which  such  impression  may  have  co- 
existed, and  will  hereafter  co-exist. 

DISTINCT   IMPRESSIONS,    ON    WHAT   CONDITIONED. 

One  inquiry,  of  no  small  importance  in  mental  science, 
here  claims  our  attention,  to  wit,  the  circumstances  under 
which  impressions  received  from  objects  of  thought  or  per- 
ception are  rendered  deep  and  distinct.  Among  these  I 
notice  the  three  following,  as  the  most  important  : 

1.  Atteyition.  In  former  chapters  it  has  been  shown 
that  attention  is  the  condition  of  distinct  perception,  in  re- 
spect to  the  phenomena  of  both  sense  and  consciousness. 
In  walking,  for  example,  we  do  not  remember  the  particu- 
lar act  of  volition,  which  directed  each  particular  step.  Yet 
we  know  that  we  must  have  been  conscious  of  such  acts. 
The  eye  runs  carelessly  over  a  particular  landscape,  and 
nothing  but  the  most  general  outline  is  remembered,  while 


MEMORY    AND    RECOLLECTION.  117 

we  know  that  each  particular  part  must  have  been  seen  by 
us.  For  the  want  of  attention,  however,  these  objects  were 
not  distinctly  perceived.  Of  course  no  distinct  and  vivid 
impression  was  made  upon  the  mind,  and  consequently 
they  are  not  remembered.  The  manner  in  which  attention 
influences  memory  is  two-fold.  It  not  only  impresses 
deeply  and  distinctly  on  the  mind  particular  scenes,  each 
taken  as  a  whole,  but  all  the  parts  of  such  scenes.  Hence 
the  whole  of  such  scenes  will  be  recalled  by  the  perception 
or  suggestion  of  any  particular  part,  wliich  may  be  met 
with  in  other  scenes.  That  memory,  however,  does  not 
depend  primarily  upon  attention,  but  upon  the  impression 
made  by  objects  of  attention,  is  evident  from  the  fact, 
that  the  ease  with  which  any  particular  event  is  recalled, 
is  not  proportioned  to  the  degree  of  attention  devoted 
to  it,  but  to  the  vividness  of  the  impression  received  from 
it. 

2.  The  impression  made  upon  the  mind  by  a  particular 
event,  and  consequently  the  ease  with  which  it  will  be 
recalled,  depends  upon  the  circmnstances  in  which  the 
event  occurred — circumstances  external  to  the  mind  ;  such 
for  example,  as  its  occurrence  at  a  time  and  place  unex- 
pected; in  connection  with  other  events  deeply  interesting 
to  us,  etc. 

3.  The  impression  which  events  make  on  the  mind, 
depends  upon  the  state  of  the  mind  itself,  when  they  occur. 
Offices  of  kindness,  when  we  little  need  them,  make  a  com- 
paratively slight  im})ression  upon  the  mind.  They  are 
accordingly  forgotten  with  comparative  ease.  But  the 
stranger  who  watched  over  us  when  we  were  sick,  in  a 
strange  land,  we  never  forget;  for  the  obvious  reason  that 
such  occurrences  are  deeply  impressed  upon  the  mind.  Who 


118  THE    INTELLECT. 

is  not  aware  that  the  impression  made  upon  the  mind  in 
reading  a  book,  listening  to  a  discourse,  or  witnessing  any 
scene,  and  consequently  the  ease  and  distinctness  with 
which  they  are  recalled,  depends  greatly  upon  the  state  of 
mind  at  the  time  ? 

DIVERSITY  OF  POWERS    OF    MEMORY,    AS    DEVELOPED    IN    DIF- 
FERENT   INDIVIDUALS. 

Assuming  the  principle,  that  those  things  of  which  we 
have  formed  distinct  conceptions,  and  which  have  deeply 
moved  and  affected  our  sensibility,  will  be  easily  and  dis- 
tinctly remembered,  the  diverse  kinds  of  memory,  as  they 
appear  in  different  individuals,  may  be  readily  explained. 

PHILOSOPHIC    MEMORY. 

The  philosopher  is,  above  all  things,  interested  in  uni- 
versal truths  and  general  principles,  and  in  facts  which 
illustrate  such  truths  and  principles.  With  names,  and 
minor  circumstances  of  time  and  place,  he  has  little  or  no 
interest.  These,  of  course,  he  seldom  recalls  ;  while  gen- 
eral principles  and  facts  connected  with,  and  illustrative  of 
general  principles,  he  never  forgets.  Here  we  have  the 
peculiarities  of  what  may  be  called  philosophical  rtiemory. 

LOCAL    MEMORY. 

With  general  principles,  however,  the  mass  of  men  are 
very  little  interested.  Events,  as  mere  events,  with  all 
their  circumstances  of  time,  place,  etc.,  are  the  things 
which  chiefly  interest  them.  In  such  cases,  general  prin- 
ciples, if  understood  at  all,  will  readily  pass  from  the  mind, 
while  facts  and  events,  with  all  their  adventitious  circum- 
stances, will  leave  their  permanent  impress  upon  it.  Here 
we  have  the  characteristics  of  what  is  called  local  memory. 


MEMORY    AND    RECOLLECTION.  119 

ARTIFICIAL    MEMORY. 

The  third  and  only  other  kind  of  memory  which  it  is 
necessary  to  notice,  is  called  artificial  memory^  a  method 
of  connecting  things  easily  remembered  with  those  which 
are  recalled  with  greater  difficulty,  that  the  latter  may  be 
recalled  by  means  of  the  former.  The  manner  in  which  the 
principle  of  suggestion  operates  in  this  instance,  may  be 
readily  explained.  The  two  objects  are  brought  into  the 
relation  of  co-existence  wuth  one  and  the  same  state  of 
mind  ;  and  the  familiar  object,  by  exciting  that  state,  re- 
calls tlie  one  less  familiar.  The  inexpediency  of  resorting 
to  such  associations,  excepting  upon  trivial  subjects,  is  so 
obvious  as  not  to  need  any  particular  remarks. 

A  few  topics  of  a  somewhat  miscellaneous  character, 
connected  with  our  present  inquiries  will  close   this  chapter. 

A    READY    AND    RETENTIVE    MEMORY. 

The  distinction  between  what  is  called  a  ready,  and  a 
retentive  memory,  next  demands  attention.  A  philosophi- 
cal memory  is  known  to  be  the  most  retentive  and  least 
ready.  General  principles  are  regarded  by  the  philosopher, 
as  above  all  price.  These  of  course  he  never  forgets.  For 
the  same  reason,  facts  and  events,  connected  with,  and 
illustrative  of  general  principles  leave  an  impress  equally 
permanent  upon  his  mind.  The  memory  of  such  a  person 
however,  will  not,  in  ordinary  circumstances,  be  ready;  for 
the  obvious  reason,  that  when  he  wishes  to  recall  any  par- 
ticular fact,  he  finds  it  necessary  first  to  recall  the  general 
principle  with  which  it  was  associated.  For  the  same 
reason,  local  memory  will  be  more  ready,  but  less  reten- 
tive     The  qualities  in  objects  with  which  such  persons  are 


120  THE    INTELLECT. 

interested,  exist  alike  in  such  an  infinite  variety  of  objects, 
that  when  this  quality  is  met  with,  a  great  multitude  of 
similar  objects  will  be  at  once  suggested.  They  will  gen- 
erally be  those  however,  which  have  been  most  recently 
seen.  Persons  possessing  local  memory  merely,  will  excel 
in  common  conversation,  and  in  what  may  be  called  loose 
and  rambling  composition.  Philosophical  memory,  dis- 
plays itself  in  the  laboratory,  the  hall  of  science,  on  the 
bench,  in  the  lecture  room,  and  pulpit. 

VAST    AND    DIVERSE    POWERS    OF    MEMORY. 

The  degree  in  which  this  faculty  is  developed  in  dif- 
ferent individuals,  may  now  be  readily  accounted  for.  It 
is  owing,  as  I  suppose,  to  two  circumstances — natural  di- 
versities in  which  the  power  is  possessed  by  different  indi- 
viduals, and  the  accidental  direction  of  the  power.  The- 
mistocles  knew  every  citizen  of  Athens  by  name.  Cyrus  and 
Hannibal  had  each  a  similar  knowledo;e  of  every  soldier  in 
his  respective  army.  Their  original  endowments  made  them 
capable  of  such  acquisitions.  They  made  such  acquisitions, 
because  they  considered  them  necessary  to  the  end  they 
designed  to  accomplish. 

IMPROVEMENT    OF    MEMORY. 

But  for  the  faculty  under  consideration,  the  past  would 
be  to  us,  as  if  it  had  not  been.  No  advantages  could  be 
derived  from  experience  of  our  own  or  that  of  others. 
Existence,  at  each  successive  moment,  must  be  commenced 
anew.  The  same  errors  and  follies,  which  formerly  occur, 
red,  must  be  repeated,  without  the  possibility  of  improve- 
ment. Through  this  faculty,  the  past  furnishes  the  chart 
and  compass  for  the  future.  The  progress  of  improvement 


MEMORY    AND    RECOLLECTION.  121 

is  onward,  with  perpetually  accumulating  force.  The  ques- 
tion, therefore,  How  can  this  faculty  be  improved  ?  presents 
itself,  as  of  special  importance.  The  following  suggestions 
may  not  be  out  of  place  on  this  point  : 

1.  The  first  thing  to  be  kept  distinctly  in  mind,  in  all 
plans  for  the  permanent  improvement  of  memory,  is  the 
principle  on  which  its  ready  and  retentive  action  depends; 
to  wit,  deep  and  distinct  impression.  All  our  plans  for 
the  accomplishment  of  the  object  under  consideration, 
should  be  formed  with  direct  reference  to  this  one  prin- 
ciple. 

2.  As  impressions  depend  very  much  upon  distinctness 
of  conception,  in  all  efforts  to  improve  this  faculty,  we 
should  habituate  ourselves  to  form  distinct  conceptions  of 
objects,  especially  of  those  which  we  wish  to  recollect.  In 
this  manner  the  impression  will  not  only  be  deep  and  per- 
manent, but  the  notion  associated  with  it  being  distinct, 
will,  when  recalled,  possess  a  corresponding  distinctness. 

3.  In  thought,  the  object  should  be  located  in  distinct 
relation  to  the  circumstances  of  time  and  place  with  which 
it  is  associated.  In  this  manner  the  impression  and  con- 
ception will  not  only  be  rendered  deep  and  distinct, 
but  each  circumstance  referred  to,  as  it  recurs  in  connec- 
tion with  other  thoughts  and  perceptions  will,  by  exciting 
the  feelings  under  consideration,  recall  the  object  associ- 
ated with  it. 

4.  Knowledge,  in  order  to  be  retained  permanently, 
must  be  systematized  and  reduced  to  general  permanent 
principles.  Otherwise,  it  will  be  exclusively  subject  to  the 
law  of  local  association  which  is  so  temporary  in  respect  to 
retention. 

5.  To  converse   with    others,    and  to  write    down    our 


122  THE    INTELLECT. 

thoughts  which  we  wish  to  retain,  contribute  to  permanency 
and  distinctness  of  recollection.  Knowledge,  by  this  means, 
is  rendered  distinct,  the  corresponding  impression  deep  and 
permanent,  and  the  whole  subject  of  thought,  most  likely 
to  be  systematically  arranged.  All  these  circumstances 
tend  to  render  memory  distinct  and  permanent. 

6.  Memory  also,  to  be  improved,  must  be  trusted,  but 
at  the  same  time,  not  overburdened,  as  is  the  case  when 
everything  is  communicated  to  it,  without  the  aid  of  a 
judicious  diary  of  important  thoughts  and  occurrences. 
That  faculty  which  is  not  exercised  will  not  be  developed 
and  improved.  Memory  is  not  exempt  from  this  law.  At 
the  same  time,  to  overburden  a  faculty  is  a  sure  way  to 
palsy  its  energies.  Nothing  but  reflection  and  judgment, 
properly  exercised,  can  fix  upon  the  line  where  memory 
should  and  should  not  be  trusted,  without  the  aid  of 
written  records  of  our  thoughts,  and  thus  secure  a  proper 
development  of  this  faculty. 

MEMORY    OF   THE    AGED. 

One  of  the  first  indications  of  the  approaching  feeble- 
ness of  age,  is  the  failure,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  of  the 
power  of  memory.  A  characteristic  precisely  the  opposite 
is  also  sometimes  presented  in  the  experience  of  aged  per- 
sons,— a  wonderful  revival  of  the  memory  of  the  occur- 
rences of  early  life.  A  lady  of  my  acquaintance,  for 
example,  aged  about  ninety  years,  had  occasion  to  amuse 
some  of  her  great-grandchildren  one  day.  She  thought 
she  would,  as  a  means  to  this  end,  relate  to  them  the  sub- 
stance of  a  story,  related  in  verse,  which  she  had  read 
when  quite  young.  She  had  never  committed  it  to  mem- 
ory, and   doubtless  had  thought   little  of  it   for  more  than 


MEMORY    AND    RECOLLECTION.  1^3 

half  a  century.  As  she  commenced  the  story,  the  entire 
poem  came  fresh  to  her  recollection.  She  could  repeat  it 
all,  word  for  word.  These  two  facts  in  the  experience  of 
the  aged, — the  failure  of  memory,  on  the  one  hand,  and  its 
wonderful  revival,  on   the  other,  need  to  be  accounted  for. 

In  respect  to  phenomena  of  the  first  class,  two  reasons 
may  be  assigned  for  their  existence  : 

1.  The  failure  of  the  faculty  of  perception  and  atten- 
tion. As  a  consequence,  distinct  notions  are  not  formed 
of  objects  of  present  thought  and  perception.  Nor  do 
they  affect  the  mind  as  they  formerly  did.  For  these  rea- 
sons, the  peculiar/*ee/m^s  which  have  co-existed  with  form- 
er thoughts  and  perceptions,  and  would,  if  revived,  suggest 
them,  are  not  revived. 

2.  In  the  failing  of  the  perceptive  faculty,  there  is  a 
corresponding  change  in  the  correlation  of  the  sensibility 
to  objects  of  thought  and  perception.  Hence  not  the  same 
feelings  precisely  are  now  excited  by  objects  of  thought 
and  perception,  as  formerly,  and  consequently  former  in- 
tellectual states  are  not  reproduced. 

In  respect  to  the  second  class,  I  would  remark,  that 
every  one  is  aware,  that  amid  the  hurrying  scenes  of  ordi- 
nary life,  such  crowds  of  associations  rush  upon  the  mind, 
at  one  and  the  same  time,  that  no  one  entire  scene  of  the 
past,  is  often  distinctly  recalled.  On  the  other  hand,  when 
we  are  in  a  state  of  temporary  isolation  from  the  varying 
tide  of  events  which  is  floating  by  and  around  us,  then  is 
the  time  when  our  recollections  of  the  past  become  full 
and  distinct.  Now  the  aged  are  in  a  state  of  isolation  of  a 
more  permanent  character.  Hence,  when  a  past  scene  is 
recalled,  the  mind  is  in  a  state  of  comparative  freedom 
from    all    diverting   and    distracting   associations.     Conse- 


124  THE   INTELLECT. 

quently,  the   scene,  in  its  entireness,  is  brought  into   full 
and  distinct  remembrance. 

DURATION    OF  MEMORY. 

If  the  law  of  association  illustrated  in  the  preceding 
chapter  be  admitted  as  true,  it  will  follow,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  that  memory  is  absolutely  indestructible.  Thought 
can  never  perish.  If  the  impression  with  which  any  thought 
has  co-existed,  should,  at  any  period,  however  remote,  be 
in  any  form  revived,  the  thought  itself  may  be  recalled.  If 
any  element  of  a  given  impression  be  reproduced,  no  rea- 
son can  be  assigned,  why  a  thought  which  co-existed  with 
it,  myriads  of  ages  ago,  should  not  thereby  be  recalled,  as 
well  as  the  one  which  co-existed  with  it  but  yesterday. 

Numberless  facts  also,  which  lie  around  us  in  society, 
fully  confirm  the  principle  under  consideration  as  a  law  of 
memory.  The  case  of  the  aged  lady  referred  to  above, 
presents  a  fact  of  this  kind.  The  most  striking  one  that 
now  recurs  to  my  recollection  is  given  by  Coleridge.  It  is 
the  case  of  a  German  girl  who  had  always  labored  as  a  do- 
mestic. While  Coleridge  was  on  a  visit  to  Germany,  and 
in  the  vicinity  of  her  residence,  she  sickened,  and  if  I  mis- 
take not,  died.  During  her  sickness,  she  began  to  utter 
sentences  in  languages  unknown  to  all  her  attendants. 
Learned  men,  from  a  neighboring  university,  were  called 
in.  It  was  then  found  that  she  was  reciting,  with  perfect 
correctness,  entire  passages  from  the  Hebrew,  Greek, 
Arabic  and  Syriac  scriptures,  and  also  from  the  writings  of 
the  ancient  Fathers.  The  occurrence  was,  by  many,  re- 
garded as  miraculous.  A  young  physician  in  attendance, 
however,  determined  to  trace  out  her  past  history,  for  the 
purpose  of  finding  a  clue  to  the   mystery.     He    found    at 


MEMORY    AND    RECOLLECTION.  125 

last,  that  when  quite  small,  the  young  woman  had  lived  in 
the  family  of  an  aged  clergyman  of  great  learning,  who 
was  in  the  daily  habit  of  reading  aloud  in  his  study  from 
the  writings  above  referred  to.  As  the  child  was  at  work 
in  a  room  contiguous,  she  was  accustomed  to  stop,  from 
time  to  time,  and  listen  to  those  strange  sounds,  the  mean- 
ing of  not  one  of  which  did  she  understand.  There  was 
the  clue  to  the  mystery.  Those  sounds  were  imperishably 
impressed  upon  the  memory.  Hence  their  repetition,  under 
the  circumstances  named.  Cases  of  a  similar  nature  might 
be  adduced  to  any  extent.  They  point  with  solemn  interest 
to  the  nature  of  the  immortal  powers  within,  as  well  as  to 
facts  of  portentous  moment  in  the  future  development  of 
those  powers. 


126  THE    INTELLECT. 


CHAPTER     X. 
THE    IMAGINATION. 

All  are  aware,  that  there  is  such  a  function  of  the  intel- 
ligence as  that  designated  by  the  term  imagination.  When, 
also,  we  meet  with  any  of  its  real  creations,  we  readily 
recognize  them  as  such.  But,  when  the  questions  are 
asked, — What  is  this  power?  What  are  its  proper  func- 
tions? and,  By  what  laws  is  it  governed  ?  the  true  answer, 
— that  which  will  command  general  assent,  does  not  so 
readily  occur,  as,  at  first  thought,  might  be  anticipated.  If 
we  recur  to  the  works  of  authors  who  have  attempted  to 
define  and  elucidate  the  subject,  we  find  that  they  differ  so 
widely  in  their  definitions  of  this  faculty  that  little  satis- 
factory information  is  obtained  from  their  presentations. 

By  some,  we  are  told,  that  the  real  function  of  the  im- 
agination, is  to  "  present  the  objects  of  pure  perceptions 
in  groups  and  combinations  which  do  not  exist  in  nature," 
or  to  "take  the  component  parts  of  real  scenes,  events,  or 
■characters,  and  combine  them  anew,  by  a  process  of  the 
mind  itself,  so  as  to  form  compounds  which  have  no  exist- 
ence in  nature." 

By  others,  it  is  defined  as  the  faculty  by  which  we 
*'  modify  our  conceptions,  by  combining  the  parts  of  differ- 
ent ones  together,  so  as  to  form  new  wholes  of  our  own 
creation";  or  as  "a  complex  exercise  of  the  mind,  by 
means  of  which  various  conceptions  are  combined  together, 
so  as  to  form  new  wholes."     The    difficulty  which  the  stu- 


THE    IMAGINATION.  137 

dent  meets  with  in  respect  to  such  definitions,  is  the  im- 
practicability of  determining,  in  their  light,  whether,  when 
he  meets  with  a  given  conception,  he  is  in  the  presence  of 
a  real  creation  of  the  imagination  or  not.  Without  further 
remarks  we  shall  now  attempt  a  definition  of  our  own. 

IMAGINATION    DEFINED. 

An  object  of  which  our  apprehensions  are  indistinct, 
may  often  be  best  defined  and  explained  by  comparing  it 
with  some  other  analogous  object  of  which  our  apprehen- 
sions are  distinct  and  well  defined.  The  imagination,  as 
all  admit,  is  a  conceptive  faculty.  So  is  the  understand- 
ing, and  of  this  latter  faculty  we  are  well  informed.  Let 
us  compare  these  two  faculties,  and  see  if  we  cannot, 
thereby,  obtain  clear  and  distinct  apprehensions  of  the  real 
and  proper  functions  of  each.  The  understanding,  as  we 
have  seen,  combines  the  elements  given  by  the  primary 
faculties,  sense,  consciousness,  and  reason,  as  given,  with- 
out modifying  them  at  all  ;  its  exclusive  province  being 
this  :  to  conceive  of,  and  represent  in  thought,  objects  as 
they  are  in  themselves,  whatever  their  nature  and  charac- 
teristics may  be.  A  conception  of  the  understanding  we 
always  compare  with  its  object,  and  pronounce  said  con- 
ception perfect  or  imperfect,  as  it  does,  or  does  not,  perfectly 
represent  that  object.  Now  we  have  another  and  different 
faculty  of  conception,  a  faculty  which  re-combines  the  ele- 
ments of  thought  given  by  all  the  other  faculties  ;  and 
blends  said  elements  into  conceptions  which  correspond, 
more  or  less  perfectly,  not  with  realities  as  they  are  in 
themselves,  but  with  certain  fundamental  ideas  in  the  mind, 
— ideas  such  as  those  of  harmony,  fitness,  the  beautiful,  the 
grand,  the  sublime,  the  good,  and  the  perfect  ;  or  their  op- 


128  THE   INTELLECT. 

posites,  the  ludicrous,  the  grotesque,  and  the  bombastic. 
We  have  in  our  minds,  therefore,  two  entirely  distinct 
classes  of  conceptions,— those  which  respect  objects  just  as 
they  exist  in  the  universe  of  matter  and  mind,  within  and 
around  us  ;  and  those  in  which  the  elements  of  such  ob- 
jects are  in  thought  combined,  in  harmony,  more  or  less 
perfect,  with  fundamental  ideas  in  the  mind  itself;  as^ 
those  of  the  beautiful,  grand,  sublime,  etc., — conceptions 
which  do  not  respect  objects  as  they  are,  but  certain  ar- 
rangements of  such  objects.  The  function  of  the  intelli- 
gence which  gives  us  the  former  class  of  conceptions,  we 
have  denominated  the  understanding.  That  which  gives 
us  the  latter,  is  the  imagination.  By  Coleridge  it  is  called 
the  "  Esemplastic,  or  into-one-forming  power."  It  re-com- 
bines the  elements  of  thought  into  conceptions  which  per- 
tain, not  to  mere  existences  ;  but  to  ideas  of  the  beautiful, 
the  perfect,  the  sublime,  etc.,  in  the  mind  itself.  A  con- 
ception of  the  understanding  is  perfect,  when  it  represents 
its  object  as  it  is,  whatever  the  object  may  be.  A  concep- 
tion of  the  imagination  is  perfect,  when  it  shadows  forth 
forms  of  beauty,  grandeur,  sublimity,  etc.,  which  corre- 
spond with  the  ideas  in  the  mind.  Understanding-concep- 
tions are  compared  with  the  object.  The  only  standard  with 
which  the  creations  of  the  imagination  are  compared, 
is  the  idea. 

ILLUSTRATION. 

A  single  illustration  will  throw  additional  light  upon  the 
distinct  and  separate  functions  of  these  two  faculties  under 
consideration.  A  number  of  human  forms  and  circum- 
stances, each  characterized  by  greater  or  less  beauties  and 
deformities,  are,  we  will  suppose,  before  the  mind.  Of  each, 
and  of  all  together,  we  form  distinct  apprehensions  ;  the 


THE    IMAGINATION.  129 

group,  with  all  its  individualities,  being,  in  thought,  repre- 
sented as  it  is  in  itself.  Here  we  mark  the  exclusive  action 
of  the  understanding.  While  these  objects  are  before  the 
mind  there  arises,  in  thought,  the  apprehension  of  a  human 
form  and  countenance  more  beautiful  and  perfect,  than  any 
which  had  been  the  object  of  perception  or  conception  be- 
fore. The  formation  of  thi^new  conception  is  the  equally 
exclusive  creation  of  the  imagination.  The  same  holds  true 
in  all  other  instances.  Wherever,  and  whenever,  we  find 
the  elements  of  thought,  given  by  the  other  faculties,  re- 
combined  into  conceptions  which  correspond,  not  with 
realities  as  they  are  in  themselves,  but  with  fundamental 
ideas,  pre-existing  in  the  mind  itself, — ideas  such  as  the 
beautiful,  the  grand,  the  sublime,  etc.,  we  here  find  our- 
selves in  the  exclusive  presence  of  creations  of  the  imag- 
ination. Such  creations,  as  we  shall  see  hereafter, 
may,  or  may  not,  be  fictions,  may,  or  may  not,  be  true 
to  objects  which  have  existence  in  nature.  Such  crea- 
tions, however,  whether  true  to  real  existences  or  not,  will 
always  present  their  objects  in  the  light  of  the  ideas 
referred  to. 

IMAGINATION    AND   FANCY    DISTINGUISHED. 

Mr.  Dugald  Stewart  is  the  first  philosopher  that  I  have 
met  with,  who  makes  a  distinction  between  the  imagination 
and  the  fancy.  I  will  give  the  remarks  to  which  I  refer,  as 
it  will  prepare  the  way  for  the  distinction  which  I  wish  to 
make.  "  It  is  the  power  of  fancy,"  he  observes,  "  which 
supplies  the  poet  with  metaphorical  language,  and  with  all 
the  analogies  which  are  the  foundation  of  his  allusions.  But 
it  is  the  power  of  the  imagination,  that  creates  the  complex 
scenes  he  describes,  and  the  fictitious  characters  which  he 
9 


130  THE    INTELLECT. 

delineates."  According  to  the  distinction  here  made,  it 
was  the  imagination  of  Milton,  which  created  the  whole 
scene,  and  the  particular  characters,  presented  in  "  Paradise 
Lost."  His  fancy,  on  the  other  hand,  furnished  the  figura- 
tive language,  analogies,  and  illustrations,  with  which  it 
is  adorned.  The  fancy,  as  thus  described,  is,  as  it  will 
readily  be  perceived,  nothing  but  a  particular  department 
of  the  operation  of  the  principle  of  association.  It  col- 
lects the  materials  from  which  the  imagination  creates  its 
scenes  and  characters,  and  then  furnishes  the  attendant 
embellishments.  In  conformity  to  this  view  of  the  subject, 
fancy  is  defined  by  Coleridge,  as  the  "  aggregative  and  as- 
sociative power."  Thus  defined,  while  the  imagination  is 
that  function  of  the  intelligence  which  is  correlated  to  ideas 
of  the  beautiful,  the  grand,  the  sublime,  etc., — the  fancy  is 
that  function  of  the  associative  principle,  which  is  corre- 
lated to  the  same  ideas. 

SPONTANEOUS    AND    REFLECTIVE  IMAGINATION. 

The  primitive  action  of  the  intellectual  faculties,  is 
spontaneous,  and  not  reflective.  We  reflect  upon  that  only 
which  has  a  prior  existence  in  the  mind.  The  same  state- 
ment is  applicable  to  all  the  creations  of  the  imagination. 
In  their  primitive  developments,  they  are  the  result  of  the 
spontaneous  action  of  this  faculty.  By  reflection,  such 
creations  are,  subsequently,  fully  developed  and  perfected. 
The  grand  conception,  for  example,  developed  in  "  Paradise 
Lost,"  was  first  spontaneously  suggested  to  the  author's  mind. 
To  fill  out  and  perfect  that  conception,  was  the  object  of 
thought  and  study  for  a  majority  of  the  years  of  his  subse- 
quent life. 


THE    IMAGINATION.  131 


REMARK   OF    COLERIDGE. 


Coleridge  has  somewhere  made  a  remark,  which  I  re- 
gard as  of  great  importance  in  guiding  the  judgment  in 
detecting  the  peculiar  operations  of  the  imagination,  and 
in  separating  them  from  the  operations  of  other  intellectual 
faculties.  The  amount  of  his  remark  is  this.  It  is  not  every 
part  of  what  is  called  a  production  of  the  imagination,  that 
is  to  be  attributed  to  that  faculty.  Much,  often,  is  mere 
narration;  and  much  is  the  mere  filling  out  of  the  grand 
outline  of  the  conception  which  the  imagination  has  com- 
bined; and  which  as  properly  belongs  to  the  understand- 
ing and  judgment,  as  the  filling  up  of  the  outlines  of  any 
other  discourse  of  which  the  intelligence  has  conceived. 
With  a  great  portion  of  the  filling  up  of  "  Paradise  Lost," 
for  example,  imagination  had  no  more  to  do  than  with  that 
of  filling  up  the  grand  outline  of  a  sermon,  or  oration.  In 
the  sublime  conception  itself,  and  in  the  mysterious  blend- 
ing of  the  elements  of  thought  often  met  with,  in  throwing 
that  conception  into  form, — here  we  find  the  workings  of 
this  creative,  plastic  faculty.  To  ev^olve  principles  which 
would  enable  the  student,  under  such  circumstances,  to 
discern  the  operations  of  this  faculty,  has,  as  before  said, 
been  the  main  object  of  the  preceding  analysis. 

CREATIONS    OP   THE     IMAGINATION,    WHY    NOT    ALWAYS    FIC- 
TIONS. 

In  the  preceding  part  of  this  chapter,  it  has  been  shown, 
that  the  creations  of  the  imagination  are  not  always,  as  it 
has  often  been  stated  by  philosophers,  "new  wholes  which 
do  not  exist  in  nature."  It  becomes  an  important  inquiry, 
When  and  why  is  not  this  statement  true?    It  will  be  evi- 


132  THE    INTELLECT. 

dent,  at  first  thought,  that  when  the  elements  of  thought 
which  enter  into  particular  conceptions,  are  wholly  re-coin 
bined,  the  new  wholes,  thus  produced,  must  exist  purely  in 
thought,  without  any  corresponding  existence.  On  the 
other  hand,  when  the  elements  of  beauty,  grandeur,  and 
sublimity  exist  in  objects  in  connection  with  other  and  dif- 
ferent elements, — elements  related  to  other  and  different 
ideas,  and  when  the  imagination  blends  these  elements 
first  named  into  some  one  beautiful,  grand,  or  sublime  con- 
ception, every  element  in  the  conception  may  be  in  strict 
correlation  to  realities.  Take  as  an  illustration,  a  single 
stanza  from  a  familiar  hymn  : 

"  His  word  of  grace  Is  sure  and  strong. 
As  that  which  built  the  skies  : 
The  voice  that  rolls  the  stars  along 
Speaks  all  the  promises." 

Every  element  in  this  beautiful  thought  is  strictly  con- 
formed to  realities,  as  they  are.  Yet  in  the  blending  of 
these  elements,  particularly  in  the  last  two  lines,  we  dis- 
tinctly mark  the  plastic  power  of  the  imagination,  in  its 
sublimest  and  most  beautiful  form. 

The  same  is  equally  true,  where  the  same  power  em- 
balms, in  similar  conceptions,  the  hallowed  sentiments  and 
experiences  of  the  past  and  present.  Who  that  ever  saw 
the  tear  of  gratitude  lying  in  the  eye  of  affliction, — a  thing 
far  more  beautiful  than  the  dew-drop,  when  it  holds  in  its 
embrace  the  image  of  the  morning  sun, — a  tear  started  by 
some  gift  that  eased,  for  a  time,  the  pressure  of  woe,  and 
then  turned  away  with  a  sorrowful  heart,  that  such  worth 
should  be  crushed  beneath  such  a  weight,  does  not  recog- 
nize the  truth,  as  well  as  beauty,  of  the  thought  contained 
in  the  following  stanza,  especially  in  the  last  two  lines? 


THE    IMAGINATION.  133 


'  I  have  heard  of  hearts  unkind,  kind  deeds 
With  coldness  still  returning  : 

Alas!  the  gratitude  of  men 
Has  of tiner  left  me  mourning." 


In  another  sense,  all  the  proper  creations  of  the  imag- 
ination are  true.  They  are  true  to  thought.  In  the  depths 
of  our  inner  being,  there  lie  thoughts  too  deep  for  any 
words  which  we  can  command.  Nothing  but  an  overshad- 
owing imagination  can  call  them  forth,  and  give  them  an 
external  embodiment.  Whether  the  forms  in  which  they 
are  embodied  are  correlated  to  substantial  realities  or  not, 
they  are  true  to  thought,  the  most  important  of  all  realities. 
We  feel  grateful,  therefore,  when  we  find  the  thoughts 
which  we  had  vainly  endeavored  to  express,  molded  into 
form,  and  thus  assuming  "  a  local  habitation  and  a  name." 

I  mention  one  other,  and  a  very  important  sense,  in 
which  the  creations  of  the  imagination  are  true.  They 
sustain,  in  many  instances,  relations  to  realities  analogous, 
somewhat,  to  that  sustained  by  general  notions.  In  a  very 
important  sense,  these  last  have  no  realities  in  nature  cor- 
responding to  them;  that  is,  there  is  no  one  object,  that  in 
all  respects  corresponds  to  a  general  notion  ;  that  is,  that 
contains  the  elements  it  represents,  and  nothing  more  nor 
less.  The  elements  belonging  to  it,  however,  are  found  in 
each  particular  object  ranged  under  it.  Let  us  now,  in  the 
light  of  this  illustration,  contemplate  the  forms  of  the 
beautiful,  for  example,  shadowed  forth  by  the  imagination. 
We  may  not  be  able,  in  all  instances,  to  find  any  one  par- 
ticular object  which  contains,  and  nothing  more  nor  less, 
the  elements  which  enter  into  this  form.  Yet,  whenever 
we  meet  with  an  object  containing  the  elements  of  beauty, 
we  find  that  element  represented  in  the  forms  of  the  beauti- 
ful  bodied   forth  by  the  imagination.     In  these  forms,  we 


134  THE    INTELLECT. 

do  not  find  any  one  particular  shadowed  forth,  but  each 
particular  blended  in  the  universal.  In  the  most  perfect 
forms  of  statuary,  for  example,  we  do  not  find  any  one 
human  form,  in  distinction  from  all  others,  represented,  but 
we  find  whatever  is  beautiful  in  every  form  there  embodied. 
As  the  understanding  represents  the  particular  in  the  gen- 
eral, so  the  imagination  represents  all  particulars  relating 
to  the  beautiful,  etc.,  in  the  universal. 

SPHERE  OF  THE  IMAGINATION  NOT    CONFINED    TO    POETRY. 

Most  of  the  examples  introduced  into  this  chapter  are 
poetical.  From  this  I  would  not  have  it  supposed,  that,  in 
my  judgment,  the  imagination  is  confined  to  this  species  of 
composition.  We  meet  with  its  finest  creations,  on  the 
other  hand,  in  painting,  in  statuary,  in  prose,  and  in  every 
kind  of  discourse  in  which  the  elements  of  thought  can  be 
blended  in  harmony  with  pure  ideas.  It  admits,  at  least, 
of  a  doubt,  whether  the  imagination  of  Milton  ranged  with 
a  more  discursive  energy  in  his  highest  prose  compositions, 
or  in  his  "  Paradise  Lost." 

LAW    OF   TASTE    IN    REGARD    TO     THE    IMAGINATION. 

It  is,  as  we  have  seen,  the  peculiar  province  of  the  im- 
agination to  dissolve,  re-combine,  and  blend  the  elements 
of  thought.  Its  procedure  in  all  these  respects,  however, 
is  not  arbitrary.  Not  every  thought  can  be  blended  with 
every  other,  without  violating  the  laws  of  good  taste. 
Here,  then,  an  important  question  presents  itself  ;  to  wit, 
What  is  the  law  which  guides  the  imagination,  in  blending 
the  elements  of  thought  ?  I  will  present  my  own  ideas  on 
this  subject,  by  an  example  taken  from  the  book  of  Job; 


THE    IMAGINATION.  135 

•*  Hast  thou  given  the  horse  his  strength  ? 
Hast  thou  clothed  his  neck  ivitk  thunder  f* 

The  propriety  of  blending  the  two  conceptions, — that  of 
the  mane  of  the  war-horse  and  of  thunder,  has  been  ques- 
tioned by  some,  on  account  of  the  total  dissimilarity  of  the 
objects  of  those  conceptions.  It  is  readily  admitted,  that 
no  two  objects  are  in  themselves  more  dissimilar.  Yet  it 
is  confidently  maintained,  that  there  never  was  a  figure  of 
speech  more  appropriate.  The  reason  is  obvious,  and  every 
one  feels  it,  though  he  may  not  have  an  analytical  con- 
sciousness of  it.  When  two  objects  are,  as  objects  of  sense, 
totally  dissimilar,  the  conception  of  each  may  excite  pre- 
cisely similar  feelings.  Hence  the  propriety  and  force  of 
the  figure  employed  by  the  sacred  writer,  in  blending  the 
two  conceptions  into  one.  This  I  conceive  to  be  the  uni- 
versal law  of  good  taste,  relative  to  the  action  of  the  plastic 
power  of  the  imagination.  Whenever  two  conceptions 
sustain  a  similar  relation  to  any  one  common  feeling  or 
sentiment,  they  may  be  blended  into  one.  The  more 
diverse  the  objects  of  those  conceptions,  the  more  striking 
the  figure,  under  such  circumstances.  I  will  give  one  other 
example  : 

"  The  twilight  hours  like  birds  flew  by, 

As  lightly  and  as  free  ; 
Ten  thousand  stars  were  in  the  sky. 

Ten  thousand  in  the  sea  ; 
For  every  wave  with  dimpled  cheek 

That  leaped  upon  the  air. 
Had  caught  a  star  in  its  embrace. 

And  held  it  trembling  there.'' 

Who  is  insensible  to  the  exquisite  beauty  of  the  thought 
here  ?  Yet  the  wave  of  the  sea  or  lake,  reflecting  the  stars 
of  night,  no  more,  as  an  object  of  sense,  resembles  the 
dimpled  cheek  of  beauty,  or  the   mother   catching  up  her 


136  THE    INTELLECT. 

babe  and  holding  it  in  her  embrace,  than  the  mane  of  the 
war-horse  resembles  thunder.  Why,  then,  are  we  struck 
with  such  delight  at  the  blending  of  conceptions,  the  ob- 
jects of  which  are,  in  themselves,  so  unlike  ?  The  answer 
is,  these  conceptions  are  mutually  correlated  to  the  same 
or  similar  feelings.  When  such  conceptions  are  thus 
blended  into  a  beautiful  emotion  common  to  both,  there  is 
shadowed  forth  the  perfection  of  beauty.  For  this  reason 
our  hearts  leap  up,  when  we  meet  with  such  thoughts  as 
the  following,  taken  from  the  same  effusion  as  that  above 
cited  : 

"  I  have  lieard  the  laughing  wind  behind, 
When  playing  with  my  hair — 
The  breezy  fingers  of  the  wind. 
How  cool  and  moist  they  were  !" 

IMAGINATION    THE    SOURCE    OF    IDEALS. 

Another  important  function  of  the  imagination  now 
claims  our  attention,  its  function  as  the  source  of  ideals.  In 
illustrating  this  function,  the  first  thing  to  be  accomplished 
is  to  distinguish  between  ideals  and  ideas. 

IDEA    DEFINED. 

An  idea,  properly  defined,  is  a  conception  of  reason.  As 
such  it  has  the  characteristics  of  universality  and  necessity, 
and  is  consequently,  incapable  of  change,  or  modification. 
Thus  whenever  certain  conditions  are  fulfilled,  reason 
evolves  the  idea  of  time,  space,  substance  and  cause,  which 
we  have  already  considered,  together  with  such  as  the 
beautiful,  the  right,  the  true,  and  the  good,  etc.,  hereafter 
to  be  considered. 

IDEAL    DEFINED. 

An  ideal  is  a  form  of  thought  intermediate  between  an 


THE    IMAGINATION.  137 

idea,  and  the  conceptions  or  notions  which  the  intelli- 
gence generates  of  particular  objects,  and  presents  arche- 
types in  conformity  to  which  the  elements  of  such  concep- 
tions may  be  blended  in  harmony  with  ideas.  In  the  mind 
of  Milton,  for  example,  the  ideas  of  the  beautiful,  the  grand, 
and  the  sublime,  etc.,  existed  as  pure  conceptions  of  reason. 
When  the  varied  conceptions,  the  elements  of  which  are 
blended  together  in  ''  Paradise  Lost,"  lay  under  the  eye  of 
his  consciousness,  his  intelligence,  brooding  over  those 
elements,  at  last  blended  them  together  into  that  grand  con- 
ception, of  which  the  poem  itself  is  the  external  embodi- 
ment. This  conception  was  the  ideal  after  which  the  poem 
was  formed,  to  realize  his  ideas  of  the  grand,  the  beautiful, 
and  the  sublime. 

IDEALS,  PARTICULAR  AND  GENERAL. 

Ideals,  like  notions,  are  particular  and  general.  Thus, 
in  the  mind  of  Milton,  there  existed  a  general  ideal  of 
what  a  poem  should  be,  in  order  to  realize,  in  greater  or 
less  perfection,  the  pure  ideas  of  reason.  At  the  same 
time,  there  existed  a  particular  ideal  of  the  manner  in  which 
the  elements  entering  into  that  poem  should  be  blended, 
in  order,  in  that  particular  production,  to  realize  those 
ideas. 

IDEALS    NOT    CONFINED    TO    IDEAS    OF    THE    BEAUTIFUL,  THE 
GRAND,    AND    THE    SUBLIME. 

Ideals  are  not  confined  to  any  one  class  of  ideas.  Ev- 
ery individual,  in  all  departments  of  human  action,  has  an 
ideal  of  the  form  to  which  the  objects  of  his  action  should 
be  brought  into  conformity,  and  in  the  light  of  which  he 
judges  of  all    productions   which   meet  his  eye.     Ideas  of 


138  THE    INTELLECT. 

fitness,   of  the  true,    the  perfect,'  and  the  good,   no   less 
than  the  idea  of  the  beautiful,  are  the  archetypes  of  ideals. 

IDEALS    NOT   FIXED    AND    CHANGELESS    LIKE    IDEAS. 

Ideals,  as  compared  with  ideas,  may  be  perfect  or  im- 
perfect. They  are  consequently  capable  of  continued 
modifications.  We  often  hear  it  said  of  individuals,  that 
their  ideals  are  imperfect  or  wrong.  As  intermediate  arch- 
etypes between  conceptions  of  particular  objects,  and  pure 
ideas  of  reason,  ideals  may,  in  the  progress  of  the  intelli- 
gence, undergo  endless  modifications,  always  advancing 
towards  the  perfect  and  absolute,  without  reaching  it. 

IDEALS   THE   FOUNDATION    OF    MENTAL    PROGRESS. 

As  intermediate  archetypes  between  particular  concep- 
tions and  universal  and  necessary  ideas,  ideals  constitute 
the  foundation  of  endless  progression  in  the  development 
of  the  mental  powers.  Every  new  elevation  which  the 
intelligence  gains,  presents  new  conceptions  of  particular 
objects,  and  consequently  new  elements  of  thought.  Ev- 
ery new  element  of  thought  involves  a  new  ideal,  more 
nearly  approaching  the  perfect  and  the  absolute,  and  thus 
lays  the  foundation  for  fresh  activity,  and  further  progress 
in  the  "march  of  mind.  Sometimes  also  ideals  degenerate, 
and  thus  the  foundation  is  laid  for  the  backward  move- 
ments of  society. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add  that  the  imagination  is  the 
sole  originator  of  ideals.  To  form  such  conceptions  is 
not  a  function  of  reason,  nor  of  the  uriderstanding  or  judg- 
ment. It  remains,  then,  as  the  exclusive  function  of  the 
imagination. 


THE    IMAGINATION.  139 

IDEALS    IN   THE    DIVINE   AND    HUMAN    INTELLIGENCE. 

In  the  divine  mind,  the  action  of  the  imagination  is 
always  in  perfect  and  absolute  correspondence  to  the  rea- 
son. As  a  consequence,  there  is  a  similar  correspondence 
between  the  divine  ideal  and  idea.  All  of  God's  "  works, 
therefore,  are  perfect."  Not  so  with  the  finite.  Man  may 
eternally  progress  towards  the  infinite  and  perfect,  but  can 
never  reach  it. 

TASTE    DEFINED. 

Taste  is  that  function  of  the  judgment  by  which  the 
characteristics  of  productions,  especially  in  belles-lettres 
and  the  fine  arts,  are  determined  in  the  light  of  ideals  and 
ideas  of  beauty,  order,  congruity,  proportion,  symmetry, 
fitness,  and  whatever  constitutes  excellence  in  such  pro- 
ductions. The  judgment  may  be  exercised  upon  ideals 
relatively  to  ideas,  and  upon  particular  productions  rela- 
tively to  both.  Thus  Milton,  when  he  apprehended  the 
conception  realized  in  "  Paradise  Lost,"  might,  and  doubt- 
less did,  often  compare  that  conception  with  his  own  idea, 
to  determine  the  fact  whether  the  former  made  a  near  ap- 
proach to  the  latter.  In  filling  out  the  conception,  he 
would  continually  compare  tlie  external  embodiment  with 
the  internal  ideal.  In  all  such  operations,  he  was  exercis- 
ing those  functions  of  the  faculty  of  judgment  denominated 
taste.  The  existence  of  good  taste  depends  upon  the 
existence  in  the  intelligence  of  correct  ideals,  together 
with  a  well  balanced,  and  well  exercised  judgment,  per- 
taining to  the  ideas  of  beauty,  fitness,  etc.  If  a  man's 
ideal  is  false,  his  taste  is  of  course  vitiated.  If  his  ideal 
were  ever  so  correct,  and  he  was  not  possessed  of  a  well 
balanced,  and  well  exercised  judgment,  pertaining  to  such 


140  THE    INTELLECT. 

productions,  he  "would  also  lack  the  characteristics  of  good 
taste. 

PRODUCTIONS  OF  THE  IMAGINATION  WHEN  NOT  REGULATED 
BY  CORRECT  JUDGMENT  OR  GOOD  TASTE. 

In  some  individuals,  in  whom  the  imagination  exists 
and  operates  with  a  high  degree  of  energy,  its  action  is 
not  guided  and  chastened  by  good  taste,  or  a  well  regulated 
judgment.  In  such  cases  we  find  the  most  perfect  forms 
of  beauty  and  sublimity  shadowed  forth  in  connection 
with  the  grossest  deformities.  The  subject  also  will,  in 
most  instances,  be  wholly  unable  to  distinguish  the  one 
from  the  other.  In  listening  to  such  men,  we,  at  one 
moment,  are  perfectly  electrified  with  the  forms  of  beauty, 
grandeur,  and  sublimity  which  are  shadowed  forth  to  our 
ecstatic  vision  ;  but  the  next,  perhaps,  we  are  equally 
shocked  and  disgusted  with  images  worse  than  grotesque, 
and  forms  of  speech  in  strange  violation  of  all  the  laws  of 
good  taste.  Under  such  circumstances  we  have  special  need 
of  two  things,  patience  and  good  judgment.  The  former 
will  enable  us  to  endure  the  evil  for  the  sake  of  the  good  ; 
the  latter  to  separate  the  one  from  the  other;  that  we  may 
not,  as  is  too  often  the  case,  receive  the  good  and  the  bad, 
as  alike  good,  nor  reject  both  as  alike  bad. 

The  most  perfect  of  all  human  productions  are  the 
results  of  genius  associated  with  good  judgment.  Of  these 
the  productions  of  Milton  may  be  referred  to  as  striking 
examples.  Grandeur  and  sublimity  are  the  permanent 
characteristics  of  his  genius.  And  how  seldom  are  his 
sublime  conceptions  marred  with  violations  of  good  taste  ! 

PRODUCTIONS    OF    IMAGINATION    AND     FANCY. 

The   productions    of   diflferent   authors,  we    read    with 


THE    IMAGIXATION.  141 

almost  equal  interest,  but  for  entirely  different  and  oppo- 
site reasons.  I  now  refer  to  two  classes  of  productions 
only,  in  one  of  which  tlie  operation  of  the  fancy  is  most 
prominent,  and  in  the  other,  that  of  the  imagination.  lu 
productions  of  the  former  class,  there  will  be  an  exuberance 
of  metaphor,  and  beautifully  appropriate  comparisons  and 
illustrations,  and  these  will  be  the  main  source  of  the  inter- 
est felt.  In  contemplating  the  productions  of  a  creative 
imagination,  on  the  other  hand,  the  grand  conception  will 
be  the  chief,  and  in  some  instances,  the  exclusive  source  of 
interest. 

IMAGINATION   AND    FANCY HOW    IMPROVED. 

Every  power  is  developed  in  one  way  only, — in  being 
exercised  upon  its  appropriate  objects.  Each  of  the  func- 
tions of  the  intelligence  under  consideration,  has  its  appro- 
priate sphere.  To  develop  the  power,  we  must  find  its 
legitimate  sphere,  and  in  that  sphere  exercise  it  upon  its  ap- 
propriate objects.  The  fancy  is  improved,  by  developing  in 
the  mind  the  sense  of  the  beautiful,  the  true,  the  perfect,, 
and  the  sublime  ;  by  furnishing  the  intelligence  with  dis- 
tinct apprehensions  of  the  forms  of  beauty,  grandeur  and 
sublimity  which  the  universe  of  matter  and  mind,  nature 
and  art,  presents. 

The  imagination  will  be  improved  by  familiarizing  the 
mind  with  the  true  functions  of  the  power  itself;  with  the 
laws  which  regulate  its  actions,  in  blending  into  form  the 
elements  of  thought  ;  and  with  its  actual  creations,  as  given 
in  the  works  of  minds  most  highly  gifted  with  this  function 
of  the  intelligence. 


143  THE    INTELLECT. 


CHAPTER    XT. 
REASON.  RESUMED. 

SECONDARY    IDEAS    OF    REASON. 

In  former  chapters  it  has  been  shown,  that  reason  suS' 
tains  this  relation  to  the  faculties  of  sense  and  conscious- 
ness: It  gives  the  logical  antecedents  of  phenomena  affirmed 
by  these  faculties.  Thus,  on  the  perception  of  phenom- 
ena, we  have  the  ideas  of  time,  space,  substance,  personal 
identity,  and  cause. 

Now  reason  sustains  a  relation  to  the  understanding 
precisely  similar  to  that  which  it  sustains  to  sense  and  con- 
sciousness. It  gives  the  logical  antecedents  of  notions  and 
conceptions,  as  well  as  of  primary  intuitions.  The  idea  of 
right  and  wrong,  of  obligation,  is  not  the  logical  antecedent 
of  mere  phenomena  given  by  sense  and  consciousness.  Be- 
fore obligation  can  be  conceived  of  or  affirmed,  the  notion 
or  conception,  not  of  mere  phenomena,  but  of  an  agent 
possessed  of  certain  powers,  and  sustaining  certain  rela- 
tions to  other  agents,  must  be  developed  in  the  intelligence. 
The  idea  of  obligation,  then,  is  not  the  logical  antecedent 
of  phenomena  affirmed  by  sense  and  consciousness,  but  of 
notions  given  by  the  understanding.  These  considerations 
fully  establish  the  propriety  of  the  distinction  between 
ideas  of  reason  as  primary  and  secondary.  The  former  are 
the  logical  antecedents  of  phenomena  given  by  the  primary 
contingent  faculties.  The  latter  sustain  the  same  relation 
to  those  of  the  secondary  faculties.     The  distinction  here 


REASON    RESUMED.  143 

made  seems  hitherto,  as  far  as  my  knowledge  extends,  to 
have  escaped  the  notice  of  the  analyzers  of  the  human  in- 
telligence. Its  reality  and  importance  to  a  correct  under- 
standing of  the  operations  of  the  human  mind  will  appear 
manifest  as  we  proceed  witii  our  analysis  of  the  secondary 
ideas  of  reason.  An  exposition  of  all  the  ideas  compre- 
hended under  this  class  will  not  be  attempted.  All  that 
will  be  attempted  will  be  the  induction  and  elucidation  of 
a  sufficient  number  of  particulars  to  serve  as  lights  to  the 
philosophic  inquirer,  in  his  researches  in  the  domain  of 
mental  science. 

IDEA    OF    RIGHT    AND    WRONG. 

Of  the  secondary  ideas  of  reason,  that  which  claims  the 
first,  and  more  special  attention,  is  the  one  mentioned 
above,  that  of  right  and  wrong,  together  with  those  de- 
pendent upon  it,  or  necessarily  connected  with  it. 

UNIVERSALITY  OF  THE  IDEA  OF  RIGHT  AND  WRONG. 

It  is  an  undeniable  fact,  that  in  the  presence  of  certain 
actions,  the  human  mind  characterizes  them  as  good  or  bad, 
right  or  wrong  ;  that  the  mind  affirms  to  itself,  that  one 
class  of  the  actions  ought,  and  the  other  ought  not  to  be 
performed  ;  that  when  we  have  performed  certain  actions, 
we  deserve  reward,  and  that  when  we  have  performed 
others,  we  deserve  punishment  ;  and  that  when  this  takes 
place,  there  is  moral  order,  and  when  it  does  not,  there  is 
moral  disorder.  Such  judgments  are  passed  alike  by  all 
mankind,  the  old  and  the  young,  the  learned  and  the  igno- 
rant, the  savage  and  the  civilized.  Should  it  be  said,  that 
mankind  differ  in  different  circumstances  in  their  judgment 
of  the  moral  qualities  of  actions  ;  I  reply  : 


144  THE    INTELLECT. 

1.  This  objection  itself  implies  the  universality  of  moral 
distinctions.  As  men  may  differ  in  referring  particular 
effects  to  particular  causes,  while  all  agree  in  the  judgment, 
that  every  event  must  have  a  cause,  so  it  is  with  moral  dis- 
tinctions. Men  may  not  always  attribute  the  same  moral 
qualities  to  the  same  actions  ;  yet  they  universally  agree 
in  this,  that  our  actions  are  either  right  or  wrong. 

2.  But  when  we  refer  to  intentions,  in  which  alone  the 
moral  quality  of  actions  consists,  we  find  a  more  extensive 
agreement  among  men  than  is  generally  supposed.  A  man 
wills  the  good  of  an  individual  possessed  of  moral  excel- 
lence. Where  is  the  intelligent  being  in  existence  who 
does  or  can  regard  such  an  act  as  any  other  than  virtuous  ? 
Who  is  not  aware,  that  men  always  justify  wrong  actions, 
if  at  all,  by  a  reference  to  their  intentions,  showing  by  such 
reference,  that  in  their  judgment  of  the  great  law  of  love, 
all  agree  ? 

3.  Vicious  actions  are  seldom  regarded  as  virtuous.  Men 
may  persuade  themselves  that  it  is  not  wrong  to  perform 
such  actions,  but  never  that  they  are  bound  to  do 
them,  or  deserve  a  reward  for  having  done  them. 

When  an  intention  morally  right  is  submitted  to  the 
contemplation  of  mankind,  all  agree  in  admitting  it  as  vir- 
tuous and  meritorious.  Thus  the  sacred  writer  speaks  of 
himself  and  associates,  as  through  a  "  manifestation  of  the 
truth,  commending  themselves  to  every  man's  conscience.'* 
This  could  not  have  been  the  case,  liad  not  the  consciences 
of  all  men  been  in  fixed  correlation  to  the  moral  law.  The 
idea  of  right  and  wrong,  then,  is  universal. 

IDEA  OF  RIGHT  AND  WRONG  NECESSARY. 

It  is  also  necessary.     When  the  intelligence  affirms  an 


REASON    RESUMED.  145 

action  or  intention  to  be  right  or  wrong,  it  is  impossible 
even  to  conceive  of  it,  as  possessed  of  the  opposite  charac- 
ter. We  can  no  more  form  such  a  conception,  than  we  can 
conceive  of  the  annihilation  of  space.  It  has  the  same 
claim  to  the  characteristics  of  universality  and  necessity, 
that  any  other  idea  has. 

IDEAS  DEPENDENT  OS  THAT  OF  RIGHT  AND  WRONG. 

A  moment's  reflection  will  convince  us,  that  the  idea  of 
right  and  wrong  is  the  foundation  of  that  of  obligation;  and 
this  again,  of  that  of  merit  or  demerit  ;  and  this  last  of  that 
of  reward  and  punishment.  When  man  would  justify  the 
bestowment  of  reward,  or  the  infliction  of  punishment,  they 
always  refer  to  the  merit  or  demerit  of  the  individual.  This 
judgment  is  sustained  by  a  reference  to  the  obligation  of 
the  same  individual,  and  his  obligations  are  shown  by  a 
reference  to  the  idea  of  right  and  wrong.  Such  facts 
clearly  indicate  the  relation  of  these  ideas,  the  one  to  the 
other. 

CHRONOLOGICAL  ANTECEDENT  TO  THE  IDEA  OF  RIGHT    AND 
WRONG,  ETC. 

It  has  already  been  remarked,  that  the  ideas  under  con- 
sideration are  the  logical  antecedents,  not  of  the  phenom- 
ena of  the  primary  contingent  faculties,  but  of  understand- 
ing conceptions.  Before  we  can  conceive  of  ourselves  as 
subjects  of  moral  obligation,  we  must  be  conscious  of  the 
possession  of  certain  powers,  and  of  existence  in  certain 
relations  to  other  beinors.  This  knowledo-e  is  the  clirono- 
logical  antecedent  of  the  ideas  of  right  and  wrong,  wliile 
these  ideas  sustain  to  the  facts  of  consciousness  the  relation 
of  logical  antecedents.  The  question  now  is,  What  are  the 
10 


146  THE    INTELLECT. 

elements  of  moral  agency,  necessarily  pre-supposed,  as  the 
condition  of  the  existence  of  the  idea  of  right  and  wrong, 
of  obligation,  etc.,  in  our  minds  ?     They  are  the  following. 

1.  Power  to  know  ourselves  together  with  our  rela- 
tions. 

2.  The  actual  perception  of  such  relations. 

3.  Power  to  act,  or  to  refuse  to  act,  in  harmony  with 
these  relations. 

That  the  ideas  of  right  and  wrong  sustain  to  such  con- 
ceptions the  relation  of  logical  antecedent,  is  evident  from 
the  following  considerations : 

1.  When  we  conceive  of  a  being  possessed  of  these 
powers,  and  existing  in  such  relations,  we  necessarily  affirm 
obligations  of  him.  An  intelligent  being  is  revealed  to  me, 
as  possessed  of  capacity  for  virtue  or  vice,  together  with 
susceptibilities  for  happiness  or  misery.  I  have  a  conscious- 
ness of  the  power  to  will  his  virtue  and  happiness,  or  his 
vice  and  misery.  I  instantly  affirm  myself  under  obligation 
to  will  the  former  instead  of  the  latter.  No  other  concep- 
tions are  necessary  to  the  existence  of  this  affirmation. 
These  facts  also  being  postulated,  obligation  must  be 
affirmed.  We  can  no  more  conceive  it  right  to  will  the  evil 
instead  of  the  good,  or,  that  we  are  not  under  obligation  to 
will  the  latter,  than  we  can  conceive  of  the  annihilation  of 
space. 

2.  If  any  of  these  elements  are  not  postulated,  obliga- 
tion can  not  be  conceived  of,  nor  affirmed.  If  we  deny  of 
a  creature  intelligence  to  perceive  his  relations  to  other 
beings,  we  cannot  conceive  of  him  as  under  obligation  to 
them.  Whatever  degree  of  intelligence  be  attributed  to  him, 
this  involves,  in  our  apprehensions,  no  obligation  to  one  act 
of  will  instead  of  another,  in  the  absence  of  all  power  to  put 


REASON    RESUMED.  147 

forth  the  required,  instead  of  the  prohibited  act.  Suppose 
a  creature  has  any  degree  of  intelligence  whatever.  This 
creates  no  obligation  to  locomotion,  in  the  absence  of  cor- 
responding power.  Suppose  the  mind  located  in  a  body 
totally  destitute  of  the  power  of  locomotion.  Would  the 
existence  of  intelligence  create  obligation  to  locomotion  ? 
Certainly  not.  Such  would  be  the  response  of  universal 
mind.  Now  the  power  to  will  is  just  as  distinct  from  the 
intelligence,  as  that  of  locomotion  is.  Hence,  intelligence, 
of  whatever  kind  or  degree,  can  no  more  create  obligation 
to  one  than  the  other,  in  the  absence  of  corresponding 
power.  To  the  conception  of  an  agent,  then,  possessed  of 
intelligence  to  know  his  relations,  and  power  to  act,  or  re- 
fuse to  act,  in  harmony  with  those  relations,  the  ideas  of 
right  and  wrong,  of  obligation,  etc.,  sustain  the  relation  of 
logical  antecedents. 

IDEA    OP    FITNESS. 

Every  person  who  has  attentively  noticed  the  operations 
of  his  own  mind,  must  have  observed,  that  under  certain 
circumstances,  certain  actions,  or  certain  states  of  mind, 
appeared  to  him  fit  and  proper.  When  asked  to  give  a 
reason  for  such  judgments,  no  other  account  can  be  given, 
than  a  simple  reference  to  the  nature  of  the  thing  itself, 
and  to  the  circumstances  supposed.  For  illustration,  take 
the  following  passage  of  Scripture  :  "  Tt  was  meet  that  we 
should  make  merry  and  be  glad  ;  for  this  thy  brother  was 
dead,  and  is  alive  again  ;  and  was  lost,  and  is  found."  Sup- 
pose that  father  to  have  been  required  to  give  a  reason  for 
the  judgment,  that  under  the  circumstances  supposed,  joy 
and  merriment  were  fit  or  proper.  What  answer  could 
he  have  given  ?    No  other  answer  than   for   the  judgment, 


148  THE    INTELLECT. 

that  no  phenomena  exist  without  a  cause.  In  both  instances, 
the  mind  knows  absolutely  that  its  judgments  are,  and  must 
be  true.  No  other  reason  for  their  truth,  however,  can  be 
given,  than  this  :  The  circumstances  being  given,  they  are 
self-affirmed. 

THIS    IDEA    SYNONYMOUS    WITH    RIGHT    AND    WRONG,  ETC. 

Now  the  idea  of  fitness,  when  applied  to  moral  relations, 
is  identical  with  that  of  right  and  wrong.  It  is  the  founda- 
tion of  the  idea  of  merit  and  demerit  ;  and  consequently 
of  that  of  reward  and  punishment. 

It  is  also  identical  with  the  idea  of  moral  order.  When 
it  is  asked,  why  is  that  state  in  which  virtue  is  rewarded 
and  vice  punished,  regarded  as  a  state  of  moral  order  ?  no 
other  reason  can  be.  assigned  than  this  :  Such  a  state  is 
fit  and  proper. 

IDEA    OF    Tift]    USEFUL,    OR   THE    GOOD. 

Whenever  we  conceive  of  a  creature  capable  of  pleasure 
or  pain,  happiness  or  misery,  we  necessarily  conceive  of  a 
state  in  which  all  the  capacities  of  such  a  creature  for  plea- 
sure and  happiness  are  perfectly  filled.  This  state  we  des- 
ignate by  the  term  good,  a  term  sometimes  used  in  another 
sense,  as  synonymous  with  that  of  right.  Whatever  tends 
to  fill  out  the  measure  of  pleasure  and  happiness,  we  desig- 
nate by  the  general  term,  useful. 

The  ideas  of  the  useful  and  the  good,  above  defined, 
give  birtli  to  all  the  varied  form-s  of  human  industry,  such 
as  agriculture,  the  mechanic  arts,  commerce,  etc.  All  are 
moving  on  to  the  realization  of  one  great  leading  idea,  the 
filling  up  of  the  capacities  of  man  for  pleasure  and  happiness. 


REASON    RESUMED.  149 


THE    SUMMUM    BONUM. 


There  is  one  idea  of  reason,  expressed  by  the  words,  the 
great  good,  the  summum  bonum,  and  the  to  xaXov^  about 
which  philosophers  have  long  disputed,  and  in  respect  to 
which,  they  have  been  about  equally  divided  in  opinion. 
The  question  may  be  thus  put :  When  we  think  of  our- 
selves, or  of  the  universe  at  large,  what  is  that  state  to 
which  our  nature  is  correlated,  as  preferable  to  any  other, 
actual  or  conceivable  ? 

Some  have  placed  the  great  good  in  happiness  merely. 
To  this  position,  however,  we  find  that  our  nature  is  not 
exclusively  correlated.  If  happiness  were  the  only  thing 
to  which  our  nature  is  correlated,  as  in  itself  most  to  be 
desired,  if  happiness  exists,  we  should  be  totally  indifferent 
in  respect  to  the  means,  or  conditions  of  its  existence.  We 
are  not  pleased,  but  pained  at  the  thought,  for  example, 
that  perfect  happiness  should  be  associated  with  great 
wickedness. 

Others,  in  departing  from  this  idea,  have  placed  the 
great  good,  in  virtue.  To  this  position,  also,  we  find  that 
our  nature  is  not  correlated.  If  virtue  is  the  only  thing 
that  the  mind  regards  as  good,  it  would  be  indifferent  in  re- 
spect to  the  condition  in  which  it  should  exist;  whether,  for 
example,  the  virtuous  agent  were  happy  or  miserable.  We 
are  pained,  on  the  other  hand,  at  the  thought,  that  virtuous 
beings  should  not  be  happy.  Happiness  our  intelligence 
affirms  to  be  the  right  of  the  pure  and  virtuous. 

The  true  solution  is,  no  doubt,  to  be  found  in  the  blend- 
ing of  the  two  above  given,  or,  as  Cousin  expresses  it,  "  In 
the  connection  and  harmony  of  virtue  and  happiness  as 
merited  by  it."    If  we  conceive  of  a  state  of  perfect  virtue. 


150  THE    INTELLECT. 

associated  with  perfect  happiness,  this  conception  contains 
a  realization  of  our  idea  of  the  summum  bonum.  Every 
department  of  our  nature  is  correlated  to  that  idea.  We  can 
conceive  of  no  state  so  much  to  be  desired  as  this.  Nor 
can  we  perceive  any  element  in  this  state  to  which  the  laws 
of  our  being  do  not  fully  respond. 

IDEAS    OF    LIBERTY    AND    NECESSITY, 

These  ideas,  like  those  of  right  and  wrong,  are  oppo- 
sites.  The  elements  entering  into  one,  are  excluded  from 
the  other.  The  question  is.  What  are  the  characteristics 
which  separate  and  distinguish  one  of  these  ideas  from  the 
other  ?  In  answer,  I  would  remark,  that  they  represent 
two  entirely  distinct  and  opposite  relations,  which  may  be 
supposed  to  exist  between  an  antecedent  and  its  conse- 
quent. The  first  is  this  :  The  antecedent  being  given,  but 
one  consequent  is  possible,  and  that  must  arise.  This  rela- 
tion we  designate  by  the  term  necessity.  The  second  rela- 
tion is,  the  antecedent  being  given,  either  of  two  or 
more  consequents  are  possible,  and  consequently,  when  any 
one  does  arise,  either  of  the  others  might  arise  in  its  stead. 

IDEA  OF  LIBERTY  REALIZED  ONLY  IN  THE  ACTION  OF  THE 
WILL. 

The  relation  between  all  antecedents  and  consequents, 
with  the  exception  of  motives  and  acts  of  will,  are  conceived 
by  the  intelligence  as  necessary.  If  the  idea  of  liberty  is 
not  realized  in  the  action  of  the  will,  it  exists  in  the  intel- 
ligence without  an  object,  or  any  element  in  any  object  cor- 
responding to  it,  in  the  universe. 

CHRONOLOGICAL    ANTECEDENTS   OF   THESE    IDEAS. 

No  idea  of  reason  does  or  can  exist  in  the  mind,  without 


REASON    RESUMED.  151 

the  appearance  of  some  phenomena,  through  which  it  is  re- 
vealed. The  existence  of  the  idea  of  liberty  can  be  ac- 
counted for  only  on  the  supposition  of  the  appearance  in 
consciousness  of  the  element  of  liberty  in  the  action  of  the 
will.  In  all  other  phenomena  of  which  the  mind  is  con- 
scious, the  element  of  necessity  appears.  The  appearance 
of  these  phenomena,  then,  are  the  chronological  antecedents 
of  the  ideas  of  liberty  and  necessity. 

IDEA    OP   THE    BEAUTIFUL   AND    SUBLIME. 

All  men  agree  in  pronouncing  some  objects  beautiful, 
and  some  sublime,  and  others  the  opposite.  By  many  phi- 
losophers, the  beautiful  and  sublime  are  contemplated  as 
simple  emotions.  Some  suppose,  that  all  objects  are  to 
the  mind  originally  alike  in  this  respect,  that  they  are  un- 
adapted  to  awaken  any  such  emotions  in  the  mind,  and  that 
these  feelings  come  to  be  connected  with  particular  objects 
by  accidental  association.  Pleasing  emotions  are  from  some 
cause  awakened  in  the  mind.  While  in  this  state,  we  per- 
ceive, we  will  suppose,  a  rose.  These  emotions  are  thus 
associated  with  that  object,  so  that  when  it  is  perceived 
again,  they  re-appear.  Hence,  not  because  the  rose  is  in  it- 
self more  beautiful  than  any  other  object,  but  on  account 
of  the  feelings  thus  associated  with  it,  it  is  ever  after  re- 
garded as  beautiful.  Now  to  this  theory  there  exists  this 
insuperable  objection.  Accidental  association  can  never 
account  for  the  absolute  universality  of  judgment  which 
exists  among  mankind,  in  respect  to  particular  objects. 
Why,  for  example,  do  all  the  world  agree  in  pronouncing 
the  rose  and  lily  more  beautiful  than  the  poppy  or  sun- 
flower ?  Accidents  never  produce  perfect  uniformity. 

Others  suppose,  that  there  are  in   the   mind  ideas  of 


152  THE    INTELLECT. 

reason  represented  by  the  terms  beautiful  and  sublime,  and 
that  objects  are  referred  to  one  or  the  other,  as  they  pre- 
sent corresponding  characteristics.  I  will  now  present  cer- 
tain considerations  designed  to  show,  that  this  last  is  the 
true  conception. 

CONSIDERATIONS  INDICATING  THE  EXISTENCE  IN  THE  MIND 
OF  IDEAS  OP  REASON,  DESIGNATED  BY  THE  TERMS  BEAU- 
TIFUL AND  SUBLIME. 

One  fact  which  has  a  very  important  bearing  upon  this 
question,  strikes  the  mind  at  first  view.  It  is  this  :  No 
human  form  or  countenance  is  regarded  by  any  person  as 
perfect.  How  can  this  fact  be  accounted  for,  except  on  the 
supposition,  that  every  such  judgment  is  based  upon  a  com- 
parison of  the  external  object,  with  an  idea  more  perfect, 
existing  in  the  mind  itself  ? 

Again,  the  ancient  sculptors  and  painters,  when  they 
attempted  to  give  to  the  world,  what  all  men  would  alike  re- 
gard as  the  forms  of  perfect  beauty,  copied  after  no  one 
living  model  ;  but  took  from  all  the  forms  of  beauty  in  the 
world  around  them,  those  parts  which  were  most  beautiful, 
and  from  these  combined  new  forms  more  beautiful  than 
any  realities  actually  existing.  Does  not  this  show,  that 
they  were  endeavoring  to  realize,  not  the  forms  of  beauty 
actually  existing  in  the  universe  around  them,  but  an  idea 
in  their  own  minds  more  perfect  than  these  forms  ? 

With  this  supposition  also,  and  with  this  only,  consists  the 
fact,  that  the  pleasure  derived  from  the  contemplation  of 
certain  forms  of  beauty  is  permanent,  and  becomes  more  in- 
tense, the  more  intimate  and  protracted  our  acquaintance 
with  them  ;  while  the  pleasure  derived  from  the  contem- 
plation of  other  forms  ceases  on  a  protracted  and  intimate 


REASON    RESUMED.  153 

acquaintance.  The  reason  of  this  obviously  is,  that  the 
first-mentioned  forms  correspond  very  nearly,  in  all  their 
parts,  to  the  ideal  in  the  mind.  An  intimate  acquaintance 
with  the  others,  however,  gives  us  a  knowledge  of  their  de- 
fects, and  in  time  destroys  the  pleasure  which  we  felt  when 
those  defects  were  not  perceived. 

I  will  present  one  other  consideration  bearing  upon  the 
subject,  which  I  regard  as  perfectly  decisive.  The  particu- 
lar elements  which  mark  objects  as  beautiful  or  sublime,  do 
in  fact  correspond  with  fundamental  ideas.  In  respect  to 
the  sublime,  all  agree  in  fixing  upon  the  infinite  as  the 
chief  source  of  emotions  of  sublimity.  In  finite  objects 
one  element  only  is  correlated  to  these  emotions,  that  of 
vastness. 

The  characteristics  of  the  beautiful  are  determinate 
form,  regularity,  uniformity,  and  variety.  A  waving,  in- 
stead of  a  crooked  line,  a  line  realizing  the  ideas  of  uni- 
formity and  variety,  has  universally  been  fixed  upon,  as  the 
line  of  beauty  and  grace.  Now  that  which  proceeds  according 
to  fundamental  ideas,  must  be  itself  the  representative  of 
such  ideas. 

OBJECTION    TO    THE    UNIVERSALITY    OP   THESE    IDEAS. 

An  objection  to  the  principle  above  elucidated,  to  wit, 
the  diflferent  standards  of  beauty  adopted  by  different 
nations,  and  by  the  same  nations,  at  different  periods,  has 
sometimes  been  adduced.  In  reply,  the  following  consid- 
erations are  presented  as  deserving  special  attention: 

1.  It  may  be  questioned  whether  the  savage  when  he 
paints  and  tattoos  his  form,  and  the  civilized  person  when 
he  adorns  his  with  the  ornaments  of  civilized  society,  are 
endeavoring  to  realize  the   same   idea.     The   one   may  be 


154  THE   INTELLECT. 

aiming  to  realize  the  idea  of  the  beautiful,  and  the  other 
(the  savage),  that  of  the  terrible.  The  same  holds  true  of 
architecture.  The  prominent  idea  in  the  Grecian  style  is 
the  beautiful.  That  in  the  Gothic  is  the  grand,  the  solemn, 
the  sublime.  The  former  and  the  latter  then,  had  not  dif- 
ferent standards  of  beauty.  They  were  aiming  to  realize 
different  ideas. 

2.  While  the  idea  may  exist  alike  in  all  minds,  the  ideal, 
that  is,  the  form  in  which  the  idea  shall  be  embodied,  may 
exist  in  different  minds,  and  among  mankind  at  different 
periods,  in  different  degrees  of  development.  Consequently 
the  forms  in  which  they  will  embody  the  idea  will  be  vari- 
ous. 

3.  In  contemplating  particular  forms  of  beauty,  in  which 
many  defects  of  course  exist  along  with  the  beautiful,  these 
may  be  mistaken  for  the  particular  features  which  are  the 
source  of  the  pleasurable  emotions  felt  under  these  circum- 
stances. These  defects  then  will  be  copied  instead  of  the 
actual  beauties. 

4.  But  in  the  midst  of  all  this  apparent  variety,  there  is 
a  more  general  agreement  than  is  commonly  supposed;  an 
agreement  that  is  fundamental  to  the  inquiry  before  us. 
Introduce  men  of  all  ages,  and  of  every  nation  into  the 
same  family,  and  ask  them  which  of  the  children  in  that 
particular  family  is  the  most  beautiful,  and  you  will  find 
but  little  diversity  in  their  judgments,  and  no  diversity 
which  is  not  perfectly  consistent  with  the  supposition  of  a 
common  ideal  in  their  minds,  while  the  striking  coincidence 
in  their  judgments  can  be  explained  on  no  other  suppo- 
sition. 

5.  There  are  actual  forms  of  beauty,  in  respect  to  which 
all  men  do  agree.     The  most  perfect  specimens  of  ancient 


REASON    RESUMED.  155 

sculpture  and  painting  may  be  adduced  as  an  illustration. 
Also  forms  of  beauty  in  the  world  around  us  ;  as,  the  rose 
and  the  lily.  Such  circumstances  we  should  find  it  difficult 
to  explain  on  any  other  supposition  than  the  one  before  us. 

CHRONOLOGICAL   ANTECEDENTS    OF   THESE    IDEAS. 

The  condition  of  the  development  of  the  idea  of  beauty 
and  of  sublimity  in  the  mind,  is  the  perception  of  the  ele- 
ments of  the  beautiful  and  sublime  in  some  external  object. 
In  the  divine  mind,  these  ideas,  among  others,  existed  eter- 
nally as  the  prototypes  after  which  creation  was  formed 
and  moulded.  The  human  intelligence  is  so  constituted, 
that,  in  the  presence  of  objects  in  the  conformation  of  which 
the  divine  idea  is  more  or  less  nearly  realized,  the  same  idea 
is  awakened  in  the  mind  of  man.  This  idea  then  becomes 
the  standard  by  which  the  external  object  is  characterized 
as  beautiful,  grand,  or  sublime. 

ILLUSTRATION   FROM   COUSIN. 

Cousin  thus  beautifully  explains  the  origin  of  the  idea 
of  beauty  in  the  mind  :  "  The  idea  of  the  beautiful  is  equally 
inherent  in  the  mind  of  man,  as  that  of  the  just  and  the  good. 
Interrogate  yourselves,  when  a  vast  and  tranquil  sea,  when 
mountains  of  harmonious  proportions,  when  the  manly  or 
graceful  forms  of  men  and  women,  are  present  to  your  view, 
or  some  trait  of  heroic  devotion,  to  your  recollection.  Once 
impressed  with  the  idea  of  the  beautiful,  man  seizes,  disen- 
gages, extends,  develops  and  purifies  it  in  his  thought,  and 
by  the  assistance  of  this  idea,  which  external  objects  have 
suggested  to  him,  he  re-examines  these  same  objects,  and 
finds  them  inferior  to  the  idea  which  they  themselves  have 
suggested." 


156  THE    INTELLECT. 


IDEA    OF    HARMONY. 


The  remarks  and  illustrations  above  presented,  pertain- 
ing to  the  ideas  of  the  beautiful  and  sublime,  are  equally- 
applicable  to  that  of  harmony.  The  ear  trieth  sounds,  as 
the  eye  doth  form  and  color.  In  harmony  words  and  sounds 
are  arranged  according  to  fundamental  ideas,  j  ust  as  other 
elements  are  in  the  beautiful  and  sublime.  That  this  is  the 
true  explication  of  the  subject  will  appear,  I  think,  from 
the  following  considerations: 

1.  When  highly  excited  by  musical  performances,  those 
who  attentively  watch  the  operations  of  their  own  minds, 
cannot  fail  to  notice,  that  under  such  circumstances  they 
uniformly  conceive  of  the  same  pieces  as  performed  in- 
finitely better  ;  and  that  it  is  this  conception  which  con- 
stitutes the  main  source  of  delight. 

2.  Persons  in  whose  minds  the  principle  of  harmony  is 
most  fully  developed,  enjoy  an  exquisite  piece  of  music 
quite  as  highly,  when  reading  it  alone,  in  the  absence  of 
all  musical  sounds,  as  when  hearing  it  performed  by  the 
best  trained  choir,  clearly  showing  that  the  idea  in  the  mind 
far  surpasses  realities  without. 

3.  Skillful  performers  on  the  organ  or  piano,  who  have 
lost  the  faculty  of  hearing,  enjoy  these  instruments  no  less 
than  before.  I  recollect  to  have  read  of  a  celebrated 
musician  in  Germany,  who  in  his  old  age  lost  his  hearing 
entirely.  Yet,  as  his  fingers  would  run  over  the  keys  of 
his  piano,  the  instrument  used  being  (a  fact  unknown  to  him) 
totally  destitute  of  power  to  produce  any  sound  whatever, 
he  would  rise  in  his  feelings  to  perfect  ecstacy  of  delight. 
In  his  own  mind  there  was  harmony  deep  and  profound.  It 
was  harmony  in  idea. 


REASON    RESUMED.  157 

4.  The  principles  of  harmony  are  all  found  to  be  reduci- 
ble to  mathematical  formulas.  These  principles  are  not 
deduced,  in  the  first  inst^^nce,  from  observation,  irrespec- 
tive of  fundamental  ideas.  Such  ideas  must  first  be  de- 
veloped, before  the  principles  of  harmony  can  be  under- 
stood. 

POETRY    DEFINED. 

We  are  now  prepared  for  a  definition  of  poetry,  prop- 
erly so  called.  A  mere  rythmical  jingle  of  words  at  the  end 
of  lines  of  a  given  length,  does  not  constitute  poetry,  ac- 
cording to  the  true  signification  of  the  term.  Nor  have  I 
been  satisfied  with  the  popular  definitions  of  the  subject 
which  I  have  met  with.  I  will  present,  as  an  example,  that 
given  by  Coleridge  :  "  A  poem  is  that  species  of  compo- 
sition which  is  opposed  to  works  of  science,  by  proposing 
for  its  immediate  object  pleasure,  not  truth  ;  and  from  all 
other  species  (having  this  object  in  common  with  it)  it  is. 
discriminated  by  proposing  to  itself  such  delight  from  the 
whole  as  is  compatible  with  a  distinct  gratification  from 
each  component  part."  The  great  objection  to  this  definition 
is,  that  many  prose,  as  well  as  poetical  compositions,  would 
fall  under  it.  I  will  now  propose  another  and  a  difi'erent 
definition.  Poetry,  or  more  properly,  perhaps,  a  poem,  is 
the  creations  of  the  imagination  embodied  in  language  ar- 
ranged in  conformity  to  the  idea  of  harmony.  I  leave  the 
definition  to  speak  for  itself. 

IDEA  OF  TRUTH. IDEA  DEFINED. 

Another  fundamental  idea  of  reason — an  idea  which  con- 
trols the  intelligence  in  all  its  movements — is  the  idea  of 
truth.  The  term  truth  may  be  contemplated  objectively 
and  subjectively.     Objectively,   it  comprehends    and    ex- 


158  THE    INTELLECT. 

presses  all  realities,  whatever  they  may  be.  Subjectively, 
it  designates  an  intellectual  conception  in  harmony  with 
the  object  of  the  conception. 

CHRONOLOGICAL    ANTECEDENT    OF    THIS    IDEA. 

The  chronological  antecedent  of  this  idea,  or  the  con- 
dition of  its  development  by  the  reason,  is  the  perception 
of  phenomena,  and  the  consequent  development  of  the  idea 
of  substance.  Then  the  great  question,  "  What  is  truth?" 
becomes  the  leading  idea  in  the  intelligence. 

THE    IDEA    OF    LAW, LAW    DEFINED. 

Among  the  most  fundamental  of  all  ideas  of  reason  is 
that  of  law.  Law,  in  its  most  general  acceptation,  is  de- 
fined as  a  rule  of  action.,  and  in  thought  and  fact,  takes  on 
two  forms, — physical  or  natural,  and  moral  ;  the  former 
•comprising  the  rule,  or  rules,  in  conformity  to  which  the 
physical  powers  in  nature  do  act.,  and  the  latter  those  in 
conformity  to  which  moral  agents  are  required  to  act.  Na- 
tural law  is  a  rule  o/*  action  ;  moral  law,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  a  rule/br  action. 

LAW,  SUBJECTIVE  AND  OBJECTIVE. 

Law,  then,  may  be  contemplated  in  two  points  of  light, 
— subjective  and  objective.  In  the  first  sense,  it  is  an  idea, 
in  which  powers  are  contemplated  as  arranged  relatively  to 
each  other,  so  that  their  mutual  action  and  reaction  shall 
produce  results  in  correspondence  to  a  certain  end,  con- 
ceived of,  and  chosen  by  the  mind.  In  the  second  sense, 
it  is  the  existence,  arrangement,  and  consequent  action  of 
these  powers,  in  harmony  with  that  idea. 


REASON    RESUMED.  159 


CONCLUSION  FROM  THE  ABOVE. 

We  come  to  this  conclusion  :  that  whenever  powers  act 
in  conformity  with  law, — powers  whose  arrangements  take 
form  in  time,  they  are  acting  in  obedience  to  some  idea  ex- 
isting in  some  intelligent  mind.  To  illustrate  this,  let  us 
suppose  an  army  of  one  hundred  thousand  men  all  dressed 
and  equipped  alike,  arranged  in  a  given  order,  and  all  per- 
forming perfectly  harmonious  motions  and  evolutions.  You 
here  perceive  the  presence  and  all-prevading  influence  of 
law.  Is  it  possible  to  conceive  all  this,  and  not  suppose 
this  law  to  be  some  idea  in  some  intelligent  mind — a  mind 
that  comprehends  all  the  parts,  and  assigns  to  each  part  its 
position,  etc.?  If  this  could  not  be  supposed  of  intelligent 
powers,  much  less  could  we  suppose  a  similar  action  of 
necessary  and  unintelligent  ones.  The  grand  problem, 
then,  the  solution  of  which  is  the  final  object  and  distinc- 
tive character  of  philosophy,  when  once  solved,  leads  the 
mind  to  the  direct  apprehension  and  contemplation  of  the 
infinite, — of  God,  whose  creative  idea  is  the  law  of  all  ex- 
istences. The  problem  referred  to  is  this  :  "  For  all  that 
exists  conditionally  (i.  e.  the  existence  of  which  is  incon- 
ceivable except  under  the  condition  of  its  dependency  on 
some  other  as  its  antecedent)  to  find  a  ground  that  is  un- 
conditional and  absolute,  and  thereby  to  reduce  the  aggre- 
gate of  human  knowledge  to  a  system."  Now,  this  ground 
can  be  found  in  nothing  but  in  the  mind  of  God. 

CHRONOLOGICAL    ANTECEDENT    TO    THIS    IDEA. 

As  mind  wakes  into  conscious  existence,  and  contem- 
plates the  action  of  the  powers  of  nature  within  and  around 
it,  it  at  once  perceives  all  things  existing  and  acting  as  a 


160  THE    INTELLECT. 

means  to  an  end.  Everywhere  diversity  blended  with  har- 
mony, presents  itself.  Now  this  presentation  of  the  powers 
of  nature  is  the  chronological  antecedent  of  the  idea  of  law 
in  the  reason.  Hence  the  great  inquiry  ever  after  imposed 
upon  the  intelligence;  to  wit,  What  are  the  laws  in  con- 
formity to  which  they  act  ?  In  this  inquiry,  the  intelli- 
gence begins  to  "  feel  after  "  the  infinite,  and  it  never  rests 
until  it  finds  itself  in  the  presence  of  "  that  creative  idea^ 
■which  appoints  to  each  thing  its  position,  and  in  conse- 
quence of  that  position,  gives  it  its  qualities,  yea,  its  very 
existence  as  that  particular  thing." 

NATURE    OF    PROOF. 

One  thought  suggested  by  the  preceding  analysis  demands 
special  attention, — the  nature  of  proof.  No  proposition 
is,  properly  speaking,  proved,  till  facts  or  arguments  are 
adduced,  which  not  only  affirm  its  truth,  but  contradict 
every  opposite  proposition.  How  often  is  this  fundamental 
law  of  evidence  overlooked  and  disregarded  in  almost  every 
department  of  human  investigation  !  In  theology,  for  ex- 
ample, how  often  is  an  hypothesis  denominated  a  doctrine, 
which  merely  consists  with  a  given  class  of  passages  of 
Holy  Writ, — assumed  as  absolutely  affirmed  by  these  pass- 
ages, when,  in  reality,  they  equally  consist  with  the  contra- 
dictory hypothesis  !  Let  it  ever  be  borne  in  mind,  that  no- 
passage  or  passages  of  Scripture  prove  any  one  doctrine 
which  do  not  contradict  every  opposite  doctrine.  No  facts 
affirm  any  one  hypothesis  which  do  not  equally  contradict 
every  contradictory  hypothesis. 

FUNDAMENTAL    AND    SUPERFICIAL    THINKERS. 

Another  suggestion  which  presents  itself  is  this, — the 


KEASON    RESUMED.  161 

difference  between  superficial  and  fundamental  thinkers. 
The  former  dwell  only  upon  the  surface  of  subjects,  and 
having  there  found  certain  hypotheses  which  consist  with 
mere  exterior  facts,  they  gravely  decide  that  they  "  have 
heard  the  conclusion  of  the  whole  matter."  They  have  dis- 
covered all  that  can  be  known,  and  "  wisdom  will  die  with 
them."  The  latter  class,  on  the  other  hand,  retire  into  the 
interior  of  subjects,  and  taking  their  position  upon  some 
great  central  facts,  announce  the  existence  and  operations 
of  universal  laws,  sustaining  to  exterior  facts  the  relation 
of  logical  antecedents,  and  explaining  them  all.  The  reason 
why  the  positions  assumed  by  such  men  are  uniformly  so 
impregnable  is,  that  the  error  of  every  hypothesis  in  oppo- 
sition to  that  which  they  have  assumed,  as  well  as  the 
truth  of  their  own,  becomes  visible  at  once,  in  the  light  of 
the  great  central  facts  on  which  they  have  taken  their  stand. 

THE    PHILOSOPHIC    IDEA. 

The  philosophic  idea  realized,  or  objectively  considered, 
is  the  reduction  of  phenomena  to  fundamental  ideas, — the 
reduction  of  the  sum  of  human  knowledge  to  a  system  ;  the 
finding,  amid  the  infinity  of  facts  which  are  floating  in  the 
universe  around  us,  some  great  central  fundamental  facts 
or  laws,  which  are  affirmed  by  all  others,  and  explain  them 
all. 

This  idea  subjectively  considered  is  a  conception  lying 
down  in  the  depths  of  the  reason,  that  all  substances  exist 
and  act  in  harmony  with  such  ideas.  Hence  the  question:, 
perpetually  imposed  upon  the  understanding  and  judgment, 
in  all  departments  of  human  research  ;  to  wit,  what  are  the 
laws  which  explain  the  facts  here  presented  ?  Science  is 
everywhere  now  on  the  high  road  tendinor  to  the  realiza- 
11 


162  THE    INTELLECT. 

tion  of  this  great  idea.     Happy  the  eyes  that  shall  see  it 
realized. 

IDEA    OF    SCIENCE    DEFINED. 

The  idea  of  science,  which  of  course  is  a  pure  concep- 
tion of  reason,  is  knowledge  reduced  to  fundamental  ideas 
and  principles  ;  or  the  properties  and  relations  of  objects, 
systematically  evolved  in  the  light  of  such  ideas  and  prin- 
ciples. Thus  in  geometry,  we  have  the  properties  and  re- 
lations of  particular  objects  systematically  evolved  in  the 
light  of  axioms  and  postulates,  which  are,  in  reality,  funda- 
mental ideas  of  reason.  Whenever  this  end  is  accomplished, 
in  reference  to  any  phenomena,  or  objects,  then  we  have 
the  scientific  idea  realized. 

PURE   SCIENCES. 

When  the  axioms,  postulates,  and  definitions  are  all 
alike  pure  conceptions  of  reason,  and  when  the  judgment 
evolves  the  properties  and  relations  of  the  objects  of  such 
definitions  in  the  light  of  such  axioms  and  postulates,  then 
we  have  what  are  denominated  pure  sciences.  Such  is 
geometry,  and  the  mathematics  generally. 

MIXED   SCIENCES. 

When  the  axioms  and  postulates  are  ideas  or  principles 
of  reason,  and  when  the  definitions  pertain  to  phenomena 
or  objects  contingent  and  relative,  as  in  natural  philosophy, 
and  when  the  judgment  evolves  the  relations  and  properties 
of  such  objects  in  the  light  of  such  ideas  and  postulates, 
then  we  have  mixed  sciences. 

CONSCIENCE    DEFINED. 

Conscience  is  that  function  of  reason  which  pertains  to 


REASON    RESUMED.  163 

the  ideas  of  right  and  wrong,  of  obligation,  of  merit  and 
demerit,  etc.  It  is  a  testifying  function  of  reason,  pertain- 
ing to  the  relation  which  ought  to  exist  between  the  action 
of  the  will  and  the  idea  of  right  and  wrong. 

AUTHORITY  OF  CONSCIENCE. 

1.  Conscience  always  commands  us  in  the  name  of  God. 
Her  mandates  are  regarded  as  the  voice  of  God  speaking 
within  us,  and  when  disregarded,  we  always  hold  ourselves 
amenable  to  the  divine  tribunal.  Conscience  in  the  heathen 
is  not  only  a  law,  but  a  law  of  God  ;  and  so  it  is  regarded 
by  them. 

2.  As  conscience  is  the  voice  of  God  within  us,  it  follows 
that  it  can  never,  in  its  appropriate  exercise,  put  right  for 
wrong,  and  the  opposite.  In  other  words,  no  man  acts  con- 
scientiously when  wittingly  doing  wrong,  nor  in  opposition 
to  conscience,  when  wittingly  doing  right.  "Conscience,"  as 
Coleridge  remarks,  "  in  the  absence  of  direct  inspiration, 
bears  the  same  relation  to  the  will  of  God,  that  a  good  chro- 
nometer does  to  the  position  of  the  sun  in  a  cloudy  day." 

OBJECTION. 

In  opposition  to  the  principle  above  stated,  it  is  very 
common  to  refer  to  the  contradictory  standards  of  moral  ob- 
ligation adopted  by  different  nations,  communities,  and  in- 
dividuals. The  following  considerations  are  deserving  of 
special  attention  in  reply  to  this  objection  : 

1.  To  suppose  that  the  heathen,  for  example,  in  all  their 
rights  and  ceremonies,  are  endeavoring  to  realize  the  idea 
of  right,  is  as  absurd  as  to  suppose  that  the  savage  is  en- 
deavoring to  realize  the  idea  of  the  beautiful,  when  he  is 
tattooing  his  body. 


164  THE   INTELLECT. 

2.  The  Bible  affirms  that  the  heathen  are  actuated  by 
fear  and  not  by  conscience  :  "  And  deliver  them  who 
through  fear  of  death  were  all  their  lifetime  subject  to 
bondage." 

3.  The  judgment  that  a  thing  is  not  wrong,  is  often  mis- 
taken for  the  testimony  of  conscience  to  its  rightness. 

4.  When  a  reference  is  made  to  the  intention,  the  only 
appropriate  object  of  conscience,  we  find  a  more  universal 
agreement  among  men  than  is  generally  supposed,  an  agree- 
ment of  such  a  nature  as  to  demand  the  truth  of  the  above 
proposition,  while  every  shade  of  difference  may  be  ex- 
plained in  perfect  consistency  with  it. 

TERM  CONSCIENCE  AS  USED  IN  THE  SCRIPTURES. 

A  good  conscience,  as  the  words  are  there  used,  is  the 
testimony  of  the  mind  to  the  agreement  of  the  will,  or  moral 
action,  with  the  moral  law.  An  evil  conscience  is  the  op- 
posite, the  testimony  of  the  mind  to  the  fact  of  the  disagree- 
ment of  the  action  of  the  will  with  that  law. 

RELATION  OF  REASON  TO  OTHER  INTELLECTUAL  FACULTIES. 

The  relation  of  reason  to  other  functions  of  the  intelli- 
gence may  now  be  readily  pointed  out.  Of  the  phenomena, 
or  truths  affirmed  by  those  faculties,  reason  gives  the  logi- 
cal antecedents.  This  is  its  exclusive  function.  The  judg- 
ment, in  all  its  operations,  is  exclusively  analytic.  It  sim- 
ply evolves  what  is  embraced  in  the  affirmations  of  the 
other  faculties.  Reason  is  synthetic.  It  always  adds  to 
the  affirmation  of  the  other  faculties  something  not  em- 
braced in  the  affirmation.  The  element  added,  however, 
always  sustains  to  that  to  which  it  is  added  a  fixed  relation, 
that  of  logical  antecedent.     Thus  when  sense  or  conscious- 


REASON   RESUMED.  165 

ness  affirms  phenomena,  reason  adds  to  the  affirmation  an 
element  not  embraced  in  it,  that  of  substance,  an  element, 
however,  sustaining  to  the  affirmation  a  fixed  relation,  that 
of  logical  antecedent. 

REASON   COMMON   TO   ALL   MEN. 

Reason  also  exists  in  all  men,  and  equally  in  all  who 
possess  it  at  all.  This  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  if  an 
individual  knows  a  truth  of  reason  at  all,  he  does  and  must 
know  it  absolutely.  There  are  no  degrees  in  such  knowl- 
edge. The  difference,  and  only  difference,  between  men 
lies  in  their  perceptive  and  reflective  faculties.  Newton 
differed  from  other  men  not  because  he  knew,  any  more 
absolutely  than  they,  that  events  suppose  a  cause,  that 
things  equal  to  the  same  thing  are  equal  to  one  another, 
etc.,  but  because  he  possessed  powers  of  perception  and 
reflection  which  enabled  him  to  see  (what  they  could  not 
discover)  the  qualities  involved  in  such  truths. 


166  THE    INTELLECT. 


CHAPTER  XII. 
LAWS  OF  INVESTIGATION. 

INVESTIGATION  AND  REASONING    DISTINGUISHED. 

One  department  of  inquiry  of  great  importance  still  re- 
mains. When  we  have  done  with  this,  our  inquiries  in  re- 
gard to  the  intellectual  powers  will  have  closed,  except  as  far 
as  we  may  find  their  operations  combined  with  that  of  the 
other  faculties  or  susceptibilities  of  the  mind. 

The  department  to  which  I  refer,  is  the  employment  of 
these  powers  in  what  is  called  a  process  of  investigation 
and  reasoning.  These  processes,  though  intimately  con- 
nected, are  entirely  distinct,  and  should  be  carefully  dis- 
tinguished the  one  from  the  other.  In  the  former  process 
our  exclusive  object  is  the  discovery  of  truth.  In  the  lat- 
ter, the  object  equally  exclusive  is,  to  prove  the  truth  al- 
ready discovered. 

Your  attention  in  the  present  chapter  will  be  directed  to 
the  first  process.  Our  inquiry  is,  What  are  the  laws  which 
govern  the  mind,  or  ought  to  govern  the  mind,  in  a  process 
of  investigation  of  truth  ? 

SUBSTANCES,  HOW  KNOWN. 

All  substances  are  revealed  to  us  by  their  respective 
phenomena.  Their  existence,  not  only,  but  their  nature, 
character,  and  powers,  are  revealed  to  us  in  this  manner, 
and  this  manner  exclusively.     The  induction  of  phenomena 


LAWS    OF    INVESTIGATION.  167 

therefore  lies  at  the  basis  of  all  our  investigations  pertain- 
ing to  substances. 

INDUCTION  OF  PHENOMENA,  FOR  WHAT  PURPOSES  MADE. 

There  are  four  purposes  entirely  distinct,  for  which  an 
induction  of  phenomena  is  made  : 

1.  For  the  purpose  of  discovering  the  nature,  character- 
istics, and  powers  of  some  particular  substance. 

2.  For  the  purpose  of  classification,  into  genera  and 
species. 

3.  For  the  purpose  of  discovering  some  general  fact,  or 
order  of  sequence. 

4.  For  the  purpose  of  discovering  universal  laws,  in 
conformity  to  which  the  action  of  substances  is  subordin- 
ated. 

Now  the  principles  which  should  guide  us  in  the  induc- 
tion of  phenomena  depend  upon  the  object  we  have  in  view 
in  such  induction. 

INDUCTION  PERTAINING   TO    PARTICULAR  SUBSTANCES. 

In  the  induction  of  phenomena  for  the  purposes  of  de- 
termining the  characteristics,  and  powers  of  some  particular 
substance,  the  following  principles  are  of  fundamental  im- 
portance in  guiding  our  investigations. 

1.  In  marking  the  phenomena  which  appear,  or  the  char- 
acteristics of  particular  phenomena,  omit  none  which  do  ex- 
ist, and  suppose  none  which  do  not  exist. 

2.  In  determining  the  particular  powers  of  the  substance 
in  the  light  of  phenomena  thus  classified  and  characterized, 
undeviatingly  adhere  to  the  following  principles.  Phenom- 
ena which  are  in  their  fundamental  characteristics  alike, 
suppose   similar  powers.     Phenomena    which  are  in  their 


168  THE   INTELLECT. 

fundamental  characteristics  unlike,  suppose  dissimilar 
powers.  In  strict  conformity  to  those  principles,  an  at- 
tempt has  been  made,  in  a  preceding  part  of  the  present 
treatise,  to  determine,  among  other  things,  the  different 
functions  of  the  human  intelligence.  Whether  the  effort 
has  been  successful,  time  will  determine. 

INDUCTION    FOR   PURPOSES  OF  CLASSIFICATION    INTO    GENERA 
AND    SPECIES. 

In  the  induction  of  phenomena  for  the  purposes  of 
classification  into  genera  and  species,  the  following  princi- 
ples should  be  strictly  adhered  to  : 

1.  Fix  definitely  and  distinctly  upon  the  principle  of 
classification,  whatever  it  may  be. 

2.  With  a  rigid  regard  to  principle,  range  with  the  given 
class  every  object,  whatever  its  diversities  in  other  respects, 
which  bears  the  characteristic  mark. 

3.  Strictly  exclude  from  the  class  every  individual  in 
which  the  characteristic  mark  is  wanting. 

The  correctness  and  apparently  easy  application  of  the 
above  principles  are  so  obvious,  that  it  would  seem,  that 
every  one  would  find  it  very  easy  to  apply  them  in  all 
cases.  But  their  rigid  application,  in  cases  where  it  is 
often  most  demanded,  requires  an  intellectual  integrity, 
and  sternness  of  virtue,  which  the  mass  of  mankind  "very 
little  wot  of."  Every  one  almost  would  readily  apply  them 
to  shells,  and  rocks,  and  earths,  and  beasts,  and  fowls,  and 
fishes,  and  even  to  the  objects  in  the  firmament  above  us.  But 
let  us  suppose  that  an  individual  has  before  him  a  correct 
definition  of  treason,  murder,  theft,  and  of  kindred  crimes 
punishable  by  the  law,  and  that  he  should  dis'^over  upon 
an    only  son,  a  dark    spot,  which,  if  carefully    examined, 


LAWS   OF   INVESTIGATION.  169 

would  mark  him  as  a  subject  of  one  of  the  crimes  above 
named  ;  it  would  require  the  stern  virtue  of  a  Brutus,  to 
be  willing  to  have  inquisition  made  according  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  immutable  justice.  Cases  which  thus  try  the  vir- 
tue of  mankind  are  of  very  frequent  occurrence. 

FINDING    A    GENERAL   FACT,   OR    ORDER    OF    SEQUENCE. 

A  general  fact,  as  we  have  seen,  is  a  quality  which  at- 
taches itself  to  each  individual  of  a  given  class.  Some- 
times it  may  be  peculiar  to  this  one  class;  sometimes  it 
may  be  common  to  it  and  other  classes.  In  other  instances, 
it  may  be  an  essential  quality  of  one  class,  and  a  mere 
accident  in  connection  with  another.  When  we  have  as- 
certained a  fact  to  be  general,  if  an  individual  of  a  given 
class  appears,  we  know,  without  particular  investigation, 
that  the  quality  is  also  present.  In  determining  the  ques- 
tion whether  a  fact  is  strictly  general,  the  only  difficulty 
which  presents  itself,  is  in  distinguishing  between  an  essen- 
tial and  an  accidental  quality.  These  two  principles  should 
determine  our  conclusions  under  such  circumstances  : 

1.  The  existence  or  absence  of  perfect  uniformity  of 
experience. 

2.  Experience  in  such  decisive  circumstances,  as  to  ren- 
der it  certain,  that  the  fact  is,  or  is  not,  an  essential,  and 
not  an  accidental  quality  of  the  class.  Nothing  but  good 
judgment  can  enable  one  to  distinguish  between  decisive 
and  indecisive  facts  under  such  circumstances. 

One  of  the  most  fruitful  sources  of  error  is  based  upon 
uniformity  of  experience  in  certain  circumstances.  The 
absence  of  such  uniformity  is  certain  evidence,  that  a  fact 
has  an  accidental,  and  not  a  necessary  connection  with  a 
certain   class.     Its   presence,  however,  may   constitute   no 


170  THE    INTELLECT. 

certain  ground  for  the  opposite  conclusion.  The  king  of 
Japan,  for  example,  reasoned  very  inconclusively,  from  an 
experience  perfectly  unvarying  in  his  circumstances,  to  the 
conclusion,  that  water  never,  under  any  circumstances, 
exists  in  any  other  than  the  fluid  state.  To  separate  the 
decisive  from  the  indecisive,  and  rest  our  conclusions  upon 
the  former  class  of  facts  only,  is  the  distinguishing  charac- 
teristic of  strong  perceptive  powers  associated  with  good 
judgment. 

THE  PROBABLE  AND  IMPROBABLE. 

Between  the  perfectly  certain  and  uncertain  lie  the 
probable  and  improbable.  If,  as  has  been  already  said,  a 
fact  has  been  ascertained  to  have  a  necessary  connection 
with  a  given  class,  its  presence,  when  any  individual  of  the 
class  is  met  with,  becomes  perfectly  certain.  But  if  its 
connection  is  accidental,  its  existence  in  connection  with  a 
particular  individual  of  the  class  becomes  probable  or  im- 
probable in  proportion  to  the  uniformity  or  want  of  uni- 
formity of  experience  under  similar  circumstances.  Many 
of  the  most  serious  transactions  of  life  rest  upon  a  calcu- 
lation of  probabilities. 

ORDER    OF    SEQUENCE. 

The  object  of  investigation  here  is  to  ascertain,  in  ref- 
erence to  given  effects,  those  things  which  sustain  to  such 
effects  the  relation  of  real  causes.  The  difficulty  to  be  over- 
come, often  consists  in  this.  The  real  cause  of  a  given 
effect  may  exist  in  connection  with  such  combinations  of 
powers,  that  it  may  be  difficult  if  not  impossible  for  the 
beholder  to  determine  which  produced  it.  Under  such  cir- 
cumstances, careful  experiments,  in  connection  with  close 
observation,  can  alone  determine  the  real  order  of  sequence. 


LAWS    OF    INVESTIGATION.  171 

There  are  four  important  principles  which  should  be  strict- 
ly adhered  to,  as  tests  of  all  our  conclusions  in  relation  to 
such  investigations  : 

1.  When  in  each  experiment,  the  combination  has  been 
different,  with  this  exception,  that  one  element  has  been 
present  in  all,  and  the  given  effect  has  in  each  instance 
arisen,  we  then  conclude  that  this  element  is  the  real  cause 
of  the  effect. 

2.  When,  on  the  removal  of  a  certain  element,  the 
given  effect  disappears,  while  it  remains,  this  being  pres- 
ent, when  each  of  the  others  is  removed,  we  then  conclude, 
that  this  particular  element  is  the  particular  cause. 

3.  When  the  given  effect  is  the  invariable  consequent 
of  the  addition  of  a  new  element  to  a  given  combination, 
while  the  effect  does  not  appear  when  this  antecedent  is 
not  added,  we  then  fix  upon  this  particular  antecedent  as 
the  real  cause. 

4.  When  a  number  of  consequents  exist  in  connection 
with  a  number  of  antecedents,  and  when  a  particular  con- 
sequent invariably  disappears  on  the  removal  of  a  given 
antecedent,  we  fix  upon  the  latter  as  the  real  cause  of  the 
former. 

THE    DISCOVERY  OF    UNIVERSAL    LAW. 

In  the  induction  of  phenomena  for  the  discovery  of  uni- 
versal law,  three  important  principles  are  to  be  strictly 
adhered  to. 

1.  The  phenomena  must  not  merely  consist  with  this 
particular  hypothesis,  but  demand  it  as  their  logical  ante- 
cedent. 

2.  Consequently  such  phenomena  must  contradict,  with 
equal  positiveness,  every  other  contradictory  hypothesis. 

3.  All  phenomena  to  which  the  given    hypothesis   does 


172  THE    INTELLECT. 

not  sustain  the  relations  of  logical  antecedent,  must  be  left 
wholly  out  of  the  account,  as  having  no  bearing  upon  the 
subject. 

But  this  subject  has  been  so  fully  treated  of  in  the 
preceding  chapter,  that  nothing  further  upon  it  is  demand- 
ed here. 

TESTIMONY. 

It  often  happens,  and  that  in  reference  to  subjects  of 
the  greatest  importance,  that  the  facts  which  constitute  the 
basis  of  our  inquiries  after  truth,  have  never  been  given 
to  us  as  objects  of  sense  or  consciousness.  We  are  com- 
pelled to  receive  or  reject  them  on  the  testimony  of  others. 
From  this  source,  the  greatest  part  of  our  knowledge,  and 
of  the  most  important  of  our  knowledge,  is  derived. 

The  great  inquiry  here  presents  itself  :  What  are  the 
laws  of  evidence  under  the  influence  of  which  we  judge 
ourselves  bound  to  receive  and  act  upon  the  phenomena 
revealed  to  us  through  the  affirmations  of  other  minds  ? 
Testimony  is  used  for  the  same  purpose  that  the  faculties 
of  sense  and  consciousness  are  used  ;  to  wit,  for  the  ascer- 
tainment of  facts,  or  phenomena,  which  constitute  the  basis 
of  judgment  in  regard  to  a  given  subject. 

CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  STATEMENTS    MADE    BY  A  WITNESS. 

The  statements  made  by  a  witness  may  be  contemplated 
in  three  points  of  light. 

1.  In  the  light  of  the  idea  of  possibility  or  impossibil- 
ity. If  an  individual  should  affirm  that  an  idiot,  remaining 
such,  had  given  a  scientific  demonstration  of  some  of  the 
most  abstruse  problems  in  the  higher  mathematics,  we 
should  give  no  credit  at  all  to  his  statement,  on  the  ground 
of  a  perceived   impossibility  of   the   occurrence   of  such  a 


LAWS    OF    INVESTIGATION.  173 

fact.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  witness  should  affirm  that 
an  individual  remaining  an  idiot  up  to  a  certain  period,  did, 
from  that  period,  manifest  a  high  degree  of  mental  energy, 
we  should  pronounce  the  statement  highly  improbable, 
though  not  absolutely  impossible  in  itself.  The  statement, 
therefore,  is  capable  of  being  established  by  testimony. 

2.  The  statement  may  also  be  contemplated  in  reference 
to  the  question  whether  in  itself,  aside  from  the  character 
of  the  witness,  it  is  credible  or  incredible.  A  statement 
characterized  as  impossible,  is  absolutely  incredible.  No 
weight  of  testimony  can  render  it  worthy  of  belief.  An 
event  also  may  be  contemplated  as  possible,  and  yet  the 
statement  that  it  has  actually  occurred  may  be  almost 
wholly  wanting  in  respect  to  credibility.  If  it  should  be 
said  that  a  pure  spirit  before  the  throne  had,  without  any 
form  of  temptation  from  without  or  within,  violated  his 
duty  to  his  God,  we  should  hesitate  to  pronounce  the  oc- 
currence impossible  in  itself.  Yet  we  should  deem  it  hardly 
credible.  A  statement,  to  be  credible,  must  assert  what  is 
in  itself  perceived  to  be  possible.  It  must  also  fall  within 
the  analogy  of  experience.  Thus,  to  the  great  mass  of  man- 
kind, there  is  wanting  entirely  any  experience  of  a  direct 
revelation  from  God.  Yet  the  existence  of  such  a  revela- 
tion for  the  good  of  the  race,  is  analogous  to  what  all  have 
experienced  of  the  divine  beneficence  to  man.  There  is, 
therefore,  nothing  incredible  in  the  statement,  that  such  a 
revelation  has  been  made.  A  statement,  then,  which  affirms 
the  occurrence  of  an  event  in  itself  possible,  and  which 
falls  within  the  analogy  of  experience,  is  capable  of  being 
rendered  worthy  of  all  confidence  by  testimony. 

3.  A  statement  is  in  itself  probable  or  improbable,  when 
it  does  or  does  not  accord  with  general  experience  in  simi- 


174  THE   INTELLECT. 

lar  circumstances.  A  thing  may  be  possible,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  very  improbable.  No  one  would  say  that  it  is 
absolutely  impossible  that  a  die,  when  thrown,  should  fall 
twenty  times  in  succession  with  the  same  number  upper- 
most. Yet  all  would  pronounce  such  an  occurrence  in  an 
exterme  degree  improbable.  An  improbable  event  may  be 
rendered  worthy  of  belief  by  testimony.  A  much  higher 
degree,  however,  is  demanded  to  establish  such  an  occur- 
rence, than  one  which  accords  with  what  we  have  had  ex- 
perience of  in  similar  circumstances. 

CIRCUMSTANCES    WHICH    GO    TO    ESTABLISH    THE   CREDIBILITY 
OF    A    WITNESS. 

We  will  now  consider  the  circumstances  which  go  to 
establish  the  credibility  of  a  witness.  Among  them,  I  will 
specify  the  following,  without  enlarging  upon  any  of  them. 

1.  The  most  important  characteristic  is  a  character  for 
veracity. 

2.  The  next  is  a  capacity  to  comprehend  the  particular 
facts  to  which  he  bears  testimony. 

3.  Full  opportunity  to  observe  the  facts,  together  with 
evidence  that  adequate  attention  was  given  to  them  at  the 
time. 

4.  Evidence  that  the  occurrence  was  of  such  a  nature 
that  the  individual  was  not  deceived  at  the  time,  and  that 
it  sustains  such  a  relation  to  the  individual,  as  to  preclude 
the  reasonable  apprehension  that  his  memory  has  failed 
him  in  respect  to  it. 

5.  An  entire  consistency  between  the  statements  of  the 
witness  and  his  conduct  in  respect  to  the  events,  the  oc- 
currence of  which  he  affirms.  If  an  individual  affirms  his 
entire  confidence  in  the  veracity  of  a  certain  person,  and 


LAWS    OF    INVESTIGATION.  175 

his  entire  treatment  of  him  is  in  full  harmony  with  his 
statements,  we  are  bound  to  admit  the  truth  of  what  the 
witness  testifies  in  relation  to  his  own  convictions. 

CORROBORATING  CIRCUMSTANCES  ASIDE  FROM  THE  CHARACTER 
OF  THE  WITNESS. 

But  there  are  circumstances  often  attending  the  testi- 
mony of  a  witness,  totally  disconnected  with  the  question 
of  his  veracity,  which  demand  our  confidence.  Among 
these,  I  specify  the  following: 

1.  The  entire  absence  of  all  motives  to  give  false  testi- 
mony. This  principle  is  based  upon  the  assumption,  that 
men  do  not  act  without  some  motive,  and  that  consequently 
they  will  not  ordinarily  violate  the  principles  of  truth  with- 
out some  temptation  to  do  it. 

2.  When  no  assignable  motives  exist  to  induce  an  indi- 
vidual to  make  a  given  statement,  if  he  is  not  convinced  of 
its  truth,  and  when  strong  motives  impel  him  to  deny  it, 
especially  if  it  is  false,  then  we  recognize  ourselves  as  ob- 
ligated to  believe  his  statements  without  reference  to  his 
moral  character  at  all. 

3.  Another  circumstance  which  tends  strongly  to  corro- 
borate the  statements  of  a  witness  is  this  :  When  the  facts 
affirmed  lie  along  the  line  of  our  own  experience  in  similar 
circumstances.  This,  however,  is  not  a  safe  principle  to 
rely  upon,  in  the  absence  of  other  circumstances  of  strong 
corroboration.  Villains  often  throw  their  statements  into 
harmony  with  experience,  for  the  purpose  of  covering  their 
dark  designs. 

4.  When,  though  new,  they  accord  with  the  known 
powers  of  the  agent  to  whom  they  are  ascribed. 

5.  When  these  facts  stand  connected  with  the  develop- 


176  THE   INTELLECT. 

ment  of  laws    and    properties   in  the    agent,  before    un- 
known. 

Under  such  circumstances,  the  further  removed  from 
experience  the  facts  are,  the  greater  the  probability  of 
their  being  true,  because  of  the  greater  probability  that 
they  would,  if  not  true,  have  been  unknown  to  the  witness. 

CONCURRENT    TESTIMONY. 

The  confidence  which  we  repose  in  the  affirmations  of  a 
witness  is  greatly  strengthened  by  the  concurrent  testimony 
of  other  individuals.  Here  the  following  circumstances 
should  be  especially  taken  into  the  account : 

1.  When  each  witness  possesses  all  the  marks  of  credi- 
bility above  referred  to. 

2.  When  there  is  an  entire  concurrence  in  their  state* 
ments,  or  a  concurrence  in  respect  to  all  material  facts. 

3.  When  the  characters  of  the  several  witnesses  are 
widely  different, — as  friends  and  enemies,  etc.,  who  of 
course  must  be  influenced  by  widely  diff'erent  motives,  and 
even  by  those  directly  the  opposite  ;  especially  when  their 
characters,  motives,  and  relations  to  the  subject  are  so  dif- 
ferent as  to  preclude  the  supposition  of  a  collusion  between 
the  witnesses. 

4.  When  one  witness  states  facts  omitted  by  others,  and 
when  all  the  statements  together  make  up  a  complete  ac- 
count of  the  whole  transaction. 

5.  When  there  are  apparent  contradictions  between  the 
statements  of  the  witnesses,  which  a  more  enlarged  ac- 
quaintance with  the  whole  subject  fully  reconciles.  Such 
occurrences  in  testimony  preclude  the  supposition  of  collu- 
sion, and  present  each  individual  as  an  independent,  honest 
witness  in  the  case. 


LAWS    OF    INVESTIGATION.  177 

6.  Coincidences  often  occur  in  the  statements  of  wit- 
nesses which,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  are  manifestly 
undesigned.  When  such  occurrences  attend  the  testimony 
of  various  individuals,  all  affirming  the  same  great  leading 
facts,  they  tend  strongl}-  to  confirm  the  testimony  given. 
This  principle  is  most  beautifully  illustrated  by  Dr.  Paley, 
in  his  Horas  Paulinfe  :  —  a  work  deserving  more  attention 
than  almost  anything  else  which  the  Doctor  ever  wrote. 

Great  care  and  sound  judgment  are  requisite  in  the  ap- 
plication of  the  principles  above  stated.  When  they  are 
fulfilled  in  the  case  of  testimony  pertaining  to  any  subject, 
it  would  be  the  height  of  presumption  and  moral  depravity 
in  us  not  to  act  upon  it  as  true.  Infinite  interests  may  be 
safely  based  upon  the  validity  of  such  testimony.  We  are 
often  necessitated  to  decide  and  act,  however,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  testimony  thus  full  and  complete,  and  often  upon 
testimony  failing,  in  many  respects,  of  the  marks  of  credi- 
bility above  laid  down.  To  discern  between  the  valid  and 
the  invalid,  to  determine  correctly  when  to  trust  and  when 
to  withhold  confidence,  requires  stern  integrity  of  heart,  and 
a  judgment,  "by  reason  of  use  exercised,"  to  distinguish 
the  true  from  the  false. 


12 


178  THE    INTELLECT. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  MAN  AS  DISTINGUISHED  FROM 
THAT  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

It  has  been  very  common  with  philosophers  to  represent 
all  created  existences,  from  the  highest  intelligences  in 
heaven  to  the  crude  forms  of  matter,  as  successive  links  in 
one  great  chain,  each  link  in  the  chain,  commencing  with 
the  lowest,  differing  mainly  in  degree  from  that  which  im- 
mediately succeeds  it.  The  highest  forms  of  brute,  and  the 
lowest  of  rational  intelligence,  for  example,  differ,  it  is  as- 
serted, not  in  kind,  but  only  in  degree.  Of  late,  the  reality 
of  orders  of  existences,  as  successive  links  of  a  great  chain, 
has  come  to  be  seriously  doubted.  The  intelligence  of  man 
and  of  the  brute,  it  is  said,  differs  not  in  degree,  but  in  kind. 
If  we  conceive  of  the  highest  forms  of  brute  intelligence 
increased  to  any  degree  whatever,  as  far  as  degree  is  con- 
cerned, still  it  makes  no  approach  at  all  to  real  rationality. 
The  different  orders  of  brute  instincts  do  constitute,  it  is 
thought,  different  links  of  one  chain.  Those  of  rational 
intelligences  constitute  another  and  totally  different  chain, 
a  chain  none  of  the  links  of  which  are  connected,  in  any 
form,  with  any  of  those  of  the  other.  This  last  is  the  opin- 
ion entertained  by  the  author  of  this  treatise.  I  will  now 
proceed  to  state  the  grounds  of  this  opinion. 

PRINCIPLE  ON  WHICH  THE  ARGUMENT  IS  BASED. 

In  conducting  our  inquiries  on  this  subject,  the  first 
thing  to  be  settled  is,  the  principle  on  which  our  conclusions 


INTELLIGENCE    OF    BRUTES.  179 

sliall  be  based.  On  all  hands  it  is  agreed,  that  there  are 
points  of  resemblance  between  the  manifestations  of  intel- 
ligence in  the  brute  and  among  mankind.  At  the  same 
time,  there  are  points  of  dissimilarity  equally  manifest  and 
important.  Now  let  A  represent  the  mental  phenomena 
which  appear  in  man,  and  never  appear  in  the  brute.  If  we 
can  find  the  power  or  powers  in  man  from  which  the  phe- 
nomena represented  by  A  result,  we  have  then  determined 
fully  the  faculties  which  man  possesses  and  the  brute  wants. 
The  faculties  thus  asserted  of  man,  are  to  be  wholly 
denied  of  the  brute,  and  all  the  manifestations  of  brute  in- 
telligence are  to  be  accounted  for  by  a  reference  to  what 
remains,  after  the  former  have  been  subtracted.  All  must 
admit,  that  this  is  the  true  and  the  only  true  principle  to  be 
applied  in  the  case.  It  now  remains  to  apply  the  principle 
to  the  solution  of  the  question  before  us. 

POINTS    OF    RESEMBLANCE    BETWEEN    THE    MAN    AND    THE 
BRUTE. 

That  brutes,  such  as  are  supposed  in  the  present  argu- 
ment, possess  the  faculty  of  external  perception,  such  as 
sight,  hearing,  taste,  smell,  and  touch;  that  such  perceptions 
are  followed  by  feelings  of  a  given  character,  and  that  these 
feelings  are  followed  by  external  actions  which  are  corre- 
lated to  the  perceptions  referred  to,  and  that  all  these  mani- 
festations are  common  to  man  and  the  brute  both,  will  be 
denied  by  none  who  have,  however  carelessly,  observed  the 
facts  which  have  presented  themselves  to  his  notice.  Such 
are  the  phenomena  common  to  man  and  the  brute. 

HYPOTHESES  ON  WHICH  THESE  COMMON  FACTS  MAY  BE 
EXPLAINED. 

There  are  two  distinct  and  opposite  hypotheses  on  which 


180  THE    INTELLECT. 

these  common  facts  may  be  explained.  When  man  has  an 
external  perception,  reason  at  once  suggests  certain  funda- 
mental ideas  in  the  light  of  which  he  explains  to  himself 
the  phenomena  perceived,  and  passes  certain  judgments 
upon  them.  Action  with  him  has  special  reference,  not  to 
the  phenomena,  but  to  the  judgments  thus  passed.  All 
these  things  we  know  from  consciousness,  to  be  true,  in 
reference  to  man. 

As  far  as  the  facts  under  consideration  are  concerned, 
it  may  be  that  the  same  is  true  of  the  brute.  All  the  phe- 
nomena of  brute  action,  however,  are  equally  explicable,  on 
an  entirely  different  hypothesis.  When  a  brute  has  a  per- 
ception of  some  object,  without  the  presence  of  any  funda- 
mental ideas  in  the  light  of  which  he  can  explain  to  him- 
self what  he  sees,  and  consequently  form  notions  and 
judgments  of  the  object  perceived,  and  act  in  view  of  judg- 
ments thus  formed,  it  may  be,  that  such  perceptions  are 
followed  by  certain  feelings,  and  that  from  these,  as  neces- 
sary consequents,  external  acts,  such  as  the  brute  puts 
forth,  arise.  All  that  would  be  intellectual  with  the  brute, 
on  this  hypothesis,  would  be  the  simple  power  to  perceive 
the  thing,  without  the  capacity  to  recognize  either  himself 
as  the  subject^  or  the  thing  perceived,  as  the  object^  of  the 
perception,  so  as  to  form  any  conceptions  or  judgments  per- 
taining either  to  the  subject  or  object.  The  feelings  which 
attend  such  perceptions,  together  with  such  as  arise  from 
the  internal  organism  of  the  brute,  such  as  hunger  and 
thirst,  are  followed  necessarily  by  external  actions  in  har- 
mony with  the  sphere  for  which  the  creature  was  designed. 
The  action  of  the  brute  would  be  in  fixed  harmony  with  the 
law, — a  law,  however,  which  has  no  subjective  existence  in 
the  intelligence  of  the  creature,  but  which  exists  as  an  idea 


INTELLIGENCE    OP    BRUTES.  181 

in  that  of  the  Creator.  Action,  in  such  a  case,  would  be 
purely  mechanical,  the  propelling  force  being  the  feelings 
generated  as  above  supposed,  while  the  law  of  action  would 
be  an  idea  which  the  subject  of  the  action  never  appre- 
hended, but  in  conformity  to  which  the  organism  of  the 
brute  is  formed. 

A  case  stated  in  the  public  prints,  a  case,  whether  true 
or  false,  at  least  conceivable,  and  therefore  proper  to  be  used 
in  illustration,  will  fully  illustrate  the  hypotheses  under 
consideration.  A  lady,  some  time  before  the  birth  of  a 
child,  was  struck  at  by  a  rattlesnake,  and  barely  escaped 
with  her  life.  Asa  consequence  of  the  fright  of  the  mother, 
the  child,  when  born,  had  upon  parts  of  its  body  the  marks 
of  the  serpent.  His  eyes  had  the  fiery  and  vengeful  appear- 
ance peculiar  to  the  reptile.  One  arm,  also,  lay  coiled  upon 
its  side  in  a  manner  perfectly  serpentine.  As  the  child 
grew  up,  and  came  into  the  presence  of  certain  objects, 
despite  of  all  efforts  of  his  will  to  the  contrary,  his  eyes 
would  roll  in  their  sockets,  with  the  fiery  vengeful  appear- 
ance peculiar  to  the  serpent  when  attacked  by  an  enemy. 
At  the  same  time,  the  arm  referred  to  would  strike  at  the 
object  perceived,  in  exact  conformity  to  the  motions  of  the 
reptile  in  similar  circumstances.  In  connection  with  the 
physical  organization  of  this  individual,  two  classes  of 
actions,  each  equally  conformed  to  ideas,  appeared  ;  the 
one  class,  however,  the  consequents  of  volition  in  harmony 
with  conceptions  and  judgments,  and  the  other  caused  by 
feelings  generated  by  external  perceptions.  Now,  in  con- 
formity with  the  fact  last  named,  we  can  explain  all  the 
phenomena  of  brute  action,  however  intelligent  in  appear- 
ance. All  such  phenomena  may  be  the  exclusive  result  of 
the  peculiar  feelings  and  organism    of  the   animal,   in  the 


182  THE    INTELLECT. 

total  absence  of  the  intelligence  peculiar  to  man.  The 
question  is,  Are  there  any  facts  peculiar  to  brute  and  human 
action,  verifying  this  hypothesis  ?  This  question  I  will  now 
endeavor  to  answer,  in  the  light  of  the  principle  I  have 
laid  down  as  the  basis  of  our  conclusions  on   this  subject. 

POIN'TS  OF  DISSIMILARITY  BETWEEN   MAN  AND  THE  BRUTE. 

In  order  to  test  the  validity  of  the  hypothesis  under 
consideration,  we  will  now  attend  to  the  fundamental  phe- 
nomena which  distinguish  man  from  the  brute.  Among 
these,  I  will  specify  only  the  following  : 

1.  Man,  from  the  laws  of  his  intelligence,  is  a  scientific 
being.  The  main  direction  of  the  human  intelligence  is 
not  merely  towards  phenomena,  but  towards  the  scientific 
explanation  of  phenomena.  This  is  one  of  the  great  wants 
of  human  nature,  the  scientific  explanation  of  phenomena. 
All  mankind  agree  i-n  the  assumption,  that  in  the  brute 
there  is  a  total  absence  of  this  principle.  Brute  intelli- 
gence pertains  exclusively  to  mere  phenomena.  The 
creature  never  seeks  an  explanation  of  what  he  sees.  He 
acts  from  feelings  generated  by  perceptions,  without  ever 
seeking  ati  explanation  of  what  he  sees  or  feels. 

2.  Man,  as  a  race,  is  progressive.  The  brute  is  per- 
fectly stationary.  For  six  thousand  years,  each  race  has 
been  spectators  of  precisely  the  same  phenomena.  The 
commencement  of  observation  with  man,  was  the  com- 
mencement of  intellectual  progress,  which  has  been  onward 
from  generation  to  generation.  With  all  his  observations, 
the  brute  has  never  advanced  a  single  step.  He  is  now 
just  where  he  was  six  thousand  years  ago.  The  beaver 
builds  his  dam,  lives  and  dies,  just  as  did  the  first  that  ever 


INTELLIGENCE    OF    BRUTES.  183 

appeared  on  earth.    The  same  is  true  of  the  action  of  every 
brute  race. 

3.  Man  is  the  subject  of  moral  obligation,  and  conse- 
quently of  moral  government.  In  other  words,  man  is  a 
moral  agent.  All  this  is  universally  denied  of  the  brute. 
He  is  never,  except  when  man  acts  towards  him,  as  all  ac- 
knowledge, irrationally,  regarded  or  treated  as  the  subject 
of  moral  obligation  or  of  moral  government.  I  might  cite 
other  points  of  dissimilarity,  equally  manifest,  and  equally 
fundamental.  But  these  are  sufficient  for  the  present  argu- 
ment. 

FACTS    APPLIED. 

It  now  remains  to  apply  the  facts  above  stated  to  the 
solution  of  the  question  under  consideration.  When  we 
have  determined  the  faculties  necessarily  supposed,  as  the 
condition  of  science,  progress,  and  moral  agency  in  man, 
we  have  determined  the  faculties  which  we  are  totally  to 
deny  of  the  brute.  For  it  should  be  borne  in  mind,  that 
the  facts  above  named  do  not  exist  in  one  degree  in  man, 
and  in  a  smaller  degree  in  the  brute.  The  difference  is  not 
that  of  degree,  but  of  total  dissimilarity.  What  various 
individuals  of  our  race,  in  the  respects  under  consideration, 
possess  in  different  degrees,  the  brute  totally  wants.  The 
faculties,  therefore,  which  are  to  be  affirmed  of  men  as  the 
condition  and  ground  of  these  facts,  are  to  be  totally  denied 
of  the  brute. 

1.  I  ask,  then,  in  the  first  place.  What  faculties  consti- 
tute man  a  scientific  being,  those  in  the  absence  of  which 
he  cannot  possess  science,  and  in  the  possession  of  which 
he  is  of  course  scientific?  Sense,  the  faculty  of  external 
perception,  man,  as  we  have  seen,  has  in  common  with  the 
brute.     But  this  a  creature  may  possess  in  any  degree,  and 


184  THE    INTELLECT. 

make  no  approach  whatever  to  science.  Other  faculties  in 
addition  are  supposed  as  the  condition  and  ground  of  such 
developments.  What,  then,  are  these  faculties?  I  answer, 
they  are,  of  the  primary  faculties,  reason,  and  self-conscious- 
ness ;  and  of  the  secondary,  understanding  and  judgment. 
In  the  absence  of  reason,  fundamental  ideas,  in  the  light 
of  which  phenomena  may  be  explained,  are  totally  wanting, 
and  consequently  science  becomes  impossible.  Without 
reason  also  self-consciousness  would,  properly  speaking,  be 
impossible,  or  if  possible,  absolutely  useless,  and  therefore 
not  supposable,  as  originating  from  perfect  intelligence. 
Without  reason  too,  conceptions,  notions,  and  judgments 
would  be  absolutely  impossible.  "Notions  cannot  be  formed 
without  ideas  of  reason,  such  as  substance,  cause,  time, 
space,  etc.  Judgments,  also,  and  consequently  classifica- 
tion and  generalization,  cannot  take  place  without  the  ideas 
of  resemblance  and  difference.  In  other  words,  without 
reason,  the  exercise  of  the  understanding  and  judgment  is 
impossible;  the  existence  of  these  faculties  is  therefore  not 
to  be  supposed.  If,  then,  as  we  are  logically  bound  to  do, 
we  take  from  the  brute,  reason,  self-consciousness,  under- 
standing, and  judgment,  what  remains  to  him?  Just  what 
we  have  attributed  to  him;  to  wit,  the  power  of  external 
perception,  together  with  corresponding  feelings,  and  sus- 
ceptibilities, and  an  external  organism,  the  action  of  which 
is  in  necessary  conformity  to  the  feelings  thus  generated. 
It  should  be  borne  in  mind,  that  science  in  man  does 
not  depend  upon  the  degree  in  which  the  faculties  above 
named  are  possessed  by  him.  The  degree  of  the  scientific 
movement  will  be,  other  things  being  equal,  as  the  degree 
in  which  these  powers  are  possessed.  When  they  exist  in 
any  degree,  there  will   be  real  science.     The  total  absence 


INTELLIGENCE    OF    BRUTES.  185 

of  science  in  the  brute,  indicates  most  clearly  a  total  ab- 
sence of  the  scientific  faculties, — faculties  which  are  so 
connected  with  each  other,  that  if  one  be  conceived  of  as 
wanting,  the  others  also  must  be. 

The  question,  I  repeat,  is  not  whether  the  action  of  the 
brute  is  not  in  harmony  with  fundamental  ideas  ;  but 
whether  these  ideas  have  a  subjective  existence  in  his  intel- 
ligence. The  bee,  for  example,  builds  its  cell  in  conform- 
ity to  pure  ideas  of  reason.  But  does  it  not  thus  build,  not 
because  it  knows  such  ideas,  but  because  of  the  peculiarity 
of  its  perceptions,  sensations,  and  physical  structure,  all  of 
which  render  its  thus  building  mechanically  necessary  ? 
The  facts  before  us  show  clearly  that  it  does. 

2.  In  the  next  place,  we  will  raise  the  inquiry,  What 
faculties  in  man  render  him  a  progressive  being?  They 
are  evidently  the  same  as  those  which  render  him  scientific, 
with  the  addition  of  the  imagination.  It  is  because  that 
where  phenomena  appear,  mankind  are  able,  in  the  light 
of  ideas  of  reason,  to  explain  to  themselves  these  facts, 
and  thus  find  the  fundamental  principle  involved  in  them, 
that,  as  a  race,  we  are  progressive.  For  this  reason  also 
mankind  gain  important  knowledge  from  accidental  expe- 
rience, a  fact  which  never  appears  in  the  brute.  A  man 
and  a  brute  are  swimming  together  across  a  river.  They 
become  exhausted,  and  when  about  to  sink,  meet  with 
something  like  a  plank  floating  by.  They  both  get  on  to  it 
and  are  saved.  The  brute  passes  on  without  being  a  whit 
wiser  from  his  experience.  The  occurrence  constitutes  an 
era  in  the  history  of  the  human  race.  Man  reflects  upon 
the  occurrence,  and  hence  arises  all  the  wonders  of  ship- 
buildino-  and  navisration.  All  these  had  their  orig-in  in  ac- 
cidental    occurrences    like    that   above    supposed.     In  the 


186  THE    INTELLECT. 

knowledge  obtained  from  occurrences  similar  in  their  nature, 
the  art  of  printing,  and  all  the  results  of  steam-power,  etc., 
originated.  Man  and  the  brute  also  hear  melodious  sounds. 
Each  alike  copies  what  he  hears.  On  the  part  of  man, 
these  sounds  are  re-combined  into  strains  still  more  melo- 
dious. Hence  the  science  of  music.  The  brute  copies 
what  he  hears,  but  never,  in  a  solitary  instance,  re-combines, 
in  the  least,  what  he  hears.  The  mocking-bird  presents  a 
striking  illustration  of  the  truth  of  this  statement.  It  will 
copy  almost  every  melodious  sound  it  ever  hears.  Yet  it 
was  never  known  to  produce  a  single  new  combination  of 
sounds.  Such  facts  most  indubitably  indicate  in  the  brute 
the  total  absence  of  all  the  faculties  which  lay  the  founda- 
tion for  progress  in  man,  the  faculties  of  reason,  self-con- 
sciousness, understanding,  judgment,  and  the  imagination. 
With  these  in  any  degree,  creatures  are  in  a  corresponding 
degree  progressive.  Without  them,  whatever  else  they  may 
possess,  they  are  perfectly  stationary.  Nothing  is  more 
unphilosophical  and  illogical,  than  the  conclusion  often 
drawn,  in  the  presence  of  progress  on  the  one  hand,  and  its 
total  absence  on  the  other,  that  brute  instinct  and  human 
intelligence  differ  only  in  degree.  How  demonstrably 
evident  is  the  conclusion,  that  they  diifer  not  in  degree,  but 
in  kind. 

3.  In  respect  to  the  inquiry.  What  faculties  in  man  ex- 
ist as  the  condition  and  ground  of  moral  agency  in  him  ? 
the  answer  is  ready.  They  are  the  faculties  above  named, 
together  with  that  oifree  loill.  The  absence  of  those  first 
named,  in  the  case  of  the  brute,  has  already  been  estab- 
lished. Shall  we  still  attribute  to  him  that  of  free  will  ? 
The  following  considerations  perfectly  satisfy  my  own  mind 
on  this  point. 


INTELLIGENCE    OF    BRUTES.  187 

(1.)  The  action  of  free  will,  in  the  absence  of  concep- 
tions and  judgments,  is  impossible.  Till  I  have  conceptions 
of  A  and  B,  and  judge  that  one  differs  from  the  other,  or  at 
least,  that  one  is  not  the  other,  I  cannot  choose  between 
them.  There  may  be  selection,  but  not  choice  ;  nor  can 
there  be  selection  such  as  implies  the  action  of  the  free 
will. 

(2.)  None  of  the  phenomena  of  brute  action  necessarily 
suppose  the  presence  of  free  will  in  the  subject.  All  such 
phenomena  are  just  as  explicable  on  the  opposite  hypoth- 
esis as  on  this.  Now  a  power  is  never  to  be  supposed, 
when  its  presence  is  not  affirmed  by  positive  facts,  or  neces- 
sarily supposed  by  the  known  sphere  of  the  subject.  No 
such  considerations  demand  the  assumption  of  free  will 
in  the  brute.  Such  an  assumption  therefore  is  wholly 
illogical. 

(3.)  All  the  phenomena  of  brute  action  clearly  indicate 
the  absence  of  the  power  under  consideration.  Place  the 
brute  in  any  circumstances  whatever,  and  there  let  particu- 
lar sensations  be  s^enerated  in  him,  and  his  action  will  be 
just  as  fixed  and  uniform,  as  that  of  any  mechanical  pro- 
cess whatever.  As  often  as  the  experiment  is  repeated,  it 
will  invariably  be  attended  with  the  same  results.  With 
such  facts  before  us,  how  illogical  the  assumption  of  free 
will  in  the  brute. 

(4.)  Such  a  power  as  that  under  consideration  would  be 
a  totally  useless  appendage  to  the  brute,  contemplating  him 
in  reference  to  the  sphere  for  which  he  is  designed.  When 
the  intellectual  faculties  above  named  are  denied  him,  what 
a  useless  appendage  to  the  brute,  and  how  worse  than  use- 
less to  man,  in  respect  to  the  use  to  be  made  of  the  animal, 
would  such  an  appendage  as  free  will  be.     The  creation  of 


188  THE   INTELLECT. 

such  a  power,  under  such  circumstances,  would  be  a  wide 
departure  from  all  the  manifestations  of  wisdom  visible  in, 
^11  the  divine  works  beside. 

(5.)  Finally,  the  power  under  consideration  constitutes 
-one  of  the  most  essential  elements  of  the  divine  image  in 
which  man  was  created.  Why  should  we  suppose  an  ele- 
ment so  fundamental  in  that  image  to  exist  in  a  creature,  in 
whom  all  the  other  elements  are  totally  wanting,  and  that 
without  any  solid  basis  for  that  conclusion  ? 

Thus,  by  the  most  logical  deductions,  we  have  deter- 
mined the  powers  of  the  brute,  as  distinguished  from  those 
of  man.  Taking  from  the  former,  what  fundamental  phe- 
nomena require  us  to  do  ;  to  wit,  the  powers  of  reason, 
self-consciousness,  understanding,  judgment,  imagination, 
and  free  will,  we  leave  him  with  the  powers  of  external  per- 
ception, with  a  sensibility,  and  physical  organization,  of 
such  a  nature,  that  under  the  varied  circumstances  of  his 
being,  his  action  is  in  necessary  harmony  with  the  ends  for 
which  the  all-wise  Creator  designed  him.  All  the  phenom- 
ena of  brute  action  can  be  accounted  for  on  this  hypothesis, 
and  its  truth  is  also  affirmed  by  fundamental  phenomena.  In 
this  lower  creation  man  stands  alone.  There  is  nothing 
like  him  "  in  the  heavens  above,  nor  in  the  earth  beneath, 
nor  in  the  waters  under  the  earth."  There  he  stands,  "  the 
image  and  glory  of  God."     Fallen  though  he  is, 

"  his  form  has  yet  not  lost 
All  its  original  brightness,  nor  appears 

Less than  the  excess 

Of  glory  obscured." 

GENERAL    REMARKS. 

1.  We  are  now  prepared  to  explain  the  ground  of  the 
misjudgment   so  common  in  respect  to  the  action  of  the 


INTELLIGENCE    OF    BRUTES.  189 

brute.  Men  judge  of  brute  action  in  the  light  of  their  own 
consciousness,  pertaining  to  similar  actions  in  themselves. 
When  men  and  brutes  are  placed  in  similar  circumstances, 
and  the  external  actions  of  both  are  similar,  men  often  con- 
clude that  the  brute  acts  in  view  of  the  same  conceptions 
and  judgments,  in  view  of  which  they  are  conscious  of  act- 
ing themselves.  Now  such  conclusions  are  wholly  unau- 
thorized. The  external  manifestations  of  instinctive  and 
rational  intelligence  may  be,  in  many  important  respects,, 
similar,  yet  there  may  be  a  total  dissimilarity  in  the  nature 
of  these  different  kinds  of  intelligence. 

2.  We  are  also  prepared  to  state  the  conclusion  which 
the  facts  connected  with  brute  intelligence  force  upon  us. 
It  is  one  of  these  two  :  Either  the  intelligence  of  the  brute 
is  incomparably  more  perfect  than  that  of  man,  or,  aside 
from  the  power  of  external  perception,  he  has  no  intelli- 
gence at  all,  such  as  man  possesses.  The  first  manifesta- 
tions of  intelligence  in  man,  how  imperfect  and  feeble  ! 
How  rude  and  ill-shaped,  for  example,  the  first  habitations 
built  by  man  !  How  slow  the  progress  of  human  archi- 
tecture from  such  rude  beginnings  to  its  present  perfection! 
On  the  other  hand,  the  first  production  of  the  brute  bears 
the  stamp  of  perfection.  The  first  dam  built  by  the  beaver^ 
the  first  nest  built  by  the  bird,  have  never  been  surpassed. 
The  first  cell  built  by  the  bee  can  hardly  be  improved,  even 
in  thought.  Now  suppose  that  such  actions  of  the  brute 
are,  as  is  the  case  with  man,  the  result  of  the  carrying  out 
of  an  idea,  a  plan,  previously  developed  in  his  intelligence, 
what  must  we  conclude?  Why,  that  the  first  race  of  brutes 
that  ever  appeared  on  earth,  had  a  degree  of  intelligence 
which  man,  after  six  thousand  years  of  laborious  progress, 


'TJIIIVEESITYJ 


l^ 


190  THE    INTELLECT. 

has  hardly  reached.     This  or  the  opposite  one  forces  itself 
upon  us. 

3.  Another  consideration  to  which  I  would  direct  atten- 
tion is  this  :  the  facts  on  which  the  conclusions  of  individ- 
uals have  been  based,  in  respect  to  the  existence  of  the 
higher  powers  of  intelli-gence  in  the  brute,  as  contrasted 
with  others  in  the  same  connection,  ^vhich  have  been  to- 
tally overlooked.  A  distinguished  naturalist,  for  example, 
states  that  the  wild  ass,  when  he  begins  to  flee  from  a  man, 
will  first  turn  one  ear,  and  then  the  other,  backwards 
towards  the  object  of  his  terror.  From  this  fact,  he  concludes 
that  the  animal  is  deliberating  w^hat  course  he  shall  take; 
and,  as  a  consequence,  attributes  to  it  the  possession  of  the 
powers  of  deliberation  and  free  will.  A  grave  conclusion, 
surely,  to  infer  from  the  leering  of  an  ass,  the  existence  of 
such  powers.  How  often  the  actions  of  the  elephant  have 
been  proclaimed,  as  proof  of  the  existence  of  the  higher 
powers  of  intelligence  in  that  animal  !  Now  let  us  contem- 
plate another  class  of  facts  in  connection  with  the  same 
animal.  Those  who  have  visited  menageries  are  familiar 
with  the  dancing  of  the  animal  at  the  "  sound  of  the  lyre," 
actions  as  indicative  of  superior  intelligence  as  any  he  ever 
puts  forth.  How  was  the  creature  taught  such  an  act?  Did 
he  take  lessons,  as  men  do,  and  thus  acquire  it?  It  was  by 
a  process  very  different  from  this.  When  the  keepers  wish 
to  have  the  animal  acquire  the  art  under  consideration,  they 
place  him  upon  a  floor  covered  with  plates  of  iron.  These 
plates  are  gradually  heated  till  the  creature,  beginning  to 
feel  pain  in  his  feet  from  the  heat,  lifts  first  one  foot  and 
then  the  other.  As  soon  as  such  motions  begin,  the  music 
commences,  which  is  made  to  become  more  and  more  lively 
as    the    animal    steps   with   greater  and   greater  rapidity. 


INTELLIGENCE    OF    BRUTES.  191 

When  this  process  has  been  continued  for  a  sufficient 
length  of  time,  the  music  ceases,  and  the  animal  is  instantly- 
taken  from  his  painful  condition.  These  experiments  being 
repeated  a  few  times,  such  an  association  is  established  be- 
tween the  sound  of  the  lyre,  and  the  sensibility  of  the  ani- 
mal, that  as  soon  as  he  hears  the  music  he  begins  to  dance, 
and  continues  the  pace  till  the  music  ceases.  Thus  we 
have  the  elephant  dancing  in  his  wisdom,  as  many  suppose. 
Now  had  the  animal  the  real  intelligence  possessed  by  any 
individual  of  our  race,  who  is  in  any  degree  removed  above 
absolute  idiocy,  such  an  imposition  could  not  be  practiced 
upon  him  for  a  single  hour. 

The  actions  of  the  creature,  in  this  case,  in  conformity 
to  intelligence,  are  not,  as  all  perceive,  a  manifestation  of 
intelligence  in  him,  but  in  the  keeper.  So  whatever  in- 
telligence the  animal  manifests  in  any  instance,  is  not  an 
indication  of  intelligence  in  him,  but  in  the  Creator.  The 
same  is  true  of  all  other  animals. 

4.  The  form  in  which  memory  exists  in  brutes,  may  now 
be  readily  pointed  out.  Memory,  in  man,  is  the  recalling 
of  the  fact  that  we  were,  in  particular  circumstances,  the 
subjects  of  such  and  such  thoughts,  feelings,  etc.  In  the 
brute  no  such  recollections  can  occur.  When  the  brute  has 
been  affected  in  a  given  manner,  in  given  circumstances, 
the  same  sensations  are  reproduced  in  him  when  he  comes 
into  similar  circumstances  again,  and  hence  the  same 
actions  are  repeated. 

5.  Finally,  we  notice  the  error  of  some  who  attempt  to 
account  for  the  diversities  of  intellectual  manifestations 
between  men  and  brutes,  on  the  ground  of  diversities  of 
phrenological  development.  To  suppose  that  the  soul  of  a 
dog,  if  placed  in  connection  with  the  brain  of  a  Newton, 


192  THE    INTELLECT. 

would  manifest  the  intelligence  of  that  great  philosopher, 
is  as  illogical  as  to  suppose  that  gold  and  water  will  exhibit 
the  same  phenomena,  when  subject  to  the  same  influences. 
The  manifestations  of  substances  diverse  in  their  nature 
will,  under  the  same  circumstances,  be  as  diverse  as  their 
nature.  The  brute,  in  any  circumstances,  is  still  a  brute, 
and  not  a  man,  nor  angel.  Diversities  of  phrenological 
development  may  account  for  the  diverse  intellectual  man- 
ifestations among  men  ;  but  not  for  those  between  man 
and  the  brute.  The  brute  must  become  another  being, 
before  he  can  manifest  the  intelligence  of  man. 


PAKT  II. 


THE    SENSIBILITIES. 


CHAPTER  I. 

RECAPITULATION. 

The  general  faculties  of  the  mind  we  have  comprehended 
under  a  threefold  division.  The  intellect,  the  sensibilities 
and  the  will  ;  the  first  comprehending  all  the  phenomena 
oi  thinking  and  knowiiig^  the  second  those  oi  feeling^  and 
the  third  those  of  loilUng.  The  first  main  division  we  have 
already  considered. 

THEIR    DIVERSITIES    AND    RELATIONS. 

Thought,  feeling,  and  willing,  how  distinct  and  diverse 
are  they,  one  from  each  of  the  others  !  Nothing  but  a 
fundamentally,  false  philosophy  can  fail  to  discriminate  be- 
tween them.  Though  perfectly  diverse  in  their  nature  and 
essential  characteristics,  however,  they  sustain  the  most 
obvious  and  important  relations  to  each  other.  Neither 
class  exists  in  the  mind  for  any  considerable  time,  without 
the  presence  of  the  others.  Feeling  awakens  thought  and  im- 
pels to  acts  of  willing.  Thought,  on  the  other  hand,  origin- 
ates and  intensifies  feeling,  and  regulates  the  voluntary 
activities  ;  while  willing  is  governed  by,  or  controls  feeling, 
and  conforms,  or  refuses  to  conform,  to  thought.  As  our 
analysis  proceeds,  these  varied  relations  will  be  brought  out 

13  a98) 


194  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

distinctly  before  the  mind.  When  feeling  is  strong  and 
fixed  by  some  engrossing  object,  then  thought  moves  in 
the  sublimity  of  power,  and  the  will  acts  with  correspond- 
ing steadiness  and  energy.  When  feeling  is  dull  and  slug- 
gish, thought  is  indistinct  and  feeble,  and  the  will  seems  to 
be  smitten  with  a  kind  of  paralysis.  Clear  and  distinct 
thought,  on  the  other  hand,  gives  birth  to  strong  and  vivid 
emotions  and  desires,  and  steadies  and  energizes  the  action 
of  the  will,  while  both  the  other  faculties  may  be  aroused 
to  the  most  vigorous  exercise  by  self-originated  acts  of 
the  faculty  last  named. 

ORDER    OF    INVESTIGATION. 

In  pursuing  our  specific  inquiries  into  this  department 
of  the  mind,  the  following  order  will  be  observed.  We 
shall  first  of  all  inquire  into  those  complex  states  in  which 
we  find  the  action  of  sensibility  associated  with  that  of  the 
other  faculties. 

GENERAL    CHARACTERISTICS    OF    THESE    PHENOMENA. 

In  concluding  this  introductory  chapter,  I  would  invite 
special  attention  to  the  following  general  characteristics  of 
the  phenomena  of  the  sensibility: 

1.  The  first  characteristic  that  I  notice  is  possessed  by 
these  phenomena  in  common  with  those  of  the  intelligence; 
to  wit,  necessity.  Certain  conditions  are  necessary  to  the 
existence  of  the  phenomena  of  sensibility  ;  but  when  these 
conditions  are  fulfilled,  the  phenomena  cannot  but  exist, 
with  all  the  peculiar  elements  which  characterize  each 
peculiar  feeling. 

2.  They  are  in  their  nature  transitory.  When  certain  con- 
ditions are  fulfilled,  they  exist,— immediately  pass  through 


RECAPITULATION.  195 

certain  modifications,  and  then  cease  to  be.  Thus  it  is  that 
a  perpetual  current  of  ever  varying  phenomena  of  this  kind, 
is  continually  passing  under  the  eye  of  consciousness.  It 
may  be  questioned  whether  one  identical  feeling,  unmodi- 
fied, ever  re-appears  upon  the  theatre  of  consciousness. 
The  only  apparent  exception  to  the  above  remark  is  found 
in  certain  feelings,  to  be  designated  hereafter,  such  as  re- 
morse, etc. 

3.  No  two  feelings  can  exist  together  in  the  mind  with- 
out one  entirely  annihilating  the  other,  or  each  so  modify- 
ing the  other  that  an  entire  new  state  of  feeling  is  induced, 
with  characteristics  essentially  different  from  either.  Often, 
for  example,  the  most  deadly  hate  is  totally  annihilated  by 
the  overpowering  influence  of  pain,  fear,  or  personal  in- 
terest. Often  the  abhorrence  of  crime  is  greatly  modified, 
if  not  annihilated,  by  the  strong  action  of  parental,  filial, 
or  conjugal  affection. 

4.  All  the  phenomena  of  the  sensibility,  with  one  excep- 
tion, to  be  mentioned  hereafter,  sustain  to  the  will  the  re- 
lation of  a  principle  of  action,  impelling  the  will  to  seek  or 
avoid  the  object  of  that. feeling.  Hunger,  thirst,  pity,  love, 
fear,  etc.,  each  impels  the  will  to  seek  or  avoid  its  own  ob- 
ject. Two  or  more  of  these  feelings  often  co-exist,  some, 
times  impelling  in  the  same,  but  often  in  different  direc- 
tions. Hence,  the  will  is  frequently  necessitated  to  gratify 
one  feeling  in  opposition  to  the  impulse  of  another.  This 
leads  us  to  notice  another  important  characteristic  of  these 
phenomena,  which  is, 

5.  The  fact  that  every  susceptibility,  or  rather  the  action 
of  every  susceptibility,  impels  the  mind  to  seek  unlimited 
gratification  :  and  that  in  opposition  to  every  other  impulse. 
The  feeling  of  hunger,  thirst,  fear,  love,  or  hatred, — as  long 


196  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

as  it  exists  at  all, — impels  the  will  towards  its  own  exclu- 
sive object,  irrespective  of  every  other  impulse.  Hence  the 
will,  by  an  unlimited  obedience  to  some  one  impulse,  often 
wrecks  the  entire  system  of  the  individual. 

6.  The  phenomena  of  the  sensibility  are  in  themselves 
destitute  of  the  moral  qualities.  They  impel  the  will  to 
choices  which  do  possess  a  moral  character.  For  the  moral 
quality  is  to  be  found  in  the  choice  and  not  in  the  impulse. 
We  might  with  the  same  propriety  be  called  to  an  account 
for  the  peculiar  sensations  produced  by  the  action  of  heat 
upon  the  human  system,  as  for  any  other  phenomena  re- 
sulting from  the  direct  and  immediate  action  of  the  original 
susceptibilities  of  our  nature.  The  acts  of  the  will,  associ- 
ated with  the  phenomena  of  the  sensibility,  constitute  a 
complex  state  of  mind,  which  the  conscience  characterizes 
as  right  and  wrong.  Nothing  can  be  more  destructive  of 
the  entire  system  of  moral  obligation,  than  the  theory  of 
Dr.  Brown,  Payne,  and  others,  which  presents  to  our  con- 
templation certain  phenomena  of  the  sensibility  as  "  in- 
volving no  moral  feelings,"  and  others  as  involving  such 
feelings  ;  while  each  is  represented  as  the  direct  and  neces- 
sary result  of  the  action  of  the  original  susceptibilities  of 
our  nature.  We  might  with  the  same  propriety  search  for 
virtue  in  the  sunshine  or  vernal  showers,  or  for  vice  in  the 
whirlwind,  as  in  the  immediate  and  necessary  phenomena 
of  the  sensibility.  In  all  these  phenomena,  aside  from  the 
controlling  influence  of  the  will,  man  is  a  mere  passive 
recipient  of  an  extraneous  influence,  exerted  without  his 
choice,  and  totally  independent  of  his  control. 

IMPORTANCE    OF    THIS    SUBJECT. 

The  following  extract  from  the  writings  of  Dr.  Thomas 


RECAPITULATION.  197 

Brown  will  set  distinctly  before  the  mind  the  importance 
of  our  present  inquiries.  "  We  might  perhaps,"  he  says, 
*'  have  been  so  constituted,  with  respect  to  our  intellectual 
states,  as  to  have  had  all  the  varieties  of  these,  our  remem- 
brances, judgments,  and  creations  of  fancy,  without  our 
emotions.  But  without  emotions  which  accompany  them, 
of  how  little  value  would  the  mere  intellectual  functions 
have  been  !  It  is  to  our  vivid  feelings  of  this  class  we 
must  look  for  those  tender  regards  which  make  our  remem- 
brances sacred,  for  that  love  of  truth,  of  glory,  and  of  man- 
kind, without  which  to  animate  and  reward  us,  in  our 
discovery  and  diffusion  of  knowledge,  the  continued  exer- 
cise of  judgment  would  be  a  fatigue  rather  than  a  satisfac- 
tion, amid  all  that  delightful  wonder  which  we  feel  when 
we  contemplate  the  admirable  creations  of  fancy,  or  the 
more  admirable  beauties  of  the  unfading  model, —  that 
model  which  is  ever  before  us,  and  the  imitation  of  which 
as  has  been  truly  said,  is  the  only  imitation  that  is  itself 
originality.  By  our  other  mental  functions  we  are  mere 
spectators  of  the  machinery  of  the  universe  ;  living  in  and 
animated  by  our  emotions  we  are  admirers  of  nature,  lovers 
of  men,  adorers  of  God." 

Nor  is  the  importance  of  our  present  inquiries  set  forth 
with  less  vividness,  by  the  less  attractive  aspects  of  the 
subject,  as  presented  by  our  author.  "  In  this  picture  of 
our  emotions,  however,"  he  adds,  "  I  have  presented  them 
in  their  fairest  aspects  ;  there  are  aspects  which  they  as- 
sume, as  terrible  as  these  are  attractive  ;  but  even  terrible 
as  they  are,  they  are  not  the  less  interesting  objects  of  our 
contemplation.  They  are  the  enemies  with  which  our 
mortal  combat,  in  the  warfare  of  life  is  to  be  carried  on  ; 
and  of  those  enemies  that  are  to  assail  us,  it  is  good  for  us 


198  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

to  know  all  the  misery  which  would  await  our  defeat,  as 
well  as  all  the  happiness  which  would  crown  our  success, 
that  our  conflict  may  be  the  stronger,  and  our  victory  there- 
fore the  more  sure.  In  the  list  of  our  emotions  of  this 
formidable  <class,  is  to  be  found  every  passion  which  can 
render  life  guilty  and  miseralDle  ;  a  single  iiour  of  which, 
if  that  hour  be  an  hour  of  uncontrolled  dominion  may  de- 
stroy happiness  forever  and  leave  little  more  of  virtue  than 
is  necessary  for  giving  all  its  horror  to  remorse.  There  are 
feelings  as  blasting  to  every  desire  of  good  that  may  still 
linger  in  the  heart  of  the  frail  victim  who  is  not  yet  wholly 
corrupted,  as  those  pernicious  gales  of  the  desert,  which 
not  merely  lift  in  whirlwinds  the  sands  that  have  often 
been  tossed  before,  but  wither  even  the  few  fresh  leaves 
which,  on  some  spot  of  scanty  verdure,  have  still  been 
flourishing  amid  the  general  sterility." 


PHENOMENA   OF   THE    SENSIBILITY   CLASSIFIED.  199 


CHAPTER    II. 
PHENOMENA  OF  THE    SENSIBILITY    CLASSIFIED, 

Mental  philosophers  differ  not  a  little  in  their  classifica- 
tion of  sensitive  phenomena.  Dr.  Brown,  for  example, 
classifies  all  such  phenomena  with  reference  to  the  idea  of 
timCf  as  immediate,  retrospective,  and  prospective.  Prof. 
Upham  divides  these  phenomena  as  natural  and  moral, 
while  Dr.  Hickok  makes  three  classes,  the  animal,  rational, 
and  spiritual.  Prof.  Haven,  on  the  other  hand  classifies 
the  sensibilities  as  simple  emotions^  affections^  and  desires. 
One  general  objection  holds  against  these  and  all  other 
similar  forms  of  classification.  They  are  incomplete,  sensa- 
tions and  appetites  being  omitted.  This  holds  strictly  with 
respect  to  all  the  forms  above  given,  Dr.  Hickok's  excepted, 
and  the  discrimination  which  he  has  made  between  rational 
and  spiritual  emotions  is  in  reality,  a  distinction  without  a 
difference,  spiritual  emotions  and  propensities  pertaining 
as  really  and  truly  to  the  rational  department  of  our  nature 
as  to  any  other.  Similar  remarks  are  obviously  applicable 
to  the  forms  of  classification  adopted  by  Dr.  Reid,  JMr. 
Dugald  Stewart,  and  others. 

We  have  endeavored  to  find  a  principle  of  classification 
free  from  all  such  objections, — a  principle  that  may  be 
readily  comprehended,  on  the  one  hand,  and  which  wiH,  on 
the  other,  be  strictly  universal  in  its  application.  This 
principle  is  found  in  the  two-fold  nature  of  man,  and  in 
his  consequent  relations  to  the  world  of  matter,  thought, 


200  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

and  voluntary  activity.  As  being  in  the  body,  and  through 
it  connected  with  the  universe  of  material  causes  we,  in 
common  with  the  animal  creation  around  us,  are  capacitated 
to  receive  certain  impressions,  and  are  the  subjects  of  cor- 
responding propensities  and  desires.  As  capacitated  for 
the  functions  of  thinking  and  knowing,  and  as  adapted,  in 
our  sensitive  natures  to  the  varied  spheres  and  objects  of 
thought  and  knowledge,  we  are  the  subjects  of  another 
and  quite  diverse  class  of  sensitive  states.  Finally  as  ca- 
pacitated for  endlessly  diversified  forms  of  voluntary  activ- 
ity in  the  adaptation  of  our  sensitive  natures  to  such  forms, 
we  are  endowed  with  certain  general  active  principles  and 
are  the  subjects  of  corresponding  sensitive  impulsions. 
We,  therefore,  present  the  following  as  the  general  and 
all-comprehending  classification  of  the  varied  phenomena 
of  the  sensibility  ;  to  wit,  1.  Those  which  pertain  to  us 
as  a  part  of  the  animal  creation,  and  which  include  sensa- 
tions and  the  appfUtes^  or  animal  propensities.  2.  Those 
which  pertain  to  us  as  rational  beings,  our  emotions  and 
affections.  3.  Those  which  pertain  to  us,  as  capacitated 
for  diversified  forms  of  voluntary  activity^  or  our  general 
active  principles  and  impulsions.  These  three  classes  of 
the  sensibilities  we  shall  treat  of  in  the  order  above  pre- 
sented. 

TERMS  DEFINED.  SENSATIONS,  EMOTIONS,  DESIRES,  PRO- 
PENSITIES, APPETITES,  AFFECTIONS,  GENERAL  ACTIVE 
PRINCIPLES,    PASSIONS. 

Before  proceeding  to  an  elucidation  of  the  varied  classes 
of  the  sensibilities,  it  may  be  important  to  define  specific- 
ally certain  terms  which  will  be  frequently  employed  here- 
after. 


PHENOMENA    OP   THE    SENSIBILITY    CLASSIFIED.         201 

Sensations  are  those  states  of  the  sensibility  which 
directly  and  immediately  succeed  any  impressions,  made 
by  any  cause,  upon  the  physical  organization. 

Emotions^  on  the  other  hand,  are  those  sensitive  states 
directly  and  immediately  induced  by  the  presence  of  any 
thought  in  the  mind. 

When  any  states  of  the  sensibility  are  excited  from  any 
cause  or  causes, — states  impelling  the  mind  to  seek  or 
avoid  any  particular  object  or  objects,  such  impulsive  states 
are  denominated  desires. 

When  the  original  constitution  of  our  nature  renders 
certain  classes  of  desires  habitual,  or  permanent,  that  par- 
ticular department  of  the  sensibility  is  called  2i  propensity. 
Such  for  example  are  our  desires  for  food,  for  drink,  and 
our  love  of  knowledge. 

When  the  object  of  any  given  propensity  is  purely 
physical,  such  as  food  or  drink,  said  propensity  takes  the 
name  appetite. 

When  the  object  of  any  propensity  is  a  living  being,  or 
a  class  of  living  beings,  the  propensity  is  then  commonly  de- 
nominated an  affection.  The  love  of  kindred,  for  example, 
is  called  an  affection. 

When  on  the  other  hand  the  object  of  a  given  propen- 
sity is  an  object  of  pure  thought,  or  an  intellectual  appre- 
hension, said  propensity  is  commonly  designated  by  such 
terms  as  principle^  desire.,  or  loiie.  Such,  for  example,  is 
the  principle  of  curiosity^  the  love  of  knoicledge,  or  the  de- 
sire for  action.  When  the  object  of  a  given  propensity,  is 
some  form  of  voluntary  activity,  such  for  example  as  action 
in  conformity,  or  in  opposition,  to  the  law  of  duty,  such  im- 
pulsive propensities  are  denominated  general  active  prin- 
ciples. 


202  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

When  any  given  propensity,  I  remark  finally,  becomes 
very  strongly  and  permanently  developed,  and  its  gratifica- 
tion becomes  a  leading  object  of  desire  and  pursuit,  said 
propensity  is  denominated  2b  passion.  Thus  individuals  are 
said  to  have  a  passion  for  music,  for  painting,  or  for  par- 
ticular forms  of  activity. 


ANIMAL    PHENOMENA    AND    PROPENSITIES  205 


CHAPTER  III. 
ANIMAL  PHENOMENA  AND  PROPENSITIES. 

SENSATIONS. 

Sensations,  as  we  have  defined  them,  are  those  states  of 
the  sensibility  which  directly  and  immediately  succeed  any 
impressions  made  by  any  cause  or  causes,  upon  the  physical 
organization.  Sensation  and  external  perception  are  states 
of  mind  which  commonly  accompany  each  other,  but,  for 
that  reason,  are  none  the  less  distinct  and  separate,  the  one 
from  the  other,  and  pertain  to  entirely  different  depart- 
ments of  the  mind.  Sensation  is  exclusively  a  state  of  the 
sensibility.  Perception  is,  as  exclusively,  a  state  of  the  in- 
telligence. 

Nor  is  sensation,  in  its  nature,  more  distinct  and  separ- 
ate from  external  perception  than  it  is  from  all  acts  of  in- 
ternal perception,  or  consciousness,  which  always  accom- 
pany this  and  all  other  states  of  the  sensibility.  In  no  case, 
do  we,  as  some  suppose,  feel  because  we  are  conscious  of 
the  feeling.  We  are,  on  the  other  hand,  conscious  of  feel- 
ings, because  we  do  experience  them.  Perception,  external 
and  internal,  implies  the  prior  existence  of  its  object.  No 
object,  or  mental  state,  exists  because  we  perceive  it.  We 
perceive  it,  on  the  other  hand,  because  it  does  exist. 

Sensations  of  a  certain  class  are  induced  by  the  action 
of  appropriate  causes  upon  any  department  of  the  physical 
organization.  Others  are  experienced  exclusively  through 
the  action  of  special  organs.     The  sensations,  for  example, 


204  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

induced  by  mere  tactual  impressions,  are  nearly  or  quite 
identical,  whatever  department  of  the  physical  organiza- 
tion is  affected.  Those,  on  the  other  hand,  which  are  in- 
duced by  the  action  of  the  organs  of  taste,  smell,  and  hear- 
ing, are  special  and  peculiar  ;  and  those  received  through 
any  one  organ  are  wholly  unlike  those  received  through  any 
other.  The  varied  sensations  of  taste,  we  experience  ex- 
clusively through  one  and  the  same  organ,  and  how  unlike 
are  all  these,  to  those  received  through  the  organs  of  smell, 
or  hearing.  Yet  the  ultimate  states  of  mind  induced  by 
one  class  of  sensations  may  be  so  much  like  those  induced 
by  another,  that  the  objects  of  one  may  sugg est  t\\o?>Q  of  the 
other.  Hence  the  figurative  impressions,  sweet  sounds, 
beautiful  music,  etc. 

Sensations  of  all  classes  take  rank  as  pleasurable,  pain- 
ful, or  incUffereyit.  Some  have  a  positive  character,  and  as 
such,  occasion  desires  for  the  presence  or  absence  of  their 
respective  causes.  Others  which  are  void  of  such  character- 
istics, occasion  no  desires  whatever. 

When  the  physical  organization  is,  throughout,  in  a 
healthy  state,  and  each  organ  performs  its  proper  functions, 
the  mind  has  its  continual  dwelling  place  in  the  midst  of 
forms  of  pleasurable  sensations  which  impart  sunlight  to 
the  countenance,  sweetness  to  the  temper,  hopeful  visions 
of  the  future,  and  cheerfulness  to  all  states  of  being.  In 
the  opposite  state  of  the  physical  organization  and  func- 
tions, in  the  absence  of  positive  pain,  there  may  be  the  per- 
petual presence  of  sensations  which  sour  the  temper,  sad- 
den the  countenance,  and  impart  the  aspect  of  gloom  to  all 
objects  of  thought.  Persons  of  the  purest  piety  not  unfre- 
quently  write  bitter  things  against  themselves,  for  no  other 


ANIMAL    PHENOMENA   AND    PROPENSITIES  205 

reasons  than  the  conscious  presence  of  sensations  thus  in- 
duced, their  real  causes  being  misapprehended. 

Through  sensation  exclusively,  we  attain  to  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  secondary  qualities  of  matter.  The  primary 
qualities,  as  we  have  seen,  are  to  the  mind,  the  objects  of 
direct  and  immediate^  or  presentative^  knowledge,  and  are, 
therefore,  to  be  regarded  as  the  known  objects  of  conscious 
states  of  the  intelligence.  The  secondary  qualities,  on  the 
other  hand,  are  recognized  as  the  unknoion  causes  of  con- 
scious states  of  the  sensibility.  The  great  fundamental 
error  in  philosophy, — the  exclusive  cause  of  all  forms  of 
skepticism  in  science  and  religion,  is  the  dogma,  that  all 
our  knowledge  of  matter  is  through  the  exclusive  medium 
of  sensation,  and,  therefore,  not  valid  for  realities  as  they 
are  in  themselves. 

APPETITES. 

The  following  prominent  characteristics  of  this  class  of 
our  active  principles,  given  by  Mr.  Dugald  Stewart,  pre- 
sent the  subject  in  a  very  clear  and  definite  manner  to  our 
minds. 

"  1.  They  take  their  rise  from  the  body,  and  are  com- 
mon to  us  with  the  brutes. 

"  2.  They  are  not  constant,  but  occasional. 

"  3.  They  are  accompanied  with  an  uneasy  sensation, 
which  is  strong  or  weak  in  proportion  to  the  strength  or 
weakness  of  the  appetite." 

"  Our  appetites,"  he  further  observes,  "  are  three  in 
number  :  hunger,  thirst,  and  the  appetite  of  sex.  Of  these, 
two  were  intended  for  the  preservation  of  the  individual  ; 
the  third,  for  the  continuation  of  the  species  ;  and  without 
them  reason  would  have  been  insufficient  for  these  impor- 
tant purposes.     Suppose,  for  example,  that  the  appetite  of 


^06  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

hunger  had  been  no  part  of  our  constitution.  Reason  and 
experience  might  have  satisfied  us  of  the  necessity  of  the 
use  of  food  for  our  preservation  ;  but  how  should  we  have 
been  able,  without  an  implanted  principle,  to  ascertain 
according  to  the  varying  states  of  our  animal  economy, 
the  proper  seasons  for  eating,  or  the  quantity  of  food  that 
is  salutary  to  the  body." 

These  observations  are  in  general  so  just  that  but  few 
additional  remarks  are  deemed  requisite. 

1.  The  number  of  our  appetites  as  given  by  the  author 
is  evidently  too  limited.  The  propensity  for  sleep,  and  for 
muscular  action,  may  as  properly,  and  for  the  reasons 
stated  above,  be  called  appetites,  as  those  already  men- 
tioned. The  same  general  observations  apply  to  the  latter 
as  to  the  former. 

2.  The  law  of  our  appetites,  when  they  are  directed  to 
their  appropriate  ends,  presents  a  very  striking  indication 
and  illustration  of  the  benevolence  of  our  Creator.  The 
law  to  which  we  refer  is  the  pleasure  which  accompanies 
their  indulgence, — a  pleasure  so  great  that  the  chief  incent- 
ive to  proper  indulgence,  is  the  pleasure,  and  not  the  end 
for  which  the  appetite  was  given  as  a  part  of  our  nature. 
The  child  grows  and  increases  in  strength  from  food  and 
exercise,  in  seeking  which,  these  ends  constitute  no  part  of 
his  motives. 

3.  The  highest  physical  enjoyment  through  the  indul- 
gence of  the  appetites,  is  when  indulgence  is  strictly  sub- 
ordinated to  the  laws  of  life  and  health  ;  a  fact  which 
presents  another  and  most  striking  illustration  of  the  divine 
beneficence. 

4.  When  the  appetites  have  been  properly  controlled 
and  directed  to  their  proper  objects,  their  demands  present 


ANIMAL    PHENOMENA   AND    PROPENSITIES.  207 

the  proper  limits  to  indulgence.  A  man,  for  example,whose 
appetite  for  food  is  in  a  healthy  and  unperverted  state, 
and  when  feeding  upon  nature's  simple  elements,  will  find 
his  appetite  the  best  possible  guide  in  regard  to  the  quan- 
tity of  food  proper  to  be  eaten. 

5.  A  special  law  of  our  nature  in  regard  to  the  indul- 
gence of  all  the  appetites  in  common,  here  demands  par- 
ticular attention.  Properly  regulated  indulgence,  while  it 
does  not  increase,  but  rather  diminishes  perhaps,  the  power 
of  the  appetite,  and  the  intensity  of  its  action,  tends  to 
increase,  rather  than  diminish,  the  gratification  attending 
such  indulgence.  Excessive  indulgence,  on  the  other  hand, 
perpetually  increases  the  power  of  the  appetites  and  the 
painful  intensity  of  its  action,  while  the  degree  of  enjoy- 
ment attending  indulgence  perpetually  diminishes,  and  is 
ultimately,  almost  or  quite  entirely  lost.  Hunger,  for  ex- 
ample, is  by  no  means  so  painful  to  the  temperate  man  as 
it  is  to  the  glutton,whiIe  the  former  finds  forms  and  degrees 
of  enjoyment  in  partaking  of  food  to  which  the  latter  is  a 
stranger.  Enslavement  under  the  power  of  appetite,  also, 
is  attended  with  a  perpetual  consciousness  of  criminal  self- 
degradation  not  only  utterly  incompatible  with  any  form  or 
degree  of  mental  blessedness,  but  which  must  issue  in  the 
deepest  forms  of  mental  wretchedness.  Byron,  for  exam- 
ple, had  sounded  the  depths  of  sensual  indulgence  in  all 
its  forms.  What  was  the  result,  as  evinced  in  his  dark 
experience?     Let  him  speak  for  himself. 

And  dost  thou  ask,  what  secret  woe 

I  bear,  corroding  joy  and  youth? 
And  wilt  thou  vainly  seek  to  know 

A  pang  even  thou  must  fall  to  soothe? 
It  Is  not  love,  It  Is  not  hate, 

Nor  low  ambition's  honors  lost, 


THE    SENSIBILIIIES. 

That  bids  me  loathe  my  present  state. 

And  flee  from  all  I  prized  the  most. 
It  is  that  weariness  which  ^  prings 

From  all  I  meet,  or  hear,  or  see ; 

To  me  no  pleasure  Beauty  brings; 

Thine  eyes  have  scarce  a  charm  for  me. 
It  is  that  settled,  careless  gloom 

The  fabled  Hebrew  wanderers  bore; 
That  will  not  look  beyond  the  tomb. 

But  cannot  hope  for  rest  before. 
What  exile  from  himself  can  flee? 

To  zones,  though  more  and  more  remote, 
Still,  still  pursues,  where  e'er  I  be, 

The  blight  of  life,  the  demon,  thought. 

Through  many  a  clime  't  is  mine  to  go, 

With  many  a  retrospection  curst ; 
And  all  my  solace  is  to  know. 

What  e'er  betides,  I've  known  the  worst. 
What  is  that  worst?  nay,  do  not  ask  ; — 

In  pity  from  the  search  forbear. 
Smile  on — nor  venture  to  unmask 

Man's  heart,  and  view  the  hell  that 's  there. 

To  that  hell  every  living  drunkard,  glutton,  and  debauchee 
is  rapidly  descending,  if  he  is  not  already  there.  The 
individual  on  the  other  hand,  who  has  wisely  disciplined  all 
his  appetites  and  other  propensities  to  a  wholesome  subjec- 
tion to  the  laws  and  principles  of  health  and  purity,  not 
only  participates  in  the  highest  forms  of  physical  enjoy- 
ment, but  has  perpetual  mental  blessedness  in  the  con- 
sciousness that  he  really  ranks  among  nature's  noblemen. 

ARTIFICIAL    APPETITES. 

Besides  those  appetites  which  necessarily  arise  from 
the  constitution  of  our  physical  system,  there  are  others 
which  are  induced  by  custom  and  use,  and  which  conse- 
quently, may  properly  be  denominated  acquired^  or  artificial. 
Of  this  character  are  the  appetites  for  the  various  narcotic 
and  stimulating  drugs  and  intoxicating  drinks.  The  strength 


•      ANIMAL    PHENOMENA   AND    PROPENSITIES.  209 

of  such  appetites  is,  in  general,  in  proportion  to  their 
destructive  tendencies.  In  reference  to  such  propensities 
total  abstinence  is  the  only  principle  demanded  by  morality 
and  prudence  ;  for  by  indulgence  the  will  power  is  con- 
stantly diminished,  while  the  desire  becomes  more  and 
more. imperious,  until  voluntary  power  is  overwhelmed  in 
the  unequal  struggle  and  the  deluded  victim  becomes  a 
fettered  slave  to  appetite  and  passion. 
14 


210  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

EMOTIONS. 

Emotions  have  been  defined,  as  those  states  of  th&  sen- 
sibility which  directly  and  immediately  swcceec?  the  presence 
of  any  thought  in  the  mind.  Emotions  sustain  the  same 
relations  to  thought,  that  sensations  do  to  impressions  made 
upon  the  physical  organization. 

EMOTIONS   CLASSIFIED,    AND   ELUCIDATED. 

All  emotions  are,  in  their  nature,  pleasant  or  unpleasant, 
joyful  or  saddening,  happifying  or  painful,  ecstatic  or  agon- 
izing, and  may  be  cla-ssified  accordingly.  An  emotion  which 
simply  excites,  without  agitating  the  mind,  is  called 
pleasant  or  unpleasant,  according  to  its  nature.  Those 
which  are  attended  with  certain  degrees  of  agitation,  are 
called  joyful  or  saddening.  Those  which  are  attended  with 
still  higher  degrees  of  excitement  are  denominated  happify- 
ing or  painful,  while  those  which  are  attended  with  the 
highest  degrees  of  agitation,  are  denominated  triumphant, 
ecstatic  or  agonizing.  Those  emotions  which  attend  the  ap- 
prehension of  good  or  ill  to  come,  are  represented  by  such 
terms  as  hope  or  fear.  Those  emotions  which  are  induced 
by  the  apprehension  of  positive  excellences,  natural  or 
moral,  or  their  opposites,  are  represented  by  such  terms  as, 
favor  or  disfavor,  approbation  or  reprobation,  delight  or 
abhorrence,  love  or  hate,  according  to  the  character  of  the 
qualities  referred  to.  \|When  any  form  of  good,  once  pos- 


EMOTIONS.  211 

sessed  or  hoped  for,  has  been  lost,  the  painful  emotions  at- 
tending the  apprehension  of  such  a  fact,  is  represented  by 
such  terms  as  regret,  mourning,  or  grief.  When  objects  of 
thought,  present  and  future  wear  the  prevailing  aspect  of 
unhopefulness,  the  emotions  induced  take  on  the  form  of 
gloom,  or  despondency.  When  the  element  of  hope  be- 
comes wholly  extinct,  the  emotions  of  agony  then  induced, 
are  represented  by  such  terms  as  misery  and  despair.  The 
consciousness  of  personal  excellences  or  defects,  is  attended 
with  emotions  represented  by  such  terms  as  self-congratu- 
lation and  self-esteem,  or  self  depreciation  and  mortifica- 
tion. If  such  excellences  and  defects  are  of  a  moral  nature, 
taking  on  the  form  of  conscious  virtue  or  vice,  good  or  ill 
desert,  the  joyful  or  agonizing  emotions  then  induced  are 
represented  by  such  words  as  self-approval,  and  self-com- 
mendation, or  self-reprobation  and  remorse.  When  joyful 
or  regretful  emotions  are  induced  by  the  contemplation  of 
good  or  ill  enjoyed  or  endured  by  others,  such  emotions 
are  denominated  sympathetic.  When  emotions  of  regret 
are  induced  by  the  contemplation  of  good  enjoyed,  or  of 
gratification  in  view  of  suffering  endured,  by  others,  such 
emotions  are  called  malign. 

CAUSES    OF    OUR    EMOTIONS    CLASSIFIED. 

The  objects  of  those  thoughts  which  induce  these  diverse 
classes  of  emotions,  are  classed  as  agreeable  or  disagree- 
able, pleasant  or  unpleasant,  beautiful  or  deformed,  desir- 
able or  undesirable,  lovely  or  hateful,  excellent  or  execrable, 
perfect  or  imperfect,  according  to  the  nature  and  character 
of  the  feelings  which  they  induce. 

EMOTIONS    AS    DISTINGUISHED    FROM    DESIRES. 

Emotions  and  desires  have  already  been  defined.     We 


212  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

desire  the  presence  or  absence  of  objects  which  have  pre- 
viously excited  in  us  pleasurable  or  painful  sensations  or 
emotions.  The  pleasure  or  pain  must  have  pre-existed,  or 
the  existence  of  desire  would  be  impossible.  Desires  are 
to  sensations  and  emotions,  what  effects  are  to  causes. 

Emotions,  as  well  as  sensations,  as  distinguished  from 
desires,  are  denominated  passive  impressions.  Desire,  on 
the  other  hand,  is,  in  a  certain  sense,  an  active  state,  a 
state  in  which  the  mind  is  impelled  to  or  from  some  object, 

HAPPINESS    OR    MISERY    CONDITIONED    ON    OUR    SENSATIONAL* 
AND    EMOTIVE    STATES'. 

Upon  the  nature  and  character  of  our  sensations  and 
emotions,  our  happiness  or  misery  is  conditioned.  We  are 
happy,  when  our  passive  impressions  are  of  a  pleasant,  and 
unhappy  or  miserable,  when  they  are  of  a  painful,  char- 
acter. Happiness  has  been  defined  by  some  individuals, 
as  gratified  desire.  This  is  a  mistake.  We  have  many  de- 
sires of  great  strength, — desires  the  gratification  of  which 
affords  little  or  no  happiness.  A  man  for  example,  may 
very  strongly  desire  to  witness  the  death  of  a  friend,  while 
the  gratification  of  that  desire,  will,  as  he  well  knows,  give 
pain  instead  of  pleasure.  The  desire  for  revenge  very 
strongly  impels  the  will,  while  the  gratification  of  the  im- 
pulse is  painful  rather  than  otherwise.  The  happiness  de- 
rived from  gratified  desire  depends  wholly  upon  the  passive 
im2Jressions,  the  sensations  or  emotions  with  which  such 
gratification  is  attended. 

IDEAS   REPRESENTED    BY   THE    TERMS,    HAPPINESS,    BLESSED- 
NESS,   MISERY,    ETC. 

\i  When  the  mind  is  in  a  condition  in  which  its  sensitive 


EMOTIONS.  213 

and  eTiiotive  states,  in  continued  succession,  are  pleasant 
or  unpleasant,  pleasurable  or  painful,  it  is  then  in  that 
state  represented  by  the  terms  happiness  or  blessedness, 
unhappiness  or  misery,  and  its  happiness  or  misery  is  per- 
fect or  imperfect,  when  one  class  of  feelings  exists  without 
the  presence  of  the  other,  or  in  the  degree  in  which  the 
two  are  intermingled  with  each  other.  The  terms  heaven 
and  hell,  as  employed  in  the  Scriptures  and  in  common 
life,  represent  the  idea  of  two  distinct  and  opposite  condi- 
tions of  existence,  the  one  in  which  all  sensitive  and  emo- 
tive states  are  of  an  exclusively  happifying,  and  the  other 
in  which  they  are  of  an  equally  painful  character.  Our 
present  condition  of  living  is  a  mingled  one.  None  are 
perfectly  happy,  and  few  are  absolutely  miserable. 

TRANSIENT   AND    PERMANENT    EMOTIONS. 

In  regard  to  our  emotions,  this  principle  generaWy  holds 
true,  that  the  same  identical  feeling  is  seldom  reproduced 
by  the  reappearance  of  the  same  thought  ;  and  the  repeti- 
tion of  that  appearance  is  generally  attended  with  a  dimi. 
nution  of  the  vividness  of  the  emotion.  This,  by  no  means 
holds  true  of  the  objects  of  the  domestic  affections,  of 
moral  and  eternal  truth,  or  of  any  objects  having  in  them 
the  elements  of  real,  and  especially  of  absolute,  perfection. 
Familiarity  with  such  objects,  even  when  nothin.g  new  is 
developed,  increases  rather  than  diminishes  their  power 
over  the  sensibilities.  Forms  of  perfect  symmetry  and 
beauty  in  nature,  and  in  art,  are,  to  all  who  have  once  at. 
tained  to  a  proper  appreciation  of  their  excellences,  objects 
of  undying  interest.  This  holds  especially  true  of  all  real 
forms  of  mental  and  moral  beauty  and  perfection.  The 
main  reason  why  other  and  common  objects,  after  our  first 


214  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

knowledge  of  them,  lose  their  power  over  our  emotions,  is 
that  familiarity  renders  us  conscious  of  their  defects,  and 
therefore  destroys  our  interest  in  them. 

Emotions  which  depend  upon  the  original  principles 
and  propensities  of  our  nature  are  permanent  in  their  char- 
acteristics, while  those  which  depend  upon  accidental 
circumstances,  on  the  other  hand,  are  of  transitory  contin- 
uance. Those  emotions,  for  example,  which  arise  in  con- 
nection with  the  domestic  affections,  the  love  of  right  and 
duty,  and  the  hatred  of  wrong,  etc.,  have  permanent  char- 
acteristics ;  while  those  of  surprise  at  the  appearance  of 
objects  new  or  strange,  or  in  unexpected  circumstances, 
after  a  short  continuance,  disappear  forever. 

GROWTH    AND    DECAY    OF    EMOTIONS. 

Some  emotions  come  to  full  maturity  almost  instantly. 
Of  this  character,  for  the  most  part,  are  emotions  of  sur- 
prise, wonder,  fear,  and  terror;  and  the  decay  of  such 
emotions  is  commonly  as  rapid  as  their  growth.  Other 
emotions  come  to  maturity  gradually,  such,  for  example,  as 
those  awakened  by  the  contemplation  of  objects  intrinsic- 
ally beautiful,  sublime,  or  excellent.  Emotions  of  this 
character  are  of  slow  and  gradual  decay,  if  they  decay  at 
all,  while  many  of  them  are  of  permanent  continuance,  and 
are  attended  with  increase  rather  than  diminution  of 
strength,  from  the  lapse  of  time. 

CONCORDANT    AND     DISCORDANT,     SIMILAR    AND     DISSIMILAR 
EMOTIONS. 

As  two  or  more  distinct  objects  of  thought  may  be 
before  the  mind  at  the  same  time,  so  two  or  more  emotions 
may  co-exist  in   the   consciousness.     Of  co-existent   emo- 


EMOTIONS.  215 

tions,  some  blend  in  unison,  mutually  inducing  a  new  state 
of  mind  concordant  with  each  of  the  blended  emotions. 
Thus  excellence  of  speech  associated  with  personal  charms, 
may  blend  into  a  common  feeling  of  admiration  for  the 
individual  in  whom  such  excellences  meet.  Other  emo- 
tions, while  they  do  not  thus  blend,  increase  and  intensify 
each  other's  characteristics.  Of  this  class  are  love  for  a 
friend,  and  sorrow  for  his  misfortunes.  Such  emotions  do 
not  blend,  yet  each  intensifies  the  other.  Emotions  of  the 
two  kinds  under  consideration  are  said  to  be  concordant. 

Other  co-existing  emotions  refuse  to  blend,  as  admira- 
tion for  personal  charms,  and  reprobation  for  crimes.  Some 
are  so  incompatible  with  each  other,  that  one  will  extinguish 
the  other.  Thus  parental  love  often  extinguishes  wholly 
the  resentment  awakened  by  the  misconduct  of  a  child. 
Emotions  of  this  class  are  called  discordant  emotions.  The 
effect  upon  the  mind  induced  by  concordant  emotions  is, 
for  the  most  part,  pleasing,  while  that  induced  by  discord- 
ant ones  is  commonly  of  a  painful  character. 

Emotions,  in  their  nature  wholly  unlike,  may  tend  to 
induce  the  same  tone  of  mind.  Cheerful  or  melancholy 
emotions,  however  unlike  their  causes  may  be,  are  of  this 
character,  and  are  hence  called  similar  emotions.  Other 
emotions,  such  as  those  of  pride  and  humility,  gayety  and 
gloominess,  as  they  tend  to  induce  opposite  tones  of  mind, 
are  called  dissimilar  emotions. 

SYMPATHETIC    AND    REPELLANT   EMOTIONS. 

All  are  aware,  that  the  contemplation  of  certain  emo- 
tions as  existing  in  other  minds,  tends  to  induce  similar 
feelings  in  our  own.  We  contemplate,  for  example,  signal 
acts  of   gratitude,  courage,  heroism,  or  benevolence  ;  as  a 


316  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

result,  emotions  are  induced  in  our  minds  prompting  the 
desire  to  perform  similar  acts  ourselves.  The  contempla- 
tion of  joy  or  sorrow  in  others  induces  similar  emotions  in 
ourselves.  Emotions  thus  tending  to  induce  similar  feel- 
ings in  other  minds  are  called  emotions  of  sympathy,  or 
sympathetic  emotions. 

There  are  other  emotions  the  contemplation  of  which 
tends  to  induce  in  our  minds,  feelings  wholly  unlike  them- 
selves. Acts  of  cruelty,  for  example,  not  only  induce  feel- 
ings of  reprobation  for  the  acts  themselves,  but  emotions 
of  compassion  for  the  individuals  injured.  Emotions,  the 
contemplation  of  which  induces  such  effects,  are  called 
repellant,  or  unsympathetic  emotions. 

CONGRtJOUS   AND   INCONGRUOUS   EMOTIONS. 

Emotions  are  often  compared  with  their  objects,  or 
causes,  and  are  deemed  congruous  when  they  do,  and  in- 
congruous, when  in  kind  they  do  not  correspond,  with  the 
character  of  said  objects.  Emotions  of  admiration,  for  ex- 
amjDle,  for  objects  really  beautiful,  sublime,  or  excellent  ; 
courage  in  the  midst  of  peril,  or  compassion  for  the  afflicted, 
we  approve  as  suitable,  fit,  and  proper  ;  while  feelings  such 
as  high  esteem  for  objects  low,  mean,  or  trifling  in  their 
nature  ;  of  terror  in  the  absence  of  real  danger,  or  indiffer- 
ence in  the  presence  of  real  suffering  and  want,  we  disap- 
prove as  out  of  place,  and  improper.  The  same  holds  true, 
when  the  degree  and  intensity  of  the  feelings  do,  or,  do  not, 
accord  with  the  real  merits  or  demerits  of  their  objects. 
Emotions  harmless  in  their  nature,  but,  in  kind  or  degree, 
the  opposite  of  what  would  naturally  be  expected  in  the 
circumstances,  excite  in  the  spectator,  the  sense  of  the 
ludicrous,  or  ridiculous;  such   manifestations   for  example. 


EMOTIONS.  217 

as  emotions  of  fear  or  terror  when  there  is  hardly  the  ap- 
pearance of  danger,  or  of  pride  or  vanity  on  account  of 
trivial  excellences,  or  of  wonder  or  surprise  at  things  not 
new  or  strange.  Emotions  of  delight  in  things  odious  or 
trivial  move  our  disgust,  contempt,  or  reprobation.  Emotions 
of  pleasure  or  indifference,  at  misfortune  or  suffering,  and 
of  hate  of  what  is  truly  excellent  and  praiseworthy,  as  ob- 
jects of  thought,  excite  in  us  feelings  of  horror  or  indigna- 
tion. All  emotions,  in  short,  of  every  kind  whether  of  love 
or  hate,  delight  or  disgust,  admiration  or  reprobation,  of 
courage  or  terror,  hope  or  despair,  are  to  the  spectator,  con- 
gruous, when  they  are  in  harmony  with  their  objects.  They 
are  incongruous  when  in  kind  or  degree,  this  compatibility 


AGREEABLE    AND    DISAGREEABLE    EMOTIONS. 

The  mind  not  unfrequently  makes  its  own  emotive 
states,  as  well  as  those  of  others,  the  objects  of  thought  and 
contemplation.  When  thus  contemplated,  they  become  the 
causes  of  pleasant  or  unpleasant,  pleasurable  or  painful 
emotions.  Hence,  as  causes  of  agreeable,  or  disagreeable 
feelings,  emotions  are  classed,  like  other  objects,  as  agree- 
able or  disagreeable.  Almost,  if  not  quite  universally,  con- 
gruous emotions,  as  objects  of  thought^  are  agreeable,  and 
all  of  the  incongruous  ones  are  disagreeable  to  the  mind  ; 
and  that  whether  said  emotions  are,  in  themselves,  pleasur- 
able or  painful.  The  mind  is  universally  pleased  with  fit- 
ness, propriety,  and  congruity,  and  nowhere  more  intense- 
ly than  when  those  ideas  are  fully  realized  in  the  relations 
between  its  own  conscious  mental  states  and  their  respec- 
tive objects.  In  circumstances  in  which  painful  emotions, 
and  those  only,  are  fit  and  proper,  the  mind  is  pleased  with 


218  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

their  presence,  and  would  be  grieved  at  their  conscious  ab- 
sence. Here  we  have  the  explanation  of  what  is  called 
"pleasure  in  tragic  scenes."  The  emotions  immediately 
excited  by  such  scenes  are  exclusively  painful  ;  as  objects 
of  thought^  however,  such  emotions  are  agreeable,  being  to 
the  mind  conscious  indications  of  the  right  state  of  the 
sensibilities. 


MENTAL    PROPENSITIES.  219 


CHAPTER  V. 
MENTAL  PROPENSITIES. 

THE    AFFECTIONS. 

The  propensities  have  been  defined,  as  those  original 
principles  or  laws  of  our  sensitive  nature  which  render  cer- 
tain classes  of  desires  habitual  or  permanent  in  our  experi- 
ence. When  the  object  of  such  propensity  is  a  living  be- 
ing, or  a  class  of  living  beings,  said  principle  of  our  nature, 
is  denominated  an  affection.  The  object  of  this  chapter  is 
to  classify  this  division  of  mental  phenomena,  and  give 
their  essential  characteristics.  In  this  class  of  the  propen- 
sities we  enumerate  the  following  : — the  love  of  society^ 
the  love  of  hindred^  the  love  of  the  sexes^  the  love  oi  friends^ 
the  love  of  home^  the  love  oi  country^  the  love  oi  benefactors^ 
the  love  of  the  species^  the  love  of  God.  We  shall  consider 
these  in  the  order  above  specified. 

THE   LOVE    OF    SOCIETY. 

From  the  original  constitution  of  our  nature,  we  are 
social  beings.  Society,  of  some  sort,  is  so  essential  to  our 
well  -  being  that  absolute  solitude  is  intolerable.  When 
excluded  from  human  society,  association  with  the  irration- 
al creation  is  sought  as  a  necessary  alleviation  of  that  sense 
of  utter  desolation  which,  if  long  continued,  would  break 
down  the  mental  faculties.  In  no  mind  does  this  principle 
become  utterly  extinct.  Even  the  socially  blighted  misan- 
thrope who  flies  from  human  society  to  the  solitude  of  the 


220  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

wilderness  or  of  mountain  caves,  and  from  that  solitude  im- 
precates curses  upon  the  race,  would  find  his  mental  deso- 
lation doubly  desolate,  were  he  informed  that  the  race  he 
curses  had  become  extinct.  Nor  will  he,  in  his  exclusion 
from  his  kind,  remain  utterly  alone  ;  but  will  there  encircle 
himself  with  his  pet  brutes.  There  is  almost  no  form  of 
good  that  we  can  fully  enjoy  without  society  of  some  sort. 
Society  indeed  gives  value  to  all  we  possess.  What  we 
know  would  be  painful  to  us,  could  we  have  no  inter- 
change of  thought  with  ocher  minds,  andour  most  delicious 
food  would  become  loathsome  in  the  continued  absence  of 
all  social  endearments. 

THE    LOVE    OF    KINDRED. 

The  term  kmdred  represents  all  relations  by  birth;  such, 
for  example,  as  the  parental,  filial,  and  fraternal.  In  the  con- 
dition and  well  being  of  individuals  within  the  circle  of  recog- 
nized consanguinity  we  naturally  feel  a  deeper  interest  than 
we  can  entertain  towards  individuals  of  the  same  class  not  thus 
related  to  us,  and  this  interest  is  generally  proportionate  to 
the  nearness  or  remoteness  of  the  relation  referred  to.  The 
most  endearing  of  all,  is  that  which  exists  between  the  par- 
ent and  the  child,  and  next  to  this  in  strength  is  the  tie 
that  binds  together  those  who  derive  their  being  from  a 
common  parentage.  The  aff'ection  of  the  parent  for  the 
child  is  generally  deeper  than  that  of  the  child  for  the 
parent.  By  some  also  maternal  affection  is  regarded  as 
more  intense  than  paternal.  But  which  is  the  strongest 
and  most  enduring,  it  would  be  difficult  to  determine.  The 
absolute  universality  of  the  form  of  affection  under  consid- 
eration undeniably  evinces,  that  it  has  its  cause  in  an 
original  principle  of  human  nature,  and  not  in  ths  mere  ex- 


MENTAL    PROPENSITIES.  221 

ternal  relations  of  the  parties  concerned.  Such  relations^ 
add  to  the  strenofth  of  the  affection  :  but  cannot  account 
for  its  existence  in  the  form  in  which  it  appears  among 
mankind  in  all  conditions  of  society.  When  these  affec- 
tions exist  in  their  purity,  and  are  attended  with  a  cordial 
fulfillment  of  the  duties  arising  from  the  varied  relations  of 
the  parties  concerned,  they  impart  an  ineffable  beauty  and 
attractiveness  to  character.  When  they  become  causes  of 
blind  partiality  in  respect  to  their  objects,  or  obstacles  to 
the  stern  discipline  of  duty,  then  they  impart  to  character 
its  mOst  unattractive  aspects,  and  become  fruitful  causes  of 
individual  and  social  demoralization.  Of  all  forms  of 
worldly  endearment,  none  are  so  tender  and  happifying  as 
those  induced  by  the  domestic  afi'ections,  when  they  exist 
in  their  purity,  and  when  love,  in  all  its  manifestations^ 
conforms  to  the  law  of  duty.  On  the  other  hand,  no  forms 
of  hate  can  be  so  embittered  and  enduring  as  that  which 
obtains  when  discord  disturbs  the  peace  and  harmony  of 
the  domestic  circle;  this  law  of  the  sensibility  holding  uni- 
versally, that  in  those  relations  where  the  most  beautiful  har- 
mony and  the  most  blissful  endearments  should  obtain,  the 
wildest  disorder,  and  most  embittered  malignity  may  be 
induced. 

LOVE    OF    THE    SEXES. 

The  love  which,  from  the  original  principles  of  our  na- 
ture, exists  between  the  sexes,  takes  on  two  forms  ; — that 
of  general  interest,  and  that  which  constitutes  the  basis  of 
the  marriage  union.  Individuals  of  each  sex  are  naturally 
more  interested  in  those  of  the  other,  than  of  their  own . 
The  natural  desire  for  the  respect  of  individuals  of  the 
other  sex, — a  desire  which  dwells  in  the  minds  of  men  and 
women  in  common,  is  one  of  the  chief  regulative  principles 


222  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

in  respect  to  good  manners  and  good  morals  in  society. 
When  members  of  either  sex,  to  the  exclusion  of  individuals 
of  the  other,  are  massed  together  for  any  considerable  time, 
they  naturally  become  vulgarized  in  manners,  and  degen- 
erate in  morals.  A  properly  regulated  intercourse  of  the 
sexes,  on  the  other  hand,  in  families,  in  schools,  and  in 
society  generally,  tends,  unconsciously  to  all  to  be  sure,  to 
the  development  of  the  most  genial  manners  and  the  most 
perfect  morals,  which  communities  can  possess.  In  the 
intercourse  of  society,  and  that  on  account  of  original  and 
necessary  tendencies  of  our  nature,  forms  of  exclusive 
affection  are  generated  between  individuals  of  opposite 
sexes,  forms  of  affection  which  induce  the  mutual  desire 
for  the  most  intimate  and  enduring  union  known  among 
mankind,  a  union  never  to  be  dissolved  but  by  the  death 
of  one  of  the  parties.  The  affection  that  lays  the  basis  for 
this  union  has  this  peculiarity  about  it,  that  when,  by  the 
mutual  vows  of  the  parties  in  marriage,  it  takes  on  the 
form  of  duty,  it  becomes  absolutely  permanent  in  its  exist- 
ence and  activity,  unless  limited  by  crime  on  the  part  of 
one,  or  both  of  the  parties  concerned. 

THE    LOVE    OF    FRIENDS. 

In  our  intercourse  with  our  kind,  we  meet,  from  time  to 
time,with  individuals  whose  spirit  possesses  a  special  genial- 
ity for  our  own,  and  with  whom,  as  a  consequence, we  delight 
to  associate.  Social  intercourse,  under  such  circumstances, 
induces  a  mutual  attachment  between  such  individuals  and 
ourselves,  an  attachment  of  a  peculiar  and  special  kind, 
represented  by  the  term  friendship.  This  conscious  mu- 
tual geniality  is  the  exclusive  condition  of  friendship. 
When  this   is  felt,  as  the  result  of  social  intercourse,  this 


MENTAL    PROPENSITIES.  223 

relationship  is  established,  and  when  it  is  not  felt,  that 
relationship  never  exists.  Various  characteristics  of  men 
and  women,  may  command  our  admiration,  or  esteem. 
Nothing,  however,  but  this  sentiment  of  mutual  geniality- 
induces  that  form  of  endearing  attachment,  known  as 
friendship.  Individuals  may  have  many  admirers,  and  even 
attached  disciples,  but  no  real  friends.  Individuals,  on  the 
other  hand,  with  no  qualities  which  command  special  admi- 
ration or  esteem,  may  have  many  friends.  There  are  indi- 
viduals of  high  and  commanding  characteristics,  who  pass 
through  life  with  little  or  no  experience  of  true  friendship. 
The  reason  is  obvious.  They  have  no  social  geniality  of 
temperament  which  draws  other  minds  into  endearing 
intercommunion  with  their  own.  When  the  geniality 
under  consideration  obtains,  all  forms  of  real  excellence 
combine  with  this,  to  strengthen  and  perpetuate  the  bonds 
of  friendship.  The  real  condition  of  friendship,  however, 
is  not,  as  already  stated,  any  special  forms  of  excellence, 
intellectual  or  moral.  Even  in  heaven,  where  all  are  mor- 
ally perfect,  special  genialities  may  induce  special  intima- 
cies known  even  there  by  the  name  of  friendship  ;  and 
among  the  lost  for  aught  we  know,  forms  of  geniality  may 
obtain  among  individuals  on  account  of  which  they  may 
be  known  as  friends. 

Friendship  induces  universally  special  confidences,  and 
one  immutable  condition  of  the  perpetuity  of  this  ten- 
derly endearing  relation  is,  that  confidence  shall,  in  no 
case,  be  betrayed  ;  for  confidence  betrayed  sunders  the 
bond  forever. 

As  natural  afi'ection  may  be  supplanted  by  feelings  of 
the  bitterest  malignity,  the  same  holds  true  of  the  ties  of 
friendship.     There   are  few  individuals  towards  whom  we 


224  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

can  experience  feelings  of  deeper  repulsion  than  towards 
those  whom  we  have  once  known  as  special  friends,  the 
ties  that  once  united  us  to  them  having  been  rudely  sun- 
dered. Misanthropy  is  the  almost  exclusive  result  of  affec- 
tion blighted  by  cruelty,  confidence  rudely  betrayed,  and 
friendship  repulsively  broken.  This  principle  almost,  if 
not  quite  universally  prevails  in  regard  to  the  affections 
now  under  consideration.  When  once  changed  to  indiffer- 
ence, coldness,  or  aversion,  the  tenderness  which  formerly 
obtained  is  never  again  renewed.  As  friendship  is  one  of 
the  sources  of  the  purest  bliss  ever  known,  so  its  loss  leaves 
a  pang  in  the  breast  which  hardly  any  cause  can  soothe, 
and  time  can  hardly  remove.  If  you  have  gained  a  real 
friend,  think  yourself  happy  indeed.  If  you  have  lost 
such  a  friend,  regard  the  loss  as  a  great  calamity.  The 
love  of  society,  of  kindred,  of  the  sexes,  and  of  friends, — 
all  in  common,  and  each  in  particular,  have  their  origin  in 
distinct  and  original  principles  of  our  sensitive  nature. 
From  the  immutable  principles  of  that  nature,  we  not  only 
desire  society,  but  as  naturally  seek,  in  society,  for  inter- 
communion with  genial  minds  whom  we  can  recognize  as 
friends. 

THE    LOVE    OF    HOME. 

"  Home,  home,  sweet,  sweet  home  ! 
There  is  no  place  like  home." 

What  is  it  that  renders  that  sentiment  so  genial  to  all 
minds  in  common?  It  is  an  original  principle  of  our  na- 
ture, which  generated  the  universal  desire  to  have  some 
one  spot,  which,  in  all  our  wanderings,  we  may  regard  as  our 
special  dwelling  place, — the  place  to  which  we  hope  to  return 
as  our  permanent  abode.  This  spot  is  represented  by  the 
term  home^  and  the  affection  which  consecrates  it,  and  ren- 


MENTAL    PROPENSITIES.  225 

ders  it  sacred  in  our  esteem,  is  the  love  of  home.  As  we 
naturally  desire  the  perfection  of  all  objects  which  we  love, 
so  we  as  naturally  desire  to  beautify  home  with  every  con- 
ceivable charm.  The  love  of  home  is  one  of  the  great 
civilizers  of  society. 

THE    LOVE    OP    COUNTRY,    OR     PATRIOTISM. 

Why  did  Mr.  Peabody  send  his  munificent  gifts  across 
the  ocean,  to  enrich  the  institutions,  and  educate  the  poor 
of  his  native  country,  instead  of  devoting  the  same  to  the 
institutions  and  poor  of  other  nations?  and  why  does  the 
world  commend  the  direction  which  he  has  given  to  the 
mass  of  his  benefactions?  We  account  for  both  these  facts, 
by  referring  to  a  fundamental  principle  of  universal  human 
nature,  patriotism,  or  the  love  of  country.  The  proper 
exercise  of  this  affection  does  not  involve  hatred  of  other 
nations,  or  indifference  to  the  rights  or  interests  of  any 
human  being.  It  does  imply  what  should  exist  in  all 
minds,  a  form  of  special  love  for  the  land  of  our  birth. 
This  is  natural  to  man  in  all  conditions  of  existence.  The 
affection  of  which  we  are  now  speaking,  in  its  varied  man- 
ifestations, takes  on  the  form  of  zeal  for  the  perfection  of 
the  government,  administration,  laws,  and  institutions  of 
one's  country,  and  for  whatever  tends  to  its  highest  pros- 
perity, together  with  a  jealous  regard  for  its  honor.  In  its 
perverted  form,  it  harmonizes  with  the  base  maxim,  "  Our 
country,  right  or  wrong." 

LOVE    OF   THE    SPECIES. 

By  an  original  principle  of  our  nature,  we  are  impelled 
to  will  the  good  of  all  men,  without  distinction  of  race  or 
color.     Under  the  influence  of  this  affection,  we  naturally 
15 


226  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

participate  in  the  joys  and  sorrows  of  our  kind,  rejoice  in 
their  prosperity,  and  regret  their  adversities  ;  we  reprobate 
injustice  and  oppression,  and  rejoice  in  the  triumph  of  jus- 
tice, truth,  and  liberty  among  all  nations,  and  in  all  com- 
munities, in  common.  Whenever  and  wherever,  a  human 
being  lifts  his  manacled  hands  before  us,  and  asks  the  ques- 
tion, "  Am  I  not  a  man,  and  a  brother  "  we  do  violence, 
not  only  to  our  intellectual  and  moral,  but  to  original  laws 
of  our  sensitive  nature,  when  we  turn  from  the  suppliant, 
as  if  he  was  not  a  man,  and  our  brother.  We  best  obey 
the  laws  of  our  intellectual,  spiritual,  moral,  and  sensitive 
nature,  when  we  make  the  sentiment  of  universal  and  im- 
partial philanthropy  our  chief  frame  of  mind.  Of  all  the 
principles  of  our  emotive  and  sensitive  nature,  activity  un- 
der this  one  is  least  likely  to  lead  us  astray  from  the  prin- 
ciples of  truth  and  duty. 

LOVE    OP    BENEFACTORS. 

Years  ago  a  Scottish  nobleman  died.  At  his  funeral,  a 
stranger  to  all  present, — a  stranger  clad  in  deep  mourning, 
appeared  and  took  his  seat  with  the  mourners,  and  during 
all  the  services  in  the  House  of  God,  and  at  the  grave,  no 
one  manifested  deeper  grief.  At  the  close  of  the  solem- 
nities, he  disappeared,  and  no  one  present  ever  saw  or  heard 
of  him  again.  Among  the  papers  of  the  deceased,  a  record 
to  this  efifect  was  discovered.  Whilst  passing  alone,  and 
on  horseback,  during  a  cloudy  night,  through  a  mountain 
gorge,  he  was  stopped  by  a  highwayman.  The  deep  breath- 
ing and  hesitation  of  the  robber  convinced  the  nobleman 
that  it  was  the  first  crime  of  the  stranger,  and  that  he  had 
been  driven  to  the  act  by  some  very  pressing  necessity.  On 
expressing  his  apprehensions,  the   nobleman   was   assured 


MENTAL    PROPENSITIES.  227 

that  he  was  correct.  "  What  amount  of  money  would  bring 
you  relief  ?"  asked  the  nobleman.  The  sum  was  named, 
and  the  stranger  was  assured,  that  if  he  would  appear  at  a 
certain  place,  the  next  day  and  give  a  sign  then  designated, 
the  money  would  be  handed  to  him,  no  questions  being 
asked,  and  the  recipient  not  being  recognized.  The  amount 
pledged  was  handed  over  as  promised.  Just  one  year  from 
that  day,  the  gift,  principal  and  interest,  was,  from  a  source 
unknown,  remitted.  So  on  every  succeeding  anniversary 
of  that  event,  the  same  identical  sum  was  always  remitted. 
No  one  doubted  that  the  recipient  of  the  great  relief,  was 
the  stranger  mourner  referred  to.  This  was,  and  is,  grati- 
tude, an  affection  which  always  implies  a  cherished  remem- 
brance of  the  gift  received^  the  most  kindly  recollection  of 
the  giver^  and  a  strong  desire  to  make  full,  and  more  thank- 
ful returns  for  the  good  conferred.  "It  is  more  blessed  to 
give^  than  to  receive  f  yet  few  forms  of  joy  lie  deeper  than 
those  which  attend  the  exercise  of  genuine  gratitude.  The 
benevolent  affections,  manifested  in  appropriate  acts,  im- 
part an  ineffable  beauty  to  character.  Gratitude  cherished 
and  duly  manifested  impart  to  character  forms  of  beauty 
and  perfection  hardly  less  attractive.  A  coldly  selfish  mind 
is  a  blot  and  blank  in  the  creation  of  God.  An  ungrateful 
recipient  of  kindly  benefactions,  is  one  of  the  most  repulsive 
and  odious  objects  that  ever  has  place  in  the  sphere  of 
thought. 

THE    LOVE    OF    GOD. 

By  nature  we  are  religious  beings,  and  naturally  delight 
in  the  contemplation  of  whatever  is  beautiful,  grand,  sub- 
lime, excellent,  or  perfect.  The  idea  of  infinity  and  per- 
fection is  the  highest  idea  that  can  have  a  place  within  the 
sphere  of  thought.     The  idea  of  an  eternal  mind  possessed 


228  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

of  every  possible  mental  attribute,  and  each  attribute  ab- 
solutely infinite  and  perfect,  is  the  highest  form  which  the 
idea  of  infinity  can  conceive.  To  this  one  idea,  all  the 
higher  departments  of  our  sensitive  nature,  the  moral  and 
spiritual,  are  immutably  correlated.  God  must  be  to  the 
mind  the  great,  central  object  of  thought  and  contempla- 
tion ;  and  the  consciousness  of  His  approbation  and  favor 
ever  must  be  the  all-overshadowing  want  of  its  nature. 
Love  to  God,  as  a  sentiment  of  our  emotive  nature,  assumes 
the  form  of  delight,  wonder,  awe,  reverence,  veneration, 
and  adoration  ;  as  different  attributes  of  the  divine  mind, 
and  different  relations  of  the  infinite  to  the  finite,  become 
objects  of  thought  and  contemplation.  When  the  mind  is 
consciously  pure  in  heart,  "  God  is  its  everlasting  light, 
and  the  days  of  its  mourning  are  ended."  When  conscious- 
ly impure,  He  can  be  to  it  nothing  but  an  object  of  dread 
and  terror.  We  close  our  elucidation  of  the  affections  with 
a  few  suggestions  of  a  general  nature  in  respect  to  them. 

GENERAL    CHARACTERISTICS    OF    THE    AFFECTIONS. 

1.  They  must  each  be  referred,  to  distinct  and  original 
principles  of  our  sensitive  nature.  Neither  class  can  be 
resolved  into  one  of  the  others;  nor  can  they  ail  be  resolved 
into  any  one  common  principle. 

2.  The  proper  exercise  of  the  affections  is  genial  to  our 
nature,  and  is  attended  with  passive  impressions  happifying 
to  the  mind.  They  occasion  pain  when  they  take  on  the 
form  of  sympathy  for  the  suffering  ;  but  even  then  they  are 
universally  agreeable. 

3.  The  affections  are,  in  themselves,  disinterested.  The 
well  being  of  their  respective  objects,  is  regarded  by  the 


MENTAL    PROPEXSITIES.  229 

mind  as  a  good  in  itself,  irrespective  of  any  reflex  influence 
upon  our  own  happiness. 

4.  In  themselves,  as  mere  impulsions  of  our  sensitive 
nature,  the  afl"ections  have  no  moral  character.  They 
prompt  to  actions  right  or  wrong,  and  under  their  influence, 
we  may  become  virtuous  or  vicious.  As  mere  states  of  the 
sensibility,  however,  they  constitute  us  neither  morally  good 
nor  bad. 

5.  As  the  aff'ections  must  exist,  excepting  when  extin- 
guished, or  turned  to  hate  by  crime  in  the  subject,  to  be 
**  without  natural  aff'ection "  implies  moral  depravity  and 
criminality  in  their  most  aggravated  forms. 

6.  The  existence  of  the  aff'ections,  resulting  as  they  do 
from  the  original  constitution  of  our  nature,  most  strikingly 
evinces  and  illustrates  the  divine  beneficence.  God  has  so 
constituted  us,  that  we  are  not  only  prompted  to  duty  by 
conscience,  but  impelled  to  its  performance  by  the  original 
principles  of  our  sensitive  nature. 

7.  As  the  highest  happiness  results,  when  duty  is  dis- 
charged by  all  within  the  circle  of  the  aflfections,  so  almost 
no  form  of  unhappiness  is  niore  intense  than  that  which 
results  from  duty  violated  within  that  circle.  What  a 
ceaseless  gloom,  for  example,  is  thrown  over  an  entire  do- 
mestic circle,  when  one  of  its  members  falls  into  crime,  or 
under  the  influence  of  some  debasing  vice.  Just  in  pro- 
portion  to  the  nearness  of  the  relations  existing  between 
individuals,  is  their  mutual  power  to  render  each  other 
immeasurably  happy  or  miserable. 


230  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 


CHAPTER    VI. 

THE  DESIRES. 

"  Our  desires,"  says  Mr.  Stewart,  "  are  distinguishable 
from  our  appetites  by  the  following  circumstances  :  1st. 
They  do  not  take  their  rise  from  the  body.  2nd.  They  do 
not  operate  periodically  after  certain  intervals,  nor  do  they 
cease  after  the  attainment  of  their  object,"  a  characteristic 
which  desires  possess  in  common  with  the  affections.  Sen- 
sations and  emotions  are  passive  states  of  the  sensibility. 
Appetites,  affections,  and  desires  are  active,  or  impulsive 
states  of  the  same  department  of  our  nature.  Appetites 
take  their  rise  in  the  body,  and  tend  towards  physical  grat- 
ifications. The  affections  impel  us  to  seek  the  good  of 
sentient  existence  around  us.  Those  phenomena  of  the 
sensibility  which  impel  the  mind  to  or  from  varied  objects 
of  thought  as  distinguished  from  those  of  the  affections, 
are  denominated  desires.  Among  these  we  shall  consider 
the  following  ; 

The  desire  of  continued  existence, —  The  desire  of 
action, — The  desire  of  knowledge,  or  the  love  of  truth, — 
The  desire  of  esteem,  objective  and  subjective, — The  desire 
of  power, — The  desire  of  authority, — The  desire  or  princi- 
ple of  imitation, — The  desire  of  superiority, — The  desire 
of  hoarding, — and  The  desire  or  love  of  order. 

THE    DESIRE    OF    CONTINUED    EXISTENCE. 

"When  the  mind  attains  to  a  distinct  and  reflective  con- 
sciousness of  the   fact  of   its   existence,  it  experiences  an 


THE    DESIRES.  231 

instinctive  desire  for  the  continuance  of  that  existence.  In 
the  presence  of  the  idea  of  the  cessation  of  its  physical 
being  an  irrepressible  desire  equally  instinctive  arises  for 
a  continuance  of  its  mental  being  and  activity  in  another 
state.  Hence  the  hope  of  immortality  "springs  eternal  in 
the  human  breast."  This  desire  of  continued  existence  is 
seldom  repressed  by  the  experience  of  unhappiness,  and 
the  extinction  of  hope.  Even  the  suicide  cries:  "Whence 
this  secret  dread,  and  inward  horror  of  falling  into  naught?  " 
This  universal  and  instinctive  desire  for  continued  exist- 
ence, "  this  pleasing  hope,  this  fond  desire,  this  long- 
ing after  immortality,"  is  an  absolute  pledge  from  the 
Author  of  our  being,  that  mind  will  never  cease  to  be. 

THE    DESIRE    FOR    ACTIO:?^. 

"  "Weary  of  rest "  is  a  poetic  form  of  speech  which 
represents  another  mental  principle  of  our  sensitive  nature. 
Action,  mental  and  physical,  is  one  of  the  immutable  de- 
mands of  that  nature.  Thought,  motion,  activity,  are  essen- 
tial elements  of  the  true  and  proper  life  of  mind  ;  and 
when  no  specific  forms  of  action  seem  demanded,  we  bestir 
ourselves  to  escape  the  weariness  of  inaction.  The  rest  of 
heaven  is  not  the  rest  of  utter  inaction,  but  forms  of  bliss- 
ful activity  that  never  tire.  As  opposed  to  a  state  of  inac- 
tion, glorified  spirits  ^'rest  not  day  nor  night."  As  we  are 
now  constituted,  action  long  continued,  or  violent,  over- 
taxes our  powers,  and  induces  the  pains  of  fatigue.  Inac- 
tion is  thus  desired,  not  as  a  good  in  itself  but  as  an 
alleviation.  As  soon  as  the  powers  become  invigorated, 
however,  action  is  desired  as  a  good  in  itself. 

THE    DESIRE,    OR    LOVE    OF     KNOWLEDGE. 

"  For  the  mind  to  be  without  knowledge  is  not  good." 


232  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

Universal  human  nature  responds  to  the  truth  of  that 
maxim.  So  strong  is  the  desire  for  knowledge  in  the  mind, 
that  it  often  flies  from  ignorance,  when  assured,  that 
"knowledge  leads  to  woe."  "Who  would  lose,  though 
full  of  pain,  this  intellectual  being  ?  "  This  love  of  knowl- 
edge, as  it  exists  in  the  mind,  assumes  two  forms,  a  desire 
for  a  knowledge  of  facts,  or  mer^  information,  and  for  sci- 
ence properly  so  called,  that  is  knowledge  in  systematic 
form. 

THE    DESIRE    OF    ESTEEM. 

The  desire  to  know  that  we  are  possessed  of  the  appro- 
bation and  favor  of  others,  minds,  and  to  be  conscious  to 
ourselves,  that  we  deserve  the  esteem  which  we  enjoy,  are 
the  results  of  original  and  immutable  principles  of  our 
sensitive  nature.  Desire  in  the  form  first  named,  is  called 
the  love  of  reputation,  and  in  the  second,  self-esteem.  Es- 
teem in  both  forms  is  a  good  to  universal  mind,  and  within 
proper  limits  may  be  lawfully  sought  as  such.  As  a  mere 
impulse,  however,  it  may  prompt  to  good  or  bad  actions 
and  cannot,  without  crime,  be  indulged,  to  the  sacrifice  of 
moral  principle  in  any  form.  To  sacrifice  reputation  in 
order,  by  adherence  to  moral  principle,  to  enjoy  the  con- 
scious desert  of  the  good  sacrificed,  is  one  of  the  purest 
and  noblest  forms  of  virtue. 

DESIRE    OF    POWER. 

A  little  child,  in  a  state  of  the  intensest  and  most  ecsta- 
tic excitement,  rushed  to  a  neighbor  who  had  called  at  its 
father's  house,  to  announce  the  great  fact,  that  it  was  then 
able  to  put  on  its  shoes  without  the  aid  of  others.  What  in- 
duced that  fullness  of  joy  in  that  child's  mind  ?  It  was  the 
consciousness  of  power,  to  which  it  had  just  attained.     A 


THE    DESIRES.  233 

similar  love  of  power  dwells  in  all  minds.  We  love  to  ex- 
ercise power  over  all  objects  around  us,  whether  material 
or  mental.  Those  spheres  of  activity  which  impart  the 
most  distinct  consciousness  of  the  possession  and  exercise 
of  this  one  prerogative,  are  of  all  others  preferred.  When 
individuals  become  distinctly  conscious  of  the  possession  of 
any  particular  kind  of  power,  especially  of  the  ability  to 
exercise  such  power  in  its  perfected  forms,  they  experience 
a  special  delight  in  its  exercise.  When,  for  example  in- 
dividuals acquire  real  excellence  of  power  in  any  depart- 
ment of  thought  or  action,  they  will  ever  after  find  special 
pleasure  in  such  forms  of  activity. 

Here  we  have  revealed  an  immutable  principle  which 
should  govern  the  student,  the  apprentice,  and  the  clerk,  in 
all  stages  of  their  education.  It  is  this  :  Aim  to  acquire 
the  entire  and  conscious  mastery  of  all  that  you  attempt  to 
learn.  You  will  then  not  only  possess  real  excellence  in 
your  future  sphere  of  thought  and  action,  but  you  will  ever 
after  find  real  pleasure  therein. 

THE    DESIRE    OR   LOVE    OF    AUTHORITY. 

At  first  thought,  it  would  appear,  that  the  love  of 
authority  is  only  a  special  form  in  which  the  love  of  power 
develops  and  manifests  itself.  Whether  this,  in  fact  is  so 
or  not,  the  former  is  so  peculiar  in  itself,  that  it  demands 
special  notice.  The  relation  of  ruler  and  subject  does  not 
imply  either  mental  or  physical  superiority  in  the  former 
over  the  latter.  The  ruler  of  a  kingdom,  the  president  of 
this  nation,  or  the  governor  of  a  state,  is  not  always  the 
wisest,  nor  the  strongest  individual  in  his  nation  or  state. 
Yet  the  will  of  such  ruler  is,  in  many  respects,  law  to  his 
subjects,  and  this  is  what  is  meant  by  authority.      We  are 


234  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

SO  constituted  by  our  Maker,  that  the  exercise  of  such  pre- 
rogative is  a  source  of  real  delight  and  gratification.  In  the 
proper  exercise  of  such  prerogatives,  the  ruler  is  ennobled 
in  public  estimation,  while  the  subject  is  not  debased.  To 
each  of  these  relations,  those  of  ruler  and  subject,  our  na- 
ture is  fundamentally  adapted.  The  people  naturally  de- 
light in  subjection  to  wholesome  authority,  while  rulers  are 
blessed  in  its  exercise. 

THE    DESIRE    OR    PRINCIPLE    OF    IMITATION. 

Man,  in  fundamental  particulars,  is,  from  the  immutable 
laws  of  his  being,  a  copyist.  The  child  copies  the  man,  and 
as  imitative  beings,  our  speech,  our  manners,  and  to  a  great 
extent,  our  morals,  unconsciously  take  form  from  those  of 
the  community  around  us.  We  naturally  dislike  to  be 
singular,  and  he  is  a  moral  hero  who  dares  to  do  right,  in 
opposition  to  general  example  around  him.  The  power 
vfhiGh  fashio7i  sways  over  community  has  its  basis  in  the 
principle  under  consideration.  Other  influences  combine 
with  this  to  give  it  power,  such  for  example,  as  the  love  of 
country,  reverence  of  ancestry,  respect  for  associates,  and 
the  principle  of  friendship.  The  power  of  example^  also, 
has  its  chief  foundation  in  the  principle  under  considera- 
tion. What  others  do,  we  are  naturally  inclined  to  copy. 
Hence  any  form  of  activity  which  constantly  stands  revealed 
before  us  in  living  example,  we  almost  unconsciously  take 
on. 

THE    LOVE    OF    SUPERIORITY. 

When  we  witness  any  form  of  activity  performed  by 
others,  we  are  naturally  inclined,  no*t  only  to  repeat  the 
same,  but  as  naturally  desire  to  excel  what  we  perceive  to 
have  been.  done.  The  desire  to  excel  does  not  imply  delight 


THE    DESIRES.  235 

in  the  want  of  excellence  in  others,  nor  that  theirs  shall  be 
less  than  ours  actually  is.  On  the  other  hand,  when  we  know 
what  others  are,  or  can  do,  we  naturally  desire  to  reach  a 
higher  degree  of  excellence,  and  rejoice  in  the  thought  that 
we  have  greater  forms  and  degrees  of  excellence  than  they 
possess.  That  such  is  the  constitution  of  our  nature  is  un- 
deniable, and  to  it  the  progress  of  society  towards  higher 
and  higher  forms  and  degrees  of  excellence  is  chiefly  owing. 
Nor  is  action  under  this  principle  wrong  in  itself.  My 
neighbor  for  example,  does  well  in  some  given  department 
of  thought  or  activity  in  which  I  am  engaged.  Where  is 
the  wrong  in  my  desiring  and  aiming  to  attain  to  a  form  of 
excellence  more  perfect  than  his  ?  If  this  desire  induces 
in  me  the  spirit  of  envy,  jealousy,  or  detraction,  here  is  a 
moral  wrong,  and  that  wrong  consists,  not  in  the  mere  de- 
sire entertained,  nor  in  any  form  of  proper  action  under  it, 
but  in  violating,  under  the  influence  of  that  desire,  the 
law  of  duty. 

THE    DESIRE    OF    HOARDIXG. 

Whatever  is  to  us  an  object  of  interest  and  delight,  we 
naturally  desire  to  possess,  and  to  retain  for  future  use 
and  enjoyment  when  possessed.  The  idea,  that  any  form 
of  good  is  ou7'S,  that  we  have  an  exclusive  right  in  it,  and 
control  over  it,  is  to  our  minds  a  source  of  great  delight, 
and  enjoyment.  The  same  feeling  naturally  induces  the 
desire  to  gain  possession  of  such  forms  of  good  which  are 
not  now  under  our  control.  Thus  we  have  the  desire  of 
property,  or  the  love  of  hoarding,— a  universal  principle  of 
human  nature. 

THE  DESIRE  OR  LOVE  OF  ORDER. 

"Order  is   heaven's  first  law,"  as   a    consequence,  the 


236  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

love  of  order  is  a  first  and  fundamental  attribute  of  univer- 
sal mind.  There  is  a  natural  and  universal  desire  for  knowl- 
edg»e  systematized,  for  facts  classified  under  general  prin- 
ciples, and  that  all  things  be  conformed  to  rules  of  order. 
The  absence  of  order,  in  any  department  of  thought  or 
action,  is  to  the  mind  a  source  of  deep  disquietude.  Order 
is  the  immutable  condition  of  efficiency  in  every  important 
sphere  of  thought  and  action. 

GENERAL    REMARKS    UPON    THE    DESIRES. 

A  few  remarks  of  a  general  nature  are  required  upon 
the  subject  before  us. 

1.  The  phenomena  included  under  each  of  these  classes, 
are  to  be  referred  to  distinct  and  original  susceptibilities 
of  our  nature,  for  the  obvious  reason  that  neither  can  be 
resolved  into  any  or  all  of  the  others  ;  nor  into  any  other 
principle  of  our  nature.  Yet  they  appear  as  universal  and 
positive  impulses  of  the  sensibility. 

2.  Each  of  these  principles  is  disinterested  in  this  sense, 
that  the  object  is  sought  for  its  own  sake,  as  a  good  in  it- 
self, and  not  on  account  of  any  consequences  near  or 
remote,  anticipated  from,  nor  under  any  more  general  im- 
pulse of  our  nature,  such  as  self-love.  We  do  not,  for  ex- 
ample, first  say,  that  knowledge  will  make  us  happy,  and 
then  seek  it  for  that  reason.  Before  any  such  reflex  calcu- 
lations were  made,  knowledge  was  regarded  as  a  good  in 
itself,  and  on  its  own  account  ;  and  as  such  it  was  desired. 
So  of  each  of  the  other  classes  referred  to. 

3.  Our  desires  are  impulsive^  not  regulative  principles 
of  action.  Each  desire  impels  the  mind  towards  its  own, 
and  awav  from  every  other,  object.     The  intelligence  must 


THE    DESIRES.  23? 

determine  which  is  to  be  gratified  on  any  particular  occa- 
sion, and  how  far. 

4.  These  principles  of  our  nature  present  a  striking 
illustration  of  the  divine  beneficence.  Whenever  we  are 
pursuing  any  object,  with  any  reference  to  our  general 
well  being,  we  are  always  gratifying  some  one  or  more 
definite  demands  of  our  nature.  The  farmer,  when  laboring 
to  provide  for  the  maintenance  of  himself  and  family,  is 
not  obeying  merely  the  impulse  of  conscience,  self-love, 
and  paternal  affection.  Many  other  principles  of  his  na- 
ture combine  their  influence  to  render  labor  itself  a 
good. 

5.  I  will  here  notice  a  mistake  into  which,  as  it  appears 
to  me,  many  philosophers  have  fallen  in  regard  to  the 
active  principles  now  under  consideration.  We  are  so 
constituted,  it  is  said,  that  the  value  of  present  attainments, 
is  always  lost  with  the  attainment  itself,  while  the  m.ind  is 
borne  on  after  new  objects.  Thus  man,  from  the  constitu- 
tion of  his  being,  is  under  the  influence  of  perpetual  delu- 
sions, seeking  as  a  good,  that  which  experience  perpetually 
affirms  to  be  "vanity  and  vexation  of  spirit."  This  is  true, 
only  when  inferior  objects  are  sought,  not  as  a  good,  but 
as  the  ultimate,  the  supreme  good.  Then  human  nature  is 
to  itself  a  perpetual  lie,  and  then  only. 

6.  The  mistake  of  many  Christians  in  endeavoring  to 
destroy  their  own,  or  the  hold  of  sinners  upon  the  world, 
by  descanting  upon  the  vanity  of  worldly  pursuits,  is  obvi- 
ous. They  thus  represent  nature  as  a  lie,  and  God  as 
requiring  gratitude  for  that  which  is  not  a  good. 

The  desires  which  we  have  been  considering,  may  be 
called  primary.     We  have  others  which  may  be  called  sec- 


238 


THE    SENSIBILITIES. 


ondary,  or  artificial.  That  which  conduces  to  gratify 
natural  desire,  will  be  desired  as  means  to  that  end.  So 
when  we  have  willed  the  attainment  of  any  object,  a  law 
of  our  nature  impels  us  to  desire  and  seek  it.  A  large 
portion  of  our  desires  are  of  this  class. 


GENERAL   ACTIVE   PRINCIPLES.  239 


CHAPTER    VII. 

GENERAL    ACTIVE    PRINCIPLES. 

Among  the  general  active  principles  of  universal  mind, 
the  following  require  special  attention;  to  wit,  the  princi- 
ples of  self-defense,  self-love,  conscience,  and  the  love  of 
justice. 

SELF-DEFENSE. 

That  this  principle  is  a  universal  law,  not  only  of  ra- 
tional, but  also  of  irrational,  sentient  existence,  is  obvious 
to  the  slightest  observer  of  the  facts  which  surround  us. 
I  may  also  remark  that  there  are  few  individuals,  who, 
under  certain  circumstances,  would  not  yield  to  the  impulse 
of  this  law.  My  object  on  the  present  occasion  is,  not  so 
much  to  inquire  into  the  lawfulness  of  self-defense,  nor  if 
lawful,  when  and  by  what  means,  but  to  inquire  into  the 
nature  of  the  feelings  which  arise  under  such  circum- 
stances. The  causes  which  excite  these  feelings  are  the 
action  of  certain  powers  which  endanger,  either  our  lives 
or  our  particular  interests.  The  causes  may  be  intelligent 
or  unintelligent.  In  either  case  the  first  feeling  excited  is 
the  emotion  of  fear  or  apprehension.  Hence  a  desire  arises 
to  escape  the  impending  evil,-^a  desire  impelling  us  either 
to  remove  ourselves  from  the  presence  of  the  cause,  or  to 
arrest  or  destroy  the  action  of  the  cause  itself.  In  case 
the  cause  is  an  intelligent  one,  the  desire  is  associated  with 
feelings  of  displeasure  towards  the  agent  himself,  strongly 
impelling  us  to  prevent  the   evil   intended,  by   destroying 


240  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

his  power  to  inflict  it.     On  this  feeling  I  deem  it  important 
to  make  the  following  remarks  : 

1.  As  an  original  impulse  of  our  nature,  it  has  no  moral 
qualities. 

2.  It  differs  in  kind  from  revenge.  To  ward  off  a  blow 
aimed  at  my  body,  or  simply  to  disarm  the  individual  who 
aims  the  blow,  and  then  to  proceed  to  inflict  positive  injury 
upon  him  after  he  is  disarmed,  are  totally  different  things. 

3.  This  is  a  universal  principle  operating  in  regard  to 
all  interests,  real  and  assumed,  right  or  wrong. 

4.  It  is  under  the  cover  of  this  principle,  that  almost  all 
injuries  inflicted  upon  men  are  perpetrated. 

5.  Virtue,  and  moral  excellence  can  never  be  hated  by 
us  except  when  they  are  placed  before  the  mind,  as  opposed 
to  the  inflexible  purposes  of  our  will,  or  to  some  darling 
gratification  upon  which  our  hearts  are  set. 

6.  An  inquiry  purely  ethical  demands  a  passing  remark 
here  :  Within  what  limits  may  we  lawfully  yield  to  the 
impulse  under  consideration?  Just  so  far,  I  answer,  as  to 
prevent  the  occurrence  of  the  impending  evil.  Whatever 
injury  the  antagonist  must  endure  in  order  to  accomplish 
this,  can  never  be  laid  to  our  account. 

SELF-LOYE. 

This  is  a  feeling  or  impulse  of  our  nature, — an  impulse 
connected  with  the  idea  of  well-being;  an  idea  elucidated 
in  a  former  chapter,  and  shown  to  be  a  necessary  concep- 
tion of  the  reason.  The  term  well-being  should  be  under- 
stood as  applicable  to  our  entire  existence.  The  feeling 
under  consideration,  impels  the  mind  to  sacrifice  present 
pleasure,  when  necessary  to  secure  our  general  well-being, 


GENERAL    ACTIVE    PRINCIPLES.  241 

and  to  endure  present  evils   for  the  same  reasons.     I    re- 
mark : 

1.  This  impulse  differs  in  kind  from  all  the  other 
impulses,  such  as  appetites,  desires,  and  affections,  which 
were  illustrated  in  former  chapters.  These  are  all  particu- 
lar, and  impel  the  mind  towards  present  gratification,  irre- 
spective of  the  future.  Hence  it  often  happens,  that  the 
impulses  arising  from  the  action  of  these  propensities, 
coincide  with,  or  are  opposed  to  the  impulse  under  consid- 
eration. The  determinations  of  the  will  are  accordingly 
sometimes  in  conformity  with  one,  and  sometimes  with  the 
other. 

2.  Equally  distinct  is  this  principle  from  selfishness. 
The  former  simply  impels  the  will  to  choose  our  own  hap- 
piness. The  latter  consists  in  yielding  to  this  impulse 
when  our  interests  are  opposed  to  the  higher  good  of 
others. 

3.  This  is  a  rational  active  principle,  the  impulse  being 
conditioned  on  the  development  of  the  idea  of  well-being. 

4.  The  mistake  of  utilitarians  in  maintaining  that  this 
is  the  only  active  principle  of  our  nature  now  becomes 
obvious.  Self-love,  as  we  have  seen,  is  totally  distinct  from 
all  our  particular  propensities,  and  but  for  their  influence, 
as  President  Wayland  has  shown,  would  exist  in  the  mere 
form  of  desire,  impelling  to  no  particular  acts  whatever.  It 
is  only  one  among  many  other  active  principles  of  our 
nature. 

CONSCIENCE. 

The  ideas  of  right  and  wrong,  of  merit   and  demerit, 

based  upon  the  two  former;  and  of  reward  and  punishment 

based   upon   those   of   merit  and    demerit,  and  conscience 

considered  as  the  testifying  state  of  the  reason,  have  been 

16 


242  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

sufficiently  illustrated  in  former  chapters.  It  only  remains 
here  to  analyze  the  phenomena  of  the  sensibility  connected 
with  the  above  ideas.     To  accomplish  this,  I  remark  : 

1.  That  in  all  right  and  virtuous  actions  there  is  per- 
ceived by  the  mind  a  certain  intrinsic  beauty,  fitness,  and 
propriety,  which  perception  is  attended  with  those  delight- 
ful emotions  which  the  idea  of  beauty,  and  of  moral  beauty 
alone  can  excite.  Precisely  the  opposite  feelings  are  awak- 
ened by  the  contemplation  of  what  is  wrong. 

2.  In  reference  to  the  above  perceptions  there  is  always 
a  strong  feeling  of  love  or  hate,  impelling  us  to  choose  the 
one  and  reject  the  other.  That  is  what  is  called  the  impul- 
sive power  of  conscience. 

3.  When  we  have  done  right  or  wrong,  there  is  always 
a  judgment  that  we  deserve  reward  or  punishment,  and 
also  a  judgment  or  expectation,  that  we  shall  receive  the 
due  reward  of  our  deeds.  These  judgments  are  always 
attended  with  certain  feelings  of  delight  and  joyful  antici- 
pation, or  of  anguish  and  fear,  which  are  called  the  testi- 
mony or  joys  of  a  good  conscience,  or  the  pangs  of 
remorse. 

Now  that  function  of  the  reason  which  gives  us  the 
judgments  above  referred  to,  together  with  the  functions  of 
the  sensibility,  which  give  existence  to  these  feelings,  con- 
stitute those  complex  operations  of  the  mind,  denominated 
conscience.  Conscience  is  neither  the  former  nor  the  latter, 
considered  by  themselves,  but  both  together.  Hence  con- 
science has  been  wrongly  defined,  as  a  mere  susceptibility, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  as  an  exclusively  rational  faculty,  on 
the  other. 

LOVE    OF   JUSTICE. 

In  the  presence  of  actions  right  or  wrong,  all  men  not 


GENERAL    ACTIVE   PRINCIPLES.  243 

only  judge  that  the  agents  deserve  reward  or  punishment, 
but  experience  what  are  called  feelings  of  good-will,  or  the 
opposite, — feelings  or  desires,  impelling  us  to  choose,  that 
the  virtuous  may  be  happy,  and  the  vicious  miserable.  This 
is  a  universal  and  necessary  impulse  of  our  nature,  and  con- 
stitutes what  is  called  the  love  of  justice  or  of  moral  order. 
This  principle,  in  case  of  aggravated  guilt,  induces  the  will 
to  turn  inward,  and  prey  upon  the  mind  itself.  This  is  the 
last  stage  of  human  anguish. 


244  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
COMPLEX  PHENOMENA. 

We  come  now  to  our  second  general  inquiry  in  regard 
to  the  phenomena  of  the  sensibility, — an  inquiry  which 
respects  those  states  of  mind  which  have  generally  been 
regarded  as  simple  feelings,  but  which,  in  reality,  are  com- 
plex states,  composed  of  certain  feelings  associated  with 
the  action  of  the  intelligence  or  will,  or  both. 

In  approaching  this  subject  I  would  first  direct  attention 
to  a  few  fundamental  principles  connected  with  the  inquiry 
before  us,  and  upon  which  all  our  subsequent  conclusions 
will  be  based. 

1.  The  spontaneous  and  necessary  phenomena  of  the 
sensibility  and  intelligence,  are  alike  destitute  of  all  moral 
qualities. 

2.  We  are  accountable  for  voluntary  states  of  mind 
only,  i.  e.  for  those  states  the  existence  and  perpetuity  of 
which  depend,  either  directly  or  indirectly  upon  our  will. 

3.  In  respect  to  all  complex  states  of  mind,  which  are 
characterized  as  right  and  wrong,  the  moral  and  voluntary 
elements  are  always  identical,  the  other  elements  being 
right  or  wrong,  not  in  themselves,  but  because  their  exist- 
ence depends  upon  the  other  or  voluntary  element. 

Hence,  we  clearly  perceive, 

4.  The  error  of  certain  philosophers  and  divines  who 
place  all  that  is  right  or  wrong  in  moral  agents,  in  right  or 
v^rong feelings  ^  whereas  feelings,  in  themselves,  are  neith- 
er rioht  nor  wronof.     Also, 


COMPLEX    PHENOMENA.  245 

5.  The  error  of  those  who  attempt,  from  the  above 
proposition,  by  appealing  to  complex  phenomena  of  the 
mind  as  if  they  were  simple  states,  to  prove,  that  feelings, 
in  themselves,  as  mere  spontaneities  of  the  sensibility,  are 
possessed  of  a  moral  character. 

Attention  is  now  invited  to  a  consideration  of  some  of 
the  complex  phenomena  of  the  mind  above  referred  to. 

WISHING. 

That  we  do  often  regard  such  states  of  mind  as  posses- 
sing of  a  moral  character  is  a  matter  of  universal  conscious- 
ness. Desiring  and  wishing  are  often,  in  common  parlance, 
used  synonymously,  and  as  such,  a  moral  Character  is  often 
and  with  propriety  attributed  to  each.  But  desire  properly 
speaking,  as  shown  in  a  former  chapter,  is  simply  an  impul- 
sive state  of  the  sensibility,  in  reference  to  certain  objects, 
a  state  necessarily  and  in  itself  destitute  of  all  moral  qual- 
ities. A  wish^  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  desire  perpetuated, 
by  a  concurrence  of  the  will  with  the  desire.  Now  when 
this  desire  is  thus  perpetuated  and  directed  towards  a  re- 
quired or  forbidden  object,  this  complex  state  of  mind  des- 
ignated by  the  phrase,  I  wish,  assumes  a  positive  moral 
character, 

LUSTING. 

Lusting  considered  simply  as  a  state  of  the  mind,  irre- 
spective of  external  actions,  is  the  concurrence  of  the  will 
with  the  impulse  of  desire,  when  directed  towards  a 
forbidden  object.  The  external  act  is  only  this  choice  of 
the  will  acted  out.  The  guilt  of  the  act  rests  in  the  pre- 
vious wish  or  choice. 

COVETOUSNESS. 

This  is  a  concurrence   of  the  will  with  the  impulse  of 


246  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

desire,  when  directed  towards  that  which  belongs  to  an- 
other. As  such  it  is  the  parent  of  crime,  and  consequently 
its  prohibition  is  numbered  among  the  fundamental  prohibi- 
tions of  the  divine  law. 

HOLINESS VIRTUE    AND    VICE. 

At  this  place  I  deem  it  important  to  point  out  the  nature 
of  holiness  and  sin,  virtue  and  vice,  and  those  characteris- 
tics by  which  one  is  distinguished  from  the  other.  Holiness 
and  virtue,  which  are  in  reality  but  different  names  for  the 
same  thing,  consist  in  the  subjection  of  the  will  to  the  dic- 
tates of  conscience,— in  other  words,  to  the  divine  will,  so  that 
all  our  other  powers  and  principles  are  subjected  to  this  one 
principle.  Sin  and  vice,  on  the  other  hand,  consist  in  the 
subjection  of  the  will  to  other  impulses  of  our  nature  in 
opposition  to  conscience  or  the  will  of  God.  A  sinner  is  a 
creature  of  mere  impulse.  The  strongest  feeling,  for  the 
time  being,  controls  him.  A  holy  or  virtuous  being  is  one 
who  subjects  all  the  impulses  of  his  nature  to  the  will  of 
God,  as  apprehended  by  the  conscience.  All  the  forms  of 
virtue  are  expressed  in  the  Bible  by  the  word  love.  The 
opposite  word,  on  the  other  hand,  expresses  all  the  forms 
of  vice  or  sin,  to  wit,  selfishness.  Of  the  nature  of  love,  as 
above  presented,  we  will  inquire  in  subsequent  chapters. 
Attention  is  now  invited  to  a  few  general  remarks  upon 
the  nature  of 

SELFISHNESS. 

Selfishness  as  very  generally  understood,  consists  in  a 
supreme  regard  for  our  own  happiness.  To  say  in  this  sense 
that  all  men  unrenewed  by  the  grace  of  God,  are  supremely 
selfish,  is  contradicted,  for  example,  by  all  the  instances  of 
parental  affection  which  may  be  seen  throughout  the  world. 


COMPLEX    PHENOMENA.  247 

But  the  selfishness  of  such  persons,  in  the  sense  of  the  word 
above  explained,  will  readily  appear  when  the  strong  action 
of  parental  affection  is  met  by  some  principle  of  duty,  in 
the  ready  subjection  of  the  latter  to  the  former.  In  this 
sense,  all  unrenewed  men  are  supremely  selfish.  They  re- 
gard their  own  gratification  above  all  other  considerations. 
In  whatever  direction  the  stronger  impulse  of  the  sensibil- 
ity directs  them,  thither  they  go,  regardless  of  right,  re- 
gardless of  their  own,  or  of  the  general  well  being  of 
others.  We  have  already  considered  two  forms  of  selfish- 
ness ;  to  wit,  lusting  and  coveting.  Attention  is  now  in- 
vited to  a  third. 

HATRED,    WRATH,    MALICE. 

In  a  former  chapter  we  have  seen,  that  whenever  an- 
other individual  is  contemplated  as  exerting  his  power  in 
opposition  to  our  purposes  or  interests,  a  strong  feeling  of 
displeasure,  called  anger,  necessarily  arises  in  our  minds, 
a  feeling  impelling  us  to  prevent  the  injury  by  destroying 
his  power  to  inflict  it.  Now  this  feeling  will  be  temporary 
or  permanent,  just  as  the  opposition  in  question  is  regarded 
as  permanent  or  temporary.  When  the  will  coincides  with 
this  impulse  and  thus  perpetuates  its  existence,  the  complex 
state  of  mind  thus  induced  is  called  hatred.  When  directed 
towards  personal  objects  it  is  the  hatred  forbidden  in  the 
Bible.  Wrath  and  malice  are  hatred,  in  its  more  excited 
forms  ;  the  former  in  what  maybe  called  the  more  tempes- 
tuous, the  latter  in  the  more  deliberate  form. 

GLUTTONY. 

This  has  been  commonly  defined  to  be  excess  in  the  use 
of  food.     Considered  as  a  state  of  mind,  it  is  the  subjection 


248  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

of  the  will  to  the  impulse  of  appetite,  and  that  in  opposition 
not  only  to  the  dictates  of  conscience  but  also  of  self-love. 

LICENTIOUSNESS, 

Considered  in  the  form  of  lust,  consists  in  the  unrestrain- 
ed license  to  sin,  and  in  the  unlimited  concurrence  of  the 
will  with  this  impulse,  whatever  its  direction  may  be.  In 
reference  to  such  persons,  nothing  but  the  absence  of  the 
impulse,  and  of  the  possibility  of  indulgence,  will  prevent 
the  commission  of  adultery  or  fornication.  "  Their  eyes  are 
full  of  adultery,  and  cannot  cease  from  sin." 

AVARICE. 

Consists  in  the  subjection  of  the  will  to  the  love  of 
hoarding  in  reference  to  money  ;  or  to  those  objects  for 
which  money  is  commonly  exchanged. 

REVENGE. 

Revenge  is  sometimes  used  to  designate  the  operation 
of  the  principle  of  justice,  the  operation  in  which  deserved 
retribution  upon  criminals  is  not  only  wished,  but  sought. 
As  such  it  is  attributed  to  God,  and  instead  of  being  wrong, 
it  is  to  be  numbered  among  the  brightest  virtues.  But  re- 
venge, as  prohibited  in  the  Bible,  consists  in  that  kind  of  con- 
currence of  the  will  with  the  spirit  of  anger,  wrath,  and  hatred, 
in  their  forbidden  forms,  which  were  described  above, — 
a  concurrence  in  which  a  gratification  of  this  spirit  is  sought 
by  inflicting  upon  an  individual  or  individuals  an  injury 
corresponding  to  an  injury,  real  or  supposed,  received  from 
them.  I  receive  a  blow  or  an  injury  from  some  individual. 
Instead  of  suppressing  the  feeling  of  displeasure  thus  ex- 
cited, I  yield  to  its  influence  by  seeking  to  inflict  a  corre- 
sponding injury  upon  the  offender.     This  is  revenge.     The 


COMPLEX    PHENOMENA.  249 

ways  in  which  the  infliction  of  the  injury  may  be  sought, 
are  various  ;  as,  directly  through  our  own  instrumentality, 
or  by  imprecating  the  interposition  of  divine  power,  or  by 
endeavoring  to  associate  the  influence  of  others  with  our 
own,  against  the  object  of  our  displeasure.  In  the  last 
sense,  revenge  most  commonly  assumes  the  form  of  slan- 
der, detraction,  defamation,  and  evil  surmisings,  evil  speak- 
ing, etc. 

PRIDE. 

Pride  and  humility  are  defined  by  Dr.  Brown,  as  "  those 
vivid  feelings  of  joy  and  sadness,  which  attend  the  contem- 
plation of  ourselves  when  we  regard  our  superiority  or 
inferiority,  in  any  qualities  of  mind  or  body,  or  in  the  ex- 
ternal circumstances  in  which  we  maybe  placed."  Again: 
"  When  I  define  pride  to  be  that  emotion,  which  attends 
the  contemplation  of  our  excellence,  I  must  be  understood 
as  limiting  the  phrase  to  the  single  emotion  that  immedi- 
ately follows  the  contemplation."  If  this  is  pride,  it  is  cer- 
tainly a  very  innocent  feeling  and  we  may  well  wonder  that 
such  heavy  denunciations  are  made  against  it  in  the  Bible. 
The  command  also,  "Let  the  brother  of  low  degree  rejoice 
in  that  he  is  exalted,"  must  be  considered  as  a  direct  com- 
mand to  be  proud.  Lost  spirits  also,  we  must  infer,  will 
be  very  humble  at  the  resurrection  ;  for  it  is  declared  that 
they  shall  be  filled  with  shame  in  view  of  their  conscious 
degradation,  the  very  essence  of  humility,  as  defined  by 
the  above  named  author.  No  wonder  also,  that  this  writer 
represents  pride  not  as  "  excusable  merely,  but  praise- 
worthy." 

Pride,  as  defined  by  others,  consists  in  inordinate  self- 
esteem.  If  so,  I  reply  it  is  a  mere  blunder,  a  misjudgment. 
Further,  the   consequent  or  the  effect,  has,  in  the  above 


250  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

definition,  evidently  been  mistaken  for  the  cause.  The 
misjudgment  is  evidently  caused  by  pride  pre-existing  in 
the  mind. 

What  then  is  pride  ?  I  answer  :  It  is  the  subjection 
of  the  will  to  the  control  of  the  desire  of  esteem,  or  the 
love  of  power,  or  both  united.  Its  very  essence  consists 
in  choosing,  or  willing  as  the  supreme  good,  our  own  exal- 
tation. "  Thou  shalt  be  as  gods."  Choosing  this  as  the 
great  good,  is  pride,  and  as  such  is  the  essence  and  cause 
of  almost  all  sin.  When  this  end  is  thus  chosen,  the  sub- 
ject may  very  easily  assume  that  he  is  what  he  really 
desires  to  be,  and  hence  pride  and  Inordinate  self-esteem 
are  very  commonly  united.  But  this  is  by  no  means  the 
case  universally.  Pride  is  often  attended  with  conscious 
degradation,  and  thus  as  we  say  is  mortified.  When  an 
individual  judges  himself  to  have  obtained  the  elevation 
desired,  and  the  judgment  is  based  upon  the  possession  of 
things  great  in  themselves,  such  as  wealth,  knowledge,  or 
power,  this  judgment  is  attended  with  a  feeling  of  joyful 
exaltation,  which,  with  the  concurrence  of  the  will  with 
the  feeling  in  question,  induces  the  individual  to  assume 
those  lofty  airs  denominated  haughtiness.  When  the  judg- 
ment in  question  is  based  upon  the  possession  of  trifling 
excellences,  such  as  a  superior  equipage,  a  beautiful  face, 
or  a  graceful  form,  the  concurrence  of  the  will  with  the 
feeling  thus  excited,  constitutes  what  is  called  vanity. 
Again  :  When  an  individual  under  the  influence  of  pride, 
perceives  in  the  possession  of  others  that  which  he  desires 
as  the  means  of  self-exaltation,  or  when  the  possessions  of 
such  individuals  are  regarded  as  a  barrier  to  the  attainment 
of  the  desired  object,  the  concurrence  of  the  will  and  the 
feeling  of  regret  and  hatred  thus  excited  constitute  eiivy. 


COMPLEX    PHENOMENA.  251 

Envy  in  its  turn,  becomes  the  fruitful  cause  of  heart 
burnings,  detraction,  slander,  and  evil  speakings,  and  a 
host  of  other  nameless  crimes,  of  which  pride  is  the  root 
and  fountain. 

EMULATION. 

When  other  individuals  are  seen  to  possess  that  which 
secures  to  them  the  esteem  desired,  pride  induces  its  sub- 
jects to  seek  a  superiority  in  respect  to  the  same  posses- 
sions, as  a  means  to  the  end  desired  or  willed.  In  this  form 
pride  assumes  the  aspect  of  emulation. 

AMBITION. 

Ambition  is  only  one  form  of  pride,  and  differs  from 
emulation  only  in  respect  to  its  objects.  It  consists  in 
willing  not  only  a  superiority  to  others  as  a  means  of  self- 
exaltation,  but  everything  else  which  may  be  regarded  as  a 
means  to  that  end.  Ambition,  when  its  control  becomes 
supreme,  is  perfectly  reckless  of  means.  All  things  are 
lawful  which  contribute  to  the  end  in  view.  As  such  it  is 
not  only  incompatible  with  the  existence  of  virtuous  prin- 
ciples, but  of  virtuous  action,  when  the  individual  becomes 
subject  to  strong  temptation.  No  principle  is  so  dangerous 
in  the  education  of  the  young  as  an  appeal  to  ambition, 
and  the  spirit  of  emulation  in  the  pupil.  •  As  far  as  the 
pupil  yields  to  the  influence  brought  to  bear  upon  him,  the 
formation,  not  merely  of  a  religious,  but  in  the  common 
acceptation  of  the  term,  of  a  virtuous  character,  becomes 
an  absolute  impossibility. 

JEALOUSY. 

Jealousy  is  the  twin  sister  of  envy.  As  envy  induces 
the  subject  to  take  from  others  that  which,  in  our  posses- 


252  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

sion,  will  exalt  us  or,  if  possessed  by  others,  will  prevent 
our  exaltation,  jealousy  leads  one  individual  to  suspect  in 
others  the  same  designs  which  he  is  cherishing  towards 
them.  To  the  envious  mind  all  beings  are  enemies,  either 
as  possessing  that  which  makes  him  wretched,  or  as  design- 
ing to  take  from  him  that  which  he  values  above  all  price. 


BELIGIOUS   PROPENSITIES.  253 


CHAPTER    IX. 
RELIGIOUS    PROPENSITIES. 

In  treating  upon  this  subject,  I  shall  notice  the  various 
religious  affections  in  the  order  in  which,  as  a  general  fact, 
they  are  developed  in  Christian  experience,  and  in  which 
they  are  presented  in  the  Bible.  I  shall  make  no  apology 
for  departing  from  the  common  course  in  making  an  analy- 
sis of  the  religious  affections  a  part  of  a  system  of  mental 
philosophy.  That  they  have  not  constituted  a  part  of  such 
courses  shows,  either  that  those  who  have  most  profoundly 
studied  mind,  have  very  commonly  disregarded  its  moral 
laws,  or  at  least,  that  religion  has  not  had  that  place  in 
philosophy  which  its  importance  demands. 

Before  entering  particularly  upon  a  consideration  of  the 
peculiar  characteristics  of  any  of  the  religious  affections,  I 
will  give  a  brief  recapitulation  of  some  of  the  topics  illus- 
trated in  the  preceding  chapters  as  preparatory  to  their  full 
and  distinct  elucidation. 

Every  phenomenon  of  human  consciousness,  as  we  have 
seen,  belongs  either  to  the  intelligence,  the  sensibility,  or 
the  will.  The  phenomena  of  the  first  two,  bear  the  char- 
acteristics of  necessity,  those  of  the  latter,  that  of  liberty, 
in  opposition  to  necessity.  In  the  will,  and  in  the  will 
only,  is  man  a  subject  of  moral  government, — a  free  ac- 
countable agent.  In  respect  to  none  of  the  phenomena  of 
the  sensibility,  or  of  the  intelligence  is  he  accountable, 
only  so  far  as  their  existence  and   character  depend  upon 


254  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

the  will.  Here  we  are  presented  with  the  great  problem 
in  theology  :  In  what  sense  is  man  accountable  for  his  feel- 
ings and  the  convictions  or  judgments  of  his  intellect  ?  In 
other  words,  in  what  sense  do  they  depend  upon  the  will  ? 

In  regard  to  such  an  inquiry  we  may  remark  in  general, 
that  when  we  are  brought  into  such  relations  to  truth  in 
any  form,  that  honest  integrity  on  our  part,  will  induce  a 
knowledge  and  belief  of  said  truth,  then  ignorance  and 
disbelief  are  both  criminal.  So  when  any  feelings  tending 
to  moral  wrong  are  voluntarily  entertained,  so  that  they 
take  on  the  form  of  wishing  relatively  to  their  objects,  then 
our  criminality  is  the  same  in  kind  as  when  the  prohibited  act 
is  performed.  When  any  feelings  prompt  to  moral  wrong, 
and  these  are  promptly  suppressed  and  held  in  subjection, 
there  is,  not  criminality,  but  moral  virtue. 

Into  all  the  religious  affections,  I  remark,  in  the  next 
place,  each  one  of  the  mental  faculties,  the  intellect,  sensi- 
bility, and  will,  enters  and  exercises  its  proper  functions. 
These  functions  will  be  designated  in  the  following  eluci- 
dation. The  religious  affections  will  also  be  treated  as 
simple  states  of  consciousness,  without  reference  to  their 
origin  or  cause.  Whether  they  are,  like  other  states,  the 
pure  results  of  truth,  or  whether  they  are  the  results  of  a 
supernatural,  divine  agency,  pertains  to  the  science  of  Bib- 
lical theology,  and  not  to  mental  science.  Having 
made  these  remarks  we  commence  our  elucidation  with  the 
subject  of 

REPENTANCE. 

In  every  mind,  there  is  an  immutable  conviction  of 
actual  violations  of  the  law  of  duty,  that  is  of  sin.  A 
benighted  heathen,  when  asked  the  question,  "  Are  you 
not  a  sinner  ?  "  replied:    "  Do  you  suppose  that  I  am  such 


RELIGIOUS    PROPENSITIES.  255 

a  fool  as  not  to  know  that  ?"  The  sentiment  expressed  by 
the  words,  "  I  am  a  sinner,"  constitutes  the  common  con- 
viction of  the  race.  Here  is  the  part  which  the  intellect 
takes  in  this  exercise.  While  this  conviction  exists  in  the 
mind,  as  it  universally  does,  it  may  be  voluntarily  enter- 
tained, with  a  view  of  all  the  consequences  it  involves, 
and  all  the  duties  it  imposes;  or  it  may  be  resisted,  and  as 
far  as  may  be,  neglected  or  suppressed.  The  mind  may, 
also,  voluntarily  entertain  the  conviction,  that  for  sin  it  has 
no  excuse  ;  it  may  sincerely  confess,  condemn  and  repro- 
bate its  inexcusable  criminality  and  ill-desert,  and  as  sin- 
cerely abandon  all  forms  of  wrong  doing,  and  yield  up  all 
its  powers  with  the  full  and  sincere  intent  to  conform  to 
all  the  demands  of  the  law  of  duty  in  all  future  time  ;  or 
it  may  assume  the  attitude  of  self-justification,  hide,  instead 
of  confess,  its  criminality,  and  hold  on  in  the  way  of  trans- 
gression. Here  we  are  presented  with  the  voluntary  ele- 
ments which  characterize  impenitence^  on  the  one  hand, 
and  real  repentance,  on  the  other.  In  the  latter  state, 
there  is,  first  of  all,  a  voluntary  entertainment  and  admis- 
sion of  \\\Qfact  and  inexcusableness  of  personal  sinfulness, 
with  all  the  consequences  and  duties  which  that  fact 
involves, — voluntarily  confessing,  condemning,  and  repro- 
bating this  fact,  and  that  before  and  to  all  concerned,  the 
mind  then  abandons  and  rejects  sin  in  all  its  forms,  and 
with  sincere  "  purpose  of  heart,"  adopts  the  law  of  duty  as 
the  immutable  rule  of  its  future  activity.  This,  I  repeat, 
is  repentance,  contemplated  as  a  voluntary  mental  state. 
These  convictions,  purposes,  and  acts,  are  attended,  of  ne- 
cessity, with  certain  emotive  states,  feelings  of  deep  sorrow, 
regret,  hatred  of  wrong,  and  desires  for  entire  moral  purity 
and   obedience  to  the  will  of  God  and  the  law  of  duty, — 


256  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

emotive  states  denominated  in  the  Scriptures  "godly  sorrow," 
on  the  one  hand,  and  "  hungering  and  thirsting  after  right- 
eousness," on  the  other.  Such  is  that  complex  mental 
state  represented  by  the  word,  repentance. 

FAITH. 

In  universal  mind,  these  convictions,  among  others,  have 
a  prominent  place, — that  God  is  infinite  and  we  are  finite, 
— that  God  is  independent  and  that  we  sustain  to  him  the 
relations  of  absolute  and  universal  dependence, — that  God 
is  merciful  and  we  are  sinners, — that  God,  as  our  creator 
and  preserver,  is  our  lawgiver  and  judge,  and  that  we  as 
his  creatures,  are  bound  to  make  his  will  the  absolute  law 
of  all  our  activity; — that  while  our  necessities  are  infinite, 
there  is  in  God  a  perfect  and  available  fullness  to  meet 
them  all,  and  that  relatively  to  all  our  real  interests,  God, 
to  meet  them,  is  absolutely  trustworthy.  When  the  mind 
distinctly  and  voluntarily  recognizes  the  validity  of  these 
convictions,  and  by  a  sealing  act  of  moral  election,  intrusts 
its  mortal  and  immortal  interests  to  the  divine  care  and 
keeping,  accepting  and  trusting  the  will  of  God  as  the  law 
of  its  activity,  it  then  puts  forth  that  mental  exercise  de- 
nominated faith, — faith  the  fundamental  element  of  which 
is  trust,  —  confidence  voluntarily  reposed  in  ascertained 
trustworthiness.  Faith  in  God  is  trusting  him  universally 
and  absolutely,  and  obeying  him  implicitly  under  the  con- 
viction of  his  universal  and  absolute  trustworthiness. 
Faith  is  not  trusting,  in  the  absence  of  valid  reasons,  but 
confidence  reposed  in  the  presence  of  valid  reasons  for  its 
exercise.  In  other  words,  faith  in  God  is  absolute  respect 
for  absolute  trustworthiness.  Unbelief,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  the  absence  of  this  respect;  it  is  disbelief,  or  voluntarj^  dis- 


RELIGIOUS    PROPENSITIES.  257 

sent,  entertained  and  cherished  in  the  presence  of  reasons 
of  infinite  weight  for  assent;  it  is  respect  withheld  from 
known  trustworthiness. 

The  view  of  faith  above  given  obviously  corresponds 
with  the  teachings  of  inspiration  upon  the  subject.  In  the 
Old  Testament,  it  is  represented  by  such  words  and  phrases 
as  "staying  the  mind  on  God,"  "trusting  in  him,"  "plac- 
ing our  hope  and  confidence  in  God,"  and  "  committing 
our  spirits  to  His  hands,"  all  implying,  as  its  fundamental 
characteristic,  trust  voluntarily  exercised  towards  God,  on 
the  ground  of  his  known  trustworthiness. 

A  few  words  may  be  necessary  to  explain  the  nature  of 
that  form  of  faith  which  respects  Christ,  as  its  special  and 
specific  object.  The  revealed  mission  of  Christ  is  to  save 
lost  men  from  their  sins.  Faitli  in  him  in  this  relation  has 
its  basis  in  the  conviction  of  personal  sinfulness,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  of  the  absolute  trustioorthiness  of  Christ,  to 
save  from  their  sins  all  who  put  their  trust  in  him  for  such 
salvation  on  the  other;  and  consists,  in  its  essential  nature, 
in  trust  voluntarily  reposed  in  him  for  this  one  end,  salva- 
tion from  sin.  This  act  of  trust  is  also  attended  with  a 
voluntary  surrender  of  all  our  powers  and  interests  to  his 
control.  This  is  what  is  meant  by  the  words,  believing  in 
Christy  as  they  are  employed  in  the  New  Testament.  So 
the  apostle  Paul  expressly  teaches.  "  I  know,"  he  says, 
"  whom  I  have  believed,  and  am  persuaded  that  he  is  able 
(trustworthy)  to  keep  that  which  I  have  committed  (volun- 
tarily intrusted)  unto  him  against  that  day." 

The  emotive  states   attending   the   exercise  of  faith  al- 
ways correspond  to  the    nature  of  the  truth    apprehended, 
and  the  attitude  in  which  it  is  contemplated  at  the  moment, 
emotive  states  represented  by  such   terms  and   phrases  as 
17 


258  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

"  quietness  and  assurance,"  peace  with  God,  "  joy  in  God," 
"  joy  unspeakable  and  full  of  glory." 

Into  the  exercise  of  faith  every  power  and  susceptibility 
of  the  mind  enters  and  bears  its  appropriate  part.  Some 
truth  is  apprehended  by  the  intellect.  The  effect  upon  the 
sensibility,  or  the  feelings  excited  are  in  accordance  with 
the  nature  of  the  object  of  contemplation,  while  the  deter- 
minations of  the  will  correspond  with  the  feelings  of  the 
heart  and  the  convictions  of  the  intelligence. 

LOVE. 

To  bring  this  subject  distinctly  before  the  mind,  it  may 
be  well  to  cite  a  few  passages  of  Scripture  in  which  it  is 
contained.  For  example  :  "  On  these  two  commandments 
hang  all  the  law  and  the  prophets,"  "  Love  is  the  fulfilling 
of  the  law."  "  All  the  law  is  fulfilled  in  one  word, 
love." 

From  these,  and  other  passages  of  a  similar  nature,  we 
learn,  that  love  constitutes  the  essential  element  of  every 
state  of  mind  that  is  morally  virtuous.  The  precept  requir- 
ing love  embraces  every  precept  of  the  moral  law,  and  con- 
stitutes the  only  element  which  renders  obedience  to  that 
law  virtuous. 

Our  first  inquiry  is,  What  is  the  fundamental  element 
of  love, — that  element  particularly  and  primarily  referred 
to  in  the  command  requiring  it  ? 

That  form  of  love  which  is  the  fulfilling  of  the  law  can- 
not, of  course,  be  found  in  any  mere  convictions  of  the  in- 
telligence. These,  fallen  spirits  possess  in  common  with 
the  pure  and  holy.  Nor  can  it  be  found  in  any  mere  e^no- 
tive  states.  If  such  states  did  possess,  in  themselves,  moral 
character,  which,  as   we   have   seen,  is  not   a  fact,  they  do 


JiELIGlOUS    PROPENSITIES.  269 

not,  undeniably  include   all  duty   to   God  and  man,  which 
they  would,  if  all  the  law  is  fulfilled  in  them. 

That  form  of  love  in  which  "  all  the  law  is  fulfilled,"  is 
attended  with  corresponding  intellectual  and  emotive  states, 
but  is  not  found  in  these.  Where  then,  shall  we  find  it  ? 
In  voluntary  states  exclusively.  When  all  voluntary  states 
and  exercises  of  the  mind  fully  accord  with  the  require- 
ments of  the  law  of  duty,  in  all  their  forms, — duty  to  God, 
to  man,  and  all  sentient  existences,  then  the  whole  law  is 
fulfilled.  In  the  Scriptures,  love  and  obedience  are  affirmed 
to  be  identical.  "  He,"  says  Christ,  "  that  hath  my  com- 
mandments, and  Tceepeth  them,  he  it  is  that  loveth  me." 
"  This,"  we  are  told,  "  is  the  love  of  God,  that  we  keep  his 
commandments."  Doing  righteousness,  we  are  also  told, 
constitutes  us  righteous  beings.  When  the  will,  is  rightly 
adjusted  towards  God  and  all  sentient  existences  who  have 
claims  upon  us,  then  we  have  fulfilled  the  law.  The  Scrip- 
tures, science,  and  the  intuitive  convictions  of  the  race, 
unite  in  affirming  the  validity  of  this  view  of  the  subject. 
An  important  inquiry  here  arises  ;  to  wit,  what  are  the  feel- 
ings by  which  those  acts  of  the  will  called  love  are  accom- 
panied ?  To  this  question,  the  following  general  answer 
may  be  given.  The  emotions  accompanying  the  exercise 
of  love  will  always  correspond  to  the  nature  of  the  beloved 
object,  and  the  particular  attitude  in  which  it  is  contem- 
plated. 

1.  The  object  may  be  contemplated  as  possessed  of  high 
moral  excellence.  It  is  then  chosen  as  an  object  of  endear- 
ing contemplation,  association,  and  imitation.  The  conse- 
quent effect  upon  the  sensibility  will  be  the  excitement  of 
intense  emotions  of  attachment  and  delight. 

2.  This  excellence  may  be  contemplated   as   associated 


260  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

with  high  natural  and  intellectual  characteristics  ;  such  as, 
wisdom,  knowledge,  and  power.  There  is  then  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  love,  a  voluntary  surrender  of  ourselves  to  the 
control  of  a  being  superior  to  ourselves  ;  while  the  feelings 
excited  are  those  of  esteem,  veneration,  awe,  and  adoration. 

3.  The  beloved  object  may  be  contemplated  as  regard- 
ing us  with  approbation  and  favor,  or  as  sustaining  to  us 
the  relation  of  a  benefactor.  We  then  experience  emotions 
of  high  gratification  and  delight,  and  the  feeling  denomin- 
ated gratitude. 

4.  We  may  contemplate  the  object  loved  as  being  hon- 
ored or  dishonored  by  others.  Feelings  of  intense  delight 
and  gratification  are  experienced  in  the  former  case,  and  of 
regret,  indignation,  and  zeal  for  his  injured  honor  in  the 
other. 

5.  We  may  contemplate  ourselves  as  having  offended 
the  object  of  our  affection.  Love  then  assumes  the  aspect 
of  sorrow,  penitence,  and  contrition. 

6.  The  object  under  consideration  maybe  contemplated 
as  in  a  state  of  suffering  and  affliction.  Love  then  assumes 
the  attitude  of  sympathy  or  pity. 

7.  Finally,  we  may  contemplate  the  object  beloved  as 
guilty  of  crime.  We  then  desire,  and  consequently  will,  his 
return  to  virtue,  which  state  of  mind  is  accompanied  with 
feelings  of  deep  and  intense  sorrow  and  regret. 

The  effect  of  a  consciousness  of  the  exercise  of  this 
virtue  will  be  internal  peace,  and  confidence  in  the  appro- 
bation and  favor  of  all  virtuous  beings. 

CHRISTIAN   WARFARE    AND    VICTORY,    AND    SELF-DENIAL. 

In  the  varied   circumstances  of  life,  events  occur,  and 


RELIGIOUS    PROPENSITIES.  261 

conditions  of  existence  arise,  in  which  our  emotive  and  sen- 
sitive states  induce  desires  impelling  the  will  in  the  direc- 
tion of  prohibited  gratifications.  When  all  such  impulsions 
are  resisted,  subdued,  and  held  in  subjection  to  the  will  of 
God  and  the  behests  of  conscience,  then  that  form  of  Chris- 
tian virtue  is  exercised,  denominated  imtience.  The  mental 
conflict  with  evil  principles  within,  and  temptations  to 
wrong  from  without,  which  attend  the  exercise  of  this  vir- 
tue, is  called  the  Christian  warfare^  or  "  the  fight  of  faith," 
while  its  conquest  over  the  propensities  to  evil  is  denom- 
inated, "  the  victory  that  overcomes  theioorld.''''  The  act  of 
obedience  by  which  all  the  propensities  are  held  in  subjec- 
tion to  the  will  of  God,  and  the  law  of  duty,  by  which 
present  gratifications  strongly  desired  are  refused,  present 
sacrifices  are  voluntarily  made  and  present  evils  are  endured, 
to  secure  the  higher  ends  of  benevolence,  and  maintain 
subjection  to  the  behests  of  conscience,  is  called  Christia7i 
self-denial. 

HUMILITY. 

Among  the  most  prominent  of  all  the  varied  forms  of 
Christian  virtue,  is  that  represented  by  the  term  humility^  a 
term  commonly  employed  to  represent  that  lowliness  of 
mind,  deep  sense  of  personal  un  worthiness,  self  abasement, 
penitence,  quietude  of  spirit,  and  submission  to  the  divine 
will,  which  always  attend  genuine  conversion.  This  virtue 
does  not  consist,  as  some  appear  to  suppose,  in  entertaining 
the  sentiment  that  we  are  greater  sinners  than  others;  that 
we  possess,  as  Christians,  no  real  virtues,  or  that  we  are 
really  worse  than  we  actually  are.  While  the  Scriptures, 
and  reason  too,  prohibit  our  forming  too  high  an  estimate 
of  ourselves, — "  thinking  of  ourselves  more  highly  than  we 
ought  to  think,"  they  do  absolutely  require  that  we  form 


262  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

just  and  true  estimates  of  our  real  and  relative  merits  and 
demerits,  excellences  and  defects  ;  in  short,  that  we  know 
ourselves  as  we  are,  and  not  as  we  are  not,  that  we  "  think 
soberly^  according  as  God  hath  dealt  to  every  man  the 
measure  of  faith."  When  the  mind  attains  to  this  real  self- 
knowledge,  humility  consists  in  a  full  and  cordial  assent  on 
its  part,  to  be  known  and  esteemed  by  the  Judge  of  all,  by 
ourselves,  and  all  intelligences,  in  perfect  accordance  with 
its  real  and  relative  deserts  ;  and  that  all  others,  those 
superior  to  ourselves  especially,  shall  occupy  similar  posi- 
tions in  universal  regard. 

THE    FILIAL    SPIRIT. 

In  the  Scriptures  we  are  taught,  that  it  is  an  immutable 
condition  of  admission  to  the  kingdom  of  heaven,  that  men 
"  be  converted,  and  become  as  little  children."  Much  is  said 
also  of  the  spirit  of  adoption^  the  filial  spirit,  with  which  all 
that  are  truly  "  born  of  God,"  become  imbued.  What  is 
this  spirit  ?     What  are  its  essential  characteristics  ? 

Inspiration,  I  remark  in  reply,  reveals  Jehovah,  not  only 
as  the  Creator,  Preserver,  Governor,  and  Judge  of  all,  but 
as  sustaining  the  most  intimate  and  endearing  jt>are?z^a/  re- 
lations to  all  the  pure  in  heart.  He  is  revealed  as  their 
Father,  and  Friend,  "  their  shield  and  exceeding  great  re- 
ward," as  entertaining  the  tenderest  sympathy  with  them 
in  all  their  joys  and  sorrows,  pleasures  and  pains,  cares  and 
perplexities,  as  being  ever  present  with  them  as  their 
teacher  and  guide,  and  the  affectionate  guardian  of  all  their 
interests,  and  as  a  propitious  hearer  of  prayer,  opening  up- 
on their  minds,  by  his  own  Spirit,  visions  of  his  glory  and 
love,  and  bringing  them   into   direct  fellowship  and  inter- 


RELIGIOUS    PROPENSITIES.  263 

communion  "  with  the  Father  and  with  his  son  Jesus 
Christ." 

Now  when  the  fatherhood  of  God  in  all  the  endearing 
relations  above  referred  to,  is  distinctly  recognized  by  the 
mind,  when  the  exercise  of  the  varied  forms  of  trust,  con- 
fidence, prayer,  fellowship,  and  intercommunion  with  God, 
become  habitual  in  its  experience  ;  and  when  it,  as  habitu- 
ally "  casts  all  its  cares  upon  Him,"  with  the  deep  assurance 
that  "in  all  our  afflictions  He  is  afflicted  ;  "  when  the  prom- 
ised divine  teachino^  and  illumination  are  sought  and 
enjoyed,  and  every  indication  of  the  divine  will  is  cordially 
met  and  acquiesced  in,  then  the  mind  is  in  the  exercise  of  the 
spirit  of  adoption,  the  filial  spirit,  under  consideration. 
When,  on  the  other  hand,  the  habitual  dwelling  place  of 
the  mind  is  under  the  shadow  of  the  sterner  attributes  of 
God,  —  his  justice,  unapproachable  purity,  all-searching 
scrutiny,  and  eternal  judge-ship,  then  it  is  subject  to  "the 
spirit  of  fear  which  gendereth  to  bondage."  When,  finally, 
all  the  divine  perfections,  in  their  true  relations,  the  mild 
and  the  stern,  the  sweetly  attractive  and  awe  inspiring,  are 
habitually  before  the  mind,  then  it  naturally  exercises  the 
filial  affection  and  confidence,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
"  Godly  fear,"  on  the  other,  which  constitute  the  highest 
possible  perfection  of  Christian  character. 

The  eynotive  states  which  attend  the  exercise  of  the 
filial  spirit  of  Christianity,  are  such  as  these;  deep  delight 
and  joy  in  God,  assurance  of  hope,  universal  satisfaction 
with  providence,  filial  gratitude  for  favors  received,  and 
quiet  acquiescence  when  they  are  withheld,  and  when  afflic- 
tions cast  their  shadows  over  the  mind  ;  all  together  con- 
stituting a  repose  of  spirit,   and    fullness    of    blessedness, 


264  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

which  make  the  nearest  possible  approach  to  "  the  rest  that 
remains  for  the  people  of  God." 

A    SPIRIT    OF    FORGIVENESS. 

When  an  injury  is  forgiven,  the  offender  is  treated  with 
the  same  kindness  as  if  he  had  never  offended  us.  Here 
we  find  the  fundamental  element  of  love,  which  for  the 
interest  taken  in  the  well-being  of  another,  consents  to 
treat  the  offender  as  innocent.  The  condition  required  of 
the  offender,  is  repentance.  Without  this,  forgiveness, 
properly  speaking,  is  an  impossibility,  or  if  possible,  a  sin. 
The  case  of  an  offender  who  continues  incorrigible,  comes 
under  another  duty  which  we  shall  shortly  consider. 

FORBEARANCE. 

This  consists  in  holding  back  from  the  offender  the  exe- 
cution of  deserved  vengeance  for  the  purpose  of  bringing 
him  into  that  state  in  which  he  can  be  forgiven.  Its  lan- 
guage towards  the  offender  is  this  :  With  your  present 
character,  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  regard  and  conse- 
quently treat  ^ou  as  a  virtuous  man.  My  desire  however 
is,  that  by  repentance,  humility,  and  forgiveness  sought, 
you  may  show  such  a  regard  to  rectitude  that  I  may  treat 
you  as  virtuous;  when  this  is  done,  you  will  be  to  me  as  if 
no  offense  had  ever  been  received.  Such  is  the  forbearance 
of  God.  "  The  goodness,  (or  forbearance)  of  God  leadeth 
thee  to  repentance." 

CONDESCENSION. 

This  virtue  is  benevolence  or  love  exercised  towards 
persons  occupying  stations  beneath  us,  and  con^sts  in 
descending  to  a  level  with  them  ;  and,  in  this  sense  con- 
forming   ourselves    to    their    capacities,   cultivating    their 


RELIGIOUS    PROPENSITIES.  305 

friendship  and  their  society  for  the  purpose  of  elevating 
them  in  the  scale  of  being  and  worth  to  a  level  with  our- 
selves. It  stands  opposed  to  pride  in  this  sense  :  pride 
places  itself  upon  the  apex  of  the  pyramid,  choosing  that 
others,  whatever  their  worth  may  be,  may  occupy  places  at 
a  respectful  distance  below.  Condescension  descends  to 
the  base,  for  the  purpose  of  helping  others  up  to  the  wide 
prospects  we  ourselves  enjoy.  The  following  truths  pre- 
sent this  virtue  to  the  mind  of  the  Christian,  as  a  duty  and 
privilege. 

1.  The  essential  equality  of  men. 

2.  Hence  the  desire  that  they  may  possess  those  privi- 
leges, the  want  of  which  in  their  case,  and  the  possession 
of  which  in  ours,  has  made  the  difference  between  them 
and  ourselves. 

3.  The  fact  that  we  are  what  we  are  in  consequence  of 
the  infinite  condescension  of  God. 

4.  The  universal  example  of  God. 

MEEKNESS 

Has  reference  to  the  manner  in  which  forbearance,  conde- 
scension, etc.,  are  exercised  ;  to  the  kind,  mellow,  and 
gentle  spirit  with  which  injuries  are  endured,  and  the 
repentance  of  the  offender  sought  and  a  "soft  answer" 
returned  to  his  abuses. 

THE    STERNER    CHRISTIAN    AFFECTIONS. 

Christian  character  is  a  reflex  of  "  the  image  and  glory 
of  God, — the  finite  receiving  and  reflecting  the  infinite  ; 
hence  this  form  of  character,  like  its  divine  original,  has  in 
it  the  mild  and  the  stern,  the  tender  and  the  severe;  mercy 
and  justice,  delight  in   goodness   and   reprobation  of  evil, 


266  THE    SENSIBILITIES. 

all  blended  in  harmonious  unity.  Individuals  who  suppose, 
that  Christian  character  in  its  perfected  forms,  is  made  up 
of  that  kind  of  good  nature  which  contemplates  with  an 
equally  immovable  complacency  the  just  and  the  vile,  truth 
and  falsehood,  the  oppressor  and  the  oppressed,  are  funda- 
mentally mistaken.  The  throne  of  God  and  the  Lamb,  is 
encircled  with  the  mild  radiance  of  the  bow  of  peace  and 
promise.  Within  the  circle  of  that  bow,  however,  "  there 
are  thunderings,  and  voices,  and  earthquakes,  and  great 
hail."  While  God  is  revealed  as  "merciful,  and  gracious, 
long  suffering,  and  slow  to  anger,"  he  is  also  revealed  as 
"  angry  with  the  wicked  every  day."  Christian  character, 
in  its  perfected  forms,  is  in  full  correspondence  with  its 
divine  original. 


PAUT    III. 


THE  WILL. 


EXPLANATIONS. 

The  will  has  already  been  defined,  as  that  faculty  of  the- 
mind  to  which  all  mental  determinations  are  to  be  referred^ 
— determinations  such  as  i7itentions^  purposes^  resolutions^ 
volitions^  and  choices.  No  additional  considerations  need 
be  presented  to  prove,  that  this  faculty  stands  at  an  equal 
remove  from  the  intelligence,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  sen- 
sibility, on  the  other.  No  philosopher  of  any  distinction 
noio  questions  the  threefold  division  of  the  mental  faculties, 
adopted  in  this  treatise.  While  the  will  is  to  be  regarded 
as  a  separate^  it  is,  by  no  means,  to  be  considered  as  an  in- 
dependent^ faculty.  All  its  acts  of  every  kind,  are  put  forth 
in  view  of  some  object  or  end  apprehended  by  the  intelli- 
gence, and  in  connection  with  some  movement  of  the  sen- 
sibility. Each  of  these  faculties,  also,  is  influenced  by  the 
action  of  each  of  the  others.  Each,  however,  has  its  own 
peculiar  sphere,  and  in  that  sphere,  is  governed  by  laws 
equally  special  and  peculiar. 

POINTS    OF    AGREEMENT  AND  DISAGREEMENT    AMONG  PHILOS- 
OPHERS. 

There  are  certain  questions  in  the  department  of  mental 
science,  in  which  all  philosophers  of  any  note  now  agree. 
They  generally  agree,  as  stated  above,  in  the  validity  of  the 

^267) 


^68  THE    WILL. 

threefold  division  of  the  mental  faculties  presented  in  this 
treatise,  the  intellect,  sensibility,  and  will.  They  also  per- 
fectly harmonize  in  the  doctrine,  that  the  two  faculties  first 
named,  are,  in  fact,  governed,  in  all  their  activities,  by  one 
fixed  and  immutable  law,  that  of  necessity.  They  differ, 
some  of  them  fundamentally,  in  regard  to  the  question, 
whether  the  will  is  also  subject  to  this  law,  or  to  that  of 
liberty  as  opposed  to  necessity.  This  is  one  of  the  leading 
issues  in  the  sphere  of  mental  science.  What  I  now  pro- 
pose to  do,  is  to  enable  the  inquirer  after  truth  to  settle 
this  issue  satisfactorily  to  himself. 

THE   TERMS    LIBERTY    AND    NECESSITY    DEFINED. 

To  accomplish  this  object,  we  must,  first  of  all,  most 
clearly  and  specifically  define  the  two  apposite  ideas  repre- 
sented by  the  terms  liberty  and  necessity,  when  they  stand 
opposed,  the  one  to  the  other.  The  term  liberty  is  sometimes 
used  in  opposition  to  the  term  servitude.  The  idea  which 
it  then  represents  is  wholly  diverse  from  that  which  it 
represents  when  it  stands  opposed  to  the  term  necessity. 
What  are  the  distinct  and  opposite  ideas  represented  by 
these  terms,  when  they  stand  opposed  the  one  to  the 
other  ? 

These  terms,  T  answer,  when  thus  opposed  to  each  other, 
represent  two  distinct  and  opposite  relations  which  may  be 
supposed  to  exist  between  a  given  antecedent  and  its  con- 
sequent. The  first  relation  is  this  :  the  antecedent  being 
given,  but  one  consequent  can  arise,  and  that  must  arise. 
This  is  the  exclusive  relation  represented  by  the  term, 
necessity.  The  second  relation  referred  to  is  this  :  the  an- 
tecedent being  given,  and  in  connection  with  the  same 
identical   antecedent,  either  of  two   or  more  consequences 


THE    WILL.  269 

may  arise,  and  neither,  in  distinction  from  the  other  must 
arise.  It  is  self-evident,  that  every  antecedent  and  its  con- 
sequent must  fall  under  one  or  the  other  of  these  relations. 
All  acts  of  will  are,  as  we  have  seen,  preceded  by  certain 
intellectual,  and  sensitive,  and  emotive  states,  tending  to 
influence  its  determinations.  These  states  (motives)  are 
the  antecedents  to  said  acts,  and  the  acts  are  the  conse- 
quents. All  such  acts, — the  consequents, — must  sustain  to 
the  states  or  motives  referred  to, — the  antecedents, — the 
relation  of  liberty  or  necessity,  as  these  terms  have  been 
above  defined.  If  a  given  act  is  free  or  necessary,  it  is> 
and  must  be,  absolutely  so. 

A    FREE    AND    NECESSARY    AGENT    DEFINED. 

Man,  then,  is  a  free  agent,  if,  in  the  identical  circum- 
stances in  which  he  does  put  forth  given  acts  of  will,  he 
might  put  forth  different  and  opposite  acts  from  those  which 
he  does  put  forth.  He  is  a  necessary  agent,  if  in  the  iden- 
tical circumstances  in  which  he  does  put  forth  given  acts  of 
choice,  he  could  not  put  forth  different  and  opposite  ones. 
The  same  holds  absolutely  true  of  all  other  agents,  and  this 
is  the  fixed  and  immutable  definition  of  a  free  agent,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  of  a  necessary  agent,  on  the  other.  So  far, 
then,  as  free  agency  is  to  be  affirmed  of  any  being,  neces- 
sary agency  is  to  be  absolutely  de^iied  of  him,  and  vice 
versa.     Is  man,  then,  a  free  or  necessary  agent  ? 

HOW   THIS    QUESTION    MUST    BE    ANSWERED. 

There  are  but  two  sources  of  ultimate  appeal  in  answer- 
ing such  a  question, — the  affirmations  of  our  own  interior 
consciousness, — and  the  testimony  of  the  author  of  mind,, 
testimony  given  in  his  own  word;  and  these  sources  of  ap- 


270  THE    WILL. 

peal  originating  as  they  do  from  the  same  infallible  author, 
must  be  in  harmony,  as  far  as  they  relate  to  the  same  facts. 
In  a  former  part  of  this  treatise,  we  have  seen,  that  in  all 
positive  mental  states,  we  have  an  absolute  consciousness, 
not  only  of  the  states  themselves,  but  also  of  ourselves,  as 
the  subjects  of  them.  Now  if,  in  this  state  of  consciousness, 
we  do,  or  do  not,  have  absolute  knowledge  of  the  actual 
relations  of  ourselves  to  the  states  referred  to,  we  either 
can,  or  cannot,  by  any  appeal  to  consciousness,  determine 
the  question,  whether  we  are  free,  or  necessary  agents.  If, 
also,  the  Scriptures,  by  express  teaching,  or  undeniable  im- 
plication, do  or  do  not  affirm  one  or  the  other  of  these  hy- 
potheses, in  opposition  to  the  other,  to  be  true,  then  we 
either  can  or  cannot,  by  such  an  appeal,  determine  where 
the  truth  lies.  If  both  these  sources  of  appeal,  should 
affirm  the  truth  of  either,  and  deny  that  of  the  other,  then, 
we  have  absolute  joroo/"  of  the  one  thus  affirmed.  Let  us 
now  turn  our  thoughts  to  each  source  of  proof  in  succes- 
sion, and  see  if  we  can,  or  cannot,  find  the  truth  after  which 
we  are  inquiring. 

TESTIMONY   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Let  us  suppose  ourselves  in  the  presence  of  some  object 
of  choice,  an  object  in  respect  to  which  one  of  two  or  more 
distinct  and  opposite  determinations  must  be  put  forth. 
What  is  the  state  of  our  consciousness  in  regard  to  these 
diverse  determinations  ?  But  one  answer  can,  in  truth,  be 
given  to  this  question.  We  are  just  as  conscious  of  abso- 
lute power  to  put  forth  either,  in  distinction  from  the  other, 
as  we  are  that  we  exist  at  all.  When  we  put  forth  one 
determination,  we  do  it  with  the  absolute  consciousness 
that  we  might,  in  the  same  circumstances,  have  put  forth 


THE    WILL.  271 

either  of  the  others.  When  in  subsequent  times,  we  re- 
member that  act  of  choice,  that  remembrance  is  always 
accompanied  with  the  consciousness  equally  absolute,  that 
we  might  have  put  forth  different  acts  of  choice  from  what 
we  did  originate.  This  absolute  consciousness  of  absolute 
free  agency  accompanies  all  our  acts  of  choice.  The  con- 
clusion is  undeniable.  We  are  free,  and  not  necessary, 
agents,  or  the  universal  consciousness  is  an  absolute  lie. 
Whatever  our  theory  in  regard  to  the  doctrine  of  the  will 
may  be,  this  is  the  absolute  testimony  upon  the  subject 
which  we  all  receive  in  the  interior  of  our  own  conscious- 
ness. To  deny  the  validity  of  the  testimony  which  we 
here  receive,  is,  in  fact,  to  impeach  the  integrity  of  the 
Author  of  the  power  of  consciousness  itself. 

We  all  have  the  consciousness,  also,  that  we  are  not 
only  free.,  but  moral  agents.  When  the  right  and  the 
wrong  are  before  us,  as  objects  of  choice,  we  recognize  our 
obligations  as  absolute  to  choose  the  one,  and  eschew  the 
other.  When  the  act  of  choice  has  been  put  forth,  we 
approve  or  condemn  the  act,  and  affirm  ourselves  as  deserv- 
ing of  good  or  ill,  in  absolute  accordance  with  the  relations 
of  our  acts  of  choice  to  the  law  of  duty. 

Upon  one  immutable  condition  can  we  affirm  our  per- 
sonal responsibility  for  acts  of  choice;  to  wit,  that  we  are 
in  facty^'ee  and  not  necessary  agents.  An  individual,  we 
will  suppose  is,  hy  no  fault  of  his,  but  by  the  will  of  Provi- 
dence, placed  in  circumstances  in  which  none  but  a  prohib- 
ited act  of  choice  is  possible  to  him,  and  that  act  he  must 
put  forth.  We  can  no  more  conceive  him  to  be  blamewor- 
thy for  any  such  act,  than  we  can  conceive  of  the  annihila- 
tion of  space;  and  God  himself,  has  thus  constituted  our 
intelligence.     The  immutable  characteristic  of  all  so  called 


272  THE    WILL. 

wrong  acts,  rests  upon  the  supposition,  that  we  are  free 
agents.  God  himself,  in  the  fundamental  laws  and  consti- 
tution of  the  universal  consciousness  and  general  intelli- 
gence, has  thus  made  Himself  responsible  for  the  validity 
of  the  doctrine  of  the  free  agency  of  man. 

EVIDENCE   FROM    INSPIRATION. 

The  Scriptures  give  us  no  direct  and  immediate  revela- 
tions pertaining  to  the  science  of  mind.  Man  stands  therein 
revealed,  and  known  as  the  subject  of  moral  government^ 
and  by  consequence,  as  possessed  of  all  the  powers  of  moral 
agency.  He  is  everywhere  addressed  by  commands  and 
prohibitions,  requiring  him,  under  sanctions  of  infinite 
weight,  to  reject  the  evil  and  choose  the  good.  For  wrong 
doing  under  all  circumstances,  he  is  affirmed  to  be  wholly 
without  excuse. 

All  such  teachings  undeniably  imply  in  man  absolute 
free  agency,  the  power,  when  he  does  right  or  wrong  to 
choose  the  opposite.  On  no  other  conditions  is  it  even 
conceivable,  as  we  have  seen,  that  he  should  be  responsible 
for  his  acts  of  choice.  God,  we  will  suppose,  and  this  is 
just  what  he  does  do,  if  the  doctrine  of  necessity  is  true, 
God  we  will  suppose,  places  a  creature  in  circumstances  in 
which  he  cannot  but  sin,  that  is,  choose  the  wrong.  Is  it 
conceivable,  that  he  should  be  blameworthy  for  doing  that 
which  it  is  impossible,  and  God  has  rendered  it  impossible, 
for  him  not  to  do  ?  Upon  one  condition  exclusively,  and 
that  from  the  nature  of  universal  mind,  as  God  himself  has 
constituted  it,  can  the  judgments  of  the  Most  High  stand 
revealed  to  the  eye  of  the  rational  creation,  "  as  true  and 
righteous    altogether ; "    namely,   that    good    and    evil  are 


THE    WILL.  273 

equally,  and  at  all  times,  and  under  all  circumstances,  2^os- 
sible  to  all  whom  God  treats  as  moral  agents. 

God  does,  in  fact,  let  me  add,  place  creatures,  and  that 
without  their  choice,  in  circumstances  in  which  they  do 
sin.  He  then  expresses  the  deepest  regret,  and  even  won- 
der and  astonishment,  and  calls  upon  heaven  and  earth  to 
be  astonished  with  him  at  the  fact,  that,  under  those  iden- 
tical circumstances,  they  do  sin.  If  the  doctrine  of  neces- 
sity is  true,  God  entertains  the  deepest  regret,  and  calls 
upon  the  universe  to  unite  with  him  in  wonder  and  aston- 
ishment, that  that  should  occur  the  non-occurrence  of  which 
he  himself  has  rendered  absolutely  impossible.  Man,  then, 
is  a  free,  and  not  a  necessary  agent,  or  the  human  intelli- 
gence is  a  lie,  and  inspiration,  a  mass  of  contradictions 
and  absurdities. 

OBJECTIONS. 

Against  the  doctrine  above  elucidated,  many  and  grave 
objections  may  be  urged,  and  have  been  urged,  objections 
lying  within  the  sphere  of  theology,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
of  philosophy,  on  the  other.  These  objections,  however, 
are  all  comprehended  under  the  following  forms. 

THE    DIVINE    FOREKNOWLEDGE. 

It  is  a  revealed  fact,  it  is  urged,  in  the  first  place,  that 
our  acts  of  choice  are  foreknown  to  God,  a  fact  which  could 
not  be  real,  were  the  will  free,  and  not  subject  to  the  law 
of  necessity.  This  objection,  I  reply,  rests  upon  the  as- 
sumption that  the  divine  foreknowledge  is  based  upon  the 
same  conditions  that  ours  is.  W^e  can  foreknow  none  but 
necessary  events.  How  do  we  know,  that  the  divine  fore- 
knowledge is  subject  to  the  same  limitations  ?  As  an 
absolutely  conscious,  and  also,  as  a  revealed,  fact  we  Joiovi 
18 


274  THE    WILL. 

that  we  are,  not  necessary,  but  free,  agents.  On  the  au- 
thority of  inspiration,  we  believe^  that  our  free  acts  are 
foreknown  to  God.  These  two  facts  we  hold  as  real,  be- 
cause we  have  valid  evidence  for  thus  holding  them.  Their 
compatibility  with  each  other,  we  do  not  profess  to  explain, 
for  the  all-adequate  reason,  that  we  do  not  understand  the 
conditions,  limitations,  or  quo  modo^  of  the  divine  fore- 
knowledge. 

THE    WILL    AS   THE    STKONGEST   MOTIVE. 

It  is  further  urged  against  the  doctrine  of  free  will,  that 
all  our  acts  of  choice  are  in  fixed  accordance  with  the 
strongest  motive^  which  would  not  be  the  case,  were  we  free, 
and  not  necessary,  agents.  When  the  objector  is  asked  to 
fix  definitely  the  meaning  which  he  attaches  to  the  words, 
strongest  motive,  his  invariable  reply  is  this;  that  is  the 
strongest  motive  which  the  will  does,  in  fact,  follow.  Let 
the  argument  on  which  this  objection  rests,  be  put  in  a 
logical  form,  and  its  absurdity  will  become  self-evident.  It 
then  stands  thus.  If  the  will  always  follows  the  motive 
which  it  does  follow,  it  is  subject  to  the  law  of  necessity; 
it  does,  in  fact,  invariably  follow  the  motive  which  it  does 
follow;  therefore,  it  is,  in  all  its  acts,  subject  to  this  one 
law.  Whether  God  has,  or  has  not,  "  left  free  the  human 
will,"  .this  truth  still  remains,  that  this  faculty,  in  all  its 
acts,  does  follow  some  motive,  and  that  motive  is  the  one 
which  it  does  follow. 

If  the  words,  strongest  motwe^  be  defined,  as  they  should 
be,  to  mean  the  strongest  desire^  or  what  the  intelligence 
affirms  to  be  best^  it  will  then  stand  revealed,  as  an  absolute 
truth,  tiiat  in  neither  of  these  senses,  is  the  will  always  as 
the  strongest  motive.     In  acts  of  moral  wrong,  the  will  fol- 


THE    WILL.  275 

lows  the  strongest /eeling  in  opposition  to  the  dictates  of 
the  intelligence.  In  doing  right  it  not  unfrequently  holds 
in  subjection  the  strongest  feeling,  while  it  yields  obedience 
to  the  behests  of  conscience. 

We  are  coxscious  of  choosing,  but  not  of  liberty  in 
choosing. 

In  reply  to  the  appeal  made  to  consciousness  in  favor 
of  the  doctrine  of  free  will,  it  is  affirmed,  that  we  are  con- 
scious of  our  acts  of  choice,  as  mere  facts,  and  not  at  all  of 
the  power  oifree  choice.  This  objection,  I  remark,  is  based 
wholly  upon  a  total  misinterpretation  of  the  knowledge 
which  is  derived  from  consciousness.  In  respect  to  all  men- 
tal states  in  common,  we  are,  as  we  have  seen,  not  only 
conscious  of  the  same  as  facts,  but  of  ourselves  as  subjects 
of,  and  of  our  relations  to,  said  states.  In  our  intellectual 
and  sensitive  states,  we  are  not  only  conscious  of  the  same, 
but  of  ourselves  in  them,  as  subject  to  the  law  of  necessity. 
In  all  acts  of  choice,  we  are  not  only  conscious  of  said  acts, 
but  of  ourselves  in  them  as  exercising  the  responsible  func- 
tions of  free,  in  opposition  to  necessary,  agency.  No  other 
exposition  correctly  interprets  real  knowledge  by  conscious- 
ness. 

RELATIONS    OF    THE    WILL    TO    MOTIVES. 

All  acts  of  will,  as  has  been  before  shown,  are  put  forth 
in  view  of  motives  of  some  kind.  In  the  absence  of  all 
motives,  it  is  self-evident,  tliat  no  such  acts  of  any  kind  are 
possible.  In  one  respect  pertaining  to  this  subject,  there 
is  now^  coming  to  be  a  general  agreement  among  philoso- 
phers ;  to  wit,  that  while  the  motive  is  the  occasion^  it  is 
not  the  cause  2^'i'oper  oi  acts  of  will.  In  the  presence  of 
any  given    motive,  the  question   what  specific  act  shall  be 


276  THE    WILL. 

put  forth  does  not  depend  upon  the  motive^  but  upon  the 
power  of  free  choice  in  the  will  itself. 

In  one  respect,  however,  the  motive  is  the  cause  proper 
of  acts  of  will.  In  the  presence  of  a  given  motive,  the  will 
must  act  in  soyne  direction.  So  far  motives  sustain  to  such 
acts  the  relations  of  real  causes.  In  the  presence  of  mo- 
tives for  the  right  and  the  wrong,  for  example,  the  will  is 
not  free  to  do  the  one  or  the  other,  or  not  to  act  at  all.  It 
must  do  the  right,  or  the  wrong.  So  far,  it  is  not  free  at 
all.  In  respect  to  the  question,  which  it  shall  do,  here  its 
freedom  is  absolute.  The  same  holds  true,  in  respect  to  all 
motives  of  every  kind. 

UNIVERSAL    PRINCIPLE    IN    REGARD    TO    THE    LIBERTY    OF 
THE    WILL. 

In  regard  to  the  will,  this  principle  with  strict  univer- 
sality obtains.  So  far  forth  as  its  activity  is  free  cit  all^  sa 
far  is  its  power  of  free  choice  absolute  ;  and  so  far  as  it,  or 
any  other  power,  is  subject  to  the  law  of  necessity,  it  is,  in 
no  sense,  free. 

INTENTIONS,    CHOICES,    VOLITIONS,    PREFERENCES,    ETC. 

Acts  of  will  are  classed,  as  intentions^  choices^  volitions^ 
etc.  Intentions  are  those  controlling  acts  to  which  others 
are  subordinate.  Choices  are  those  acts  in  which  a  selection 
is  made  between  different  objects  presented  to  the  mind's 
election.  Preferences  are  acts  of  choice  which  accord  with 
the  strongest  desire.  Volitions  are  executive  acts  by  which 
intentions  are,  or  are  attempted  to  be,  realized.  A  man's 
intention,  we  will  suppose,  is  to  take  a  journey.  All  those 
subordinate  executive  acts  by  which  that  intention  is  sought 
to  be  carried  out  are  called  volitions. 


THE    WILL.  277 

In  intentions  and  choices  we  are,  and  in  preferences  and 
volitions  we  are  not,  free.  In  the  two  former,  we  are  con- 
scious of  absolute  freedom.  By  definition,  we  cannot  put 
forth  an  act  of  preference  but  when  choice  accords  with  the 
strongest  feeling.  Volitions  being  subordinate  executive 
acts,  must  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  be  as  the  intentions 
to  which  they  are  subordinate,  and  the  former  being  given, 
the  latter  must  be. 

Intentions  take  rank,  as  subordinate,  and  ultimate.  The 
former  are  those  controlling  acts  to  which  volitions  of  a 
certain  class  are,  or  may  be,  subordinate.  The  latter  are 
those  acts  of  will  to  which  intentions  and  volitions  of  cer- 
tain classes  may  be  subordinate,  but  which  are  themselves 
subordinate  to  no  other  acts.  The  term  motive  is  sometimes 
employed  as  synonymous  with  intention. 

As  intentions  control  all  other  acts  of  will,  the  moral 
character  of  the  latter  always  is  as  that  of  the  former.  This 
statement  accords  with  teachings,  not  only  of  inspiration, 
but  with  those  of  philosophers  and  theologians  universally, 
as  well  as  with  the  intuitive  convictions  of  the  race. 

POINTS    OF    GENERAL    AGREEMENT    IN    RESPECT   TO    THE 
DOCTRINE    OF    THE    WILL. 

In  concluding  this  last  department  of  our  present  in* 
quiries,  I  would  specify  the  points  of  agreement  which  have 
now  generally  obtained  in  the  spheres  of  both  philosophy 
and  theology,  in  regard  to  the  doctrine  of  the  will.  They 
are,  among  others,  the  following  : 

1.  The  validity  of  the  doctrine  of  a  triunity  of  the  men- 
tal powers  denominated  the  intellect,  the  sensibility,  and 
the  will. 


278  THE   WILL. 

2.  That  man  is  free,  if  free  at  all,  only  in  respect  to  the 
action  of  the  will. 

3.  That  he  is  directly  and  immediately  responsible  but 
for  acts  of  will,  and  that  the  moral  characters  of  all  suck 
acts  are  as  those  of  our  ultimate  intentions, 

4.  That  for  our  other  mental  states:  viz.,  those  of  the 
intelligence  and  sensibility,  we  are  accountable  so  far  forth 
only,  as  their  existence  and  character  depend  upon  the 
action  of  the  will. 

5.  That  in  all  complex  mental  states  of  which  moral 
character  can  be  predicated,  the  voluntary  and  moral  ele- 
ments are  identical. 

THE    IDEA  OF  LIBERTY    AS    OPPOSED    TO    THAT  OF  SERVITUDE. 

The  term  liberty  sometimes  represents,  not  only  an  idea 
opposed  to  that  represented  by  the  term,  necessity,  but  one 
opposed  to  that  represented  by  the  term,  servitude.  In 
the  latter  sense,  we  are  free  when,  and  only  when,  all  our 
voluntary  activity  is  in  harmony  with  the  conscience  and 
the  law  of  duty,  and  all  the  impulsions  of  the  propensities 
are  held  in  strict  subordination  to  the  law  of  conscience 
and  duty.  We  are  in  a  state  of  moral  servitude,  when  the 
propensities  control  the  will  in  opposition  to  the  behests  of 
conscience  and  duty.  The  form  of  servitude  thus  result- 
ing, and  the  degradation  implied,  depend  upon  the  charac- 
ter of  the  controlling  propensity,  the  lowest  and  most 
degrading  of  all  being  that  in  which  the  animal  in  man 
obtains  the  ascendency.  The  term  liberty,  or  freedom  is 
employed  to  designate  the  former  state,  because,  that,  in 
it,  in  the  exercise  of  the  high  prerogative  of  self-control, 
the  mind  always  does  that  which  it  approves  and  delights 
in.     The  latter  state,  on  the  other  hand,  is  represented  by 


THE   WILL.  279 

the  term  servitude,  because  that,  in  a  state  of  conscious 
enslavement  to  the  lower  propensities,  it  does  that  which 
it  necessarily  reprobates  and  abhors. 

THE    WILL    AS    SUBJECT    TO    THE    LAW    OF    HABIT. 

It  is  a  fixed  law  of  all  the  mental  faculties  in  common, 
that  action  in  any  given  form,  generates  a  tendency  to 
continued  action  in  the  same  form,  a  tendency  which  is  in- 
creased by  each  repetition  of  the  same  act.  Under  this 
law  the  will  is  constantly  acting.  In  doing  the  right  or  the 
wrong,  we  are  not  only  incurring  the  desert  of  praise  or 
blame,  but  we  are  constantly  forming  fixed  habits  which 
tend  to  perpetuate  action,  in  all  future  time,  in  the  same 
direction.  These  habits, — for  the  formation  of  which  we 
are  responsible,  at  length  become  so  fixed,  that  all  prospect 
of  change  totally  disappears. 


INDEX. 


Action,  desire  of,  231. 

Affections,  detined,  200;  classi- 
fied, 219;  characteristics  of, 
228. 

Affirmations,  universal,  90. 

Ambition,  251. 

Appetites,  defined,  200;  kinds 
of,  205;  artificial,  208. 

Association,  defined,  95;  pre- 
ferred to  suggestion,  95;  law 
of,  96;  phenomena  of  ex- 
plained, 97;  cf  different  ob- 
jects, 103;  accidental,  105; 
mistake  explained,  106;  in 
different  individuals,  107;  in- 
fluence of  habit,  107;  danger 
of  vicious  associations.  111; 
permanence  of,  112. 

Authority,  love  of,  233. 

Avarice,  248. 

B. 

Beautiful,  idea  of.  151;  in  the 
mind,  152;  universality  of, 
153;  antecedents  of,  155. 

Benefactors,  love  of,  226. 

Blessedness,  idea  of,  212. 

Body,  idea  of  contingent,  10; 
finite,  12. 

Brown,  his  idea  of  the  validity 
of  sense  and  consciousness, 
44. 

Brutes,  intelligence  of,  178. 

C. 

Cause,  idea  of  conditionally  nec- 
essary, 16,  19;  and  events, 
18;  and  effect,  19. 

Choice,  276. 

Classification,  principle  of,  1; 
of  faculties  verified,   4;  ex- 


plained, 81 ;  form  of,  81,  ar- 
bitrary? 81. 

Coleridge,  mistake  concerning 
the  understanding,  70. 

Color,  a  primary  quality,  53. 

Conceptions,  defined ;  classified, 
60 ;  validity  of.  66 ;  complete 
and  incomplete,  66;  sponta- 
neous and  reflective,  66;  in- 
dividual, generic  and  specific, 
67;  concrete  and  absolute, 
68;  positive,  privative  and 
negative,  68;  characteristic, 
68;  inferior  and  superior, 
69 ;  not  perceptions  recalled, 
69. 

Condescension,  264. 

Conscience,  defined,  162;  au- 
thority of,  163;  as  used  in 
the  Bible,  164;  nature  of, 
241. 

Consciousness,  no  facts  of  omit- 
ted, none  supposed,  1 ;  the 
faculty  of  internal  percep- 
tion, 24,  25;  facts  or  object 
of,  32;  natural  and  philo- 
sophical, 35;  a  distinct  fac- 
ulty, 37;  objects  of,  antece- 
dents, 39;  validity  of,  44;  of 
matter,  50 ;  of  choice,  275. 

Contingent,  defined,  9 ;  given  by 
perception,  21. 

Conversion,  of  propositions,  89. 

Country,  love  of,  225. 

Cousin,  ideas  of  the  beautiful, 
155. 

Covetousness:  245. 


Deductions,  conditions  of,  91. 

Desires,  defined,  200,  230;  re- 
marks upon.  236. 

Dreaming,  phenomena  of  ex- 
plained, 99. 


(281) 


282 


INDEX. 


Emotions,  defined  200;  classes 
of,  210;  causes  of,  211;  dis- 
tinguished from  desires,  211 ; 
source  of  happiness  or  mis- 
ery, 212;  transient  and  per- 
manent, 213;  growth  and 
decay  of,  214;  concordant 
and  discordant,  similar  and 
dissimilar,  214;  sympathetic 
and  repellant,  215;  congruous 
and  incongruous,  216;  agree- 
able and  disagreeable,  217. 

Emulation,  251. 

Esteem,  desire  of,  233. 

Events,  idea  of,  contingent  and 
relative,  19. 

Existence,  desire  of,  230. 


F. 

Facts,  faculties  inferred  from,  2; 
province  of  philosophy,  43; 
in  science,  90;  relation  to 
principles,  91;  finding  gene- 
ral, 169. 

Faculties,  character  and  num- 
ber, how  obtained,  1;  how 
classified,  4  ;  classification 
verified  by  consciousness,  5; 
verified  by  terms  appropri- 
ated, 5;  defined,  6;  diverse 
in  functions,  not  in  sub- 
stance, 7;  primary,  24,  26; 
intuitive,  26;   secondary,  64. 

Faith,  256. 

Fancy,  distinguished  from  imag- 
ination, 129;  productions  of, 
140;  how  improved,  141. 

Fashion,  standard  of,  108. 

Feeling,  distinct  from  thought 
and  will,  5; 

Filial  spirit,  262. 

Fitness,  idea  of,  147;  synonym- 
ous with  right  and  wrong, 
148. 

Forbearance,  264. 

Foreknowledge  and  free  will, 
273. 

Forgiveness,  264. 


Free  agent,  defined,  263. 
Friends,  love  of,  222. 


Genera  and  species,  82. 

Generalization,  rules  for,  84. 

Genius,  with  judgment,  109  ; 
with  incorrect  taste,  110. 

German  school,  fundamental  er- 
ror of,  28,  60. 

Gluttony,  247. 

God,  being  and  perfections  of,  27 
-29;  love  of,  227. 

H. 

Hamilton,  Sir  W.,  his  definition 
of  consciousness,  30-31 ;  his 
idea  that  consciousness  is  not 
a  faculty,  37;  classification 
of  qualities,  47;  representa- 
tive knowledge,  48;  error 
concerning  color,  53. 

Happiness,  idea  of,  212. 

Harmony,  idea  of,  156. 

Hickok,  error  of,  61. 

Hoarding,  desire  of,  235. 

Holiness,  246. 

Home,  love  of,  224. 

Humility,  261. 

Hypothesis,  when  regarded  as  a 
law,  2;  relation  to  facts,  3; 
deductions  from,  3;  in  sci- 
ence, 91. 

I. 

Idea,  defined,  136;  of  right  and 
wrong,  143;  of  right  and 
wrong  necessary,  144;  ideas 
dependent  on,  145;  chrono- 
logical antecedent  of,  145;  of 
fitness,  147;  of  the  useful, 
148;  of  liberty  and  necessity, 
150 ;  of  the  beautiful  and  the 
sublime,  151;  of  harmon}^ 
156;  of  truth,  157;  of  law, 
158;  of  science,  162. 

Idealism,  basis  of,  58. 

Ideals,  defined,  136;  particular 
and   general.  137;   not   con- 


INDEX. 


283 


fined  to  beauty  and  sublimi- 
ty, 137;  not  fixed,  138;  foun- 
dation of  progress,  138;  di- 
vine and  human,  139. 

Imagination,  defined,  127;  dis- 
tinguished from  fancy,  129; 
spontaneous  and  reflective, 
131;  remark  of  Coleridge, 
131;  not  always  fiction,  not 
confined  to  poetry,  134;  law 
of  taste  concerning,  134  ; 
source  of  ideals,  136;  with- 
out taste,  140;  productions 
of,  140 ;  how  improved,  141. 

Imitation,  principle  of,  234. 

Infidelity,  its  basis,  27,  58. 

Infinite,  the  idea  of  distinct,  12; 
implied  by  the  finite,  13. 

Induction,  in  respect  to  facts  of 
mind,  1;  of  phenomena,  167; 
for  classificatioj,  168. 

Intellect,  relates  to  thought,  6; 
not  a  compound,  7 ;  phenom- 
ena of,  classified,  8;  in  brutes, 
178. 

Intelligence,  relation  to  the 
qualities  of  matter,  49;  in 
brutes,  178. 

Intention,  moral  character  of, 
276. 

Intuitions,  validity  of,  65. 

Investigation  and  reason,  166 ; 
laws  of,  169. 

J. 

Jealousy,  251. 

Judgment,  defined,  71 ;  acts  of, 
classified,  72;  quantity  of,  72; 
quality  of,  72;  relations  of, 
73 ;  modality  of,  73 ;  intuitive 
and  deductive,  74;  empirical 
and  rational,  74;  character- 
istic of,  75;  incompatible,  77; 
in  abstraction,  77;  inferred, 
84;  how  improved,  93;  and 
understanding  confused,  93. 

Justice,  love  of,  243. 


Kant,  his  idea  of  substance,  34, 
58;  a  priori  knowledge,  59. 


Kindred,  love  of,  220. 

Bjiowledge,  direct  and  implied, 
21-24;  direct  prior  to  im- 
plied, 23;  direct  or  by  per- 
ception classified,  24;  imme- 
diate and  mediate  defined, 
30;  by  consciousness  direct 
and  valid,  31 ;  implies  an  ob- 
ject and  a  subject,  45;  repre- 
sentative and  presentative, 
48;  of  matter,  49;  validity 
of,  58;  a  priori,  59;  love  of, 
231. 


Law,  idea  of,  158 ;  objective  and 
subjective,  158;  antecedent 
of,  159 ;  discovery  of  univer- 
sal, 171. 

Liberty,  idea  of,  150;  in  act  of 
will,  150;  antecedent  of ,  150; 
defined,  268;  of  will,  269- 
279. 

Licentiousness,  248. 

Locke,  his  error  concernmg  the 
idea  of  substance,  17 ;  funda- 
mental error  of,  27. 

Love,  246,  258. 

Lusting,  245. 

M. 

Malice,  247. 

Materialism,  basis  of,  58. 

Matter,  relation  to  mind,  45; 
qualities  of,  46 ;  real  or  ideal, 
50;  knowledge  of,  51;  not 
mere  force,  51. 

Meekness,  265. 

Memory,  distinguished  from 
recollection,  114;  states  of 
mind  in,  114;  distinct,  115; 
conditions  of,  116;  diversities 
of,  118;  philosophic,  118; 
local,  118;  artificial  119; 
ready  and  retentive,  119; 
diverse  powers  of,  120;  im- 
provement of,  120;  of  the 
aged,  122;  duration  of,  124. 

Mental  phenomena,  contingent 
and  relative,  14. 


284 


INDEX. 


Mind,  laws  of  defined,  2;  self- 
conscious  of  personality,  33; 
relation  to  matter,  45. 

Misery,  idea  of,  212. 

Motives,  in  relation  to  will,  275. 

N. 

Necessary  ideas,  defined,  9; 
conditional  or  unconditional, 
16;  implied  by  perceptions, 
21 ;  origin  of,  79. 

Necessity,'  idea  of,  150;  antece- 
dent of,  150;  of  action,  de- 
fined, 268. 

Notions,  defined,  64;  classified, 
66 ;  validity  of,  66 ;  complete 
and  incomplete,  66;  spon 
taneous  and  reflective,  66; 
individual,  generic  and  spe- 
cific, 67;  subjective  real,  70; 
general,  how  formed,  78; 
abstract,  79. 


Observation,  defined,  41. 
Order,  love  of,  235. 

P. 

Passions,  defined,  200. 

Patience,  260. 

Patriotism,  225. 

Perception,  objects  of,  43;  the- 
ory of,  45. 

Personal  identity,  idea  of  in  the 
mind,  13;  necessary,  15;  in- 
tuitive, 33. 

Phenomena,  unlike  separated — 
like  in  the  same  class,  1 ;  of 
mind  classified,  4;  differ  in 
kind,  4;  of  intellect  classified, 
8;  mental  phenomena  con- 
tingent and  relative,  14,  17; 
relation  to  substance,  34;  in- 
duction of,  167;  as  to  par- 
ticular substances,  167,  com- 
plex, 244. 

Philosophic  idea,  161. 

Philosophy,  province  of,  43. 


Poetry,  defined,  157. 

Power,  defined,  20;  idea  of,  uni- 
versal and  necessary,  20; 
desire  of,  232. 

Preference,  276. 

Prejudices,  explained.  111. 

Pride,  249. 

Probable  and  improbable,  170, 

Proof,  nature  of,  160. 

Propensities,  defined,  200;  ani- 
mal, 203;  mental,  209;  relig- 
ious, 25:1-266. 

Propositions,  elements  of,  87; 
conversion  of,  89. 


Qualities,  given  by  sense,  42; 
objects  of  perception,  43; 
classified,  47. 


Reason,  defined,  25,  55;  sphere 
of,  56 ;  primary  and  second- 
ary ideas  of.  57 ;  validity  of 
57;  secondary  ideas  of,  142 
relation  to  conscience,  164 
common  to  all  men,  165. 

Reasoning,  an  inferred  judg- 
ment, 84;  basis  of,  85. 

Recollection,  defined,  114;  dis- 
tinct and  easy,  115;  condi- 
tions of,  116. 

Reflection,  defined,  141. 

Relative  ideas,  14. 

Repentance,  254. 

Revenge,  248. 

Right  and  wrong,  idea  of,  143; 
universality  of,  143;  neces- 
sary, 144. 


S. 


Scepticism,  basis  of  58. 
Science,  idea  of,  162;  pure,  162; 

mixed,  162. 
Self-defense,  239. 
Self-love,  240. 
Selfishness,  246. 
Sensation,   distinguished    from 

sense,  40;  defined,  200,  203. 


INDEX. 


285 


Sense,  the  faculty  of  external 
perception,  24;  disting-uished 
from  sensation,  40;  sponta- 
neous and  voluntary,  40; 
knowledge  by,  42;  validity 
of,  44. 

Sensibilities,  relate  to  feelings, 
6,  193;  diversities  of,  193; 
characteristics  of,  194;  class- 
ification, 199. 

Sexes,  love  of,  221. 

Slander,  effects  of,  113. 

Society,  love  of,  219. 

Somnambulism,  100. 

Space,  idea  of  necessary,  10 ;  in- 
finite, 12;  distinct,  13. 

Species,  love  of,  225. 

Stewart,  error  of  in  respect  to 
consciousness,  34 ;  percep- 
tion, 70;  fashion,  109. 

Sublime,  idea  of,  151;  in  the 
mind,  152;  universality  of 
153;  antecedents  of,  155. 

Substance,  idea  of  explained, 
16;  necessary,  17;  distinct, 
17;  consciousness  of,  34; 
substances  how  known,  166. 

Succession,  idea  of,  contingent, 
11;  finite,  12. 

Summum  bonum,  149. 

Superiority,  love  of,  234. 

Susceptibilities,  character  and 
number  of,  how  obtained,  2. 

Syllogism,  figures  of,  86. 

T. 

Taste,  standard  of,  108;  defined, 
139. 


Terms,  distribution  of,  87 ;  rules 
for,  88.     . 

Testimony,  173 ;  concurrent, 
176. 

Thinkers,  fundamental  and  su- 
perficial, 160. 

Thought,  distinct  from  feeling 
and  will,  4;  contingent  or 
necessary,  9. 

Time,  idea  of  necessary,  11 ;  in- 
finite, 12;  distinct,  13. 

Truth,  idea  of  defined,  157;  an- 
tecedent of,  158. 


Understanding,     defined,     64; 

notion  -  forming  power,    65; 

mistake    of    Coleridge,    70; 

confused  with  judgment,  94. 
Useful,  idea  of,  148. 


Volitions,  376. 

W. 

"Will,  questions  concerning,  367; 
as  the  strongest  motive,  374 ; 
general  principle,  378. 

Wishing,  245 

Witness,  statements  of,  172; 
credibility  of,  174;  circum- 
stances of,  175. 

Wrath,  347.  •- ->^.. 


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